IRAN’S NUCLEAR POLITICS

By Jim Walsh

On July 20, 2006, Security Studies Program Research Associate Jim Walsh testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Iran’s nuclear program. In his remarks, Dr. Walsh addressed the nature of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the current state of the negotiations between Europe and Iran, U.S. policy options, and the role of Congress in resolving the issue. The following excerpt is taken from the first part of the testimony. Dr. Walsh traveled to Iran in February 2006 to meet with government officials and academic analysts, and was part of a group of experts that met with Iran’s President Ahmadinejad in New York in September 2006.

Western analysts know little about Iran’s nuclear program and the decision-making process that governs it. There are multiple centers of political power in Iran, including the Supreme Leader, the President, the Grand Ayatollahs, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) and intelligence apparatus, the Majlis, the former President, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the bazaar, and public opinion. Given our ignorance of how these actors make nuclear policy, we should be wary of those who claim to know what Iran wants.

The Emergence of Ahmadinejad

One of the most important developments in the last year has been the election of President Ahmadinejad, who is known in the United States for his deeply troubling remarks regarding Israel and the Holocaust and aggressive rhetoric on the nuclear issue. Within Iran, however, his political identity is rooted primarily in domestic, not foreign, policy. His core issue is economic populism, including the redistribution of wealth, eradicating corruption, and anti-elitism. Ahmadinejad improved his political position during his first year, winning points for being the first president to travel to the provinces and meeting with local people. His fervor and willingness to replace elements of the bureaucracy have helped con-
solidate his image as a politician willing to challenge the old elite.

Ahmadinejad’s relations with other centers of power have been less successful. Despite the election of a new, harder line Majlis, relations between the President and the legislature are not strong. Ahmadinejad also appears to have alienated several Grand Ayatollahs. This unhappiness stems from his lack of respect for religious protocol, his denial of the traditional political access that Grand Ayatollahs have enjoyed, and the President’s unorthodox religious views regarding the 12th Imam. Of course, attitudes toward Ahmadinejad are not uniform. He has some support among senior clerics. More importantly, the Grand Ayatollahs are reluctant to voice their displeasure while the President enjoys the support of the Supreme Leader.

Perhaps the most important dimension in Iranian politics is the relationship between Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. The Supreme Leader is the dominant player. It is worth remembering that Ahmadinejad, unlike his predecessors, is not a cleric. This is noteworthy in a theocracy, where the most important political actor is a religious figure. That said, Ahmadinejad’s lesser position has not prevented him from indirectly challenging the Leader on occasion and taking on issues not delegated to him, such as the nuclear program. The Supreme Leader tolerates Ahmadinejad’s antics because both are very conservative and because Ahmadinejad is popular with segments of the populace, like the poor and many young people, not recently supportive of the revolution. Given Khamenei’s position, he can allow Ahmadinejad to act out, and then if political winds change, quickly disassociate himself from the President.

So far, Ahmadinejad has adopted a short-term strategy, one that could crash and burn before his term is up. As a populist challenging the elites and the old guard, he begins from a tenuous position. In other countries, populists who suddenly come to power have had to find a way to co-opt at least part of the bureaucracy and traditional leadership to build a basis for governing. So far, Ahmadinejad has not reached out to these groups.

As an economic populist, he has made expensive promises about redistributing wealth, but his statist economic policy and provocative foreign policy will likely scare off badly needed foreign investment. High oil prices have brought cash, but absent investments in infrastructure and improvements in productivity, it will be difficult for Ahmadinejad to deliver on his core issue. One scenario is that Ahmadinejad’s popularity will decline, and he will leave after one term. Another is that, unable to deliver on his economic promises, Ahmadinejad might seek to provoke a crisis with the United States. Some
In October 2006, the Center for International Studies—together with the Bloomberg School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University and the School of Medicine at Al Mustansiriya University in Baghdad—released a controversial study on the number of civilian deaths in Iraq since the start of the war.

Its central conclusion, based on a population-based field survey conducted in Iraq by public health researchers from Johns Hopkins and Al Mustansiriya, is that approximately 600,000 people have died violently above the normal mortality rate. Including non-violent deaths that can be linked to the war, the total is estimated to be more than 650,000.

The study, which was commissioned and written with the assistance of Executive Director John Tirman, was released the same week as a sister article, an epidemiological report published in the British medical journal, *The Lancet*. The article in *The Lancet*, which was written by members of the Johns Hopkins/Al Mustansiriya team, received a great deal of media attention, and continues to stir debate weeks after publication. Some of the issues being debated include the household survey method used and the baseline number of pre-war deaths in Iraq that was cited by the research team.

The Human Cost of the War in Iraq

“The Human Cost of the War in Iraq: A Mortality Study, 2002-2006,” the study released with the support of CIS, explains the methodology used by the Hopkins and Al Mustansiriya researchers, discusses how so many fatalities could be possible, looks at the overall status of health in Iraq, examines U.S. military injuries and deaths, and outlines policy implications of the findings.

“The study’s numbers are shockingly high, and this has naturally led to skepticism about the method,” said Tirman. “I am confident that this kind of household survey—a standard epidemiological tool—is exceptionally sound science. This does not mean that we shouldn’t explore the numbers, try to verify them in different ways, and so on. But no one has laid a glove on the method. And the responses from many knowledgeable people tell us that the scale of killing in Iraq is much greater than most of us had imagined. We have changed the discourse about violence.”

According to Tirman, “CIS commissioned the study because of our ongoing interest in the role of violence in Iraq, which seems to be difficult for scholars, military commanders, and policymakers to grasp. By getting a firmer hold on the scale of mortality, and the way Iraqis attribute the causes of death, we greatly expand our knowledge of war.”

This commentary by Professor Van Evera, Associate Director of the Center for International Studies, is adapted from his article in the Center's Audits of the Conventional Wisdom series, “The Bush Administration is Weak on Terror,” which was published in October 2006 and is available at http://web.mit.edu/cis/acw.html.

The U.S. public widely credits President Bush with toughness on terror. In fact, the Bush administration is weak on terror. It wages a one-front war against Al-Qaeda when effort on every relevant front is needed.

The administration focuses on a military and intelligence offensive abroad while neglecting five other fronts: homeland security, securing weapons and materials of mass destruction, winning the war of ideas across the world, ending conflicts that fuel support for Al-Qaeda, and saving the failed states where Al-Qaeda and like groups can find haven. The administration also weakened its offensive by alienating potential allies and diverting itself into a counterproductive sideshow in Iraq. Due to its errors the terror threat has increased since 9/11.

Front No. 1: The Military/Intelligence Offensive

The Bush administration’s counterterror campaign features the use or threat of force to destroy or coerce regimes that shelter Al-Qaeda, and the use of intelligence and police work to destroy Al-Qaeda’s global organization. The centerpiece of this offensive was the 2001 smashing of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had sheltered Al-Qaeda. This success denied Al-Qaeda access to training bases and isolated its leaders from their global network.

