INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS

Essays and readings on human interaction

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Foreword

As a graduate student many years ago, I remember musing over a comment by Gordon Allport that God had not seen fit to organize natural phenomena so that they would conform to man’s neat and logical ordering of the scientific disciplines. Recently C. P. Snow has given other connotations to this point in his discussion of the “two worlds.”

Perhaps nowhere is the abyss between formal logic and reality more evident than in man’s attempt to order knowledge about his own behavior. There are today 24 divisions within the American Psychological Association, and these are presumably logically separable from each other as well as from the subdivisions of sociology, anthropology, political science, and psychiatry. In turn, none of these gives more than a nod of recognition to the insights of the playwright, the novelist, the poet, or the historian.

In the resultant confusion of tongues, it is refreshing to come upon a sophisticated attempt to bring systematic order to an important set of behavioral phenomena without regard to disciplinary jurisdiction. When my colleagues told me so in their Preface, I realized with a start that studies of these phenomena, although they form the very core of human existence, are scattered all over the map of the behavioral sciences and the humanities. The field of interpersonal relations is not even formally recognized as a scientific discipline in its own right.

Several things become apparent as a result of this endeavor. First, and most important, there is much useful knowledge scattered all through the behavioral science literature about the many different varieties of interpersonal relationships. The fact that it is so scattered has prevented us from discovering how much, in a sense, we know already.

It is unlikely to occur to us until such a systematic analysis is undertaken that there are common causal relationships affecting the behavior of lovers, friends, nurses and patients, prisoners and wardens, confidence men and their victims, teachers and students, consultants and clients, and mutual enemies. Since a sociologist interested in criminology has studied one of these relationships, and an educational psychologist has studied another, a psychoanalyst another, and an organization theorist another, and so on ad infinitum, the possibility of perceiving them as belonging to a common behavioral category is almost precluded.

A second “discovery” follows on the heels of the first: many of the profound
should, since I now had so much less commitment to survival in such a world. Consequently, this time I was fired at the end of one year. The suggested reason was that I had failed to develop a professional self-image and tended to identify with students. That was the end of my academic career.

V. Well, where does that leave me now? Coming out of the blind alley of academia I had been led into by my failure to see that Brains turn into Men after all, trying to get back to where I was when I was ten. Back then I had decided I didn’t want to be a Man. I never entirely gave up that decision. Defensiveness, a desire for security, and the surprising fact of my “masculine” competence in an academic setting—all of this led me into being a male impersonator for too long, and I got so used to it that it was very hard to stop. But I am not now, nor have I ever been a Man.

Right now my life is learning what it means to be Gay. At the moment I’m living in a big old house with five other Gay Men. We’ve been living together for a year now, supporting ourselves with savings and various odd jobs, and trying to learn to relate to each other. We are breaking up soon. We didn’t make it. We were still too frozen in the old patterns, still too much Men. But we learned something in the process. Two of us are working at setting up a new collective, and we’ll try again. There’s no turning back, there’s only a void behind us. And what’s ahead of us only begins to exist as we create it.

I also have to decide what to do with all the knowledge and skills I’ve learned in my life in the straight world—with the resources and power these give me access to. Now that I don’t define myself as an intellectual, I have come to terms with intellectualism. When I was a Brain, things of the mind were the source of my sense of self-worth and a consolation for loneliness. Now I have other, less alienated sources of self-worth, but it will be a long time (if ever) before I can live without such consolation. As an academician, I learned to use ideas as weapons to establish my power over others. Now I reject a self-concept based on power. Yet I am involved more than ever in a struggle against all the power of this society; in this struggle, it is only through the use of ideas that I can feel I am fighting back against my oppressors. Thus this paper.

Finally I have no answers. I don’t know where I am going, only the direction in which I must proceed. I often feel alone and isolated in this journey, but that is changing. Slowly, with many false starts, we are coming together. We are frightened because we are leaving all of the world we knew behind us, with whatever security it provided. It is still very hard to trust each other with our lives. But there is no going back, and we are building the future as we go. We must create a new world, if we are to be able to go on living. We are determined to live, so the future is ours.

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On face-work: An analysis of ritual elements in social interaction

Erving Goffman

Every person lives in a world of social encounters, involving him either in face-to-face or mediated contact with other participants. In each of these contacts, he tends to act out what is sometimes called a line—that is, a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself. Regardless of whether a person intends to take a line, he will find that he has done so in effect. The other participants will assume that he has more or less willfully taken a stand, so that if he is to deal with their response to him he must take into consideration the impression they have possibly formed of him.

The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes—albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself.

