remained low due to massive state subsidies, in particular for foodstuffs. Such a system could not go on for ever and sooner or later had to confront the accumulating social and economic problems. Gagarin's fate is instructive. In the tours that followed his space flight in 1961 his charm and wit won him world-wide popularity, but with the accession to power of the Brezhnev group in 1964 his star began to fall as the new leaders became jealous of his fame. Gagarin himself appeared disgusted with the veracity of the Brezhnev regime and its crumbling up of the arms race once again - he represented the genuinely peaceful face of peaceful coexistence. Afflicted by a growing drink problem, on 27 March 1968 Gagarin died when the MiG-15 jet he was piloting crashed. With him died the hopes of the 'children of the Twentieth Congress', those who believed in the USSR's ability to become a 'normal' open society. At the time (and for some, indeed, in retrospect), the Brezhnev years superficially appeared an oasis of calm and gradual improvement in the country's stormy twentieth century. It was, however, the calm of decay.

Document 9.1 The 1965 Reforms

The economic reforms of 1965, associated with the name of the prime minister, Alexei Kosygin, but drawing on the ideas of the economist Evsei Liberman advanced in Khruzhchev's last years, soon ran into the sand of bureaucratic obstruction. They suggested a recognition of the problems, but a failure of will to resolve them. The Central Committee plenum of 27–9 September 1965 framed the reforms as follows.

The serious inadequacy in industrial management is that administrative methods predominate over economic ones. Economic cost accounting [khozraschet, the buzz word of all reforms] in enterprises has largely a formal character, while the rights of enterprises in economic activity are limited.

The work of enterprises is regulated by a large number of plan indicators, which limits the autonomy and initiative of the enterprise collectives and reduces responsibility for improving the organisation of production. The system of material incentives for industrial workers provides few incentives to improve the general outcome of work of the enterprise, in raising the profitability of production and improving the quality of industrial production.

The territorial management of industry, while to some degree broadening the possibility of inter-sectoral specialisation and greater cooperation of industrial production within a given region, at the same time inhibited the development of sectoral specialisation and rational production links between enterprises in different economic regions, distanced science from production, and led to the fragmentation and complexity of the management of industrial sectors, so that they lost some effectiveness in their work.

To develop further industry and raise the level of social production ... an improvement in planning methods is required, the strengthening of economic incentives to improve industrial production, to raise the material incentives of workers to improve the work of their enterprises.

The CC plenum considers it essential that industrial management is organised on the sectoral principle, to create union republic and all-Union ministries for industrial sectors.

It is expedient to remove superfluous regulations in the work of enterprises, to reduce the number of plan indicators imposed on enterprises from above, to provide them with the necessary resources to develop and improve production, to improve the use of such economic instruments as profits, prices, bonuses and credit.

The whole system of planning, the management of enterprises and material incentives should be directed towards ensuring high rates of development of social production and to raising its efficiency. An important condition for achieving the stated aims is to create in enterprise collectives incentives to develop higher plan demands, improvements in the use of production resources, labour reserves, material and financial resources, the perfection of technology, the organisation of labour, and raising the profitability of production.


Document 9.2 Brezhnev on the Party and the People

More often than not Brezhnev appeared to enjoy the trappings of power rather than the substance of power itself. By the early 1970s he had made himself 'first among equals', yet failed to use his authority to resolve any of the problems facing the country. He himself fell seriously ill in 1976 and became increasingly distant from all but the pomp of power. This extract from a speech he delivered to the Central Committee plenum in December 1973 is typical of his wooden style, reflecting the lifeless ad dogmatic language that characterised the whole period. The slogan 'strengthening the links between the party and the masses', as vacuous as it was universal, became the catchphrase of the Brezhnev era.