Other elements of the Bush offensive were less successful. The Bush team bungled the battle of Tora Bora in Afghanistan in December, 2001, allowing Osama bin Laden and other top Al-Qaeda leaders to escape. Then it offered too little economic and security assistance to the new Afghan government of Hamid Karzai. As a result, Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies have regained a strong presence in southern and eastern Afghanistan and in nearby Pakistan. This endangers all the gains won by ousting the Taliban in 2001-2002. Al-Qaeda is again creating the sanctuaries it needs to train its killers.

The Bush administration wrecked valuable Syrian cooperation against Al-Qaeda by its truculent stance toward Syria. After 9/11, the Syrian government shared intelligence with the U.S. that allowed the U.S. to thwart Al-Qaeda attacks on the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain and on the U.S. embassy in Ottawa, Canada. The Bush administration’s hostility toward Syria ended this cooperation.

And the administration’s war on Iraq consumed resources needed to battle Al-Qaeda. It also inflamed the Muslim world against the U.S., giving Al-Qaeda a big boost.

Thus even on the offensive the Bush team has botched key operations and lost focus on key objectives.

Front No. 2: The Defensive

The Bush administration’s homeland defense effort has large holes. The FBI remains focused on crime solving, not terror prevention. Local law enforcement has not been fully engaged in the struggle. The U.S. government still has no coordinated national watch list of terror suspects. Instead it maintains several different watch lists, feeding confusion among security personnel.

U.S. nuclear reactors and chemical plants remain vulnerable targets for terrorists. Clever attacks on these reactors and plants could kill tens of thousands or more. The U.S. food supply remains vulnerable to attack. U.S. insurance laws governing terror give businesses little incentive to harden their infrastructure against an attack. U.S. borders remain essentially open.

The CIA has been damaged by a campaign against CIA employees who were deemed unfriendly to the Bush administration.

This situation reflects the administration’s decision to focus on the offensive while doing
only enough on homeland security to give the appearance of action. At this point, homeland security is more a palliative to public fear than a real security program.

**Front No. 3: Securing Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Vast nuclear and biological weapons and materials remain poorly secured in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Enough nuclear materials remain poorly secured in Russia and other countries to make tens of thousands of Hiroshima-sized atomic bombs. Yet the U.S. spends only some $1.3 billion per year on the project (through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative, or CTR) to secure these materials and will not have it finished for years. The CTR program lacks a strong, visible leader who can make things happen in Washington and other capitals. Amazingly, in the two years after 9/11 no more loose nuclear weapons and materials were secured than in the two years prior—a testament to the Bush administration’s inattention to the problem.

**Front No. 4: The War of Ideas**

To defeat Al-Qaeda the U.S. must change the terms of debate in the Arab/Muslim world. Al-Qaeda finds recruits and haven because much of the Arab/Muslim public accepts its narrative. It will remain strong until that narrative is discredited.

This narrative is a farrago of historical fabrications and half-truths. It portrays the last century as a period of vast unprovoked one-way violence by the U.S. and other non-Muslim states against a benign Muslim world that was innocent of wrongdoing. If this narrative were true it would indeed justify Muslim rage. But violence between Muslims and non-Muslims has been a two-way street. Western states have committed great cruelties against Muslim societies. These include horrific barbarism by France, Britain, and Italy in their efforts during 1840-1962 to subdue colonies in Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and elsewhere; the 1953 U.S.-led coup in Iran; and U.S. policy toward Afghanistan during 1989-1992 that left it in flames.

On the other hand, Muslim Sudan’s government has slaughtered two million non-Muslim South Sudanese since 1983, and it supported the murderous Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. Muslim Indonesia murdered 200,000 Christian East Timorese during 1975-2000 and 400,000-500,000 of its non-Muslim Chinese minority in 1965. Muslim Turkey massacred 600,000-1,500,000 Christian Armenians in 1895 and 1915, in one of the great genocides of modern times. The recent history of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims is marred by great crimes committed by both sides.

Muslim extremists also have much Muslim blood on their own hands. Their crimes include the slaughter of several hundred thousand Muslims in Darfur by Sudan’s Islamist government since 2003, the killing of thousands of Afghan Muslims by the Islamist Taliban during its bloody rule, the killing of tens of thousands of Algerian Muslims by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), during 1992-1998, and the killing of thousands of Iraqi Shi’a by Sunni jihadists in Iraq since 2003. These crimes put the lie to the extremists’ claims of concern for the welfare of fellow Muslims.

Some of the western crimes cited by Al-Qaeda and other jihadis are invented. They describe the U.S. interventions in Somalia (1992-94), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999) as violent predations against Muslim populations. This portrayal grossly distorts the historical record. The U.S. intervened in each case to help Muslims. Its intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo ended Serb violence against those Muslim-majority populations. U.S. intervention in Somalia saved over 40,000 Muslim Somali lives.

In short, the Al-Qaeda narrative leaves much to correct. Muslim rage would be deflated if Muslims understood this. But Bush administration efforts to correct the record are half-hearted. The books and media products that would be produced in a serious war of ideas are not appearing. Missing are films of interviews with the hundreds of African victims maimed by Al-Qaeda’s 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Missing are documentaries on the murderous cruelty of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Islamist government in Sudan against their Muslim citizens. Bush Administration spending on public diplomacy is paltry—only $1.36 billion in FY 2006.

As a result, malignant misperceptions persist in the Muslim world. For example, large majorities in Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and continued on page 14
Précis Interview Series

BARBARA BODINE

Ambassador Barbara Bodine, a Visiting Scholar at CIS, spent much of her 34-year diplomatic career in the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula. Before coming to MIT, she directed the Governance Initiative in the Middle East at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. In 2003, she served as the first coordinator for post-conflict reconstruction for Baghdad and the central governates of Iraq. From 1997-2001, she was the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen. Prior to that appointment, Ambassador Bodine served as Deputy Principal Officer in Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War and, in 1990, as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion and occupation. She received the Secretary of State’s Award for Valor for her work in occupied Kuwait. Ambassador Bodine was the State Department’s Associate Coordinator for Counterterrorism Operations and, later, acting overall Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Dean of the School of Professional Studies at the Foreign Service Institute.

précis: You recently wrote that the policy of avoiding diplomatic contact with our enemies is misguided. Are there any exceptions?

BB: We should engage with—not shun—those governments with which we disagree the most, including having a permanent diplomatic presence in their capitals. Some of this is informed by my own history. I spent two-and-a-half years in Baghdad in the early 1980s, when we had no formal relationship. We were there under the Belgian flag. The living and working conditions were about as difficult as they could possibly be. But it was important to have American officials on the ground to not only deal with the government but to see and sense what was happening beneath the official gloss. We should have embassies in Tehran and North Korea. We should have had one in Iraq before the war. Diplomatic relations and a diplomatic presence are not prizes. They are in our own self-interest. We have had a mission in Havana for years. We had one in Stalinist Russia, Maoist China, apartheid South Africa, Nazi Germany and a host of other reprehensible places with reprehensible leaders. I think the fact that we did not have a presence in Tehran during the brief reformist presidency of Khatemi was one key reason we missed a possible opportunity to engage that regime. Are there exceptions? No, I don’t think so. It might not be a full embassy, there may not be an ambassador, but there should be someone on the ground.

précis: Do Americans misunderstand the notion of diplomacy? Do we expect too much of diplomats?
BB: I don’t think we expect too much from our diplomats. We expect too little. Exceptionalists and unilateralists dismiss diplomacy as no more than dictating to lesser states. To the extent such dictates don’t work, they judge diplomacy to have failed. There is the corresponding notion that any engagement is futile and thus diplomacy is a wasted effort. Diplomacy is not flashy, it is not public and it does not bring instant results. It is an incremental process, not an event, one that is most effective when it is less seen. It is the art of persuasion, but it also has to be one of unfettered candor. The goal is not some ill-defined “good relationship” as a goal in itself, but the development of a broad and deep relationship, that can prevent, mitigate, withstand and overcome crises.

