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Commentaries on
Elizabeth S. Anderson
The Imperative of Integration
(Princeton University Press, 2010)

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With reply by

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The Burdens of Integration

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1. Introduction, Summary, Concerns

As a visionary black feminist pragmatist philosopher invested in social justice projects around issues of politics and place, I approached Elizabeth Anderson's the Imperative of Integration with hopes that her project would be useful in my own. Her use of available social science research and Deweyan non-ideal theory have resonance with my attempts to wed philosophy with the world. I walked away from the book uncertain of who Anderson's audience was and if I was the sort of person whom she sought to persuade. Possibly Anderson's goal was to put integration back on the agenda for whites who had lost their resolve about racial inclusiveness due to concerns about black deviance. Being non-white and having a differing perspective on so-called black subcultures, I found myself both critical of and confused by many of the value judgments made throughout the analysis.

Due to the task assigned me in these comments, I will not have the time to engage Anderson's multilayered text on every claim I might need clarification of or wish to criticize, but will instead make some observations and endeavor a few critical remarks in broad sweeps, with the hope that these few interactions with the text will be a helpful contribution to this discussion about it and for the clarity that may come after Anderson's replies.

Anderson advances two primary claims. The first is a claim in non-ideal political theory, that "integration is an indispensable goal in a society characterized by categorical inequality (Anderson 2010, 180)." The second is a methodological claim about how to go about that non-ideal theory, that "social and political philosophy needs to be grounded in an empirically adequate understanding of the problems we face and the effects of proposed solutions to these problems (Anderson 2010, 180)." I support a version of both these assertions but overall I am critical of the details of the project. Both the claim of integration made and the way Anderson uses the method she proposes do not seem to reflect a sustained treatment of white hegemony in the United States as the basis for racial injustice and any deep critique of capitalism and its attending ills. Lacking these critical frames, Anderson's attempt to analyze the data does not take seriously enough the burdens of integration on black people and that the democratic ideal that she posits may not only be unrealistic (a claim she addresses a bit in the last chapter) but also undesirable. In this limited space, I'll treat the methodological concerns first and the claim of integration second.

2. The Economic Theory of Culture and Lived Experience

Anderson's method weds Deweyan non-ideal theory with the increasing call for practical philosophers to attend the data gathered by our colleagues in the social sciences. Whether or not Anderson's method can be faithfully reconciled to Dewey's own method is not a question of primary importance to me, other commentators might take it up, rather my deepest concern is rooted in another of classical Deweyan pragmatism's central claims that our work should attend to and get not only data from, but also be interpreted through, lived
experience. We live in a nation shaped by practices of white hegemony that are tricky because they have caused many of us to view the culture and norms of an idealized white mainstream that has asserted itself as universal and morally good. Its norms are taken to be the only (good) way for contemporary people to live together. Even as Anderson writes about racial stigma and social closure, the larger critique of the systemic and structural reinforcement of prejudice in the mainstream society is wanting.

Methodologically, the studies used to support Anderson's thesis may not be in themselves problematic. Throughout the text it is the value judgments Anderson makes when interpreting the data that suggest her methodology, while laudable, is hindered by an inattention to lived experience that makes her interpretations perplexing at best. It is not that I disagree with the validity of the findings of the studies Anderson uses to support her work. Yes, more black people are poor and live in crime ridden neighborhoods than should. Yes, black people who live in and attend schools in predominately white spaces seem to enjoy a level of what Anderson calls "mainstream success" that their peers in segregated spaces do not. Yet, we need only look at a few of the moves of interpretation that Anderson makes to see that other interpretations of the data are possible (and perhaps preferable) when we consider the twin realities of white hegemony and capitalism and what those findings may mean to the black people they are concern. The roots of the problem I have with Anderson's view are most likely found in the way she deploys the "economic theory of culture" that their peers in segregated spaces do not. Yet, we need only look at a few of the moves of interpretation that Anderson makes to see that other interpretations of the data are possible (and perhaps preferable) when we consider the twin realities of white hegemony and capitalism and what those findings may mean to the black people they are concern. The roots of the problem I have with Anderson's view are most likely found in the way she deploys the "economic theory of culture" she advocates.

Anderson brings in her economic theory of culture to address how responsibility for deviant black behavior should be assigned. Instead of viewing deviance as an essential part of black culture, by using an "economic framework" wherein "culture is the equilibrium outcome of individuals' strategic outcomes to each other's conduct within the constraints of their resources and opportunities (Anderson 2009, 76)," responsibility for the social conditions that produce that deviance may extend beyond the deviants, while they remain responsible for their own behaviors. On the one hand, this economic framework gives reasons why whites should not stigmatize all blacks based on the behaviors of some. On the other hand, Anderson's use of this economic view of culture as opposed to what she calls the folk anthropological version of culture, raises some concerns.

Do people actually experience culture transactionally the way that Anderson proposes? When asserting things about their 'cultures' what sorts of values and experiences are people trying to defend? How does the economic framework take into account people's lived experience of culture? Does Anderson adequately attend to black experiences and claims of culture(s) that could complicate her analysis?

Defending both her view of the economic theory of culture and her model of integration against claims that it is merely assimilationist, Anderson uses a study done by Elijah Anderson as a primary source for her claims about the nature of black experiences in the inner city without attention to other studies done of black United States life that may have given her a fuller account. Anderson's interpretation is fraught with value judgments that trivialize and pathologize many black experiences, such as possible reasons for school disengagement and the aesthetic choices black people make in a white hegemonic social world. These judgments give me pause as to whether I can follow her line of reasoning to the integration she proposes.

Is a culture of deviance from the norm all that Anderson supposes advocates of identity politics to be asserting when they speak of black culture(s)? I would hate to assume so, but the book does little to show what other characteristics these advocates might be talking about and why their view may have traction. Moreover, in attempting to disclaim a black culture, Anderson problematically asserts, "For the most part, American blacks and whites share a common American culture (Anderson 2010, 114)" but does little to explicitly tell the reader what that common culture might entail. The book does not treat the specificity of white hegemony in depth, nor does it unpack why anti-black prejudice may have particular reasons and effects that differ from the prejudices that face the well-integrated Jewish or Asian person (to use two other racial-ethnic identities Anderson mentions). Indeed, it is the recalcitrance of anti-black prejudice in what I might agree to call United States mainstream shared culture that I would have liked Anderson to consider in greater detail in her argument for integration. Claiming that residential segregation is at the root of continued anti-black prejudice does not contend with the history and effects of white supremacy as an integral, formative principle of the United States polity.
Consider the possibility of alternate interpretations based on different understandings of lived experience and value judgments that I mention above. When referring to the differences between the imperative of integration she advocates and types of assimilation that may be necessary steps toward that imperative in seeming opposition to blanket assimilative programs, Anderson lists several practices that are often coded as culturally black that black persons should or may lose in the integration process (see Anderson 114-115). In each of the three cases of acceptable integration losses, Anderson aggregates practices and habits that have differing significance from my lived experience as a black woman living the United States from a poor, working class background and her recommendations, that may have economic value (keeping a job to sustain myself), also suggest burdens of integration (tokenism, exceptionalism, violence, isolation, disrespect). That the bulk of those burdens would fall on the integrating black person seems a multiplication of oppressions.

Anderson weds gang membership and school disengagement and claims that they are both indicative of social dysfunction (of the people who become deviant) and not of culture. We could agree that neither gangs nor school disengagement are an essential part of black culture. Yet, Anderson does not consider a claim made by multiculturalists and scholars of education that one of the reason many minorities may disengage from school is not simply because excelling in school is "acting white" but rather that what is being taught in schools has little to no import in how they should negotiate their daily lives nor does it matchup to the history and legacy of the ethnic and cultural groups to which they identify. Nor does Anderson give much attention to the efforts to create education curriculum and spaces that would decenter white privilege and engage the minds of students of all races differently (cf. Walsh 1996). We could, and scholars have, interpreted school disengagement differently.

People who look like and struggle like poor, black students are often given short shift in mainstream education. Children may be rejecting education not only because their friends call it 'acting white' or because their schools lack financial resources but because the content of the curriculum leaves intact a prejudicial view of their lived experiences and privileges white hegemony. I am certain that is not enough to say that in a truly integrated society the problems of bad textbooks and misinformed teachers wouldn't exist nor am I willing to say that for the economic gain that a good, mainstream education is supposed to lead to, that this concern is a trivial point.

Daily as a black academic at a predominately white institution who works on diversity matters in my research but also at the levels of curriculum development and campus climate, I become more and more certain that there is a normative culture of higher education that effaces, erases, and extends the oppression of non-majority students, faculty, and staff. This norm operates in opaque and limiting ways, not the least of which consists in telling those same stigmatized, oppressed people who make it to the hallowed halls for their educations or to make their livings that life is so much better when you disregard disrespect, forgive whites for their awkward expressions of prejudice, and dare not to question the nature of the disciplines and institutions who've welcomed you - even when it is soul-crushing.

Much like the value laden interpretation of school disengagement Anderson gives makes me wonder if I could support her integrative project, when she lists concerns about things such as "styles of personal appearance" in corporate practices as secondary concerns, I find myself uneasy with costs of Anderson's call to integration to black people (Anderson, 115). When she quickly dismisses claims about personal appearance in public spaces, Anderson misreads much of why blacks have contested dress codes in their workplaces. She lumps together the sagging of pants with dreadlocks as forms of personal appearance in corporate practices as secondary concerns, I find myself uneasy with costs of Anderson's call to integration to black people (Anderson, 115). When she quickly dismisses claims about personal appearance in public spaces, Anderson misreads much of why blacks have contested dress codes in their workplaces. She lumps together the sagging of pants with dreadlocks as forms of personal styling like white subculture forms (tattooing, etc), that corporations might sanction against and offers that blacks may need to assimilate to mainstream styles of dress to succeed.

