1. What is the role of deterrence and compellence in great power military interventions? Can small actors effectively deter powers like the United States?

2. Do organizational cultures influence the ability of great powers to intervene militarily in post-Cold War conflicts?

3. What are some factors that limit/encourage great power participation in military interventions?

4. What is the best type of assistance the United States and other leading powers can contribute to peacekeeping missions? Is it ground forces, unique capabilities (ie. airlift, ISR), funding, training, etc? What tactics should interveners use? What should they avoid?

5. What is the desired end-state of great power military interventions? Is it enduring peace, political stability, or simply the immediate cessation of hostilities?

6. Do great powers need to respect the holy trinity of peacekeeping (minimal use of force, impartiality of intervening forces, host nation consent)?

7. Can great powers use instruments of power other than military force to influence the actions of states/groups? Are they effective?

Additional discussion questions are included in the reading notes. They are printed in italicized font.
**Deterrence and Coercion:**


- Deterrence v. Compellence
  - A threat that compels rather than deters requires that punishment be administered **until** the other acts rather than if he acts.
  - Static (Deterrence) v. Dynamic (Compellence)
  - Deterrence is based on raising the potential cost of action for adversary.
  - Compellence must have a time horizon in order to be useful and credible
    - “Violations” continue while the adversary waits for your actions (ie. We will attack you if you don’t stop killing civilians—civilians continue to die if we do not attack—lowers credibility)
    - Difficult to determine thresholds (ie. How far do I need to retreat to prevent you from carrying out your threat? When do I need to stop my actions before you carry out your actions?)
  - Deterrence and compellence both require assurances of what will not happen if you do what is desired/don’t do what is not desired.
    - Often difficult to provide assurances for compellence.
  - Compellence is similar to offense→inducing action or acquiescence by an action that threatens to hurt
  - Defense may merge with deterrence, but differences exist between the two.
    - Pure Defense: Make it so the enemy cannot succeed.
    - Coercive/Deterrent Defense: Induce enemy to not proceed by making his actions costly
- Connectedness between the proscribed action and the threatened response is required.
  - Makes threats credible
  - Shows limits, prevents spirals
  - ie. If the Russians put missiles in Cuba, why doesn’t the US blockade Vladivostok.
- United States has come to use the term “defense” as a euphemism for military
  - Secretary of War → Secretary of Defense (1947)
- How to deterrence and compellence apply to great power military intervention?
- What options do actors (both interveners and warring parties) have to either compel or deter action?


- Deterrence is a form of coercion
- Mutual nuclear deterrence results from the characteristics of nuclear weapons
- One or two weapons can cause significant harm
- Relative size of forces is not important, thus relationship between parties is symmetrical
- Deterrence is successful when status quo is maintained and fails when the status quo is not maintained.
  - Deterrence is a peaceful employment of force, so when an adversary is not deterred and violent means are necessary, deterrence has failed.
- Despite existence of nuclear deterrence, nuclear states are not locked in a status quo.

- Conventional forces are quite different from nuclear forces
  - Inflict small punishment
  - Competitive in application
  - A country must be able to make and mobilize them
  - Need application to political decisions
  - Time sensitive
  - Allow for discriminatory use
  - Critically additive
  - Constantly changing

- Different characteristics lead to different type of deterrent effect
  - Primary difference: no self-organizing device because punishment is difficult, power is not symmetrical, external influence (not bilateral relationships between states)

- Threats lose credibility if they are undesirable to execute.
  - Analyzes basic elements that determine the relative will and skill to apply force.

- Issues to consider:
  - Relative interest of objectives for parties
    - Nuclear deterrence would likely lead to the more interested party prevailing in bargaining as both sides attempt to avoid escalation
    - In conventional cases, actors may probe more to determine if more force should be used.
  - Political asymmetries and Power asymmetries
    - Must appear to be superior to the other in order to deter threats, thus should keep capabilities secret, but keeping capabilities secret does not serve much deterrent value.
    - Timing and speed of mobilization can also be used to deter
    - Conventional power is expensive and additive → having allies is helpful.
      - Allows for better “image” projection
      - Divide and conquer strategies
  - Escalation and brinkmanship
    - Used to demonstrate potential intentions
    - Frightens adversaries
    - Must be limited
Challenger may engage a defender to alter relations between the challenger and a third country or internal politics.