For example, I was Ambassador in Yemen during Desert Fox—when we bombed Iraq in December 1998. The initial Yemeni reaction was one of knee-jerk public condemnation of our actions, although in private they professed to understand and accept the action. My staff and I spent days meeting with any and every Yemeni official, opinion-maker and academic we could find to explain our policy, our actions and the consequences of their public posture. Six weeks later, the Yemenis shifted from tacit support of Iraq to a white paper that formally recast the fundamentals of their policy to one of constructive partnership with the United States. That didn’t come from one conversation with one person, or from public admonitions, scolding or threats.

précis: Does the State Department need more resources?

BB: Are we underfunded and understaffed? Absolutely. In Yemen, a country the size of France, I had one economic officer, one political affairs officer, one public affairs officer, and my deputy. The State Department also badly distributed the resources it does have. Our embassies on the Arabian Peninsula are tiny in proportion to our interests and the complexity of the relationships. In the first Clinton Administration, an internal State review concluded that our embassies in Africa and Middle East should be significantly better staffed and that many in Western Europe were seriously overstuffed. However, an effort to rectify this imbalance died on the Secretary’s desk. The European Bureau successfully blocked the shifts. We are only now and by too little restructuring our presence to reflect a post-Cold War world, nearly 20 years after the end of the Cold War. But this is just a rearrangement of deck chairs so long as the base line of resources is not significantly enhanced.

précis: Should the United States promote democracy in the Middle-East? Is it possible?

BB: Someone once said that you can support it but you cannot export it. It is a truism that it must be indigenous and organic if reforms, change, governance are to be sustainable. That process is ongoing and predates the Iraq War and changes in Administration public policy.

Just a few examples from the Peninsula: Yemen has been a constitutional republic for 16 years and is listed by Freedom House as “partially free.” Kuwait has had an independent parliament for over 40 years. You have a constitutional monarchy in Bahrain. Unfortunately, democracy promotion as cast by the Administration has undermined indigenous efforts and embarrassed and isolated local reformers. It is not the goal but the methods, the rhetoric and the apparent inconsistencies bordering on perceived hypocrisy that undermines not just our efforts but those in the region. The President taking full credit for the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon is an example. This undercuts the indigenous nature of the reforms and makes them American, foreign and external and therefore invalid. “Democracy” as defined by the Administration tends toward events and processes, elections and parliaments, not the fundamentals.

I prefer to talk about governance. You need continued on next page
to get at the core values—accountability, transparency, participation, equality of opportunity and rule of law—not the externalities. These I believe are possible, even probable, with support, assistance and encouragement.

précis: When you went to Iraq in 2003, were you confident that we could erect a decent democratic government?

BB: I do not believe that was our policy or our goal when we went in. That evolved as other rationales fell away. The original plan was “imposed democracy”—a horrific oxymoron. The government was to be put in the hands of a group of exile leaders; we would be out, the occupation would be over, by August of 2003. Liberal democracy was not on the table. Those of us looking at grass roots, bottom-up democracy—local councils and that sort of thing—were told very bluntly we would not be there long enough for that. We were told that our goal was a “national government,” which meant, in this case, top down.

In April 2003, over dinner the night before we left for Baghdad, [retired Lt. General and initial director of Iraq reconstruction] Jay Garner laid out this plan: go in with our small teams, get the ministries up and running, appoint a government, a constitutional drafting committee, conduct referenda, hold parliamentary elections, and hand over to a fully sovereign Iraqi government by August. Someone finally asked, “Which August?” To believe you could do all of that in four months, it was absolute madness and stunning arrogance. Our goal was to get out as fast as we could. We had an accelerated redeployment plan for U.S. forces in the summer of 2003. When [second director of Iraq Reconstruction] Jerry Bremer took over in May 2003, we swung 180 degrees, from dumping it on the Iraqis to keeping the Iraqis as far from governing as possible. Both approaches were equally dismissive of the Iraqis. In one, they would accept an externally imposed junta; in the other, they would accept an externally imposed viceroy. There was a middle way, and we missed it.

précis: Given the ethnic and religious differences in Iraq, was the failure of the occupation inevitable?

BB: I do not think that Iraq was so inherently fractured that an occupation was a foreordained disaster. Though it is tattered and frayed, there is, and there certainly was, an Iraqi national identity. The Iraqis know who they are and are proud of the fact that they are not Iranians, Turks, or Syrians. The differences among Iraqis are long standing, but were not divisive. There is no history of this level of sectarian violence. On the contrary, if we had gone in with a commitment to political, economic and physical reconstruction process that brought the Iraqis in as partners in their own reconstruction, there is a chance we might today have a viable, functioning state, whether or not it fit some American standard of “liberal democracy.”

Arguments that Iraq can, should or already has divided into three states, and that the United States must recognize and accept this “fact” ignores the reality of Iraq. This is not Yugoslavia that reverted to traditional ethnic states. Iraq never has been three states. There are 27 ethnic and sectarian groupings, not three, and they do not in any way divide readily or easily geographically. The breakup of Iraq was not inevitable. I do not know when or how Iraq can walk back from the chaos that has engulfed it now.
CIS AND ALUMS STEER TOBIN PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY

CIS faculty members and alumni are key contributors to The Tobin Project, a non-profit organization based in Cambridge that links leading academics and policymakers as a way of developing “new ideas that will strengthen America.” The project begins with the premise that academics are far more effective in developing innovative policy proposals when working directly with elected officials who share their goals.

The Tobin Project organizes a network of professors and policymakers into working groups. The National Security Working Group’s academic contributors are primarily professors from the MIT Security Studies Program and SSP graduates. The group has posted on-line essays that map an alternative to current U.S. foreign and security policy.

CIS Associate Director Stephen Van Evera, chair of the National Security Working Group, edited the essays into a volume, *How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security*, and contributed two of his own: a summary essay and an article on counterterrorism. SSP Principal Research Scientist Cindy Williams wrote an article on national security budgeting, and SSP Director and Ford International Professor of Political Science Barry Posen wrote an essay on disengaging from Iraq.

Another contributor is Associate Professor of Political Science Ed Steinfield, who wrote an essay on China’s rise. Matthew Bunn, a Senior Research Associate at Harvard’s Kennedy School who is completing his Ph.D. at MIT, wrote a piece on preventing nuclear terrorism. SSP alumnus and Dartmouth government professor Benjamin Valentino provided an overview article on American foreign policy, and another SSP alumnus, Daniel Byman, Associate Professor and Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, wrote about counter-terrorism.