In parallel we must resolve yet another important task - the stubborn struggle for the further affirmation of a genuine party style of work, a party approach in all spheres of economic activity. We cannot approach questions of the management of the economy, to questions of the improvement of this management, from a narrowly economic position. This for us is a party matter, a political matter, whose success to an enormous extent depends on the political atmosphere in all sections of our society. A party approach is inseparable from raising personal responsibility, from changing the attitude of cadres to party decisions ...
The Politburo of the CPSU’s CC expresses its firm belief that after the confirmation of the economic plan at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, after the publication of the Appeal of the Central Committee, our whole party with its whole energy will take up this task, will undertake an all-people socialist emulation at such a level when not only the leaders [peredoviki] of production but whole collectives will undertake higher obligations and will do everything for their fulfilment.

We have 380,000 primary party organisations, about 15 million communists. This is an enormous force. We need only know how to organise it correctly, reveal its limitless possibilities, make all party organisations, all communists, conscious and active fighters for the party’s policies. Then we will be able to achieve any, even the most complex, task! (Extended applause.)

I have already mentioned, and wish to underline yet again, that the task of party organisations consists of the constant strengthening of the links between the party and the masses, in the constant lively interaction with toilers so as to understand their needs and aspirations, so as to know how to explain to them the essence of the policies of our party, to know how to mobilise the masses to implement in practice our programme, the programme of building a communist society in our country, the programme of the struggle for peace and friendship between peoples. (Stormy, extended applause.)


Document 9.3 Détente and the Helsinki Accords

Détente is the name given to the period from the late 1960s to the late 1970s marked by a reciprocal improvement and regulation in relations between the superpowers, accompanied by intra-European détente and an improvement in intra-German relations. The high point of this period was President Richard Nixon’s visit to Moscow in May 1972 to sign the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty and SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty I), followed by Brezhnev’s visit to the United States the following year. The period culminated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held in Helsinki in August 1975. The Helsinki conference, and above all the rights enshrined in its Final Act, was to play a crucial role in the peaceful transcendence of Soviet-type socialism. The ‘three baskets’ at Helsinki dealt with security, economic cooperation and human rights; the USSR was so keen on the advantages bestowed by the first two (above all, confirmation of post-war borders and acknowledgement of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states) that it signed up to the third. Critics in society could now appeal to these rights, formally undersigned by the communist authorities themselves, to hold their own governments accountable. The ‘third basket’ agenda undermined the systems from within and without. In short, Helsinki first of all ratified ‘Yalta’, and then transcended it.

I Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty

The participating States will respect each other’s sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other’s right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations . . .

II Refraining from the threat or use of force

The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present Declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

III Inviolability of frontiers

The participating States regard as inviolable all one another’s frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.

IV Territorial integrity of States

The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States.

Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such constituting a threat or use of force. The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other’s territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognised as legal.

V Peaceful settlement of disputes

The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security, and justice . . .

VI Non-intervention in internal affairs

The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the
had been one of the key political scientists advising Khrushchev on the idea of establishing a 'state of all the people' (what he calls here the 'people's state') and he remained loyal to his vision of a modern developed socialism. Almost every postulate in his argument could be questioned, including his characterisation of national issues, the lack of any serious criticism of the electoral system, his reliance on technology (and in particular developments in computer science) to bail out the Soviet system, and above all the compliant tone of the whole 'developed socialism' approach, of which he was such an eloquent exponent. Later, during perestroika, the pusillanimity of this whole group of shestdesyatniki (1960s) 'reformers' at this time came to haunt them.

There are stages, periods and degrees in the development of socialist society. After the victory of the October Revolution, official documents spoke of the conquest of political power by the working class: the 1930s saw the creation of the foundation and, subsequently, the bases of socialist society; the 1950s saw the complete construction of socialism; finally, the 1970s are witnessing developed socialist society and the construction of the material and technical basis of communism...

Developed socialism is an independent, more or less protracted state in the transition to communism, a stage in which occur changes inherent in socialism as such, in which the advances of the scientific and technological revolution intertwine with the advantages of the socialist social system. Soviet society has just entered the period of the scientific and technological revolution, and a long period will be needed for the development of all aspects of social life on the basis of that revolution.