- Conciliation and deterrence
  - De-escalation can occur if one uses purely defensive threats
- Reputation and knowledge


- Causes of refugee disasters are genocide, politicide, ethnic cleansing, occupation, repressive regimes, deterioration of economic conditions, dangerous environment created by warfare.
  - Politicide can often evolve into genocidal (possibly using ethnicity as a mobilizing force as discussed in earlier readings?)
  - Landmines are a variant of occupation—they don’t leave when troops withdraw.
- Remedies are aerial bombing, safe zones, safe havens, peace enforcement, general war
  - Aerial bombing is a form of punishment
    - Cheap solution—but does it actually solve anything? Does it just make the situation worse?
    - Range issues depending on location of target country
    - What target set should be attacked?
      - Civilian population, industry, transportation, communications, electricity generation?
  - Safe Zones: Protect victims where they live—Iraqi Kurds were protected from Iraqi forces who were threatened by air strikes on forces that trespassed into the safe zone
    - Rarely attempted
    - Cause de facto secession—leading to political obstacles
  - Safe Havens: Displaced victims can seek protection, but not necessarily near their homes
    - If violence is low level and unsophisticated, airpower may be unable to deter offenders. States may consider using ground forces.
      - Safe Havens have failed in Darfur because they aren’t adequately protected.
  - Enforced Truce: Peace enforcement
  - General Offensive War: Aim is to destroy military power of assailant.
    - This is the only permanent solution to the conflict
- Is humanitarian intervention deterrence or compellence
  - Deterrence is easier than compellence
    - Dissuasive threat protects status quo
    - Challenger has to escalate conflict and face added risks
    - Defender of the status quo has a lot at stake, and is therefore a more credible deterrent.
    - Easy to agree on a stopping point=starting point.
Compellence is more difficult because of the same reasons above.
- Rescuers often find themselves required to use compellence because violence has already started

**Delusions**


- Post-Somalia emphasis on the need for exit strategies.
  - Anthony Lake “Exit Strategy Doctrine”
- Based on preventing mission creep, American impatience, and the idea that interventions should be painless and self-limiting.
- Emphasis on exit strategies makes it appear that military interventions are mechanical tasks, not evolving strategic contests.
  - Overemphasis undermines operations
- If the US will not maintain a long term presence (as we have in Sinai and the Persian Gulf), how do we ensure mission accomplishment?
  - Transition Options
    - Follow on force
    - Local Political Entity
    - Division and Balance of Power
- How do we measure success and failure?
  - What are our initial expectations?
  - Two assumptions:
    - Nature of the problem and a possible solution
    - How will weather and other conditions affect the mission?


- Misconception that impartial peacekeepers end conflict.
  - This is true in traditional peacekeeping, where the goal is to monitor an existing cease-fire that all parties have accepted.
- Impartiality may actually lengthen conflict in peace enforcement operations.
- Wars don’t start unless the parties would rather fight than concede.
  - A war will not end until both sides agree, or a one side is defeated.
  - Compromise is only possible when both sides realize they have more to lose than to gain from fighting
- How do we ensure that conflict ends?
  - Can’t be done by remaining neutral
  - Half-way solutions don’t work
    - UN tried to prevent Serbs from consolidating victory, but didn’t provide military assistance to the Croats and Muslims.
- Economic sanctions and arms embargos extended stalemate in the Balkans
- US tried to capture General Aidid in Somalia but did not have a replacement to lead Somalia, leading to a failed mission
  - Impartiality fuels fighting by letting factions compete for UN jobs, contracts, and monetary assistance.
  - Areas without UN forces reestablished commerce.
- Interveners must pick a side to be successful.
  - To make peace is to decide who rules.
    - Pick a side to support. If a state can’t do this, the state should not intervene
  - Avoid half-measures
  - Do not confuse peace with justice
    - Interveners are placing higher premiums on legitimacy than peace.
    - What is the end state goal? Ending killing or establishing peace?
Tactics


- Force requirements for stability operations differ significantly from those needed for conventional operations.
- Instead of using estimated size of the opposing force to determine force requirements, planners of stability operations should rely on the population of the intervention area.