A person tends to experience an immediate emotional response to the face which a contact with others allows him; he cathects his face; his “feelings” become attached to it. If the encounter sustains an image of him that he has long taken for granted, he probably will have few feelings about the matter. If events establish a face for him that is better than he might have expected, he is likely to “feel good”; if his ordinary expectations are not fulfilled, one expects that he will “feel bad” or “feel hurt.” In general, a person’s attachment to a

particular face, coupled with the ease with which disconfirming information can be conveyed by himself and others, provides one reason why he finds that participation in any contact with others is a commitment. A person will also have feelings about the face sustained for the other participants, and while these feelings may differ in quantity and direction from those he has for his own face, they constitute an involvement in the face of others that is as immediate and spontaneous as the involvement he has in his own face. One's own face and the face of others are constructs of the same order; it is the rules of the group and the definition of the situation which determine how much feeling one is to have for face and how this feeling is to be distributed among the faces involved.

A person may be said to have, or be in, or maintain face when the line he effectively takes presents an image of him that is internally consistent, that is supported by judgments and evidence conveyed by other participants, and that is confirmed by evidence conveyed through impersonal agencies in the situation. At such times the person's face clearly is something that is not lodged in or on his body, but rather something that is diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter and becomes manifest only when these events are read and interpreted for the appraisals expressed in them.

A person may be said to be in wrong face when information is brought forth in some way about his social worth which cannot be integrated, even with effort, into the line that is being sustained for him. A person may be said to be out of face when he participates in a contact with others without having ready a line of the kind participants in such situations are expected to take. The intent of many pranks is to lead a person into showing a wrong face or no face, but there will also be serious occasions, of course, when he will find himself expressively out of touch with the situation.

When a person senses that he is in face, he typically responds with feelings of confidence and assurance. Firm in the line he is taking, he feels that he can hold his head up and openly present himself to others. He feels some security and some relief—as he also can when the others feel he is in wrong face but successfully hide these feelings from him.

When a person is in wrong face or out of face, expressive events are being contributed to the encounter which cannot be readily woven into the expressive fabric of the occasion. Should he sense that he is in wrong face or out of face, he is likely to feel ashamed and inferior because of what has happened to the activity on his account and because of what may happen to his reputation as a participant. Further, he may feel bad because he had relied upon the encounter to support an image of self to which he has become emotionally attached and which he now finds threatened. Felt lack of judgmental support from the encounter may take him aback, confuse him, and momentarily incapacitate him as an interactant. His manner and bearing may falter, collapse, and crumble. He may become embarrassed and chagrined; he may become shamefaced. The feeling, whether warranted or not, that he is perceived in a fluttered state by others, and that he is presenting no usable line, may add further injuries to his feelings, just as his change from being in wrong face or out of face to being shamefaced can add further disorder to the expressive organization of the situation. Following common usage, I shall employ the term poise to refer to the capacity to suppress and conceal any tendency to become shame-faced during encounters with others.

In our Anglo-American society, as in some others, the phrase "to lose face" seems to mean to be in wrong face, to be out of face, or to be shamefaced. The phrase "to save one's face" appears to refer to the process by which the person sustains an impression for others that he has not lost face. Following Chinese usage, one can say that "to give face" is to arrange for another to take a better line than he might otherwise have been able to take, the other thereby gets face given him, this being one way in which he can gain face.

As an aspect of the social code of any social circle, one may expect to find an understanding as to how far a person should go to save his face. Once he takes on a self-image expressed through face he will, expected to live up to it. In different ways in different societies he will be required to show self-respect, abjuring certain actions because they are above or beneath him, while forcing himself to perform others even though they cost him dearly. By entering a situation in which he is given a face to maintain, a person takes on the responsibility of standing guard over the flow of events as they pass before him. He must ensure that a particular expressive order is sustained—an order which regulates the flow of events, large or small, so that anything that appears to be expressed by them will be consistent with his face. When a person manifests these compulsions primarily from duty to himself, one speaks in our society of pride; when he does so because of duty to wider social units, and receives support from these units in doing so, one speaks of honor. When these compulsions have to do with postural things, with expressive events derived from the way in which the person handles his body, his emotions, and the things with which he has physical contact, one speaks of dignity, this being an aspect of expressive control that is always praised and never studied. In any case, while his social face can be his most personal possession and the center of his security and pleasure, it is only on loan to him from society; it will be withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is worthy of it. Approved attributes and their relation to face make of every man his own jailer; this is a fundamental social constraint even though each man may like his cell.

Just as the member of any group is expected to have self-respect, so also he is expected to sustain a standard of considerateness; he is expected to go to certain lengths to save the feelings and the face of others present, and he is expected to do this willingly and spontaneously because of emotional identification with the others and with their feelings. In consequence, he is disinclined to witness the defacement of others. The person who can witness another's humiliation and unfeelingly retain a cool countenance himself is said in our society to be

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1 Salesmen, especially street "stummers," know that if they take a line that will be discredited unless the reluctant customer buys, the customer may be trapped by considerateness and buy in order to save the face of the salesman and prevent what would ordinarily result in a scene.
“heartless,” just as he who can unfeelingly participate in his own defacement is thought to be “shameless.”