The Tobin Project is named for Economist and Nobel laureate James Tobin, a Yale professor who served in the Kennedy Administration and published regularly in both popular and scholarly journals. Professor Tobin told his graduate students that it was the responsibility of academics not only to produce outstanding research and to teach well, but also to serve the public.


---

**A new strategy would pursue U.S. interests in Iraq from the outside in, rather than the inside out. It would seek to shape rather than administer, to influence rather than control.**

—Prof. Barry Posen, “Iraq Disengagement”

**Never in modern times have the world’s great powers had less reason to compete with each other or more reasons to cooperate to solve problems that commonly threaten them all.**

—Prof. Stephen Van Evera, “American Foreign Policy for the New Era”

**Since September 2001, federal budgets for national security have climbed more than 50 percent in real terms. Unfortunately, much of the added money reflects “business as usual” rather than programs aimed at making the nation safer from today’s threats.**

—Cindy Williams, “Budgets to Make America Safer”
This essay is taken from a summary report of a conference on transnational violence that was held at MIT in April 2006 as part of the Center’s Persian Gulf Initiative, an effort to educate American academics and policy-makers about the Persian Gulf region.

The report, written by CIS graduate student Nichole Argo, whose own research deals with the motivations of suicide bombers, draws on research presented by conference participants, including: Scott Atran, Director of Research at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris; Mohammed Hafez, Visiting Professor at the University of Missouri; Ahmed Hashim, Associate Professor at the Naval War College; Quinn Mecham, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College; David Siddhartha Patel, a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Stanford University; Reuven Paz, Director of the Project for the Research of Islamist Movements at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya in Israel; and Roger Petersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT. The report (which is available at http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/pg1_0406_report.pdf) and this adaptation deal with the identity and motivations of jihadis, and the implications of the data for counterterrorism efforts.

The typical jihadi is competent, educated, and generally middle-class. He or she does not suffer depression or sociopathy, and outside of Palestine, most jihadis are married. Approximately 87 percent of today’s jihadis join the jihad outside their country of origin. Of those who remain in their home countries, 14 percent have worked for their country’s security services and 6 percent are or have been politicians. The most heavily represented nationalities among jihadis were Saudis (17 percent), Pakistanis (8.5 percent), Egyptians (7 percent), Moroccans (6 percent) and Iraqis (5 percent). Though concerns about “the next Afghanistan” are often voiced, as of yet there is little evidence that jihadis are heading to a particular locale.

During the past two years, we have seen an increasing number of self-constituting jihadi groups. They appear to radicalize through the Internet, and hold weak or no ties to previous terror organizations. Most recent terror attacks were carried out by small, decentralized groups who have little contact with each other. The network responsible for the 2004 Madrid bombings is typical. It was local and grew by chance and marriage—not with the strategic intentionality one might have expected. The perpetrators, like those who set off bombs in London and Bali in recent years, were not born poor nor were they poorly educated. Their religious knowledge appears to have been relatively shallow, and it is unclear whether acquisition of religious belief was a cause or consequence of their radicalization.

Why Do They Join?

In contrast to conventional wisdom claiming that organizational or educational indoctrination breeds terror, the data show that new jihadis are mostly drawn to jihad through friends and family networks.

Islamic religious ideology is often seen as the root cause of transnational terror. Because most jihadis engage in Salafi discourse, we assume that this ideology causes their violence. (Salafism is a puritanical form of Sunni Islam.) But several workshop participants argued that it is not the Salafi ideology that is motivating jihadis to take up violence. The Salafi message appears to play a strong role only in justifying and maintaining a commitment to jihad brought on by other factors.

Several facts support this argument. First, there are many Salafis who do not endorse violence. Second, today’s jihadis are usually not deeply religious. Participants noted that jihadis often lack basic knowledge of Islam, but seem to have gained self-esteem by joining the jihad.

A third reason to question the conventional wisdom on ideology and indoctrination is that we have seen this reasoning before, in the case of Communism and Nazism. Research has generally found, however, that social norms rather than ideology caused people to join these move-
ments. Similarly, research conducted by MIT Political Science Professor Roger Petersen on East European resistance movements has found that emotions like resentment and social norms, rather than more developed ideological beliefs, explain why people join such causes. In a similar vein, the author’s own research in the Palestinian territories found that communities that were small and home to a significant number of social groups were more likely to get involved in risky rebellion. Rebellion was a product of local norms of reciprocity. Ideology was important in maintaining the resistance after it organized.

These insights suggest that we need to rethink the common assumption that jihadi ideology motivates global terrorism. Jihad beliefs appear to be a vehicle of violence meant as social protest but not its engine.

Several conference participants identified emotions as important factors driving people to make jihad. Though rarely acknowledged in the rational choice models of much social science, emotions appear integral to terrorism. This role can be seen in jihadi media products, such as video and Internet-based writings, which argue that the West has attempted to humiliate and target the Muslim world and offer jihad as a means to regain pride. Biographical stories that create sadness and anger are the main method of attracting recruits in these media, not theological arguments.

**Lessons Learned**

In the battle to destroy terrorists’ capabilities, our primary focus should be on their motivations.

Police responses to terror in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Britain and the United States have often included arresting clerics or other designated “inciters.” But the empirics say that organized Islamic groups do not officially recruit, and self-radicalizers will still join the jihad absent recruits. Therefore, arresting clerics may not stem the tide of radicalization. Also, this approach often reinforces feelings of prejudice or unfair treatment within communities.

The conferees also agreed that we should pay greater attention to the way we use military force. Specifically, calculations about the utility of force may need to give greater weight to civilian casualties. Media images of the destruction and dead civilians wrought by Western militaries are ubiquitous throughout the Arab world—not just in jihadi videos. These images play right into the hands of jihadi narratives.

In Washington, it is hard to escape calls for a war of ideas. As one participant noted, “the implication is that we should just sell ourselves better—that with more information, people will see we’re good.” But current proposals evince little understanding of the jihadi psychology. For instance, one explicit U.S. goal is to counter Salafism. Yet studies show that the only way we have managed to bring people away from jihad was to show them a different Salafi way. In other words, at least insofar as changing the minds of jihadi goes, it might be more realistic to aid those who promote a less virulent extremist philosophy, rather than those who promote Western-style liberalism.

Likewise, proposals to plant stories in foreign presses or to build a coherent propaganda message are misguided. This is because people—and especially people trying to interpret actions across cultures—weigh consequences more than intentions. What we do is more important to foreign opinion than what we say.

What then can we do? The most successful thing the United States has done lately for its image in the Muslim world, tsunami relief in Indonesia, was not intended as public relations. After the relief effort, support for a war against terror increased, and support for terror went down. The key to the tsunami relief success is that it was not spoken of as part of a U.S. strategy to win hearts and minds. Because many foreigners so mistrust U.S. intentions, any efforts construed as part of a U.S. strategy are likely to fail.
HUDA AHMED
Continued from page 1

Amman, the Office of Homeland Security has total discretion in allowing visitors to enter the U.S., and determining the length of time they may stay. This is just one of the many things we learned trying to get Huda to the U.S.—a process that took six months.”