In addition to population, the situation must also be assessed (simple policing or maintaining stability in an area with no central government?)

- 1-4 troops per thousand population: Routine policing operations
  - US- 3.1 police officers: 1000 population
  - Boston- 3.4 police officers: 1000 population
- 4-10 troops per thousand population: Low intensity counterinsurgency
  - India’s Punjab state 5.7:1000
  - 1965 US intervention in the Dominican Republic: 6.6:1000
  - Iraq (17 Sep 08)-5.2:1000
- Over 10 per thousand of population
  - Malayan Emergency (20:1000)
  - Northern Ireland (20:1000)
  - Balkans

- Shows that large numbers of peacekeeping forces are required.
  - Long term commitments might be difficult
- To avoid overexerting forces, we can deal with countries piece by piece using an oil spot or strategic hamlet approach.
- Growing population will cause more problems → difficult to maintain even low force requirements.
- Rotation of forces in an extended operation will decrease readiness and retention.

Article summarizes many of the key messages discussed in other readings this week.

- Military intervention often fails to bring about enduring peace in violent communal (ethnic) civil conflict.
- US is generally unprepared, despite recent experience (Lebannaon, Somalia, Afghanistan)
  - US therefore tries to avoid involvement.
- Communal civil wars have been the primary type of warfare since the end of the Cold War.
- Policymakers fail to distinguish between communal civil wars and ideological ones.
  - Key difference is how groups differentiate themselves—hardened identities
    - In communal conflict, you cannot generally “change sides”
    - Constructivist theory dictates that identities are changeable, but recent conflicts show otherwise (Balkans)
  - Security Sensitivity: Communal conflict leads individuals to fear for security even after the conflict ends—modern hatreds. These are heightened by the inability to distinguish combatants from noncombatants—can’t provide assurance of security.
  - Little Power-Sharing Potential:
    - Leaders promise protection from the enemy, not compromise
    - High levels of autonomy may lead to security dilemma type issues as people fear the mobilization of other groups.
  - Population displacement
    - Leads to economic breakdown and disintegration of political structures.
    - Affects neighboring states through refugees
- US “peacemaker” attitude is an obstacle to the achievement of stability.
- Difficulties
  - Large force sizes are necessary to maintain peace (see Quinlivan)
  - Challenging rules of engagement
    - Avoid contributing to violence
    - ROE must be broad enough to allow for mission completion
    - Disarmament often relies on coercion and intrusion
  - When is the mission complete?
  - Neutrality poses difficulties
- Alternative Strategies (See tables on pages 51 and 76)
  - Commissary: Provide humanitarian relief without becoming involved in the larger conflict
  - Quarantine: Trying to isolate a conflict to prevent outside interference
  - Balance: Training and arming one side to create a local balance of power
  - Pick a winner: Aid one group in winning
Transfer: Relocating groups into defensible areas
Prophylaxis: Using military force to ensure order and avert hostilities


- There are two prescriptions for counterinsurgency operations
  - Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM)
  - Costs-Benefits

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<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Hearts and Minds</th>
<th>Costs-Benefits</th>
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| **Theoretical Justification** | Insurgency is the result of modernization (have-nots). COIN practitioners must provide for the have-nots to prevent them from falling | -Coercive economic model  
- WHAM is ineffective ➔ no link between economic aid and support for government |
| **Actions**             | -Protect population from insurgents  
-Develop good governance  
-Improve economic/social conditions | -Prevent insurgents access to inputs  
-Attack the process of input-output conversion  
-Harden insurgent targets |
| **Problems**            | -Resources going to insurgents                                                   | -Coercion may increase hatred of government/COIN forces |

- Winning hearts and minds must ensure:
  - Physical control of territory and population
  - Penetration of authority throughout the country
  - Promotion of economic and social development
  - Unity Principle: These three goals must occur simultaneously

- WHAM must protect people from insurgents
  - Strategic hamlets make this possible

- Requires good governance to prevent “voids of underadministration.”
  - Great Power Interventions implication ➔ Failed States (i.e. Somalia)
  - Insurgency threatened governments need more professional governments
    - Dilemma: States need strong military/police forces to defeat insurgency, but regimes must use political power to buy military and police support ➔ soldiers become mercenaries disinterested in fighting insurgents.