The combined effect of the rule of self-respect and the rule of considerateness is that the person tends to conduct himself during an encounter so as to maintain both his own face and the face of the other participants. This means that the line taken by each participant is usually allowed to prevail, and each participant is allowed to carry off the role he appears to have chosen for himself. A state where everyone temporarily accepts everyone else’s line is established. This kind of mutual acceptance seems to be a basic structural feature of interaction, especially the interaction of face-to-face talk. It is typically a “working” acceptance, not a “real” one, since it tends to be based not on agreement of candidly expressed heartfelt evaluations, but upon a willingness to give temporary lip service to judgments with which the participants do not really agree.

The mutual acceptance of lines has an important conservative effect upon encounters. Once the person initially presents a line, he and the others tend to build their later responses upon it, and in a sense become stuck with it. Should the person radically alter his line, or should it become discredited, then confusion results, for the participants will have prepared and committed themselves for actions that are now unsuitable.

Ordinarily, maintenance of face is a condition of interaction, not its objective. Usual objectives, such as gaining face for oneself, giving free expression to one’s true beliefs, introducing depreciating information about the others, or solving problems and performing tasks, are typically pursued in such a way as to be consistent with the maintenance of face. To study face-saving is to study the traffic rules of social interaction, one learns about the code the person adheres to in his movement across the paths and designs of others, but not where he is going, or why he wants to get there. One does not even learn why he is ready to follow the code, for a large number of different motives can equally lead him to do so. He may want to save his own face because of his emotional attachment to the image of self which it expresses, because of his pride or honor, because of the power his presumed status allows him to exert over the other participants, and so on. He may want to save the others’ face because of his emotional attachment to an image of them, or because he feels that his co-participants have a moral right to this protection, or because he wants to avoid the hostility that may be directed toward him if they lose their face. He may feel that an assumption has been made that he is the sort of person who shows compassion and sympathy toward others, so that to retain his own face, he may feel obliged to be considerate of the line taken by the other participants.

By face-work I mean to designate the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face. Face-work serves to counteract “incidents”—that is, events whose effective symbolic implications threaten face. This poise is one important type of face-work, for through poise the person controls his embarrassment and hence the embarrassment that he and others might have over his embarrassment. Whether or not the full consequences of face-saving actions are known to the person who employs them, they often become habitual and standardized practices; they are like traditional plays in a game or traditional steps in a dance. Each person, subculture, and society seems to have its own characteristic repertoire of face-saving practices. It is to this repertoire that people partly refer when they ask what a person or culture is “really” like. And yet the particular set of practices stressed by particular persons or groups seems to be drawn from a single logically coherent framework of possible practices. It is as if face, by its very nature, can be saved only in a certain number of ways, and as if each social grouping must make its selections from this single matrix of possibilities.

The members of every social circle may be expected to have some knowledge of face-work and some experience in its use. In our society, this kind of capacity is sometimes called tact, savoir-faire, diplomacy, or social skill. Variation in social skill pertains more to the efficacy of face-work than to the frequency of its application, for almost all acts involving others are modified, prescriptively or proscriptively, by considerations of face.

I have already said that the person will have two points of view—a defensive orientation toward saving his own face and a protective orientation toward saving the others’ face. Some practices will be primarily defense and others primarily protective, although in general one may expect these two perspectives to be taken at the same time. In trying to save the face of others, the person must choose a tack that will not lead to loss of his own; in trying to save his own face, he must consider the loss of face that his action may entail for others.

In many societies there is a tendency to distinguish three levels of responsibility which a person may have for a threat to face that his actions have created. First, he may appear to have acted innocently; his offense seems to be unintended and unwitting, and those who perceive his act can feel that he would have attempted to avoid it had he foreseen its offensive consequences. In our society one calls such threats to face faux pas, gaffes, boners, or bricks. Second, the offending person may appear to have acted maliciously and spitefully, with the intention of causing open insult. Third, there are incidental offenses; these arise as an unplanned but sometimes anticipated by-product of action—action which the offender performs in spite of its offensive consequences, although not on purpose. From the point of view of a particular participant, there are three types of threat can be introduced by the participant himself against his own face, by himself against the face of others, by the others against their own face, or by the others against himself. Thus the person may find himself in many different relations to a threat to face. If he is to handle himself and others well in a contingencies, he will have to have a repertoire of face-saving practices for each of these possible relations to threat.

THE BASIC KINDS OF FACE-WORK

The avoidance process. The surest way for a person to prevent threats to his face is to avoid contacts in which these threats are likely to occur. In a
societies one can observe this in the avoidance relationship? and in the tendency for certain delicate transactions to be conducted by go-betweens. Similarly, in many societies, members know the value of voluntarily making a gracious withdrawal before an anticipated threat to face has had a chance to occur.

Once the person does chance an encounter, other kinds of avoidance practices come into play. As defensive measures, he keeps off topics and away from activities which would lead to the expression of information that is inconsistent with the line he is maintaining. At opportune moments he will change the topic of conversation or the direction of activity. He will often present initially a front of diffidence and composure, suppressing any show of feeling until he has found out what kind of line the others will be ready to support for him. Any claims regarding self may be made with belittling modesty, with strong qualifications, or with a note of unseriousness; by hedging in these ways he will have prepared a self for himself that will not be discredited by exposure, personal failure, or the unanticipated acts of others. And if he does not hedge his claims about self, he will at least attempt to be realistic about them, knowing that otherwise events may discredit him and make him lose face.