The idea of developed socialism is opposed to Maoist concepts of 'leaps' and 'communes' as the way to communism. These Maoist concepts ignore the fact that socialism must for a long time develop on its own base and are associated with the curtailment of socialist forms of economic and social life for the benefit of pseudo-communist (and in practice petty-bourgeois and even semi-feudal) reforms.

There is no need to dwell on the achievements of the Soviet economy. It is enough to recall the figures cited at the 24th Congress of the CPSU [March 1971]: the Soviet economy produces in one day a social product valued at two thousand million rubles, which is ten times greater than the daily output at the end of the 1930s. This provides new opportunities for the development of productive forces at the same time that society is making new demands on the economy. The economy is now developing in a more balanced and harmonious manner, and the population has a greater demand for material and cultural services.

As to qualitative indices, we should note that there are in social life key socio-political concepts that sum up the nature of a phenomenon and provide the basis for decisions important for society. Such concepts are, for example, the people's state, the scientific and technological revolution,
Document 9.5  The 1977 'Brezhnev' Constitution

If the Stalin Constitution had not explicitly granted the Communist Party a privileged status, this changed in the Brezhnev Constitution adopted on 7 October 1977. Article 1 reaffirmed that the country had become a state of all the people. Article 3 the principles of democratic centralism, while Article 6 provided a general formula for the role of the Communist Party in the Soviet state.

Article 1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of all the people, expressing the will and interests of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, the working people of all the nations and nationalities of the country.

Article 3. The Soviet state is organised and functions on the principle of democratic centralism, namely the electiveness of all bodies of state power from the lowest to the highest, their accountability to the people, and the obligation of lower bodies to observe the decisions of higher ones. Democratic centralism combines central leadership with local initiative and creative activity and with the responsibility of each state body and official for the work entrusted to them.

Article 6. The leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state and public organisations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people.

The Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the development of society and the course of the home and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great constructive work of the Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character to their struggle for the victory of communism. All party organisations shall function within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR.

Source: Konstitutsia (osnovni zakon) RSFSR (Moscow, Politizdat, 1980), pp. 5–6.

This only provided a general indication of the powers of the party in the system of soviets and ministries. The party–state relationship, as in other spheres of Soviet life, was governed more by convention than by statute. The CPSU was the kernel of the state, but it was potentially the state itself, although official Soviet thinking stressed that the Communist Party ruled but did not govern. The party was in effect the senior executive branch of the Soviet government where all decisions were made or confirmed: the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers acted as the junior administrative branches, implementing decisions taken within the appropriate party committee. Such overlapping and lack of definition of functions was a natural consequence of the constitution's rejection of the separation of powers. As if to
The failure of the official de-Stalinization is at the heart of the malaise. It is more than a decade now since, at the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev exposed Stalin’s misdeeds. That act could make sense only if it had been the prelude to a genuine clarification of the many issues raised by it and to an open nation-wide debate on the legacy of the Stalin era. This has not been the case. Khrushchev and the ruling group at large were eager not to open the debate but to prevent it. They intended the prologue to be also the epilogue of the de-Stalinization…

In the Soviet Union, we know, the revolution has survived all possible agents of restoration. Yet it seems to be burdened with a mass of accumulated disillusionment and even despair that in other historical circumstances might have been the driving force of a restoration. At times the Soviet Union appears to be fraught with the moral-psychological potentiality of restoration that cannot become a political actuality. Much of the record of these fifty years is utterly discredited in the eyes of the people; and no returned Romanovs are going to rehabilitate it. The revolution must rehabilitate itself, by its own efforts.


Within-system Reform and Beyond

There remained in the USSR hopes that the system could change from within. The samizdat Political Diary, edited by Roy Medvedev, for example, reflected the belief that the system retained an evolutionary socialist potential. Publishing a range of views, the journal believed that an enlightened public opinion in society, and the emergence of a reformist section in the elite, would allow the Soviet system to lose some of its coercive features while removing the restrictions that inhibited the creative potential of the economy and society.