About Ms. Ahmed’s arrival, CIS Executive Director John Tirman said, “It is a tremendous opportunity for our Center—and the larger community at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—to welcome Huda Ahmed to Cambridge. She is already a distinguished reporter, and has shown great courage covering the war in Iraq. I am certain we will learn a lot from her about her country and the conflict there.”

A native Iraqi and a graduate of Baghdad University’s College of Languages, Ms. Ahmed became a reporter for Knight Ridder in Baghdad in 2004. Prior to that, she worked in Baghdad as an interpreter, researcher and reporter for The Washington Post and as a translator for The Daily Baghdad Observer and the Al Jumhuriya Daily.

Knight Ridder recognized Ms. Ahmed in 2004 for extraordinary bravery in covering combat during the siege of Najaf in southern Iraq, where she and a fellow reporter were trapped overnight in a rebel-controlled shrine. In a sardonic nod to the dangers of her reporting assignments, Ms. Ahmed told the Neuffer award committee that in addition to reading, computers and climbing, her interests include “survival.”

The Elizabeth Neuffer Fellowship is named for the Boston Globe reporter who was killed on assignment in Iraq in 2003. Ms. Ahmed is the second recipient of the annual fellowship, which is awarded to female journalists who have a demonstrated dedication to and talent for covering human rights and social justice issues.

OYE TO LEAD GROUP ON SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY

Professor Kenneth Oye, Director of the Center’s Political Economy and Technology Policy Program, one of the Principal Investigators of the NSF-funded Program on Emerging Technologies (PoET), and a former Director of CIS, has been named co-leader of the Human Practices Thrust of SynBERC, the Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center. He will be working with Professor Paul Rabinow of the University of California at Berkeley.

SynBERC is a multi-institution research effort to lay the foundation for synthetic biology. Professor Oye’s group will look at that discipline in the frame of human practices—specifically, the ways that economic, political and cultural forces may affect development of the field, and ways in which synthetic biology could have an impact on human security, health and welfare as a result of new objects it creates. More information is available at: http://www.synberc.org/humanpractices.html.
MISTI LAUNCHES NEW PROGRAM IN SPAIN

The MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives program (MISTI) has added an eighth country program, in Spain. Joining the MISTI programs in China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan and Mexico, MISTI-Spain has begun preparing MIT students for internships with Spanish companies, research institutions and university labs.

MISTI-Spain is also taking steps to strengthen the ties between Spain’s corporate and academic sectors and the MIT community, through workshops, collaborative research, lectures, and other events at MIT and in Spain.

Opportunities in Madrid and Barcelona

The new program currently supports two pre-existing study abroad opportunities in Spain: one in Madrid that runs during the spring semester, and one for Chemical Engineering and Chemistry students in Barcelona at the Institut Quimic de Sarria (IQS).

Students who participate in MISTI-Spain will complete Spanish language training in the Foreign Languages and Literatures Section at MIT. Students are selected based on the recommendation of their academic advisors. Interested companies receive the students’ paperwork. After they select a potential candidate, they send a short project proposal. The company and the student then reach an understanding about the details of the proposed internship. Interns receive a stipend and travel support.

MISTI Spain’s Directors are Mercedes Balcells-Camps, a Postdoctoral Associate at the Harvard-MIT Division of Health Sciences & Technology; Manuel Martinez-Sanchez, a professor in MIT’s Department of Aeronautics & Astronautics; and Aero-Astro Professor Jaime Peraire, director of MIT’s Aerospace Computational Design Laboratory. Griselda Gomez is the program coordinator. For detailed information on MISTI Spain, see http://web.mit.edu/mit-spain/ or email merche@mit.edu.

SSP RECEIVES CARNEGIE SUPPORT AND PARTNERS WITH CSIS

In June, the MIT Security Studies Program received a $600,000 two-year grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The funds are for institutional support. The Carnegie Corporation of New York has supported SSP for more than a decade. According to SSP Associate Director Owen Cote, “The Carnegie Corporation’s grant for the Security Studies Program is central to our mission of doing research and training graduate students.”

In recent months, SSP has teamed up with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to examine the development and fielding of large, complex defense systems. “Organizing for a Complex World: Designing, Developing and Deploying Complex Weapon and Net-Centric Systems—Lessons of the Past and the Way Forward” will include six bi-monthly workshops and produce a handbook for policymakers. The effort involves meetings in Washington and the participation of specialists from government, industry, and academia. Pierre Chao of CSIS and recently retired MIT Professor of Public Policy and Organization Harvey Sapolsky are the co-leaders.
Indonesia still do not believe that groups of Arabs carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. U.S. efforts to destroy Al-Qaeda cannot succeed while such attitudes endure.

**Front No. 5: Ending Inflammatory Conflicts**

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict inflames Arabs and Muslims against the United States. Al-Qaeda exploits the conflict with great success in its propaganda. Hence the U.S. must move credibly to end it. The Bush team should frame its own final-status peace plan. That plan should accord with the major peace plans of recent years—the Ayalon-Nusseibeh plan of 2003, the Clinton bridging proposals of December 2000, and others. The administration should then use carrots and sticks to persuade both sides to agree. And it should develop a strategy for strengthening moderates and weakening extremists on the Palestinian side.

The U.S. should also move to dampen other conflicts in the Mideast and Muslim worlds, like those in Kashmir and Chechnya, as Al-Qaeda exploits them all by painting Muslims participants as victims, whether or not they are. Hence the United States should be the great maker and builder of peace in the region.

Instead the Bush administration has done little to push peace. It has offered no final-status peace plan for Israel-Palestine and done little else to calm the conflict. Nor did it press for peace in Kashmir and Chechnya.

**Front No. 6: Saving/Resuscitating Failed States**

Al-Qaeda and other terror groups grow and thrive in failed states. They use failed states as havens where they can establish secure bases that can mass-produce trained, motivated killers. Al-Qaeda grew into a monster in the 1990s because it found haven in Afghanistan, where it trained thousands of terrorists. Yet the Bush administration has not addressed dangerous state failures in the Mideast region. As a result, failed states have proliferated.

Five failed or semi-failed Mideast-region states now pose a danger: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Lebanon, and Iraq. All are failing partly because the Bush administration has done little to sustain them. If they remain failed, all may serve as havens for Al-Qaeda or other terrorists.

**Still Missing: A Strong Counterterror Policy**

Before 9/11, the Bush administration virtually ignored the terror threat. The 9/11 attack should have cured the administration’s torpor toward terror, but it persists. The administration talks tough but does too little. The U.S. should devote all needed energy to defeat Al-Qaeda. This requires action on every relevant front. The U.S. should also refrain from further diversions from efforts against the Al-Qaeda network and other jihadi terrorists. For example, a military confrontation with Syria or Iran should be avoided. Al-Qaeda is the greatest danger we face and defeating it must be our top priority.
have suggested that Ahmadinejad might welcome American air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities for this reason.