Certain protective maneuvers are as common as these defensive ones. The person shows respect and politeness, making sure to extend to others any ceremonial treatment which might be due. He employs discretion; he leaves unstated facts which might implicitly or explicitly contradict and embarrass the positive claims made by others. He employs circumlocutions and deceptions, phrasing his replies with careful ambiguity so that the others' face is preserved even if their welfare is not. He employs courtesies, making slight modifications of his demands on or appraisals of the others so that they will be able to define the situation as one in which their self-respect is not threatened. In making a belittling demand upon the others, or in imputing uncomplimentary attributes to them, he may employ a joking manner, allowing them to take the line that they are good sports, able to relax from their ordinary standards of pride and honor. And before engaging in a potentially offensive act, he may provide explanations as to why the others ought not to be affronted by it. For example, if he knows that it will be necessary to withdraw from the encounter before it has terminated, he may tell the others in advance that it is necessary for him to leave, so that they will have faces that are prepared for it. But neutralizing the potentially offensive act need not be done verbally; he may wait for a propitious moment or natural break—for example, in conversation, a momentary lull when no one speaker can be affronted—and then leave, in this way using the context instead of his words as a guarantee of inoffensiveness.

When a person fails to prevent an incident, he can still attempt to maintain the fiction that no threat to face has occurred. The most blatant example of this is found where the person acts as if an event which contains a threatening expression has not occurred at all. He may apply this studied nonobservance to his own acts—as when he does not by any outward sign admit that his stomach is rumbling—or to the acts of others, as when he does not "see" that another has stumbled. Social life in mental hospitals owes much to this process; patients employ it in regard to their own peculiarities, and visitors employ it, often with tenuous desperation, in regard to patients. In general, tactful blindness of this kind is applied only to events which, if perceived at all, could be perceived and interpreted only as threats to face.

A more important, less spectacular kind of tactful overlooking is practiced when a person openly acknowledges an incident as an event that has occurred, but not as an event that contains a threatening expression. If he is not the one who is responsible for the incident, then his blindness will have to be supported by his forbearance; if he is the doer of the threatening deed, then his blindness will have to be supported by his willingness to seek a way of dealing with the matter which leaves him dangerously dependent upon the cooperative forbearance of the others.

Another kind of avoidance occurs when a person loses control of his expressions during an encounter. At such times he may try not so much to overlook the incident as to hide or conceal his activity in some way, thus making it possible for the others to avoid some of the difficulties created by a participant who has not maintained face. Correspondingly, when a person is caught out of face because he had not expected to be thrust into interaction, or because strong feelings have disrupted his expressive mask, the others may protectively turn away from him or his activity for a moment, to give him time to assemble himself.

The corrective process. When the participants in an undertaking or encounter fail to prevent the occurrence of an event that is expressively incompatible with the judgments of social worth that are being maintained, and when the

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2 In our own society an illustration of avoidance is found in the middle-and upper-class Negro who avoids certain face-to-face contacts with whites in order to protect the self-evaluation projected by his clothes and manner. See, for example, Charles Johnson, Patterns of Negro Segregation: New York, Harper, 1943, ch. 13. The function of avoidance in maintaining the kinship system in small preliterate societies might be taken as a particular illustration of the same general theme.

3 An illustration is given by Kenneth S. Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture (New York, Macmillan, 1942): "A neighbor or a group of neighbors may tender their good offices in adjusting a quarrel in which each antagonist would be sacrificing his face by taking the first step in approaching the other. Wise intermediaries can effect the reconciliation while preserving the dignity of both" (Vol. 2, p. 211).

4 In an unpublished paper Harold Garfinkel has suggested that when the person finds that he has lost face in a conversational encounter, he may feel a desire to disappear or "drop through the floor," and that this may involve a wish not only to conceal loss of face but also to return magically to a point in time when it would have been possible to save face by avoiding the encounter.

5 The Western traveler used to complain that the Chinese could never be trusted to say what they meant but always said what they felt their Western listener wanted to hear. The Chinese used to complain that the Westerner was brusque, boorish, and unmannered. In terms of communication standards, presumably the conduct of a Westerner is so gauche that he creates an emergency, forcing the Asian to forge any kind of direct reply in order to rush in with a remark that might rescue the Westerner from the compromising position in which he had placed himself. (Smith, Chinese Characteristics [New York, Revell, 1894], ch. 6, "The Talent for Indirection.") This is an instance of the important group of misunderstandings which arise during interaction between persons who come from groups with different ritual standards.