Surely, there are many ways and fads of dress and hairstyle among Black Americans. Yet, not understanding the significance of the commitment of many black people to wear natural, culturally or religiously significant hairstyles in a public space that has, through the continued creation and acceptance of a white centered standard, encouraged black people to use strenuous processes, at great costs, often with harsh chemicals on their hair to fit the norm - places a burden too high on the heads of black people in my opinion. To hastily write that such an issue should be a secondary concern for blacks seeking more opportunities for employment, is either cruelly insensitive or unreflectively naïve.
3. Integration, Democratic Ideals, and Agonism

I wonder if I'm wrong in concluding that Anderson's position that full, social integration of blacks into white communities (and not it would appear, the other way around) is necessary for democracy? I worry about the call for informal integration as necessary to achieve her ideal democratic situation. Not because integrated communities and institutions are (always) bad spaces, rather because her recommendations for integration place too high a burden on people already burdened by oppression. Further, I am not sure her ideal of the identity of a democratic citizen over and above other social and political identities is either attainable or desirable.

Anderson argues for a group identity of democratic citizens for all U.S. people that would be "superordinate" to their racial or ethnic identities and believes that informal, social integration is necessary to achieve this aim. Again, careful to point out that her view proposes that both disadvantaged and majority groups would be (and ought be) changed by integration, Anderson does not offer many details about how the white majority would change by having more informal interaction with black people. She admits that anti-black prejudice remains in spite of some areas of increased integration. As a black person who lives and works in spaces where I am one of few black people, I remain unconvincing proximity breeds empathy in a forceful, politically relevant way. Affections for the one black family on the block or the black bestfriend, need not extend to other black persons. Indeed, in my lived experience (which I am sure may be echoed by a survey of my students and faculty of color at my institution) there are ways in which the amiable closeness of a few persons of color is used to prove lack of prejudice, further exclude others, and maintain a status quo that refuses to interrogate or change its norms. Knowing who the accepted and acceptable blacks are allows neighbors, co-workers, and students to more easily assuage their racial fears and political and control potential wayward blacks who happen to arrive in the neighborhood or campus.

A strong argument about why or how the informal social integration Anderson champions would lead to equitable social relations better than more just public policies and interventions to counteract the ills of the legacies of racism and the nature of capitalism to subordinate people for profit was necessary. I am unsure why those of us interested in social justice should not fight for the redistribution of material resources to poor communities and make issues of civil respect, political issues (cf. Honneth 1996).

In a nation that continues to oppress (through law and custom) the great majority of black people while privileging a few of us to live more integrated lives with greater economic mobility (as long as we accept race-motivated micro aggressions as part of the deal), more needed to be said about how or why countervailing voices of collective black political commitments (in coalition with sympathetic white persons) should not be the expected and desired norm of political interactions today. In her rejection of black identity politics as a necessary part of the democratic ideal, Anderson gives too short a consideration to exactly the politicized black identities of the people actors as one of the factors at work in the Civil Rights movement to which she attaches her imperative of integration and those politicized identities that galvanized black nationalist movements whose focus on positive (constructed, as they may have been) identities and spaces for black people that she rejects without a complete hearing.

The inclusion and identity theories posited by Beverly Tatum and Iris Marion Young are too quickly dismissed at the end of the book (see pages 184 -186). Both theories, while not wholly sufficient, provide a bounty of insights into how we might forge lasting, meaningful, just social relations given our particular social milieu. Claiming that the self segregation of blacks prevents whites from interactions they need to interrogate and reject their own racial biases because such "practical learning can take place only in integrated settings, (Anderson 186)" does not address in a sustained way the practical recommendations made by Tatum or Young that would, I think offer ways for people to interact on many inclusive levels that would not overburden oppressed people with the task of educating the majority.

Anderson's democratic ideal does not seem to take seriously the lived experience of factionalism, conflict, and disagreement that might also be found at the root of a healthy, contemporary, large scale democracy (perhaps, Dewey's ideal does not either). Agonism in politics is essential to politics (cf. Mouffe 2000). Figuring out how to mediate the dangers of disagreement, factions, and dissent is a matter of politics. As citizens of United States of America, we could agree that there are some basic and fundamental rights and practices
(equality, shared responsibility for public works, centrality of the Constitution, etc.) as essential to our polity and fight it out as to what they might mean without having to become patriots in the robust sense that Anderson seems to advocate in the closing pages of the book. I find Anderson's call to a superordinate national democratic identity undesirable, not because people would be unwilling, but because it might too easily be used to silence the calls for justice that a different democratic ideal would welcome.

References:
Anderson on Multiculturalism and Blackness: A Du Boisian Response

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Elizabeth Anderson’s *The Imperative of Integration* is an exciting contribution to social and political philosophy. Brian Leiter summed up the reaction of many when he referred to it on his blog as a “tour de force of philosophical argumentation utilizing social science data.”¹ Despite the resistance to her project I will express in what follows, I believe philosophers of race and specialists in Africana philosophy have good reason to celebrate the fact that this cutting-edge effort at empirically informed normative work is also an original and stimulating contribution to work on the ethics and politics of race, focusing particularly on the African American situation. In this comment, I will respond to Anderson’s useful work by taking up some of the positions that she frames her project by criticizing and rejecting.

Anderson’s claim that racial segregation in the contemporary US is intolerable is introduced in her book’s first chapter through a contrast with permissive positions on segregation that she sees as having emerged in the wake of successive turns: first, by black organizers in the 1960s from Civil Rights to Black Power, and then by progressives in general in the following decades toward the celebration of diversity. As she puts it: “The hope of black nationalists and left multiculturalists is that racial equality can be achieved through, or at least notwithstanding, substantial racial segregation” (2). But these positions are not viable, Anderson claims, because “[t]his hope is an illusion” (ibid.). My response to Anderson may be considered a set of thoughts from a black nationalist and left multiculturalist perspective in defense of this illusion.

The perspective I wish to support can be called Du Boisian because it can be seen as a sort of descendant of the position on segregation toward which Du Bois evolved by the early-to-mid-1930s, a position that famously led him to resign from the board of the NAACP and from his role as editor of the organization’s magazine, *The Crisis*. In 1934, in *The Crisis*, he published a controversial piece in which he argued that black people should avoid opposing “segregation pure and simple.”² Discrimination, not separation, is what ought to be fought, and Du Bois felt by this point that some of the energy spent fighting segregation might be better spent on black self-organization. “Doubtless,” wrote the cosmopolitan Du Bois, “in the long run, the greatest human development is going to take place under experiences of widest individual contact.”³ In the short term, though, he believed the time had come for black people to concentrate on achieving “economic emancipation through voluntary determined cooperative effort.”⁴

It is important to distinguish between two reasons Du Bois had for encouraging some short term acceptance of *de jure* segregation. One

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³ Ibid., 558.

⁴ Ibid.
involved the necessity of meeting black people’s material needs. “There seems no hope,” he wrote in 1933, “that America in our day will yield in its color or race hatred any substantial ground.” Thus it seemed most prudent to focus on securing well-being and advancement within segregated institutions. The other reason for reallocating energy in this way had to do with having the right motivations for opposing segregation. In the same 1933 essay, which bore the title “On Being Ashamed of Oneself: An Essay on Race Pride,” Du Bois described an entry in his grandfather’s journal in which his grandfather expressed indignation at the very idea of having been invited to a “Negro” picnic. In Du Bois’ estimation, something like this sense of shame in being associated with black people remained, overtly or not, a factor in the desire to be rid of segregation, among the black elite especially.

The importance of this second reason can be seen by looking forward from the 1930s to Du Bois’ 1960 essay “Whither Now and Why.” In this post-Brown period, Du Bois recognized that the time was swiftly approaching in which “the American Negro will become in law equal in citizenship.” The coming demise of legal segregation, however, only made more acute for him the question of whether a lack of pride in being black would attract people to the option of total assimilation. His opposition to this was firm: “What I have been fighting for and am still fighting for is the possibility of black folk and their cultural patterns existing in America without discrimination; and on terms of equality.” In support of this, he advocated increasing commitments to black-focused education, black communities, and black families.

Anderson opposes the segregation of African Americans, including their self-segregation. She believes that segregation perpetuates inequality by isolating African Americans from resources and reinforcing stigmatizing stereotypes. She also holds that it undermines democracy by dividing citizens rather than facilitating communication. Given the white supremacist origins of US segregation and the extent to which it is perpetuated today partly by continued racist attitudes and institutional racism, I cannot imagine someone who opposes anti-black racism disagreeing with Anderson at every single stage of her argument. Even some of what she has to say about black self-segregation is endorsable from an updated Du Boisian perspective. Anderson rightly criticizes conservative claims that, firstly, segregation today is morally innocent because it results from freely made choices by black people to stick together and, secondly, the disadvantages of segregated black life today are due to internal pathologies rather than any external unfairness. She persuasively argues that “observed levels of segregation cannot be explained without some discriminatory processes keeping blacks out,” thus showing that black choices are currently unfairly restricted, and she mounts a strong attack on the conservative tendency to treat “dysfunctional, self-destructive norms” in segregated black communities as simply a problem of “bad values” rather than “the product of visibly constrained options” (73, 78-79).

Let us turn, though, to her criticism of multiculturalism, which she sees as the egalitarian version of the misguided fixation on culture by conservatives. In the book’s final chapter, she discusses what she sees as the “Limits of Multiculturalism” (183-189), criticizing the views of Beverly Tatum, Iris Marion Young, and Amie MacDonald. Anderson complains that these thinkers unhelpfully prioritize racial identities and ethnocentric affiliation over the goal of an integrated national identity. Her strongest argument that this prioritization is problematic is her claim that these authors fail to ground their views in a “realistic appraisal of the material and social conditions for advancing racial equality” (186). I will return to this claim that multiculturalist defenses of black self-segregation are simply unrealistic in my closing paragraphs.

For now, I wish to address Anderson’s claim that multiculturalist defenses of black self-segregation confuse race and culture. She directs this charge at MacDonald and Young, especially, criticizing the way they tend to “slide from a structural to a cultural account of race” (187). I will not attempt to defend MacDonald and Young against the claim that that they sometimes make illegitimate slides of this kind. What Anderson fails to acknowledge, though, is that it is imperative for discussing racial justice that we be able to link and
move back and forth between race as a position in a social hierarchy and race as a determinant of cultural identity in legitimate ways as well. This failure leads Anderson to talk as if race and culture are easily disentangled. “Whites and Asians can, and do, play jazz,” she writes, concluding that “only a spurious association of culture and ancestry can support the thought that racial self-segregation is needed to preserve or develop diverse cultural meanings and practices” (ibid.).