Document 9.17 A Reformist Programme for Democratisation

An important document outlining a draft programme for the gradual democratisation of the Soviet system, echoing many of the themes of the Action Programme and anticipating in uncanny detail Gorbachev’s reforms in the late 1980s, was a letter dated 19 March 1970. Its authors were Andrei Sakharov (1921–89), a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences who had played a central role in developing Soviet nuclear weapons and the author of Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom (1968), Valerii Turchin, also a renowned physicist, and Roy Medvedev, the historian whose work on Stalinism, Let History Judge (1968), broke new ground in analysing Stalin’s dictatorial rule. He later summarised his ideas on the socialist democratisation of the USSR in his On Socialist Democracy (1971), which is cited below (Document 9.25). The letter identified the central problems in Soviet society and appealed to the leadership to achieve self-reform based on a programme of ideas that drew on many topical ideas. Its tone was loyal, internationalist and socialist. Sakharov soon abandoned hopes that the regime would reform itself, while Turchin was forced to emigrate in 1977. Quite apart from its recommendations for change, the document represented an acute and accurate portrait of the problems affecting the Soviet Union.

To L. I. Brezhnev, Central Committee of the CPSU; A. N. Kosygin, USSR Council of Ministers; N.V. Podgorny, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

Respected Comrades:

We are appealing to you on a question of great importance. Our country has made great strides in the development of production, in the fields of education and culture, in the basic improvement of the living conditions of the working class, and in the development of new socialist human relationships. Our achievements have universal historical significance. They have deeply affected events throughout the world and have laid a firm foundation for the further development of the cause of communism. However, serious difficulties and shortcomings are also evident.

This letter will discuss and develop a point of view which can be formulated briefly by the following theses:

1 At the present time there is an urgent need to carry out a series of measures directed toward the further democratisation of our country’s public life. This need stems, in particular, from the very close connection between the problem of technological and economic progress and scientific methods of management, on the one hand, and the problems of freedom of information, the open airing of views, and the free clash of ideas, on the other. This need also stems from other domestic and foreign political problems.

2 Democratisation must promote the maintenance and consolidation of the Soviet socialist system, the socialist economic structure, our social and cultural achievements, and socialist ideology.

3 Democratisation, carried out under the leadership of the CPSU in collaboration with all strata of society, should maintain and strengthen the leading role of the party in the economic, political, and cultural life of society.

4 Democratisation should be gradual in order to avoid possible complications and disruptions. At the same time it should be thoroughgoing, carried out consistently in accordance with a carefully worked-out programme. Without fundamental democratisation, our society will not be able to solve the problems now facing it, and will not be able to develop in a normal manner…
Over the past decade menacing signs of disorder and stagnation have begun to show themselves in the economy of our country, the roots of which go back to an earlier period and are very deeply ingrained. There is an uninterrupted decline in the rate of growth of the national income... Defects in the system of planning, accounting, and incentives often cause contradictions between the local and departmental interests and those of the state and nation. As a result, new means of developing production potential are not being discovered or properly put to use and technical progress has slowed down abruptly. For these very reasons, the natural wealth of the country is often destroyed with impunity and without any supervision or controls: forests are levelled, reservoirs polluted, valuable agricultural land inundated, soil eroded or salinised, etc. The chronically difficult situation in agriculture, particularly in regard to livestock, is well known. The population’s real income in recent years has hardly grown at all; food supply and medical and consumer services are improving very slowly, and with unevenness between regions. The number of goods in short supply continue to grow. There are clear signs of inflation.