6 A pretty example of this is found in parade-ground etiquette which may oblige those in a parade to treat anyone who faints as if he were not present at all.
event is of the kind that is difficult to overlook, then the participants are likely
to give it accredited status as an incident—to ratify it as a threat that deserves
direct official attention—and to proceed to try to correct for its effects. At this
point one or more participants find themselves in an established state of ritual
disequilibrium or disgrace, and an attempt must be made to re-establish a satisfac-
tory ritual state for them. I use the term ritual because I am dealing with acts
through whose symbolic component the actor shows how worthy he is of respect
or how worthy he feels others are of it. The imagery of equilibriun is apt here
because the length and intensity of the corrective effort is nicely adapted to the
persistence and intensity of the threat. One’s face, then, is a sacred thing, and
the expressive order required to sustain it is therefore a ritual one.

The sequence of acts set in motion by an acknowledged threat to face, and
terminating in the re-establishment of equalurium, I shall call an interchange.
Defining a message or move as everything conveyed by an actor during a
turn at taking action, one can say that an interchange will involve two or more
moves and two or more participants. Obvious examples in our society may be
found in the sequence of “Excuse me” and “Certainly,” and in the exchange
of presents or visits. The interchange seems to be a basic concrete unit of social
activity and provides one natural empirical way to study interaction of all kinds.

MAKING POINTS—THE AGGRESSIVE USE OF FACE-WORK

Every face-saving practice which is allowed to neutralize a particular threat
opens up the possibility that the threat will be willfully introduced for what can
be safely gained by it. If a person knows that his modesty will be answered by
others’ praise of him, he can fish for compliments. If his own appraisal of self
will be checked against incidental events, then he can arrange for favorable
incidental events to appear. If others are prepared to overlook an affront to them
and act forbearantly, or to accept apologies, then he can rely on this as a basis
for safely offending them. He can attempt by sudden withdrawal to force the
others into a ritually unsatisfactory state, leaving them to flounder in an inter-
change that cannot readily be completed. Finally, at some expense to himself,
he can arrange for the others to hurt his feelings, thus forcing them to feel guilt,
remorse, and sustained ritual disequilibrium. 8

When a person treats face-work not as something he need be prepared to
perform, but rather as something that others can be counted on to perform or

8 This kind of imagery is one that social anthropologists seem to find naturally fitting. Note, for
example, the implications of the following statement by Margaret Mead in her “Kinship in the
Admiralty Islands” (Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, 34: 183–
558): “If a husband beats his wife, custom demands that she leave him and go to her brother, real
or fictitious, and remain a length of time commensurate with the degree of her offended dignity”
(p. 274).

9 The strategy of maneuvering another into a position where he cannot right the harm he has
done is very commonly employed but nowhere with such devotion to the ritual model of conduct
as in revengeful suicide. See, for example, M. D. W. Jeffreys, “Samsonic Suicide, or Suicide of

to accept, then an encounter or an undertaking becomes less a scene of mutual
considerateness than an arena in which a contest or match is held. The purpose
of the game is to preserve everyone’s face from an inexcusable contradiction,
while scoring as many points as possible against one’s adversaries and making as
many gains as possible for oneself. An audience to the struggle is almost a
necessity. The general method is for the person to introduce favorable facts about
himself and unfavorable facts about the others in such a way that the only reply
the others will be able to think up will be one that terminates the interchange
in a grumble, a meager excuse, a face-saving I-can-take-a-joke laugh, or an empty
stereotyped comeback of the “Oh yeah!” or “That’s what you think!” variety.
The losers in such cases will have to cut their losses, tacitly grant the loss of a
point, and attempt to do better in the next interchange. Points made by allusion
to social class status are sometimes called snubs; those made by allusions to moral
respectability are sometimes called digs; in either case one deals with a capacity
at what is sometimes called “bitchiness.”

In aggressive interchange the winner not only succeeds in introducing informa-
tion favorable to himself and unfavorable to the others, but also demonstrates
that as interactant he can handle himself better than his adversaries. Evidence
of this capacity is often more important than all the other information the person
conveys in the interchange, so that the introduction of a “crack” in verbal
interaction tends to imply that the initiator is better at footwork than those who
must suffer his remarks. However, if they succeed in making a successful party
of the thrust and then a successful riposte, the instigator of the play must not
only face the disparagement with which the others have answered him but also
accept the fact that his assumption of superiority in footwork has proven false.
He is made to look foolish, he loses face. Hence it is always a gamble to “make
a remark.” The tables can be turned and the aggressor can lose more than he
could have gained had his move won the point. Successful ripostes or comebacks
in our society are sometimes called squeals or toppers; theoretically it would
be possible for a squeal to be squealed, a topper to be toppled, and a riposte
to be parried with a counterriposte, but except in staged interchanges this third
level of successful action seems rare. 9

THE CHOICE OF APPROPRIATE FACE-WORK

When an incident occurs, the person whose face is threatened may attempt
to reinstate the ritual order by means of one kind of strategy, while the other
participants may desire or expect a practice of a different type to be employed.
When, for example, a minor mishap occurs, momentarily revealing a person in
wrong face or out of face, the others are often more willing and able to get blind to the discrepancy than is the threatened person himself. Often they would prefer him to exercise poise, while he feels that he cannot afford to overlook what has happened to his face and so becomes apologetic and shame-faced, if he is the creator of the incident, or destructively assertive, if the others are responsible for it. Yet on the other hand, a person may manifest poise when the others feel that he ought to have broken down into embarrassed apology—that he is taking undue advantage of their helpfulness by his attempts to brazen it out. Sometimes a person may himself be undecided as to which practice to employ, leaving the others in the embarrassing position of not knowing which tack they are going to have to follow. Thus when a person makes a slight gaffe, he and the others may become embarrassed not because of inability to handle such difficulties, but because for a moment no one knows whether the offender is going to act blind to the incident, or give it joking recognition, or employ some other face-saving practice.