Let us consider two counterexamples. First, note that cultural expression related to the body can link culture and ancestry in important ways. Consider hairstyles. When pondering the relevance of hair to the politics of race, it would be missing the point to note that whites and Asians too can braid or lock their hair or even imitate Afros. The functioning of hairstyles of these types as forms of cultural resistance to anti-black racism is tied to the valuing of black African ancestry by those who have it through the valuing of physical characteristics associated with such ancestry. And while it is good and right that all people appreciate black hairstyles as a kind of cultural contribution, it is not at all implausible to claim that perpetuation of this form of cultural creativity is intimately connected to patterns of self-segregation (e.g., patronization of black barbershops, hair salons, and individual practitioners).

Consider now something non-physical: knowledge of history. It is imperative that all people overcome Eurocentric understandings of US and world history and achieve greater knowledge of the roles and contributions of people of African descent. This might be taken to show that transcending racism requires that we all change in similar ways, regardless of race. But note that it is also part of a people’s cultural life to venerate certain parts of human history because those parts are viewed as distinctively theirs. People around the world ought to know about the American Revolution, but there is nothing strange in the fact that it is Americans who commemorate it on the Fourth of July. Thus, when being black is viewed not merely as a position of subordination but also as a cultural standpoint, we see nothing strange in the fact that there are people of African descent who celebrate black history as their history and encourage their children to cherish it as well. This is not a spurious association of culture and ancestry. It is a socially mediated connection between the two, which is both politically powerful as a response to past and present anti-black racism and acceptable as part of a non-racist future. Self-segregation of the type that supports it (e.g., supplementary educational programming for black children) should not be seen as inappropriate.

The Du Boisian approach to segregation I am advocating holds that we should oppose racial division insofar as it expresses a white supremacist devaluation of black life but view efforts to preserve and cultivate a distinct black community as vitally important precisely for attacking such devaluation and as generally justifiable as well. Does this undermine democratic habits of communication? Anderson is right to raise this worry and we ought to recall Du Bois’ suggestion that human development is best achieved when there are no barriers to interaction across group lines. What I take from this, though, is that we must balance the two vital and justifiable goals of black communal self-development and wide interracial contact, as these goals are not – in principle – incompatible.

Indeed, I would argue that Andrew Valls, in his recent essay, “A Liberal Defense of Black Nationalism,” indirectly provides one vision of how we might balance these objectives. He argues that we should remove the disproportionate burden of personal and social transformation that integration places on African Americans and replace it with the freedom offered by policies that allow them a choice “between participating in well-funded, thriving white-dominated institutions, on the one hand, and participating in well-funded, thriving black-dominated institutions on the other.” While Valls intends the ultimate outcome of having such a choice to be a matter of no concern for his purposes, it is worth considering the optimistic thought that mutual respect and constant cultural interchange between thriving black and non-black communities might create the conditions hospitable to both relative black autonomy and effective national unity.

But perhaps this is a case of preferring principles to reality. Anderson claims that the problem with left multiculturalism is that it

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neglects the impact on whites of prioritizing ethnoracial self-segregation. It reinforces whites’ alienation from disadvantaged groups, and their own tendencies to self-segregation. Given that it is impossible and undesirable to abolish informal routes to human and social capital development, and that whites control most of these routes, such a stance is self-defeating (188).

Clearly Anderson is not treating redistribution of resources in a manner enabling the kind of choice Valls describes as a live option. Indeed, she is explicit about the fact that her commitment to non-ideal theorizing narrows options considerably, although things are made unclear by her claim that political philosophers need not accommodate “people’s unwillingness to meet certain standards of justice” (190). Given Valls’ argument that the disproportionate burden of integration on African Americans is an injustice, how do we know that the connection Anderson draws between black self-segregation and “white clubbishness” is not a matter of unwillingness to do justice rather than a matter of “the limitations of human psychology” (188, 190)?

In spite of this vagueness, I believe we should seriously consider the possibility that, given the demographics and socioeconomic structure of the US, Anderson is right that only integration can address the problems of limited access to resources and stigma-based discrimination that sustain black disadvantage. Recall that one of Du Bois’ motivations in advocating some acceptance of segregation in the 1930s was the goal of meeting black people’s needs, even at the expense of lofty ideals. If Anderson is right about what integration and integration alone can accomplish, then sharing that motivation means we should immediately drop all sentimental attachment to black self-segregation and work tirelessly toward integration. Without admitting that Anderson has resolved the matter once and for all, I am willing to acknowledge that this could very well be the case.

What I find unfortunate about The Imperative of Integration, though, is that it shows little to no recognition that the above conclusion is tragic. To accept the futility of the goal of an economically stable and broadly flourishing black community life in America – and, as a correlation, integration primarily on terms of relative equality rather than as capitulation to the fact that black people remain at a seemingly insurmountable disadvantage when their exposure to white people is limited – is to accept a huge blow to black dignity. Sheryll Cashin, whom Anderson appropriately cites as a fellow integrationist, calls it a “cruel truth” that her research suggests that “living in an integrated community is practically the only route black people have to escape concentrated black poverty.” She claims to have reached this conclusion “[p]ainfully,” and it is indeed a painful conclusion as it has, among other things, the harmful effect of reinforcing stereotypes of black people as simply unable to succeed in the absence of whites. Anderson’s insensitivity to this harm and her resulting failure to address it helps make it the case that those of us with black nationalist and left multiculturalist leanings are unlikely to relinquish our lofty ideals in response to her work, despite the admittedly tough task of presenting a realistic alternative vision of the way forward.

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11 Ibid.

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The title of Elizabeth Anderson’s book recalls an issue that might appear to have been put to rest several decades ago, amidst the controversies of *Brown v. Board of Education* and school busing in Boston. Through the misguided, but widespread celebration of our “post-racial” era, as marked by the election of the United States’ first black president, one might suppose that the issue of racial integration is obsolete. This false assumption might understandably be predicated on the image of men and women of color who staff the current President’s Cabinet, mainstream network and cable news channels, television shows, and numerous films that are now being produced in Hollywood.

Anderson is keenly aware that the some of the above phenomena, along with the language of color-blindness, the existence of middle-class multiracial neighborhoods, and the widespread language of multiculturalism can lead to the belief that racial integration is finished and done. But make no mistake: the topic of her book is hardly obsolete or restricted to one small segment of American race relations. Rather, it encompasses a much broader subject matter, namely the pervasive phenomenon of racial segregation across all walks of life—not just schools. In this sense and others, hers is a radical and broad challenge to the idea that segregation is limited to a few narrow dimensions of modern American life—as some not-so-quaint holdover from the period of Jim Crow.

Anderson draws upon Charles Tilly’s description of “durable inequalities,” or “[l]arge, stable, systematic social inequalities across the world [which] are tied to many kinds of group identities, as of race gender (sic) ethnicity, religion, caste, tribe, clan, family line, and national citizenship.” (7). She prefers the term “group” or “categorical inequalities,” in order to emphasize that these are linked to social categories that exemplify systematic hierarchies. Her examples include “black/white, male/female, citizen/alien, and Hindu/Muslim,” rather than to individual and variable characteristics such as height, color or ‘intelligence.’ (7)

Anderson develops her position that group inequalities are tracked through differences in material resources, rights, privileges, and power by tracing their origins in the tribal or nationalistic impulses of groups who have control over large swaths of land. This may explain her development of segregation as taking two major forms—namely spatial and role-based.

The book takes us methodically through is a series of rich chapters that begin by amassing data to show how spatial segregation closely tracks segregation in many other areas, from education, employment, public and retail spaces, and law enforcement. In the first three chapters of her book, Anderson martials an enormous range of arguments to argue that racial segregation is a pervasive element of modern American society. The evidence presented is ample, clear, and persuasive beyond a doubt—that segregation leads to a pervasive structural inequality.¹ Her analysis provides an excellent foundation

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¹ Anderson observes that the data on social segregation does not track similarly for Asian and some Latino migrants. This is, she claims, because
by which to establish a methodical argument in favor—not only of integration, but of a (moral/social) imperative to integration.

The second half of the book illustrates that moves toward racial integration have generally had beneficial effects for whites as well as blacks. The racial response and attitudes of whites towards blacks improves as a result of racial integration. It follows that there is a strong pragmatically case for undertaking many of the reforms to which Anderson points.

As persuasive as Anderson’s arguments are, I am left with a nagging question. We have all seen numerous occasions when individuals do not act in such a way as to enhance their own self-interests. This is displayed vividly during election years, when individuals who stand to be harmed by the policies endorsed by one political candidate will nevertheless vote for that very same candidate. I am not making a partisan statement; in the United States, examples could be given on behalf of both major party presidential candidates. Witness, for example, that before the 2008 election, then-Senator Obama returned from the campaign trail to vote for the renewal of FISA, which promised to increase state surveillance powers and to give telecommunications companies immunity for turning over subscriber details to the U.S. government in violation of standing privacy laws. Liberal voters barely noticed. Similarly, many poor white voters in 2012 voted for Sen. Mitt Romney, despite his overt promises to enact economic policies designed to harm poor voters.

And so, I wonder what the impetus is to garner support for the albeit very persuasive arguments that Anderson makes among an enormous group of whites who have evinced little interest in moving towards racial justice or racial integration, despite any long-term benefits that it may harbor for them as well? This question leads me back to Anderson’s discussion of the sources of long-standing inequality, namely Max Weber’s analysis of the tribal or nationalistic impulses of controlling land or domains and closing it off to others (7). Anderson extends this analysis to other historical periods—to the Japanese samurai caste, immigration groups in the U.S., and even cases that occur during the feudal period (8).