Other changes in the internal political balance of power may produce changes in policy and possible opportunities for rapid shifts in US-Iranian relations. This December’s Assembly of Experts election could affect the distribution of political power, especially if Rafsanjani runs and wins. Similarly, the Supreme Leader’s retirement or the Presidential election in 2009 could influence the direction of Iranian policy.

Like other countries in the nuclear age, Iran’s domestic constituency for nuclear technology consists of multiple players with varying ambitions.

Many Players to Watch

Like other countries in the nuclear age, Iran’s domestic constituency for nuclear technology consists of multiple players with varying ambitions. Some actors want a complete fuel cycle for purely civilian use; others want a complete fuel cycle as a hedge, i.e., for the development of nuclear weapons somewhere down the road if events warrant. A third group simply wants nuclear weapons.

Keep in mind that Ahmadinejad has no formal role in nuclear policy. However, he may have gained power in this area for himself through his statements. But so far, his role appears to be more as spokesperson than a policy decider.

The Supreme Leader is the ultimate decision-maker on nuclear policy, though in terms of day-to-day work, the principal actor is the Supreme National Security Council Secretary, Ali Larijani. Larijani is said to enjoy the confidence of the Supreme Leader and is thought to be very conservative but pragmatic. Khamenei apparently has a genuine interest in nuclear energy and may harbor views not unlike those heard during the heady days of the 1970s, e.g., nuclear energy is the key to economic progress; nuclear energy is tantamount to technological development and independence. These views appear to be widespread, and are reflected in media coverage and elite circles. They may be reinforced by a suspicion of U.S. motives—created in part by the fact that the U.S. government tolerated nuclear development under the Shah (including enrichment) but now opposes it.

The Supreme Leader’s views concerning nuclear weapons probably represent a mix of ideas. On the one hand, it is said that the Supreme Leader issued a secret fatwa some years ago in response to a military inquiry regarding nuclear weapons. The fatwa is said to cite Koranic principles that constrain the use and possibly the development of nuclear weapons. Such a fatwa would be consistent with previous judgments and reflect a fairly strong set of Islamic principles that appear to rule out the use of nuclear weapons in all but the most extreme situations. On the other hand, the fatwa itself has been described as sufficiently vague that the restraint may not prove very onerous.

President Ahmadinejad views regarding weaponization are unknown, but it is clear that Ahmadinejad sees value in the nuclear issue as a card he can play with the public. In this context, nuclear development is meant to tap into a sense of nationalism and a feeling of injustice—that is, U.S. double standards and the West versus the technological have-nots. Ahmadinejad has close ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) and the intelligence services, both of which are generally viewed as pro-nuclear weapons.

Another important group of elites can be described as the conservative technocratic class. This group is mostly opposed to the United States, but wants to avoid confrontation. They also generally oppose Ahmadinejad and contend that the harsh rhetoric coming out of Tehran and Washington has reinforced hardliners in both nations. They believe that Iran has not yet made a decision to build nuclear weapons but warn that further escalation of the dispute increases the risk that Iran
will make a decision to seek nuclear weapons. The conservatives deeply mistrust the U.S. government, fearing that it seeks regime change, but express affection for America.

Another key group is the nuclear bureaucracy. Within it, most notably in the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), there are vocal advocates for a complete fuel cycle, but it is unclear how widely those views are held. Historically, the role of nuclear bureaucracies in nuclear decision-making has been important. Nuclear bureaucracies enjoy a monopoly of information, particularly in developing countries where the pool of nuclear expertise is limited. Nuclear bureaucracies have their own interests. If key leaders in the bureaucracy view a nuclear weapons project as a boon to their budget or other core interests, it can be a powerful partner with other pro-weapons constituencies. Information on these organizations is sparse.

**The Supreme Leader is the ultimate decision-maker on nuclear policy, though in terms of day-to-day work, the principal actor is the Supreme National Security Council Secretary, Ali Larijani.**

**Popular Sentiment**

Finally, there are the Iranian people. Five years ago, the Iranian public really had no views about nuclear technology. Once the nuclear program became public and the dispute intensified, however, a vaguely anti-nuclear mood transformed into pro-nuclear attitudes colored by a sense of nationalism and victimization. Indeed, the government’s nuclear policy is one area where there seems to be broad agreement and support.

Still, Iranians are not prepared to defend their newly discovered right to nuclear technology to the death. They are concerned about sanctions and economic isolation, and they fear a U.S. military strike, reducing the attractiveness of the nuclear program. Perhaps the most important characteristic of the Iranian public’s view of nuclear technology is that they have been unable to grasp the link between enrichment—civilian nuclear technology—and nuclear weapons. As such, they do not understand the West’s proliferation concerns.

The segment of the population that supports the overt development of nuclear weapons, which tends to be younger and poorer than the mean, may be getting larger as the political conflict escalates. A recent Zogby poll of Iranian public opinion appears to show higher than expected support for an Iranian bomb. The common denominator is support for a complete fuel cycle, including a functioning enrichment capacity.

Beyond these key actors, there are many questions. What is the role or influence of former president Rafsanjani, said to be the key actor on nuclear policy in previous years? Are there differing opinions or even divisions within the AEOI? Is there an Iranian equivalent of Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan or India’s Hommi Bhabha, that is, a nuclear advocate and bureaucratic champion extraordinaire? Finally, what is the position of the regular military versus the IRG when it comes to the issue of nuclear weapons? Historically, inter-service politics and rivalries have had significant impact on nuclear policy outcomes. Though there is a general sense about the position and influence of the major players, there may be key secondary actors about whom little is known.

In sum, for everything we know about Iranian nuclear politics, there is something we do not. Given our ignorance, the best strategy is to wait and see what Iran does, gather intelligence, and negotiate. It will be years before Iran can produce nuclear weapons. Hence, the situation is dangerous, but not urgent.
Former Iranian President Khatami Visits MIT

Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami visited MIT on September 11, 2006 for an informal luncheon dialogue with faculty members and invited guests. Khatami is the most senior Iranian figure to tour the U.S. since 1979, when the two countries severed formal ties. His visit to MIT, hosted by Associate Provost Philip Khoury and the Center for International Studies, came during his two-week U.S. tour. In his remarks, Khatami criticized recent U.S. policy in the Middle East. Nevertheless, he said, negotiation between the United States and Iran on nuclear and other pressing issues is not only desirable but necessary: “The Iranian nuclear problem can only be resolved through negotiation. It is now a pride issue in both countries.” CIS Executive Director John Tirman said of the visit, “There is little doubt that more dialogue is needed between these two countries. This kind of forum is a small but important step in that direction.”