COOPERATION IN FACE-WORK

When a face has been threatened, face-work must be done, but whether this is initiated and primarily carried through by the person whose face is threatened, or by the offender, or by a mere witness, is often of secondary importance. Lack of effort on the part of one person induces compensatory effort from others; a contribution by one person relieves the others of the task. In fact, there are many minor incidents in which the offender and the offended simultaneously attempt to initiate an apology. Resolution of the situation to everyone’s apparent satis-

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10 Folklore imparts a great deal of poise to the upper classes. If there is truth in this belief it may lie in the fact that the upper class person tends to find himself in encounters in which he outranks other participants in ways additional to class. The ranking participant is often somewhat independent of the good opinion of the others and finds it practical to be arrogant, sticking to a face regardless of whether the encounter supports it. On the other hand, those who are in the power of a fellow-participant tend to be very much concerned with the valuation he makes of them or witnesses being made of them, and so find it difficult to maintain a slightly wrong face without becoming embarrassed and apologetic. It may be added that people who lack awareness of the symbolism in minor events may keep cool in difficult situations, showing poise that they do not really possess.

11 Thus, in our society, when a person feels that others expect him to measure up to approved standards of cleanliness, tidiness, fairness, hospitality, generosity, influence, and so on, or when he sees himself as someone who ought to maintain such standards, he may burden an encounter with extended apologies for his failings, while all along the other participants do not care about the standard, or do not believe the person is really lacking in it, or are convinced that he is lacking in it and see the apology itself as a vain effort at self-elevation.

12 Thus one function of seconds in actual duels, as well as in figurative ones, is to provide an excuse for not fighting that both contestants can afford to accept.

13 See, for instance, Jackson Tobey, “Some Variables in Role Conflict Analysis” (Social Forces 1952) 30:333-37: “With adults there is less likelihood for essentially trivial issues to produce conflict. The automatic apology of two strangers who accidentally collide on a busy street illustrates the integrative function of etiquette. In effect, each of the parties to the collision says, ‘I don’t know whether I am responsible for this situation, but if I am, you have a right to be angry with me, a right that I pray you will not exercise.’ By defining the situation as one in which both parties must faction is the first requirement; correct apportionment of blame is typically a secondary consideration. Hence terms such as tact and savoir-faire fail to distinguish whether it is the person’s own face that he diplomacy saves or the face of the others. Similarly, terms such as gaffe and faux pas fail to specify whether it is the actor’s own face he has threatened or the face of other participants. And it is understandable that if one person finds he is powerless to save his own face, the others seem especially bound to protect him. For example, in polite society, a handshake that perhaps should not have been extended becomes one that cannot be declined. Thus one accounts for the noblesse oblige through which those of high status are expected to curb their power of embarrassing their lesser’s, as well as the fact that the handicapped often accept courtesies that they can manage better without.

Since each participant in an undertaking is concerned, albeit for differing reasons, with saving his own face and the face of the others, then tacit cooperation will naturally arise so that the participants together can attain their shared but differently motivated objectives.

One common type of tacit cooperation in face-saving is the tact exerted in regarded to face-work itself. The person not only defends his own face and protects the face of the others, but also acts so as to make it possible and even easy for the others to employ face-work for themselves and him. He helps them to help themselves and him. Social etiquette, for example, warns men against asking for New Year’s Eve dates too early in the season, lest the girl find it difficult to provide a gentle excuse for refusing. This second-order tact can be further illustrated by the widespread practice of negative-attribute etiquette. The person who has an unapparent negatively valued attribute often finds it expedient to begin an encounter with an unobtrusive admission of his failing, especially with

abase themselves, society enables each to keep his self-respect. Each may feel in his heart of hearts, “Why can’t that stupid ass watch where he’s going? But overtly each plays the role of the guilty party whether he feels he has been misused or not” (p. 332).

14 Regardless of the person’s relative social position, in one sense he has power over the other participants and they must rely upon his considerateness. When the other act toward him in some way, they presume upon a social relationship to him, since one of the things expressed by interaction is the relationship of the interactants. Thus they compromise themselves, for they place him in a position to discredit the claims they express as to his attitude toward them. Hence in response to claimed social relationships every person, of high estate or low, will be expected to exercise noblesse oblige and refrain from exploiting the compromised position of the other.