Yet, it seems that the missing element in considering the origins of group inequality is the notion of racism or racial threats; perhaps the element is there but obscured under the aegis of “tribal” or nationalistic impulses. On Anderson’s account, race appears to have a very specific reference—mostly to black-white relations. As she acknowledges, group inequalities can have their symptoms and sources in power as well. I wonder whether these inequalities that can be traced to power, in fact, emerge from racial impulses. What we call tribal or nationalistic—at least in the United States—is based less on kinship relations than on certain antagonistic group encounters (a generous interpretation) that occurred at various historically specific moments, such as the conquest of North American lands, widespread wars against and massacres of American Indians, and of course, the importation of African slavery. I am not suggesting that race be broadened to include all antagonistic group encounters. Still, within the context of North America, it would include certain non-kin based hostile encounters such as those having to do with indigenous populations versus settler groups, and in later history, immigrants and other dark populations.

Weber’s analysis of tribal or nationalistic social control/exclusion still seems to be missing the systematic racist impulse that Anderson acknowledges throughout her meticulously argued work. I focus on this because I think that understanding social inequality as emerging from racial divisions changes our understanding of U.S. history and political structures somewhat, and points us to a question that still desperately needs to be answered. Our understanding of U.S. history changes in that we might be able to understand more insightfully


Institutions? Judgments of attributive responsibility do not dictate individuals who are not so acting), and among wider American act irresponsibly, among the black community (which contains many consequences of destructive behavior be allocated among wider Americans should take toward these facts. How should responsible for their actions. What is controversial is the moral controversial that blacks who act in these ways are “These causal claims should not be controversial. Nor should it be controversial that blacks who act in these ways are attributively responsible for their actions. What is controversial is the moral response Americans should take toward these facts. How should substantive responsibility for dealing with the causes and consequences of destructive behavior be allocated among those who act irresponsibly, among the black community (which contains many individuals who are not so acting), and among wider American institutions? Judgments of attributive responsibility do not dictate judgments of substantive responsibility. Even if a group of people habitually engages in self-destructive behavior for which they are attributively responsible, it does not follow that they should be made to bear all of its costs, or denied some outside help” (75-76).

These acts, which Anderson agrees with conservatives are imprudent and harmful, are understood as causal. Yet, I wonder whether conservatives are not also engaging in racially stigmatizing behavior by pointing to these behaviors as causal sources of inequality and disadvantage rather than symptomatic of the same? If we keep with Anderson’s larger argument that there are pervasive social inequalities between blacks and whites, then if wealthier, more advantaged, whites were to engage in many of the same activities, would we still be inclined to see these as imprudent and harmful, or would we understand them as modeling self-preserving behavior (as used to be the case for white farm families in early 20th century America)?

Could it not be the case that the absence of socially just structures is what leads conservatives to view such behaviors as imprudent and harmful? In other words, if we begin from the position that racism/racial stigma is the source of racial inequality, then these behaviors may be seen as symptoms rather than causes of racial inequality and disadvantage. For example, the dominance of single-parent families may be less due to the irresponsibility of black fathers than the pervasive racial profiling and tendency to incarcerate 1 out of 10 black men. Empirical studies have shown that in cases where men’s earnings are low and uncertain, there are substantially decreased rates of marriage. Equally prevalent, where the rates of men to women are low, marriage rates are also low. Similarly, we could see the absence of black fathers as due to the result of the state to criminalize young black men at an alarming rate for a War on Drugs, even though “people of color are actually no more likely to be guilty of drug crimes and many other offenses than whites,” as

5 http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=122
Michelle Alexander argues.\textsuperscript{7} As well, the inability to “study diligently until graduating from high school” may be less a destructive habit than a response to the same insufferable circumstances that Anderson herself argues are the result of racial segregation, i.e. crumbling infrastructure, inadequate material resources and personnel, the need to find a source of income to help one’s family survive, etc.\textsuperscript{8} I review Alexander’s argument in order to ask Anderson whether it may not be useful to consider racism as the source of pervasive racial inequality? If so, this source—rather than the impulse to social control and dominance—may provide even stronger foundations for her sound and extensive arguments behind the imperative to integration. However, if racism is an original source of durable or group or long-standing inequalities, then the answer to my initial non-ideal question may still not find a sufficient answer through Anderson’s otherwise remarkable book: what is at stake—what is the compelling impetus—for whites and other non-blacks to work towards this imperative?

References


Commentary on Elizabeth Anderson’s The Imperative of Integration

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Elizabeth Anderson draws the attention of moral, social, and political philosophy to the idea of integration, an idea that is most often associated with the struggles to desegregate schools and neighborhoods in the years before and after the U.S. Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board (Patterson 1997). Her book, The Imperative of Integration, is a remarkable contribution because integration is not frequently mentioned outside of debates in the fields of urban affairs and education policy, and residential integration and segregation are rarely mentioned in academic philosophy.

When housing, as a general issue, is raised in academic philosophy in the United States, it is done so in regards to homelessness, and when the subjects of integration and segregation do appear, it is in reference to education. Housing and education are deeply connected (Schwartz 2001), but housing, and the related issues of access, segregation, development and redevelopment, affordability, and fair housing policies, are important social indicators in their own right. Therefore, it is about time that normative and applied philosophy pay attention to the topics of integration and housing, and the problem of residential segregation. Not only is housing a proper subject of justice, but it is also a fundamental component of society, and in a democratic republic, is a physical indicator—a display—of the equality and quality (or its lack) of its citizenship. And more than that, the home (situated in a neighborhood, which in turn is situated in a polity) is where the value of democracy and a sense of justice is initially imparted to individuals. The home is the first place that democracy abides.

Thus, integration remains an important idea and value. It can be defined by starting with a narrow, quantitative conception of its purported opposite, segregation, which is “the degree to which two or more groups live separately from one another, in different parts of the urban environment” (Massey and Denton 1988, 281). Degrees of segregation are determined by the evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering of populations in specific areas. Integration, however, is not just a neutral or value-free social scientific indicator—the numeric opposite of segregation (Sundstrom 2004). It connotes more than the demographic status of mixed ethnic and racial populations within some locale; instead it reveals how effectively any particular society has established the bonds of common life. Here is Anderson’s definition:

If segregation is a fundamental cause of social inequality and undemocratic practices, then integration promotes greater equality and democracy... In our preoccupation with celebrating our particularistic ethno-racial identities, we have forgotten the value of
identification with a larger, nationwide community. Integration in a diverse society expands our networks of cooperation and provides a stepping stone to a cosmopolitan identity, which offers the prospect of rewarding relations with people across the globe (Anderson 2010, 2).

As is seen above, integration is usually thought to be the other of de jure or de facto segregation. Segregation in housing, neighborhoods, schools, and communities signals and causes further disparities in education, and access to political power and economic opportunity (Oakes 2004; Orfield 1996; Massey and Denton 1993). Segregation has negative consequences, so desegregation, and even more so integration, would have equally serious positive consequences in improving the quality of life and opportunities for those who would benefit from greater access to education and housing resources. Moreover, integration in public life and the political culture, not only benefits the individual but it also improves the democratic life of society. There is strong evidence of the general positive effects of policies, such as the Moving Toward Opportunity (M.T.O) projects that sought to integrate families from poor neighborhoods to those with less poverty, or the post-1990 “Housing and Opportunity for Everyone” (HOPE VI) policy that sought to replace past public housing (much of which were modernist concrete tours erected on superblocks) with developments guided by New Urbanist principles and that sometimes involved inclusionary housing: a mix of affordable housing, and market-rate units. The results of M.T.O. policies are mixed, but their limited positive effects and potential should not be dismissed. Similar concerns have been registered about HOPE VI developments, but its effect on the quality of life in public housing and the reduction of concentrated poverty has been substantial (Cisneros 2009).

So integration is a social good, but what sort and whose concept of integration should be judged as good? And by whom? Integration can be thought of as a simple, quantitative demographic goal, as the result of secure political belonging and full inclusion as a citizen with the access to social goods and rights that attend that status, or it can focus on the relations between persons and their interactions across social activities. Who is offering integration as an ideal also matters because their perspectives and interests and the social and geographic place they inhabit in our society affect their judgment. Thus some might stress integration as combination, making whole, unity, and homogeneity, while others put greater emphasis on access, connection, and equal participation and membership.

As a theorist one is tempted toward the abstract and ideal, even while one engages in non-ideal theory, but it is important that the theorist step back and listen to the demands, interests, and perspectives of the effected individuals, families, and communities that are marginalized and segregated. It is important to listen, as a matter of political theoretical method. And what one hears when one listens to the voices of the diverse communities is that sometimes integration does come up (as I had found in interviews with fair and affordable housing professionals and activists in Oakland and San Francisco), but it is not a prominent demand; rather, more often one hears claims for affordable, safe and decent housing, community-based development, and reference to principles such as community, democracy, accountability, equity, and inclusion (Right to the City 2009). These principles and demands may be consistent with some version of integration, but what that term means in the here and now, and for policies that seek to shape the future, should be discursively generated from the communities most immediately effected; in the mean time community-building and organization, or local forms of solidarity, precede and have normative precedence over integration.
Ronald Sundstrom

Commentary on Anderson

Anderson’s account of integration is consistent with the community-affirmed values of inclusion, equity, and participation in so far as it is motivated by the ideals of democracy and equality in social relations (Anderson 2010, 90). Her focus on equal and non-dominative communication and relations is important because it illustrates the ongoing value of integration. All the same, given that integration is closely associated with assimilation, some groups and communities will likely resist and be offended by policies labeled as racially and ethnically integrative. Anderson takes pains to distinguish integration from both mere desegregation and assimilation (Ibid., 112-34), but her judgment about “our preoccupation with celebrating our particularistic ethno-racial identities” (Ibid., 2) is not helpful nor is it tied to how communities build bonding-social capital within and bridging-social capital with other communities. Anderson seems distracted by American spectacles of social identities, which leaves her analysis unreceptive to how those festivals engender community building and mobilization.