Of particular concern regarding our country’s future is the lag in the development of education: our total expenditures for education in all forms are three times below what they are in the United States, and are rising at a slower rate. Alcoholism is growing in a tragic way and drug addiction is beginning to surface. In many regions of the country the crime rate is climbing systematically. Signs of corruption are becoming more and more noticeable in a number of places. In the work of scientific and scientific-technical organisations, bureaucratism, departmentalism, a formal attitude toward one’s tasks, and lack of initiative are becoming more and more pronounced...

What is wrong? Why have we not only failed to be the pioneers of the second industrial revolution, but have in fact found ourselves incapable of keeping pace with the developed capitalist countries? Is it possible that socialism provides fewer opportunities for the development of productive forces than capitalism? Or that in the economic competition between capitalism and socialism, capitalism is winning?

Of course not! The source of our difficulties does not lie in the socialist system, but on the contrary, it lies in those peculiarities and conditions of our life which run contrary to socialism and are hostile to it. The source lies in the antidemocratic traditions and norms of public life established in the Stalin era, which have not been decisively eliminated to this day...

The overwhelming majority of the intelligentsia and the youth recognise the need for democratisation, and the need for it to be cautious and gradual, but they cannot understand and justify measures of a patently antidemocratic nature. And, indeed, how can one justify the confinement in prisons, camps, and insane asylums of people who hold oppositionist views but whose opposition stands on legal ground, in the area of ideas and convictions?

In many instances, there was no opposition involved, but only a striving for information, or simply a courageous and unprejudiced discussion of important social questions. The imprisonment of writers for what they have written is inadmissible. It is also impossible to understand or justify such an absurd and extremely harmful measure as the expulsion from the Soviet Writers’ Union of the most significant popular writer [Solzhenitsyn], who has shown himself to be deeply patriotic and humane in all that he does. Equally incomprehensible is the purging of the editorial board of Novy Mir, around which the most progressive forces in the Marxist-Leninist socialist tendency had rallied.

It is indispensable to speak once again about ideological problems. Democratisation, with its fullness of information and clash of ideas, must restore to our ideological life its dynamism and creativity – in the social sciences, art, and propaganda – and liquidate the bureaucratic, ritualistic, dogmatic, openly hypocritical, and mediocre style that reigns in these areas today.

A course toward democratisation would bridge the gulf between the party and state apparatus and the intelligentsia. The mutual lack of understanding will give way to close cooperation. A course toward democratisation would inspire a wave of enthusiasm comparable to that which prevailed in the 1920s. The best intellectual forces in the country would be mobilised for the solution of economic and social problems...

We propose the following draft programme of measures which could be realised over a four-to-five-year period:

1 A statement from the highest Party and government bodies on the necessity for further democratisation and on the rate and means of achieving it. The publication in the press of a number of articles containing a discussion of the problems of democratisation.
2 Limited distribution (through Party organs, enterprises and institutions) of information on the situation in the country and theoretical works on social problems which at the present time would not be made the object of broad discussion. Gradual increase of access to these materials until all limitations on their distribution have been lifted.
3 Extensive, planned organisation of complex industrial associations with a high degree of autonomy in matters of industrial planning, technological processes, raw material supply, sale of products, finances and personnel. The expansion of these rights for smaller productive units as well. Scientific determination after careful research of the form and degree of state regulation.
4 Cessation of interference with foreign radio broadcasts. Free sale of foreign books and periodicals. Adherence by our country to the international copyright convention. Gradual expansion and encouragement of international tourism in both directions (over a three- to four-year period),
expansion of international postal communications, and other measures for broadening international communications, with special emphasis in this regard on member nations of Comecon.

5 Establishment of an institute for public opinion research. The publication (limited at first but later complete) of materials indicating public attitudes on the most important domestic and foreign policy questions, as well as of other sociological materials.

6 Amnesty for political prisoners. An order requiring publication of the complete record of all trials of a political character. Public supervision of all prisons, camps and psychiatric institutions.

7 Introduction of measures to improve the functioning of the courts and the procuracy and to enhance their independence from executive powers, local influences, prejudices and personal ties.