Since social relationships are defined partly in terms of voluntary mutual aid, refusal of a request for assistance becomes a deliberate matter, potentially destructive of the asker’s face. Chester Holmes, The Real Chinaman (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1895) provides an Chinese instance: “Much of the falsehood to which the Chinese as a nation are said to be addicted is a result of the demands of etiquette. A man, frank ‘not’ in the height of discourtesy. Refusal or denial of any sort must be softened and toned down into an expression of regretted inability. Unwillingness to grant a favor is never shown. In place of it there is seen a chastened feeling of sorrow that unavoidable but quite imaginary circumstances render it wholly impossible. Centuries of practice in this form of evasion have made the Chinese matchlessly fertile in the invention and development of excuses. It is rare, indeed, that one is caught at a loss for a bit of artfully embroidered fiction with which to hide an unwelcome truth” (pp. 274-75).
persons who are uninformed about him. The others are thus warned in advance against making disparaging remarks about his kind of person and are saved from the contradiction of acting in a friendly fashion to a person toward whom they are unwittingly being hostile. This strategy also prevents the others from automatically making assumptions about him which place him in a false position and saves him from painful forebearance or embarrassing remonstrances.

Tact in regard to face-work often relies for its operation on a tacit agreement to do business through the language of hint—the language of innuendo, ambiguities, well-placed pauses, carefully worded jokes, and so on. The rule regarding this unofficial kind of communication is that the sender ought not to act as if he had officially conveyed the message he has hinted at, while the recipients have the right and the obligation to act as if they have not officially received the message contained in the hint. Hinted communication, then, is deniable communication; it need not be faced up to. It provides a means by which the person can be warned that his current line or the current situation is leading to loss of face, without this warning itself becoming an incident.

Another form of tacit cooperation, and one that seems to be much used in many societies, is reciprocal self-denial. Often the person does not have a clear idea of what would be a just or acceptable apportionment of judgments during the occasion, and so he voluntarily deprives or deprecates himself while indulging and complimenting the others, in both cases carrying the judgments safely past what is likely to be just. The favorable judgments about himself he allows to come from the others; the unfavorable judgments of himself are his own contributions. This "after you, Alphonse" technique works, of course, because in depriving himself he can reliably anticipate that the others will compliment or indulge him. Whatever allocation of favors is eventually established, all participants are first given a chance to show that they are not bound or constrained by their own desires and expectations, and that they have a properly modest view of themselves, and that they can be counted upon to support the ritual code. Negative bargaining, through which each participant tries to make the terms of trade more favorable to the other side, is another instance as a form of exchange perhaps it is more widespread than the economist's kind.

A person's performance of face-work, extended by his tacit agreement to help others perform theirs, represents his willingness to abide by the ground rules of social interaction. Here is the hallmark of his socialization as an interactor. If he and the others were not socialized in this way, interaction in most societies and most situations would be a much more hazardous thing for feelings and faces. The person would find it impractical to be oriented to symbolically conveyed appraisals of social worth, or to be possessed of feelings—that is, it would be impractical for him to be a ritually delicate object. And as I shall suggest, if the person were not a ritually delicate object, occasions of talk could not be organized in the way they usually are. It is no wonder that trouble is caused by a person who cannot be relied upon to play the face-saving game.

FACE AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

When a person begins a mediated or immediate encounter, he already stands in some kind of social relationship to the others concerned, and expects to stand in a given relationship to them after the particular encounter ends. This, of course, is one of the ways in which social contacts are geared into the wider society. Much of the activity occurring during an encounter can be understood as an effort on everyone's part to get through the occasion and all the unanticipated and unintentional events that can cast participants in an undesirable light, without disrupting the relationships of the participants. And if relationships are in the process of change, the object will be to bring the encounter to a satisfactory close without altering the expected course of development. This perspective nicely accounts, for example, for the little ceremonies of greeting and farewell which occur when people begin a conversational encounter or depart from one. Greetings provide a way of showing that a relationship is still what it was at the termination of the previous coparticipation, and, typically, that this relationship involves sufficient suppression of hostility for the participants temporarily to drop their guards and talk. Farewells sum up the effect of the encounter upon the relationship and show what the participants may expect of one another when they next meet. The enthusiasm of greetings compensates for the weakening of the relationship caused by the absence just terminated, while the enthusiasm of farewells compensates the relationship for the harm that it is about to be done to it by separation. 15

It seems to be a characteristic obligation of many social relationships that each of the members guarantees to support a given face for the other members in given situations. To prevent disruption of these relationships, it is therefore necessary for each member to avoid destroying the others' face. At the same time, it is often the person's social relationship with others that leads him to participate in certain encounters with them, where incidentally he will be dependent upon them for supporting his face. Furthermore, in many relationships, the members come to share a face, so that in the presence of third parties an improper act on the part of one member becomes a source of acute embarrassment to the other members. A social relationship, then, can be seen as a way in which the person is more than ordinarily forced to trust his self-image and face to the tact and good conduct of others.