This problem might be related to her use of Charles Tilly’s theory of “durable inequality” (Tilly 1998). One of the features of Tilly’s theory is its assertion that the structures that lead to disparity are unintentional, and that opportunity hoarding and the emulation of such practices across social networks, rather than belief structures, are what causes inequality to be persistent. Tilly’s critics have argued that his methodology fails to consider the prominent role of racial ideology in inequality (Morris 2000). Tilly is likely correct that there are many cases of opportunity hoarding due to unintentional discriminatory practices but there remain political projects that are intent on securing long-standing racial privileges as seen in nation-wide fights over immigrant rights, and fair and affordable housing policy (HoSang 2010; Campbell 2011).

Policies that mitigate such hoarding are clearly needed; however, solidarity, whether local or trans-institutional, within and between communities of color, and others effected by housing disparities remains an effective and legitimate strategy to respond to such injustices (Shelby 2005). For example, Causa Justa :: Just Cause, a multiracial organization in Oakland and San Francisco, has been valuable part of the fight for housing justice in the Bay Area. Another, example is the strategy of the Chicago Anti-Eviction Campaign, which was recently covered by the New York Times, to break into and rehabilitate abandoned and neglected homes, and then organize individuals and families to illegally reside in those homes, thereby confronting the neglect of neighborhoods by the city, and the role of banks in the foreclosure process and the immiseration of communities. Tilly’s method focuses too much on plugging in those who suffer disparity into presumably resource-rich social networks rather than community building.

Moreover, community building and mobilization leads to the ends that sociologists and political theorists call “integration.” Social capital is built by communities engaged in building resources inside their communities, connecting with residents, and then connecting with outside resources. Recent attention and social science about the Chicago neighborhood of Chatham illustrates this process (Sampson 2011). Likewise, even when communities need “outside” resources, such as the provision of affordable housing, which by itself is not necessarily integrative, successful developments are those that provide resident services to connect residents to social services and to each other and to the community at large. Community development work within residential developments builds and encourages civic engagement on local as well as larger City-wide, regional, and state-level politics (Jois 2007; Right to the City 2010; Samara 2012). It is remarkable, for example, in a study of residential developments in Berkeley, CA, that more community building occurred within affordable housing developments, the residents of which were low-income, rather than in mixed-income developments (Berkeley Housing Survey 2012). More integrative ends were met by building community.
among poor and low-income residents, rather than merely “integrating” classes of people. It is important to note that it is precisely the lack of community building that is one of the biggest limitations of M.T.O. projects.

Solidarity of this sort, also serves as a break against the appropriation of liberal ideals for illiberal ends, for example, the use of the ideal of integration in redevelopment and de-concentration programs that result in land grabs, displacement, the breaking up of communities and the further immiseration of poor people rather than any real integration. Anderson’s analysis is a work of non-ideal theory, but it is precisely in our non-ideal world that liberal values are used (as she recognizes in the colorblindness debate) to willfully ignore and defend injustice (HoSang 2010).

Integration need not be opposed to solidarity, including those solidarity movements built on the foundations of communities that organize around particular identities. In fact, Anderson makes reference to solidarity through the words of Senator Charles Sumner in his 1849 argument for equal Common Schools before the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Sumner’s reference to solidarity is striking, and it is also consistent with local solidarity, such as the solidarity free Blacks displayed in organizing, building, and teaching in their own schools, the African Schools, of the period. Although Sumner argues that it was the bigotry of the whites, and the creation of segregated schools, that created the need for maintaining African Schools in the first place, he seems to note that in the creation of these schools free Blacks asserted their right to have their children educated. The solidarity of African Americans to fight for the rights of their children was a building block for Sumner’s argument for Common Schools.

Local solidarity builds community, makes a path for trans-institutional solidarity, and provides a basis for larger social and political inclusion. Public policy interested in integration, therefore, should focus on supporting and generating local solidarity and community building, as well as inclusion and equity. One might call the results of such efforts “integration” but that remains an abstraction. From the street view, what comes first is local solidarity.

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Whose Integration? What's Imperative?

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1. Elizabeth Anderson's *The Imperative of Integration* is a fine and serious effort by one of our best contemporary ethicists, as well as a testament to the mainstreaming of concerns that have long animated philosophical race theory. Anderson shows in impressive detail that the persistence of racial segregation is a problem, that non-ideal theory is an invaluable resource for understanding this problem, and that something like integration is central to solving the problem. Unfortunately, the book's central conceit in some ways pulls against its most powerful arguments. Professor Anderson shows that racial justice is imperative, to be sure, and that talking about integration is one way to make and explore this point. But it may be imperative to take up this thought in other ways, and to be suspicious of appeals to integration per se. To her credit, Anderson anticipates some aspects of this worry and attempts to deal with them in advance. But she seems to underestimate the concern, and to overlook its connections to her own methodological commitments.

2. One reason to be suspicious of twenty-first century appeals to integration emerges from a careful consideration of the concept's relationship to the US civil rights movement - the sort of consideration that one finds in recent work by civil rights historians. Charles Payne, for example, notes that the apartheid South, as he puts it,

involved plenty of integration; it just had to be on terms acceptable to white people. 'Segregation' is the way apologists for the South liked to think of [their social order].... It was the most innocent face one could put on that system. When we use the term as a summary term for what was going on in the South, we are unconsciously adopting the preferred euphemism of nineteenth-century white supremacist leadership.¹

Payne goes on: "If 'segregation' is a poor way to describe the problem, 'integration' may not tell us much about the solution."²

One of the things Payne has in mind is the fact that integration was not obviously a central goal for many of the people who participated in movement work or who came to support that work. This ambivalence had multiple roots, from the experience of watching assiduously-husbanded black resources siphoned off into white communities in the name of integration, to the conviction that, as James Baldwin puts it, it is unwise to integrate into the "burning house" of a system in decline.³ Whatever the motivation for the ambivalence, the facts on the ground are such that, as historian Todd

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² Payne 145.
Moye puts it, “scholars now see the civil rights movement preeminently as a movement for self-determination rather than a movement for integration of the races or even for equal civil rights.”

As I say, Anderson knows this history, and goes to some trouble to insulate her project from the criticisms that might emerge from it. She points out that as she uses the term, ‘integration’ does not mean that the cultural practices that we identify with particular racial groups have to be eradicated and replaced with ‘white’ practices (§§6.1, 9.2), or that all forms of race-related solidarity have to be replaced by fealty to abstractions like ‘humanity’ or ‘individuality.’ And it certainly does not provide a cover for “the dissolution of black-owned enterprises” (§6.1) of the sort that was rampant in the south as local authorities operationalized the mandate to integrate.

On Anderson’s account, racial integration is what we aspire to and work towards when we resist the race-related social closure that we call ‘segregation.’ This social closure has both horizontal and vertical dimensions, compartmentalizing people into separate spaces as well as into separate niches or roles. The horizontal segregation of residential spaces is a problem because it enables some communities to hoard access to opportunities and resources, or to shift certain of the burdens of social life - pollution, undesirable public facilities, and so on - onto other communities. Similarly, the vertical segregation of nodes in opportunity networks sorts people of different races into, among other things, different social roles and occupational strata, even when they occupy the same physical spaces. And segregation along both these dimensions contributes to the persistence of racial animus, as it rules out the kind of routine and thoroughgoing interactions among equals that would help break down or prevent the formation of implicit racial biases. All of this of course has obvious consequences for democratic ideals of collaborative citizenship and associated living.

On Anderson’s account, what Charles Payne calls ‘integration’ just isn’t worthy of the term. It simply isn’t true to say that the Jim Crow south involved plenty of integration, if one also has to say that this integration had to happen on terms acceptable to whites. The control that whites had over the conditions of racial interaction points directly to the vertical social closure that real integration - “the participation as equals of all groups in all social domains” - means to undo. Similarly, only a kind of “confusion” can lead one to say that integration is equivalent to the cooptation or eradication of the black-owned enterprises and black-run institutions and opportunity structures that emerged under Jim Crow. Integration is an ethical ideal, and the ideal requires the visualization and pursuit of a social condition that simply is not identical with the half-hearted, uneven, and often duplicitous pursuit of integration that we witnessed in the US after the successes of the civil rights movement. And the vindication of the ideal, the resurrection of the integration-imperative “from the grave of the civil rights movement,” is crucial to social justice.

Anderson can block the first reason to worry about the appeal to integration by distinguishing her ideal from various counterfeit invocations of it. But stipulating to a narrower and more precise definition that one finds in the wilds of actual social practice points to a second reason for concern. We’re meant to think that Moye’s activists were in fact calling for a higher form of integration, or insisting on its true form, rather than rejecting integration as such. But one might think that what these people thought they were doing should matter to a truly democratic politics.

We might start to unpack this second worry by asking a question: If there are reasons, strong reasons rooted in historical practice, to refuse a particular way of characterizing an ethical ideal, to refuse a


5 It does mean, however, that we have to relinquish our attachment to what Paul Gilroy once called ‘cultural insiderism’ - the thought that, as Alain Locke put it, cultures have colors, and that participation in a racial practice is and must be limited only to the members of the racial group with which that practice is associated.


7 Anderson 12.
vocabulary that happens to come freighted with substantial historical baggage, then what is at stake in insisting on the problematic characterization? I suspect that Anderson thinks that integration-talk represents the cleanest, simplest, most direct way to make the relevant points. But it is clean and simple only if we ignore certain of the experiences that the language occasions, and it is direct only if we forget the work she has to do to stipulate to a definition of integration that avoids the stakes of this discursive choice.

I mean to be making a point about the relationship between non-ideal theory and a political phenomenology, which may become clearer if I link it to Anderson’s own Deweyan claims about non-ideal theory. She explains that “in non-ideal theory, normative inquiry begins with the identification of a problem. We then seek a causal explanation of what can and ought to be done about it, and who should be charged with correcting it” (p34, §1.5). We learn a bit later that committing to non-ideal theory in the context of a democratic culture involves a further commitment:

> [R]acial equality requires not just propositional knowledge, but practical knowledge of how to work together on terms of equality. Only racially integrated collective agents can generate this practical knowledge. Only by working and thinking together can we work out mutually respectful and cooperative habits of interaction. (p207, §9.2)

This is a very Deweyan picture, and it seems to me to require a rather different posture toward the historical baggage of integration-talk than the one Anderson adopts. On this sort of picture, to say that normative inquiry begins with the identification of a problem is to point to a social process, a process of conjoint or collaborative inquiry, during which ethical agents constitute themselves as a public by identifying a problem and orienting themselves to it, together. Collective inquiry of this sort involves the discovery or creation of a shared vocabulary, a shared discursive framework that all parties can accept as a basis for “working and thinking together.” If this is right, then it matters that some people might worry about the suitability of integration-talk as a resource for characterizing the pursuit of racial justice.