8 Abolition of the indication of nationality on passports and questionnaires. Uniform passport system for the inhabitants of cities and villages. Gradual elimination of the system of passport registration, to be accomplished simultaneously with the evening up of economic and cultural inequalities between different regions of our country.

9 Reforms in education: increased appropriations for elementary and secondary schools; improving the living standard of teachers and increasing their autonomy and leeway to experiment.

10 Passage of a law on information and the press. Guaranteeing the right of social organisation and citizens’ groups to establish new publications. Complete elimination of prior censorship in every form.

11 Improvement in the training of leadership cadres in the art of management. Introduction of special managerial training programmes on the job. Improvement in the information available to leading cadres at all levels, increasing their autonomy, their rights to experiment, to defend their opinions, and to test them in practice.

12 Gradual introduction of the practice of having several candidates in elections to party and Soviet bodies on every level, even for indirect elections.

13 Expansion of the rights of Soviets; expansion of the rights and the responsibilities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

14 Restoration of the rights of those nationalities deported under Stalin. The re-establishment of the national autonomy of deported peoples with the opportunity for them to resettle in their homeland (in those cases where until now this has not been realised).

15 Measures directed toward increasing public discussion in the work of governing bodies, commensurate with the interests of the state. Establishment of consultative scientific committees to work with the government bodies at every level, such committees to include highly qualified specialists in the different disciplines . . .

Respected comrades! There is no way out of the difficulties now facing our country except a course toward democratisation, carried out by the Communist Party in accordance with a carefully worked-out plan. A turn to the right – that is, a victory for the forces that advocate a “stronger administration, a ‘tightening of the screws’” – would not only fail to solve any of the problems but, on the contrary, would aggravate them to an extreme point and lead our country into a tragic impasse. The tactic of waiting passively would ultimately have the same result. Today we still have the chance to set out on the right path and to carry out the necessary reforms. In a few years it may be too late. The recognition of this is a necessity on a nationwide scale. The duty of all who see the causes of these problems and the road to their solution is to point out this road to their fellow citizens. Understanding the need for, and possibility of, gradual democratisation is the first step along the road to its achievement.


This could be taken as a blueprint for Gorbachev’s reforms a generation later. By then the crisis symptoms identified here had become much sharper, and the proposed piecemeal remedies less convincing. Later that year (4 November 1970) Sakharov, Valeri Chkalide and Andrei Tverdokhlebov formed the Committee for Human Rights in an attempt to ensure that the regime obeyed its own laws in the sphere of human rights guided, as they put it, by the “humanist principles of the Universal declaration of Human Rights”, adopted by the United Nations in 1948. Chkalide was forced to emigrate in late 1972, but Sakharov remained a thorn in the Soviet regime’s side until in the early 1980s he was sent into internal exile to Gorkii (now renamed Nizhni Novgorod).

Document 9.18 Rostropovich on Solzhenitsyn

The award to Solzhenitsyn of the Nobel Prize for literature on 8 October 1970 was treated by the party leadership as a ‘provocative act’, and a ‘top secret’ (sovshennosekretnoy) order was given for a campaign to be launched to discredit the author and to argue that the award was not a literary but a political act. The cellist Mstislav Rostropovich sheltered Solzhenitsyn, and in an open letter on 31 October 1970 he condemned the intellectual closure of the period.

Dear Comrade Editor,

It is no longer a secret that A. Solzhenitsyn spends most of his time in my house not far from Moscow. I witnessed his expulsion from the Union of Writers at the very time when he was working hard on the novel [August] 1914, and now comes the award of the Nobel Prize to him and the
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newspaper campaign about this. It is the latter that forces me to take up my pen to you.

This is already the third Soviet author to receive the Nobel Prize, but in two out of the three cases [Solzhenitsyn and Boris Pasternak] we consider the award a dirty political game, but in one (Sholokhov) as the due recognition of a world-class author... People should not be forced to condemn what they quite simply have not read or heard. I remember with pride that I did not attend the meeting of cultural figures... where they abused B. Pasternak and designated a speech for me to make criticising Doctor Zhivago at a time when I had not even read it...