CIS Hosts Conference on Iraq

On the weekend of November 11 and 12th, 2006, CIS co-hosted a conference with Brandeis’s Crown Center on Middle East Studies. “War in Iraq: Regional Ramifications” featured a series of panels with leading scholars from the United States and the Middle East discussing the regional implications of the Iraq war. CIS Visiting Scholar Barbara Bodine, Council on Foreign Relations scholar Steven Simon, and SSP Director and Ford International Professor of Political Science Barry Posen looked at the war’s effect on terrorist networks. SSP alum Jeremy Pressman chaired a panel dealing with the war’s long-term implications for U.S. foreign policy; it included Geoffrey Kemp of the Nixon Center in Washington, CIS Associate Director Stephen Van Evera, and Stephen Zunes, a Professor of Political Science at the University of San Francisco. Kanan Makiya of the Crown Center and Joost Hilterman from the International Crisis Group’s Amman office spoke about the war’s ethnico-religious dimensions.

The conference also included regional experts who examined how the war has affected individual states in the Middle East. Crown Center Professors Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki discussed the effect on Israelis and Palestinians, respectively, while Ellen Laipson of Washington’s Henry L. Stimson Center covered the implications for the Gulf States. Marc Lynch, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, addressed Jordan; Duygu Bazoglu Sezer of Bilkent University spoke about Turkey; and Moshe Maoz of Hebrew University looked at Syria.

Norton, Khouri Speak at Bustani Seminar

Boston University Professor of International Relations and Anthropology Augustus Richard Norton, whose current research focuses on strategies of reform in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, inaugurated this year’s Emile Bustani Middle East Seminar with a talk on the war between Israel and Hezbollah. The other Bustani speaker this semester was Rami Khouri, who directs the Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut. Khouri’s topic was “The Ideological Chasm in the Middle East.”

MISTI Week Smash: Gore Film + Moniz

On September 22, 2006, an overflow crowd viewed “An Inconvenient Truth,” Al Gore’s documentary on global warming, as part of MISTI Week, a series of events that showcases the range of international education programs and activities offered by the MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives. As many as a few hundred would-be attendees had to be turned away. The film was followed by a discussion led by Professor Ernest J. Moniz, co-director of the Laboratory for Energy and Environment and co-chair of the MIT Energy Research
Council. MISTI Week, which began with a cultural fair at the MIT Student Center on September 18th that featured Indian dance, Mexican mariachi, a Chinese lion dance, Japanese taiko drumming and Spanish flamenco, involved seminars, activities and other films, as well as orientation sessions for MISTI's eight study-abroad programs.

Telhami on Terrorism

Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, gave a talk at the Center on November 1, 2006, on “Terrorism and Deterrence: Lessons from Iraq, Lebanon and Gaza,” as part of the MIT Security Studies Program Wednesday Seminar Series. Other SSP speakers this semester included MIT Senior Research Scientist Richard Lanza (on long-range detection of nuclear materials); CIS Director Richard Samuels (on Japanese grand strategy); Bruce Blair, President of the World Security Institute (on China’s energy security); Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University (on U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons); Chaim Kaufmann, Associate Professor of Political Science at Lehigh University (on when to partition states experiencing ethnic violence); and Nora Bensahel of the RAND Corporation (on pre-war planning for post-war Iraq). Each semester’s Wednesday Seminars are listed at: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wednesday.html.

CIS Starr Forums: Iraq, Iran and North Korea

This fall, the CIS Starr Forum series held two public events at MIT’s Bartos Theater: one in October on U.S. policy in Iraq, another in November on Iran, North Korea and post-Cold War nuclear proliferation. The Iraq event featured two journalists who reported on the invasion and its aftermath—New Yorker staff writer George Packer and former Washington Post Baghdad bureau chief Rajiv Chandrasekaran. Packer is author of The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq. Chandrasekaran, now an Assistant Managing Editor at the Post, recently published Imperial Life in the Emerald City, a searing history the U.S. occupation government. The forum was moderated by one of the senior U.S. officials Packer and Chandrasekaran covered, CIS Visiting Scholar Barbara Bodine. In 2003, Ambassador Bodine served as coordinator for post-conflict reconstruction for Baghdad and the central governates of Iraq. (For more on Ambassador Bodine’s service in Iraq, see the interview on page 3.) The Starr Forum on nuclear proliferation, moderated by CIS Executive Director John Tirman, featured SSP Director Barry Posen, SSP Research Fellow Jim Walsh, and David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security. Both events are streamed at: http://web.mit.edu/cis/starr.html.

Immigrant Rights in Interwar France

On October 31, 2006, Mary Lewis, John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Social Sciences in the Department of History at Harvard University, gave a talk at CIS called “The Boundaries of the Republic: Contemporary Legacies of France’s Interwar Immigrant Rights Regime.” The event, co-sponsored by MIT-France, was part of this year’s Myron Weiner Seminar Series on International Migration. The series is organized by the Inter-University Committee on International Migration, a focal point for migration and refugee studies at Boston University, Brandeis University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Harvard University, MIT, Tufts University, and Wellesley College.
New Faces

Ann Abbondante joined CIS as administrator for Professor of Political Science Kenneth Oye, the Program on Emerging Technologies, and CIS public programs. Ann formerly worked at the Harvard Catholic Student Center and is a freelance music writer.

Tadashi Hayashi has joined CIS as a visiting fellow. Mr. Hayashi spent three decades at Nippon Keidanren (the Japanese Business Federation), eventually becoming Director of the Environment and Land Use Bureau (Industrial Affairs Bureau). In June 2004, he was appointed the Managing Director and Secretary General of the Keizai Koho Center, where he promotes mutual understanding between Japan and other countries.

Rebecca Dodder is a new post-doctoral associate in the Program on Emerging Technologies (PoET). She received her Ph.D. in Technology, Management & Policy from MIT in 2006 and has an M.A. in Science, Technology & Public Policy from George Washington University.

Kelli Eagan is the new administrative assistant for MISTI. She studies at the Harvard Extension School and is a singer/songwriter.

Scott Mohr, a Professor of Biophysical Chemistry and Bioinformatics at Boston University, joins CIS this year as a Visiting Fellow. Professor Mohr is working with the Program on Emerging Technologies.

Soji Samikawa joins CIS this year as a Visiting Scholar. A 1992 graduate of the Faculty of Economics at Keio University in Japan, Mr. Samikawa also formerly worked at the Japan Business Federation in a variety of positions, most recently as Principal Administrator of the Economic Policy Bureau.

Carol R. Saivetz is also a Visiting Scholar at the Center. She is a Research Associate at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, where she writes on Russian foreign policy issues and teaches on Russia and the Middle East. Dr. Saivetz is working on a book on Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy, to be published by Rowman and Littlefield.

Assistant Professor David Singer has joined the political science faculty. Professor Singer studies international political economy, with a focus on international financial regulation, the influence of global capital flows on government policymaking, international institutions and governance, and the political economy of central banking. His forthcoming book is titled Regulating Capital: Setting Standards for the International Financial System. Before coming to MIT, Professor Singer taught at the University of Notre Dame and worked in corporate finance and technology venture development.