Contemporary heirs of Dewey in the study of democratic deliberation remind us that the process of conjoint ethical deliberation has important experiential conditions and implications, some of which they capture by distinguishing deliberation from dialogue. Levine, Gastil, and Fung explain: “When a group seeks to deliberate on a public issue… it may be necessary to first engage in dialogue. This form of speech is not as concerned with solving a problem as with bridging linguistic, social, and epistemological chasms between different subgroups of the potentially deliberative body.”

This preliminary bridging work helps potential co-inquirers “truly understand one another’s standpoints and appreciate the history and conviction of one another’s views.” This is valuable for straightforward reasons: “Once each subgroup understands how the others think, talk, and reason, it is easier to avoid conceptual confusions, symbolic battles, and epistemological thickets that could otherwise derail a deliberative process.”

In light of these reasonable extensions of Deweyan non-ideal theory, Anderson’s assumption that integration-talk just is the right vocabulary for talking about racial justice seems to me to pull against her own methodological commitments. It turns out to take a great deal of work to maintain this assumption. She has to set aside the many reasons that Payne, Moye, and others find for suspicion about this vocabulary - reasons rooted, you’ll recall, in the concrete historical accounts of integration-talk mediating and facilitating the continuation of racial oppression and exploitation well into the post-segregation period. She has to qualify her invocations of ‘integration’ to make clear that she has in mind only one of the various meanings that attach to it in commonsense usage, a meaning that does not involve assimilation, cooptation, and other forms of post-segregation racial injustice. And she has to develop this purified commonsense usage into a term of art, so that it can take on fairly unusual meanings involving the distortion of opportunity structures entirely apart from...

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9 Levine, Fung, and Gastil 9.
restricted access to physical space. These techniques for strategically narrowing and expanding the meanings of terms are standard moves in analytic philosophy, and they have their place. But here they come at some cost: they require that we set aside the way the vocabulary actually functions in the practices of conjoint normative inquiry. And when that happens we have to ask whether the cost is too high, in ways that undermine the chances for productive conjoint action.

Once again, I find encouragement for this worry in Anderson's own express commitments. In discussing for "a sound political philosophy," she explains that "[i]t is one thing to lay out an objective required by justice, another to implement policies capable of achieving that objective" (p212, §9.5). Contemporary work in the practice of democratic deliberation, combined with the suspicion of integration-talk that emerges from historical accounts of The Movement, suggests that policies aimed at achieving what Anderson calls 'integration' might need to be formulated in rather different terms. If movement activists were less interested in integration than in self-determination - if, that is, they were less likely to represent their aims to themselves in terms of integration than in other terms - and if they felt this way because the language of integration had in their experience been bound up with problematic events and practices, then reviving the ideals of the movement may mean leaving the vocabulary of integration buried in the grave where Anderson finds it.

Adopting this strategy -- effectively bracketing questions about the way integration-talk functions in concrete contexts of democratic deliberation, in order to contain any problem until the process of social amelioration has gotten farther along -- may be the right response to the worries I've raised. But I find myself wondering if the process of dialogue, as described above, should enter into the process even at the stage of philosophical articulation. Anderson endorses the Deweyan thought that "social and political philosophy needs to be grounded in an empirically adequate understanding of the problems we face" (p201, §9.1). But Dewey never tired of explaining that empirical adequacy had to do with experience in all of its existential and phenomenological depth. For Deweyans, and for anyone keen to do justice to the actual exercise of ethical agency by social beings, normative philosophy must also be grounded in a phenomenologically adequate understanding of our problems. And this means attending to the way we frame and navigate our shared problem-spaces, and to the way this work validates or invalidates the experiences of the people with whom we hope to collaborate in struggle.

Attending to the phenomenological dimensions of political life has never been the strong suit of liberal political philosophy. Anderson's oddly tone-deaf reading of Hegel's lord and bondsman narrative (p122, §5.4) situates her squarely in this tradition, as does her determination to present her argument as a middle way between (more or less) equally benighted separatists, multiculturalists, and conservatives. She has nevertheless achieved something remarkable, and given us a variety of powerful and persuasive reflections on various questions of racial justice work. My fear is that these arguments will translate and travel less well than they otherwise might, because they have been formulated without regard for a philosophy of the history of racial politics that refuses the centrality of liberal frames, and that makes room for the wider vision of human flourishing that animates certain forms of the black radical imagination. (I should say, and should say that I wish I didn't have to say, that 'black radical' here is not identical with non-starter racial separatism, of the sort that seems to haunt mainstream dreams of the
Paul C. Taylor

I want to say that The Imperative of Integration deserves an audience beyond the whitely post-civil rights liberals for whom it seems to have been written. But 'deserves' may not be the right word, given the book's indifference to the way its language might register to those outside its target audience. Perhaps better: there are readers who might benefit from the book, and who might enrich its arguments, if they were contemplated as members of its discursive and deliberative community. I hope that what I've written here, together with Professor Anderson's response, will begin the process, in Deweyan terms, of making the interracial, pan-ideological public constituted by the burdens of racial injustice aware of itself as a public, and as an inchoate community.
Reply to My Critics

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I would like to thank my critics V. Denise James, Chike Jeffers, Falguni Sheth, Ronald Sundstrom, and Paul Taylor for their stimulating and constructive comments. Rather than discussing each of their contributions separately, I will divide my reply along thematic lines, most of which were articulated by more than one commentator.

1. The vocabulary of integration and the role of a white scholar in the philosophy of race

Taken together, my commentators articulate an important challenge to any white scholar working in the philosophy of race who has the aim of offering proposals for the promotion of racial justice. The problem is general: it applies to anyone occupying a structural position of privilege who aims to produce knowledge of practical use to the oppressed. The challenge is to articulate ideas in a way that connects fruitfully to the self-understandings of the oppressed, since they can be liberated only if they (among others) exercise their agency to that end, and agency works through people’s self-understandings. A common theme running through my critics’ commentaries is that my language of integration does not connect in the right way to what Taylor calls the political phenomenology of the black community.

I’d like to step back and consider this problem from the perspective of social theory. Max Weber (1968, vol. I, ch. I.1.6) distinguished two dimensions of analysis of social behavior. First, we can analyze behavior causally, tracing its underlying mechanisms, likelihood under different conditions, and effects. Second, we can analyze its social meaning, or the significance of behavior as understood by members of society. The two dimensions are linked, since the meanings people place on conduct affect the likelihood that they will do it and shape patterns of social behavior in more complicated ways. However, one of the deep themes of social theory is that people often misrecognize their own social practices. Indeed, misrecognition may be a critical feature that reproduces patterns of behavior over time. For example, studies of gift exchange comment on the discord between the social meaning of gifts as freely given, and the underlying social fact that gift exchange is (covertly) obligatory (Mauss 1967).

Weber was interested in understanding the social world as it is, not in devising a set of social meanings that would mobilize participants to change it. Considering the latter project as lying at the core of the project of creating a more democratic society, it is evident that the scholar occupying a structural position of privilege has no authority to dictate terms of transformational self-understanding to the key agents—the oppressed—whose mobilization is needed for the project to succeed. What help, then, can the scholar of privilege provide in her capacity as a social theorist committed to democratic equality? Four things:

1. She can provide a detailed analysis of the multiple interlocking and reinforcing causal mechanisms that, together, reproduce systematic oppression—undemocratic relations of subordination, exploitation, marginalization, cultural imposition, and stigmatization—in the present day. This supplies an account of the mechanisms that must
be blocked and ultimately dismantled in order to realize a more just and democratic society. This is the task of ch. 1-3 of my book.

2. She can provide an analysis of why occupants in privileged positions ascribe the social meanings they do to the persons and conduct of both the privileged and the disadvantaged–meanings that figure constitutively in the reproduction of stigmatized social identities, stigmatizing social policies, and the failure of the privileged to recognize their own causal role in perpetuating systematic oppression. Critical to task is to explain how and why the privileged systematically misrecognize the causal mechanisms underlying both their own conduct, and the conduct of those whom they stigmatize. This is the task of ch. 3-4 of my book.

3. She can provide an analysis of strategies, policies, and institutions that are (a) needed to block and ultimately dismantle the unjust mechanisms identified above and (b) that are in the feasible option set for agents committed to creating a more just and democratic order. For the objective of non-ideal theory is not to describe a perfectly just but unattainable world, but to identify available strategies that evidence shows have causal power to undermine the causes of group oppression. This is the task of ch. 5-7 of my book.

4. She can identify causal deficiencies in alternative strategies proposed to deal with injustice, (strategies that fail to fully account for the mechanisms that are causing injustice), warn of their likely results, and begin to address some of the costs to the oppressed of the strategies recommended in (3) by offering reasons to expect that, even if the short-run costs are substantial, those costs will decline in the long run. This is the task of ch. 8-9 of my book. Ultimately, however, she lacks the authority to weigh the costs against the benefits to the oppressed of alternative strategies. That is something the oppressed must ultimately weigh for themselves.

None of these things, however important, supply terms of self-understanding that the oppressed need find congenial. Taylor, Sundstrom, and James complain that the term “integration”, which I use to refer to the strategies and institutions identified in (3), has many negative connotations in blacks’ lived experience. While I acknowledged that blacks have good reason to regard with suspicion the debased forms of integration whites have resentfully offered to them (p. 1), and the stresses of the experience of integration even when white-dominated institutions are trying to do a better job of it (ch. 9), I wasn’t aware that the term itself is sufficiently toxic to substantial segments of the black community as to disqualify it as a name for an ideal that they might find inspiring. My own theory predicts that my relative segregation from the black community would make me ignorant of this fact, and also claims that I am incompetent, and indeed not authorized, to correct this error on my own. Therefore I welcome Taylor’s invitation to cross-racial dialogue in the creation of a shared vocabulary that would be better able to articulate and advance democracy and racial justice. What I care about is that the causal mechanisms reproducing undemocratic and unjust race relations be dismantled, and I clam that cooperative interracial interaction on terms of equality is needed to dismantle them. What terms we use to denote these activities are up for grabs. Moreover, the terms we choose in dialogue will also shape and reflect jointly achieved understandings of how to specify the activities in question. Whatever we decide to call these activities, they do not amount to a fixed ideal but are always in need of reconstruction in light of experience with their successes and failures, and in need of enrichment by what Taylor calls the “wider vision of human flourishing” found in “certain forms of the black radical imagination.”