Every person should have the right without fear to think independently and to speak out on what they know, what they have personally thought, lived through, and not only weakly vary what has been instilled into them. We will inevitably achieve free thought without prompting and pressure...

Mstislav Rostropovich


Document 9.19 The View from Within

The KGB reported on the views of the population, and these declassified files now provide a rich source of information about the deep processes going on in Soviet society. On 21 December 1970 Andropov, the head of the KGB since 1967 and future leader of the USSR, reported on the situation, in particular the sedition attempts by parts of the intelligentsia to achieve 'democratic socialism'.

Top Secret

Among the scientific, technical and part of the creative intelligentsia documents are being passed around in which various forms of 'democratic socialism' are being propounded. According to one of these schemes of 'democratic socialism', whose author is Academician Sakharov, the evolutionary path of internal political development of the USSR will inevitably lead to the creation in the country of a 'truly democratic system'. As part of this, mathematicians and economists should in good time develop its model so that it could be a synthesis of what is possible in existing socio-political systems.

In a number of projects for the 'democratisation' of the USSR the 'restriction or liquidation of the monopoly power of the CPSU and the national development of an opposition loyal to socialism' is envisaged. Their authors and distributors consider that the current level of development of socialist democracy should allow opposition views to exist, and demand legal opportunities to express views that disagree with the official course to be made available. From this perspective they declare that criminal legislation that prosecutes anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda or the distribution of obviously false fabrications, smearing the Soviet state and its social system, is unconstitutional.

On the basis of the preparation and distribution of 'samizdat' literature there is taking place a noticeable consolidation of like-minded persons, and there are marked indications of attempts to create something like an opposition.

Approximately towards the end of 1968–early 1969 there emerged out of oppositionally minded elements a political core, called the 'democratic movement', which in their view has the three characteristics of an opposition: they 'have leaders, activists and are based on a significant number of sympathisers, not taking on the clear shape of an organisation, but set themselves clear aims and choose a suitable tactic, to gain legality'.

The main aims of the 'movement', as formulated in the thirteenth issue of The Chronicle of Current Events issued by the Moscow group of the 'democratic movement' headed by Yakir, is 'the democratisation of the country by developing in people democratic and scientific convictions, resistance to Stalinism, self-defence from repression, the struggle against extremism of whatever sort'.

Sources: Istochnik, no. 2, 1994, pp. 75–6; Rossiya, kotoruyu my ne znali, p. 327.

It goes without saying that Andropov stressed that the KGB was taking 'the necessary measures' to suppress the movement, but (indicative of a more sophisticated approach) called for the ideological apparatus to devise ideological and political measures to neutralise the movement and to deal with the political factors that allowed samizdat material to be distributed. On 21 June 1972 Petr Yakir was arrested and charged under article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, covering 'anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda'. His father, General Iona Yakir, a hero of the Civil War, had been shot in 1937 along with most of the rest of the Red Army high command. At the time of his arrest Petr Yakir had stated: 'If I 'confess', that means they have tortured me; if I 'commit suicide', that means they have murdered me'. After interrogation in the notorious Lefortovo gaol he is alleged to have recanted in December 1972, and in a 'show trial' in August 1973, he and his co-defendant Viktor Krasin made public confessions and received light sentences.

Document 9.20 Bukovsky – In the Camps

Arrested as a student in the early 1960s for political activities and first sentenced in 1963, Vladimir Bukovsky spent twelve years in the Soviet nightmare world between the Gulag and psychiatric hospitals. The scene of his struggle was the Gulag, fighting for every right and benefit possible, seeking to use the system against itself. The role of the West as a conduit and echo chamber for Soviet dissident demands and concerns is highlighted here. It was pressure from the West that led to his expulsion in December 1976, in exchange for the Chilean communist leader Luis Corvalan.