- Costs and Benefits Model is based on economics
  - Inputs ➔ Process ➔ Outputs
  - Inputs = Food, information, weapons
  - Process = Conversion of inputs into outputs (attacks)
  - Must deal with all parts of the model

Does Winning Hearts and Minds work in communal (ethnic) wars, or is its effectiveness limited to ideological (people’s) war?
What are some additional problems associated with Winning Hearts and Minds?
  - Insurgents often get material support from the population. How do we know that material assistance being provided under WHAM isn’t being funneled to our adversaries?
  - How do we balance the interests of elites (and intervening forces) with the need for stability and security?


- Our military culture is not well suited to the current security environment.
- Thesis: The United States should abstain from intervention in small wars except in those rare cases when military intervention is essential to protecting or advancing US national security.*
  - Great power intervention in small wars is a matter of choice
  - Small Wars: all campaigns other than those where both sides consist of regular troops
- Americans are casualty averse → shaped a distinct “American way of war”
  - Apolitical: Look only at military component, not at lasting peace.
  - Astrategic: War as an autonomous activity, forgets about post-War
  - Ahistorical
  - Problem Solving, Optimistic: US military to solve everything
  - Culturally Ignorant
  - Technologically Dependent
  - Firepower Focused
  - Large Scale
  - Profoundly Regular
  - Impatient
  - Logistically Excellent: Isolates troops from civilians
  - Sensitivity to Casualties: We like long-range, high-tech operations that put the warfighter out of danger’s way.
- Conventional wisdom ignores the enemy.
- Key Points:
  - The United States often forgets about the end-state goal of political success and instead focuses on battlefield success.
  - We use the wrong (overly conventional) tactics
- Developing strength and speed may be strategically counterproductive
- Vietnam as an example of poor COIN
  - GEN Westmoreland failed to recognize that the object of war extends beyond the defeat of enemy military forces. → It also includes securing the political object for which war is waged.
    - Think Clausewitz!
  - War was waged too conventionally.
  - Recommended Reading: Learning to Eat Soup With A Knife, Nagl
  - We are repeating the same mistakes in Iraq
Policy Implications: Do we train forces dedicated to perform military operations other than war? Do we abandon direct military intervention?
  - Weinberger-Powell Doctrine
    - We should only intervene if it is absolutely necessary to our national interest or that of our allies. When we go in, we must be fully supported by the American people, and we must deploy a force capable of carrying out the mission.

*What are US national security interests? When do interventions in developing nations serve US national security?*

Do we see any connections between this article and the 2008 National Defense Strategy?
  - Balancing between conventional and irregular warfare
  - Shedding cultural elements that are barriers to developing unconventional capabilities
Military Perspectives on Intervention


- The role of airpower in peacekeeping is auxiliary.
- Shift from provision of political and financial assistance to direct contributions of personnel and material.
- **What does airpower provide that other types of forces do not?**
  - Credibility and Efficiency
  - Improved observation and reporting reduces mistrust among parties
  - Improved C2
    - Language barriers still exist
    - Will we relinquish command authority?
    - Author believes airpower will improve C2 at tactical, operational and strategic levels.
  - Improved ISR
    - Increased air surveillance will enhance stability
      - Warring groups will find it more difficult to disrupt agreements without being caught
      - Primary disputing parties will be deterred from violating agreements
  - Problems/Difficulties
    - Dissemination issues (Do we share this with them?)
  - Other unique capabilities
    - Meteorology
    - PSYOPS
  - Airlift
    - Inter and Intra theater personnel and equipment movement
    - Airdrops
    - Leads to expanded ground infrastructure→expanded costs
    - Rapid response can prevent escalation of conflict.
- Airpower does not replace ground forces
- Significant cost tradeoffs
  - *Is it worth it? What value is added?*


- Article begins with general background on peacekeeping in the period immediately following the end of the Cold War.
- End of Cold War led to a change in the “essence of military power.”
  - During Cold War, peacekeeping operations were supposed to be carried out by neutral forces
  - US was seldom neutral, so participation in PKOs was minimal
  - UN viewed as an instrument of anti-Western diplomacy.
US success in peacekeeping came outside of the UN.
In 1993, US was unprepared to take on peacekeeping operations.