2. How Integration/Inclusion Works

Having just conceded the inadequacy of the term “integration,” but with the dialogue needed to come up with a better term incomplete, I am in somewhat of a quandary as to how to proceed. Sundstrom uses terms including “community, democracy, accountability, equity, and inclusion” to refer to ideals he endorses. These evocative terms all pick up on aspects of the ideal I am after, but a single term is needed. I therefore propose, as a provisional remediation, to use the term “inclusion” for what I call “integration” in my book. However, insofar as my critics have named my ideal of integration as an object of critique, it might be unfair to represent them as criticizing inclusion, since they may have a different understanding of what inclusion amounts to. Hence I shall retain the use of “integration” in this section, when I discuss what my critics Jeffers and James have named as their object of criticism.
Integration may refer either to a condition or to activities. As an ideal condition or achieved state of affairs it consists in full inclusion of social groups on terms of equality across all of the main institutions of social life. As a set of activities in our non-ideal world, it consists in a range of modes of intergroup interaction, including (1) spatial integration: sharing social spaces and facilities, (2) formal integration: intergroup cooperation toward shared goals in formal organizations such as firms, schools, sports teams, government offices, and the armed forces, with members of all groups participating in all formal positions of the organization in substantial numbers, enjoying all of the powers and entitlements of those positions, (3) political integration: intergroup dialogue, coalition-building, negotiation, and contention over public policies in the constitutive activities of democratic politics (political campaigns, elections, grassroots organizations, demonstrations, legislation, school board meetings, etc.) in which all groups have voice and significant bargaining power (ch. 5), (4) informal integration: intergroup affiliation in intimate relations as of friendship and marriage.

My book stresses formal and political integration as the key integrative activities that promote black desegregation and access to resources. I argue that spatial integration by itself, without the social engagement entailed by the other modes of integration, may provide access to physical resources such as safer neighborhoods and better housing, but that it does not improve blacks’ access to social capital, and may not provide the background conditions for cooperative interaction that formal integration supplies (pp. 117, 119-120, 126). The numerous studies I cite on the positive effects of formal and informal integration never suggest that whites’ experience in a single integrative activity or relationship purges them of all racial antipathies and stigmatizing stereotypes. Rather, they demonstrate that the effects of integration are incremental and probabilistic. Yet the positive effects on whites’ attitudes are measurable, and spread to some degree beyond the specific persons with whom whites engage. Hence, mere token integration is insufficient to generate positive effects (p. 151). For integration to have cumulatively observable positive effects, I argue that it must involve substantial representation of excluded groups and be assiduously practiced across multiple domains, in multiple modes.

Hence, when James disparages mere “proximity” as insufficient to secure respectful race relations, argues that her experience of being a token black professor in a white dominated institution has not transformed the consciousness of her white colleagues, that whites who have a single black friend do not necessarily acquire empathy toward all blacks, and that partial integration in some domains does not eliminate racism everywhere, she affirms rather than undermines my argument.

I spend a much of my book detailing the diverse paths by which different types of integration work their effects. For example, spatial integration gives blacks access to the richer resources available in areas from which they have been excluded. Formal and informal integration give blacks access to forms of social and cultural capital they need to obtain jobs and advance their careers (§6.2). Political integration involves the cross-racial coalition building needed to enable blacks to direct public resources to their communities. It also involves contentious activities, whereby blacks organize to demand fair treatment and hold white political actors accountable for their policies. Integrative activities, particularly in politics, do not necessarily involve warmth and consensus, but often do their constructive work through stressful contention and disagreement (§§5.2-5.3).

Hence, when James suggests that “countervailing voices of collective black political commitments (in coalition with sympathetic white persons) should . . . be the expected and desired norm of political interactions today,” and that “those of us interested in social justice should . . . fight for the redistribution of material resources to poor communities” and that “factionalism, conflict, and disagreement . . . [are] found at the root of a healthy, contemporary, large scale democracy” she affirms rather than undermines my argument. This is what political integration is about.

Beyond all of these effects, I stress the educative functions of integration. I reverse the stigmatizing narrative of integration’s educative effects, according to which ignorant blacks are uplifted by contact with enlightened whites with supposedly superior cultural values. It is mainly whites who need to be educated by blacks through integration. Throughout my book, I stress the corrupting effects of segregation on dominant groups. Segregation makes dominant
groups ignorant, bigoted, parochial, irresponsible, unjust and incompetent in interacting with stigmatized groups (pp. 108-9). It disables them from recognizing their own injustice, by insulating them from exposure to critique and accountability at the hands of the groups they exclude. Political integration, carried out through contentious and forceful expression of complaints of injustice and demands for justice, is the great vehicle whereby blacks have taught America to move closer to justice and to realize a more democratic society (§§5.2-5.3). Formal and informal integration have subtler educative effects, working more on implicit than explicit racial biases. These modes of integration undermine whites’ racial stereotypes by exposing them to and giving them an interest in recognizing heterogeneity among blacks. Formal integration, when raised to a critical mass across all occupational positions, undermines stereotypes that link whites to elite positions and blacks to subordinate positions. These are all cognitive improvements spurred by blacks exercising agency in integrated settings (§6.3).

The story I tell about American politics places blacks’ struggle for racial justice at the very center of American democratic development. The story I tell about democracy generally represents contention by integrated coalitions of the less advantaged with their more privileged allies as the engine of progress toward a more just and democratic order. Since schools are the places where students are taught about the history of American democracy and more generally about democratic values and processes, it follows from my account that schools should highlight blacks’ contributions to making America a more just and democratic society, and center attention on the ways democracies learn to educate and improve themselves by listening to the voices of the disadvantaged.

For this reason, I disagree with Jeffers’s representation of integration as a “huge blow to black dignity.” When all Americans, and not only African-Americans, are taught the pivotal contributions of African-Americans to realizing American ideals of equality and democracy, black dignity is enhanced. Centering black agency in American history also humbles white narcissistic narratives of self-enlightenment and superiority.

My book instantiated a conception of political philosophy and democratic theory that focuses attention on racial and other group injustices, and on the indispensable agency of subordinate groups in overcoming these injustices. This is plainly a challenge to mainstream analytic political philosophy, which mostly ignores race and marginalizes consideration of group injustices more generally. Hence I find it astonishing that James thinks I am “telling . . . stigmatized, oppressed people who make it to the hallowed halls for their educations or to make their livings . . . [to] dare not to question the nature of the disciplines and institutions who’ve welcomed you.”

James’s reading is so bizarrely contrary what I took myself to be doing that some diagnosis of this miscommunication is called for. Can my own theory account for my failure to communicate successfully? Along the lines I indicate in section 1, I speculate that my use of the term “integration,” which appears to have highly negative connotations in a substantial segment of the black community with which I have not had enough contact (although I have shared my work with other black scholars who have not objected to the term), led her to draw inferences about what I am saying from her own understanding of this term, rather than from my explicit disavowals of older understandings of integration and my extended discussion of how my usage, designed for analytic purposes, differs from cognate concepts. I thank Taylor for his reading of “integration” in the analytic mode I intended, for his insightful discussion of racial differences in how that term is understood, and for his useful proposals for how to construct a better vocabulary.

3. Methodology: Non-Ideal Theory, Mechanisms, and Motives

Non-ideal theory begins with the identification of moral and political problems in our world, moves on to analyzing and evaluating the causes of these problems, considers the evidence on what could block or dismantle those causes, and recommends strategies of improvement that lie within the capacities and resources of people today. Even better worlds than those that would be produced by these strategies might be imagined. Non-ideal theory sets those aside if it cannot identify feasible paths from our world to those more ideal worlds. The focus of non-ideal theory is on what we can and should do, given the constraints under which we currently live.
A distinctive feature of my way of doing non-ideal theory is to be meticulous and precise in differentiating the variety and interaction of discrete causal mechanisms underlying the problem at hand, by pursuing normative concerns in close conjunction with research in the social sciences and history. Only so can we identify specific causal levers that can block or undo those causes. So I am equally meticulous and precise in differentiating the variety of strategies that we can undertake, and in focusing close on what effects they may be expected to yield, in light of empirical research. Non-ideal theory demands splitting, not lumping.

For this reason I resist James’s complaint that I fail to engage in a “deep critique of capitalism” and James’s and Sheth’s complaint that I decenter “white hegemony,” white racism, and the history of violence in my account of current racial injustice. I do criticize Tilly for discounting violence in the historical construction of group inequality (p. 12). But non-ideal theory focuses on the problem here and now. While I note blacks’ current disproportionate subjection to police violence, white-on-black violence plays a much less central role in the reproduction of racial inequality today than in the slave era, or in the Jim Crow era of KKK terrorism, lynching, violent disenfranchisement, and white rioting against black neighborhoods.

One could, if one likes, call “white hegemony” the entire interlocking and mutually reinforcing set of mechanisms that reproduce systematic black oppression today. What I am showing, then, is how that hegemony works, in detail. As an analytic category, however, “white hegemony” is too lumpy to do the practical work non-ideal theory needs. It has been realized in too many different ways across historical eras and countries. What matters for action is the particular mechanisms realizing it today, so that we can identify specific counter-mechanisms. I also find “capitalism” too lumpy, and an inaccurate fit to the problem. To be sure, some of the mechanisms I identify, such as predatory lending practices that drain housing wealth out of black neighborhoods, are distinctively capitalist. But others are not. The tendency to stereotype is universal. Even some particular racial stereotypes cross continents and economic systems. For example, some of the stigmatizing stereotypes of blacks today originated in pre-capitalist Muslim stereotypes of their African slaves, which were communicated to Europeans (Davis 2003, pp. 12-13).