15 Greetings, of course, serve to clarify and fix the roles that the participants will take during the occasion of talk and to commit participants to these roles, while farewells provide a way of unambiguously terminating the encounter. Greetings and farewells may also be used to state, and apologize for, extinguishing circumstances—in the case of greetings for circumstances that have kept the participants from interacting until now, and in the case of farewells for circumstances that prevent the participants from continuing their display of solidarity. These apologies allow the impression to be maintained that the participants are more warmly related socially than may be the case. This positive stress, in turn, assures that they will act more readily to enter into contacts than they perhaps really feel inclined to do, thus guaranteeing that diffuse channels for potential communication will be kept open in the society.
THE NATURE OF THE RITUAL ORDER

The ritual order seems to be organized basically on accommodative lines, so that the imagery used in thinking about other types of social order is not quite suitable for it. For the other types of social order a kind of schoolboy model seems to be employed: if a person wishes to sustain a particular image of himself and to gain the feelings to it, he must work hard for the credits that will buy this self-enhancement for him; he should try to obtain ends by improper means, by cheating or theft, he will be punished, disqualified from the race, or at least made to start all over again from the beginning. This is the imagery of a hard, dull game. In fact, society and the individual join in one that is easier on both of them, yet one that has dangers of its own.

Whatever his position in society, the person insulates himself by blindness, half-truths, illusions, and rationalizations. He makes an “adjustment” by convincing himself, with the tacit support of his intimate circle, that he is what he wants to be and that he would not do to gain his ends what the others have done to gain theirs. And as for society, if the person is willing to be subject to informal social control—if he is willing to find out from hints and glances and tacit cues what his place is, and keep it—then there will be no objection to his furnishing this place at his own discretion, with all the comfort, elegance, and nobility that his wit can muster for him. To protect this shelter he does not have to work hard, or join a group, or compete with anybody; he need only be careful about the expressed judgments he places himself in a position to witness. Some situations and acts and persons will have to be avoided; others, less threatening, must not be pressed too far. Social life is an unaltered, orderly thing because the person voluntarily stays away from the places and topics and times where he is not wanted and where he might be disparaged for going. He cooperates to save his face, finding that there is much to be gained from venturing nothing.

Facts are of the schoolboy’s world—they can be altered by diligent effort but they cannot be avoided. But what the person protects and defends and invests his feelings in is an idea about himself, and ideas are vulnerable not to facts and things but to communications. Communications belong to a less punitive scheme than do facts, for communications can be by-passed, withdrawn from, disbelieved, conveniently misunderstood, and tactfully conveyed. And even should the person misbehave and break the truce he has made with society, punishment need not be the consequence. If the offense is one that the offended persons can let go by without losing too much face, then they are likely to act forbearingly, telling themselves that they will get even with the offender in another way at another time, even though such an occasion may never arise and might not be exploited if it did. If the offense is great, the offended persons may withdraw from the encounter, or from future similar ones, allowing their withdrawal to be reinforced by the awe they may feel toward someone who breaks the ritual code. Or they may have the offender withdrawn, so that no further communication can occur. But since the offender can salvage a good deal of face from such operations, withdrawal is often not so much an informal punishment for an offense as it is merely a means of terminating it. Perhaps the main principle of the ritual order is not justice but face, and what any offender receives is not what he deserves but what will sustain for the moment the line to which he has committed himself, and through this the line to which he has committed the interaction.

Throughout this paper it has been implied that underneath their differences in culture, people everywhere are the same. If persons have a universal human nature, they themselves are not to be looked to for an explanation of it. One must look rather to the fact that societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilize their members as self-regulating participants in social encounters. One way of mobilizing the individual for this purpose is through ritual; he is taught to be perceptive, to have feelings attached to self and a self expressed through face, to have pride, honor, and dignity, to have considerateness, to have tact and a certain amount of poise. These are some of the elements of behavior which must be built into a person if practical use is to be made of him as an interactant, and it is these elements that are referred to in part when one speaks of universal human nature.

Universal human nature is not a very human thing. By acquiring it, the person becomes a kind of construct, built up not from inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that are impressed upon him from without. These rules, when followed, determine the evaluation he will make of himself and of his fellow-participants in the encounter, the distribution of his feelings, and the kinds of practices he will employ to maintain a specified and obligatory kind of ritual equilibrium. The general capacity to be bound by moral rules may well belong to the individual, but the particular set of rules which transforms him into a human being derives from requirements established in the ritual organization of social encounters. And if a particular person or group or society seems to have a unique character all its own, it is because its standard set of human-nature elements is pitched and combined in a particular way. Instead of much pride, there may be little. Instead of abiding by the rules, there may be much effort to break them safely. But if an encounter or undertaking is to be sustained as a viable system of interaction organized on ritual principles, then these variations must be held within certain bounds and nicely counterbalanced by corresponding modifications in some of the other rules and understandings. Similarly, the human nature of a particular set of persons may be specially designed for the special kind of undertakings in which they participate, but still each of these persons must have within him something of the balance of characteristics required of a usable participant in any ritualistically organized system of social activity.