Metz examines military requirements of UN peacekeeping missions and US military capabilities; determines where USAF can participate.

What can the US provide?
- Joint Planners to the Joint Staff and the staffs of unified commands that understand requirements of PKOs
- Planners to multinational planning staffs
- Training of international partners
- Logistics
- Command and Control
- Basing and Maintenance
- Aerial Refueling
- SAR
- Medical Assistance
- ISR
- Weather
- SOF Support
- Traditional airpower support

No major changes to US military force planning are necessary to provide assistance.
- What about doctrine, tactics?

PKOs occur in the “fuzzy area between war and peace” → military operations are subordinate to diplomatic efforts.

Broader mission set than Bash, but this also means more resources and higher costs.
- Greater emphasis on training and planning than Metz?
- Will this be effective?

In 1993, US military is slow to develop peacekeeping strategy.
- Command issues
- Leadership is reluctant to take on new missions as force size is reduced.


French global presence is larger than what is expected given its demographic and economic resources.
Treacher argues that this international involvement is driven by French desire to promote grandeur and its international standing as a world power.
- The desire to maintain grandeur and rang drives French foreign policy
  - French interventionist culture
- At the end of the Cold War, France needed to justify its presence on the UN Security Council.
- In order to prevent being marginalized on the UNSC, France increased participation in UN PKOs (and PKOs outside of the UN).
Justified participation as using universal values of the French Revolution (1789) – Defender of human rights.

- Assistance to French “partners” in Africa
  - Regular occurrence
  - Africa was the one region where France could still act like a great power with the deployment of only a few hundred troops.
  - Conditional on partner’s human rights record and degree of progress in the transition to Democracy

Progression of French Military Intervention

UN: Instrument of American Hegemony
(de Gaulle)
↓
Participant in UN PKOs: UN as a Power Multiplier
(Mitterand)
↓
Increased power projection capabilities
Professionalization of the Armed Forces
↓
Multinational Operations
(Chirac)
↓
No longer the world’s gendarme (particularly in Africa): selective engagement


- British Army has traditionally distanced itself from formalized doctrine.
- Two factors have led to British disdain for doctrinal publications:
  - Preferred to rely on experience
    - Tactics = Opinion of the senior officer present
    - Tactics passed down orally within units and not shared in a spirit of competition.
    - Particularly true with COIN Operations
  - Unique relationship between the Army and civilian policy-makers
    - Mutual Confidence led to a high degree of decentralization.
    - Tactics developed at the lower levels – many cases it was the lowest (8-man sections).
- According to some British officers, the British Army deployment to Bosnia in 1992 led to the development of peacekeeping doctrine: Wider Peacekeeping.
- Why did this happen?
  - Organizational Process Model
    - Health of the organization is deemed to be paramount – maximizing autonomy and ensuring the essence of the organization
Behavior within the organization is regulated by standard operating procedures based on pre-established routines in new situations, the organization looks to existing routines and experience.

The military organization will seek to solve short-term problems to the detriment of long-term ones.

- Health of the Organization
  - Some officers believed that peacekeeping would open up new missions.
  - Others concerned that it would lead to a debilitation of operating standards and overexert forces.
  - Consensus formed around the latter.
  - British Army needed to ensure autonomy:
    - The military has different ideas about peacekeeping than civilian leadership use Wider Peacekeeping to educate civilian decision makers.
    - Also maintains autonomy by challenging US position on peace enforcement (US thought peace keeping and enforcement were the same things, just at different intensity levels.

- Original doctrine kept traditional peacekeeping missions, avoided peace enforcement
  - Fear of mission creep
  - Senior leadership supported non-involvement in inter-ethnic conflicts.

- Serving officers largely opposed the new doctrine.
  - Viewed WPK as a political document not a military one.
  - Denied commanders flexibility

- Led to new doctrine: Joint Warfare Publication, JWP 3-50, Peace Support Operations
  - Sought “creation of a comprehensive and self-sustaining peace, rather than a superficial conflict by military force.”
  - Involved additional agencies and organizations
  - Minimum use of force
  - No longer need for consent and impartiality
  - Increased applicability of doctrine peace enforcement operations