“White racism,” too, is either too lumpy, if it encompasses all of the mechanisms underlying black disadvantage, or too narrow, if it only includes explicit avowal of white supremacist ideology and conscious hatred for blacks. While varieties of pernicious conscious racism persist, we must come to grips with the considerable research documenting that many whites today are unaware of their racial biases and want to avoid discriminating against blacks. The mechanisms reproducing black disadvantage have shifted substantially since the end of Jim Crow.

My purpose in stressing these implicit mechanisms, and in stressing ethnocentrism over racial hatred, is not, as James supposes, to tell blacks to “forgive” whites. It is to identify fruitful strategies that can block or undo these mechanisms. Whites who are ethnocentric but not racist in the narrow sense can be induced to extend their ingroup-favoring biases to blacks by including blacks on their cooperative work teams. Whites who want to avoid discriminating but are unaware of their own biases behave more fairly when they need to reach decisions that they have to justify to blacks. Including blacks in their decisionmaking groups makes these whites more epistemically responsible in decisions affecting blacks, and more careful to avoid discrimination (§§6.3-6.4).

Another purpose in focusing on implicit mechanisms is to recruit well-meaning but self-ignorant whites as allies in the cause of racial justice. Calling them racist only alienates them. A vocabulary is needed to enable them to understand not just what they are doing but why their own self-understandings misrecognize what they are doing. The psychological language of ethnocentrism and implicit biases helpfully explains this in ways that can move them forward.

Sheth asks how whites can be motivated to support inclusion. She is right to stress that racial antagonism remains a significant force today. Nevertheless, racial attitudes have softened among a large segment of the white population, with ethnocentric biases overtaking racial hatred in ways that provide two openings for more inclusive strategies. First, many whites’ explicit endorsement of civil rights principles means that they really do want to avoid discriminating. They embrace an image of themselves as not racially biased. When they know they are being judged on how well they are living up to that image, many do take care to be more inclusive (pp. 50, 129-131).
Second, cooperating with diverse groups, while experienced as stressful for most people in the heat of the action, induces longer-term tendencies by members of all races to choose more racially inclusive social domains in the future (p. 127). Inclusion therefore builds on itself. While this is incremental, it is real, and can be nudged along by concerted action.

I have another reason for investigating causal mechanisms: to criticize the ideology that rationalizes black stigmatization and white neglect of systematic black disadvantage. The dominant stigmatizing narrative blames blacks for dysfunctional behaviors present in poor segregated black neighborhoods, such as gang violence and dropping out of school, claims that these behaviors are the main cause of black disadvantage, and claims that blacks alone are responsible for addressing these problems. In §4.3, I offer an explanation of these behaviors, appealing in part to an economic theory of norms, to demonstrate how their causes extend beyond the black community to the structures of segregation that oppress them. I stress the ways they reflect individual adaptation to severe external constraints and deprivations. James’s preferred explanation of school disengagement fits that pattern, so it is congenial and not opposed to my account. I also offer moral arguments questioning the assumption that if blacks have any responsibility at all for destructive behavior, the rest of society has no duty to help. This argument is addressed to elites leading public institutions, and to whites more generally, to explain why observed destructive behaviors taking place in segregated black neighborhoods do not justify neglect and inaction.

Sheth complains that the behaviors I consider are symptoms rather than causes of systematic black disadvantage, and that it is stigmatizing to focus on these behaviors as causes. I agree with her that these behaviors are symptoms: the whole point of my causal analysis shows how they are symptoms of larger structures of racial injustice imposed on black communities. At the same time these behaviors, especially violence and dropping out of school, are also proximate causes of worse outcomes for blacks. Furthermore, as William Julius Wilson (2009) has argued, arguments addressed to enlist agents outside the black community in the cause of racial justice will not get a serious hearing unless these “cultural” issues within the black community are addressed.

Sheth is also correct to observe that the same behaviors stigmatized by conservatives as causes of black disadvantage are cast in a different light when whites engage in them. Alcohol abuse and promiscuous sex are practiced more widely by wealthy white than by black college students, with no stigmatizing effects on the former. Nowhere is this double standard more evident than with respect to “stand your ground laws,” which seek to extend to the whole society the norms of violence in response to challenges to masculine honor that have wrought devastation in high-poverty segregated neighborhoods. While support for these laws is partially grounded in longstanding white racist fears of black men challenging white male honor, their main effect appears to be to increase killings of whites (McCellan and Tekin 2013).

James complains that I pathologize black culture by focusing on deviant behavior, and trivialize it by offering an economic theory of norms that fails to account for how people experience culture. These complaints misapprehend the point of my causal analysis in §4.3. I was not offering a general survey of all black culture, but criticizing the ideology that rationalizes black stigmatization and inequality. It is impossible to criticize this ideology without focusing on the behaviors that ground the stigma, and offering a destigmatizing account of those behaviors. James is correct to observe that my economic theory does not account for how people experience culture. As sociologists have long stressed, the meanings people attach to behaviors do not necessarily track or correspond to their causes. Causes of behavior are often opaque or misrecognized by the actors themselves, and by others. Because black stigmatization rests on causal attributions, to undermine the stigmatizing ideology requires that one offer an alternative causal account.

4. Respect, Black Pride, Black Community Development, and the Ordeal of Integration

My book argues that segregation plays a central causal role in reproducing three large types of racial injustice against blacks: deprivation of resources, educational, and economic opportunity; political disempowerment; and stigmatization. A concern with stigmatization—the pervasive disrespect inflicted on blacks in U.S. society—is a central theme of my book. I investigate the social bases of this disrespect, and stress the importance of inclusion for
expanding the social bases of respect beyond the black community to the whole society.

Among the social bases of disrespect are practices that discriminate not against blacks as such, but against blackness—for example, cultural expressions that are seen as black. I illustrate this phenomenon with respect to discrimination against certain black hairstyles in corporate settings and criticize this as a case of what I call secondary discrimination (p. 115). It is secondary not because it isn’t disrespectful or unjust, but because it is logically and causally derivative of primary discrimination against blacks as such. The context for my discussion of appearance norms in corporate settings is my larger critique of assimilation as a strategy for achieving racial equality. I criticize assimilation as “largely misguided” because racial inequality is caused by unjust race relations and not by cultural differences between blacks and whites (p. 114). In calling corporate appearance norms “marginal to the central problems of racial inequality,” I was therefore not calling for blacks to give up the struggle for respect and against secondary discrimination in this realm. I was rather criticizing assimilationism for supposing that racial equality would be advanced if blacks would adopt white cultural norms of appearance.1 The only specifically black cultural difference that I argued played a causal role in racial inequality was certain linguistic differences that tend to generate miscommunication between blacks and whites, at blacks’ expense. This is the only case in which I suggested that a kind of assimilation (convergence of interracial communication practices closer to white than black linguistic conventions) would promote inclusion and hence racial equality.

Enjoyment of the social bases of self-respect is critical to a flourishing life and a constructive sense of agency. When an oppressed community is deprived of those bases in the wider society, it is imperative that it cultivate those bases within its own ranks. I accept Jeffers’s thoughtful discussion of the legitimate connections between culture and racial ancestry, how these are cultivated in black community life, and how critical they are to black dignity. None of my criticisms of multiculturalist and black nationalist strategies is intended to deny or disparage those efforts—indeed, I acknowledged their importance (pp. 2, 183, 185). I have one and only one criticism of these strategies: that they fail to contend with the fundamental causal role of segregation in reproducing systematic black disadvantage in access to resources, political power, and the social bases of self-respect in the wider society. They are not wrong; they are incomplete.

James’s response exemplifies this failure of some in the multiculturalist and black nationalist left to squarely contend with the causal analysis I present in my book. Simply arguing for more resources to be directed to black communities ignores the larger political economy of segregated, disadvantaged communities. Segregation turns these communities into sieves: resources flow out at least as quickly as they enter (Fusfeld and Bates, 1984). Moreover, economic opportunity is not a matter of access to material resources only, but of expanding the scope of opportunities for cooperation beyond the bounds of one’s parochial community.

Jeffers and Sundstrom offer the most constructive and promising paths forward. I wholeheartedly agree with Jeffers that “we must balance the two vital and justifiable goals of black communal self-development and wide interracial contact, as these goals are not—in principle— incompatible.” I gladly take on board Sundstrom’s thoughtful and extended account of how festivals of social identity foster solidarity and community, and how community building provides a basis for inclusion.

Sundstrom offers a path forward that may allay Jeffers’s worry that my recommendations entail the tragic dissolution of black community life. In my book, I envisioned that, in the medium-to-long term, the assiduous practice of inclusion might end in a balance of local community/wider inclusion somewhat like what American Jews enjoy today. Jews are fully included across the institutions of American life, while continuing to enjoy flourishing distinctively Jewish institutions, celebrations, and spaces (pp. 113-114). While some Jews disagree about whether current trends and patterns of Jewish inclusion, particularly intermarriage, are striking the right

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1 I may have muddled the waters by also discussing appearance norms that self-consciously express an anti-corporate ethos, some of which are associated with blacks, others with whites. My point was to distinguish corporate policies that penalize such modes of appearance from policies that are racially discriminatory in penalizing employees for black cultural expression.
balance, or threaten to dangerously attenuate Jewish culture, most are not very distressed about it.

The paths of change for any group may differ and cannot be wholly predicted or controlled. Nor is anyone authorized to speak for their descendants. So the possibility of tragedy cannot be ruled out. Yet blacks have always had a substantially stronger preference for inclusion than whites have been willing to accommodate. I therefore consider it unlikely that the pace of inclusion would run ahead of blacks’ preferred balance of local community/wider participation. DuBois may have been right to give up on that aim in the 1930s, at the nadir of black power in America, as Jeffers argues. Yet the browning of America, the willingness of tens of millions of whites to vote twice to elect a black president, and the gradual softening of white racial animus suggest that the time has returned for a renewed push toward inclusion.

Works Cited