The Security Studies Program has three military fellows this year. Air Force Lt. Col. Roftiel Constantine arrived from the Pentagon, where he served as Chief of the Architecture Integration Division for the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Warfighting Integration. He holds graduate degrees in systems engineering and political science. Marine Lt. Col. Michael B. Parkyn served most recently as Director of Leader Development at the Lejeune Leadership Institute in Quantico, VA. He previously served in Kyrgyzstan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and as an Air Tasking Order Development Officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Army Lt. Col. Michael C. Wehr arrived from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg. He commanded an Engineer Battalion in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Selected for promotion to Colonel, in 2007 Lt. Col. Wehr will take command of the Vicksburg District within the Mississippi Valley Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

People

Professor Suzanne Berger’s latest book, How We Compete: What Companies Around the World are Doing to Make it in Today’s Global Economy, has been published in French, Japanese, and Italian translations. Professor Berger recently received the Rossi Prize from France’s Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques and was named a Class of 1960 Professor at MIT. She also received a 2006 Pi Sigma Alpha and American Political Science Association Award for Outstanding Teaching in Political Science.

Visiting Scholar Barbara Bodine participated in a conference on Iraq held earlier this year by The CNA Corp. The conference report, Managing Civil Strife and Avoiding Civil War in Iraq, is available at www.cna.org. At the American Political Science Association conference in September, Ambassador Bodine spoke about the jihadi movement, on a panel sponsored by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

Professor of Political Sociology Diane E. Davis was named head of the International Development Group in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning. She was also elected to Research Committee 21 (Urban and Regional Development) of the International Sociological Association, and to the council of the Community and Urban Section of the American Sociological Association.

Visiting Scholar Luise Druke is working with faculty and researchers at MIT, Harvard and Tufts on an initiative dealing with issues relating to global governance, multilateralism and UN studies. In Germany, Dr. Druke has been appointed to a research council on UN Studies.

Ford International Professor of History John Dower, a CIS affiliate and winner of the Pulitzer Prize for his book Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, received this year’s Japan Society of Boston John E. Thayer III Award for promoting understanding between Japan and the United States.

At this year’s APSA conference, graduate student Vanda Felbab-Brown presented a paper about drugs and insurgents, graduate student Benjamin Friedman presented a paper on overreacting to terrorism and Assistant Professor Taylor Fravel presented a paper on China and territorial expansion. Graduate student Paul Staniland chaired a panel on insurgency.

Taylor Fravel is a Visiting Fellow this academic year at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Graduate students Brendan Green and Paul Staniland spent the summer at the RAND Corporation doing research on counter-insurgency and religious politics and conflict, respectively.

Graduate student Michael Glosny is a Research Fellow this year at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Associate Professor of Political Science Chappell Lawson served as unofficial election observer during the Mexican Presidential Election July 2, 2006. He appeared in the media several times, writing and speaking about the election, including on PBS’s “Charlie Rose.”
Bruce Mazlish, Emeritus Professor of History, is to be co-editor of a new journal: New Global Studies. In November 2006, he was the lead speaker at the Conference on NGOs, hosted by the Center for Global Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Lucian Pye, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, continues to review books on Asia and the Pacific for Foreign Affairs.

Associate Professor of Political Science Jonathan Rodden was granted tenure on July 1, 2006.

Graduate student Joshua Rovner won a Stanley Kaplan Fellowship at Williams College and is teaching courses there on American foreign policy and intelligence and national security.

Political Science graduate student Neil Ruiz and his team, CentroMigrante, won one of the two grand prizes in MIT’s 2006 100K Entrepreneurship Competition. Their project, which combines developmental architecture with a self-help business model, aims to provide clean, safe and affordable urban housing for transient job seekers in the Philippines.

In her role as a member of the Centre Advisory and Review Group of the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation & Poverty at the University of Sussex (UK), CIS Research Affiliate Sharon Stanton Russell participated in meetings held in Cairo for the program’s mid-term review. In September 2006, Dr. Russell presented remarks regarding international migration in the session on “Demography and the Social and Economic Environment” at the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Roundtable on Demography and Geopolitics.

The next book by Jing Wang, S.C. Fang Professor of Chinese Language and Culture and Head of MIT’s Section on Foreign Language and Literatures, Brand New China: Advertising, Media, and Commercial Culture, will be published by Harvard University Press next year. Prof. Wang has been appointed Chair of the International Advisory Board of Creative Commons in China.

Elizabeth Wood was appointed full Professor of History on July 1, 2006.

Published

Robert J. Art, Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, and Patrick M. Cronin
“Coercive Diplomacy,” in Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management In a Divided World (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006).


Barbara Bodine, CIS Visiting Scholar

“9/11 Miniseries is Bunk,” Los Angeles Times (September 8, 2006).

“Generations have been decimated; who will be left to rebuild the nation?” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (October 15, 2006).

Robert Buderi, Fellow, Security Studies Program and Gregory T. Huang
Diane Davis, Professor of Political Sociology and Assistant Dean, Department of Urban Studies and Planning


Luise Druke, CIS Visiting Scholar

Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science

Eugene Gholz, SSP Research Affiliate
(with Peter Dombrowski)

Bruce Mazlish, Emeritus Professor of History

Michael Fischer, Professor of Anthropology


“Introduction to Culture At Large with George Lipsitz: Rethinking American Culture,” Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 21, No. 3 (August 2006).

Austin Long, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science
On “Other War”Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006).

Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies Program

Whitney Raas, Masters Student in Political Science and Austin Long, PhD Candidate in Political Science

Joshua Rovner and Austin Long, Ph.D. Candidates in Political Science
“Correspondence: How Intelligent is Intelligence Reform?,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Spring 2006).

Joshua Rovner, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science
Richard Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of CIS


Carol Saivetz, CIS Visiting Scholar


Caitlin Talmadge, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science


Caitlin Talmadge and Benjamin Friedman, Ph.D. Candidates in Political Science

“War on Terror Bloats Defense Budget,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer (October 4, 2006).

John Tirman, CIS Executive Director


Stephen Van Evera, Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of CIS


Cindy Williams, Principal Research Scientist, Security Studies Program

“Paying Tomorrow’s Military,” Regulation, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer 2006).


New Audits of the Conventional Wisdom

Among the topics covered in the Center’s “Audits of the Conventional Wisdom” essay series during the summer and fall of 2006 were the U.S.-India nuclear deal, the status of the war on terror and U.S. diplomacy, and Japanese foreign policy. All of the Audits are available at http://web.mit.edu/cis/acw.

Recently published:

Violence and Insecurity: The Challenge in the Global South (Diane E. Davis); Waiting for Goldilocks: Getting Japan’s Foreign Policy Just Right (Richard J. Samuels); The Bush Administration is Weak on Terror (Stephen Van Evera); The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal: The Triumph of the Business Lobby (Subrata Ghoshroy); The War on Terror: Forgotten Lessons from WWII (Stephen Van Evera); Channel-Surfing: Non-Engagement as Foreign Policy (Barbara Bodine); Why Do Islamist Groups Become Transnational and Violent? (Quinn Mecham); Budgets to Make America Safer (Cindy Williams); Immigration and Insecurity: Post 9/11 Fear in the United States (John Tirman).
If you want to subscribe...

Subscriptions to *précis* are free to the community. Please send your address or any comments to us at:

MIT Center for International Studies  
Attn: *précis*  
292 Main Street, Building E38 (2nd Floor)  
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307

visit CIS on the Web  
HTTP://web.mit.edu/CIS