Architecture: The Global Imaginary in an Antiglobal World

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Daniel Bertrand Monk and Andrew Herscher argue that the discipline of global history, because it supposedly champions an “inclusive and heterogeneous arrays of ‘local’ sites across the globe,” fails to diminish the sway of the universalist assumptions of the Enlightenment. Even worse, global history is a “perversion” of that older project. The new universalism—by the sheer weight of its dialectical majesty—transforms the great buildings of the past into sites of exclusion.1 Monk and Herscher use the word global as the telltale signifier of this tragedy as it moves up and down various academic and economic registers: from “global history,” to “global history of architecture,” to “global architectural history,” to “global histories of architecture,” to land ultimately at the doorstep of “the globalization of the history of architecture.”

I would like to disentangle the components of this position. First I will differentiate the disciplinary project that goes by the heading global history from “a global history of architecture.” Then I will tackle the question of the geopolitical. In this, I feel that Monk and Herscher’s argument would be strengthened by broadening the historical focus rather than targeting the word global. To demonstrate just how slippery the word is, let me start by pointing out that though Monk and Herscher argue that global history has reinforced the focus on “local sites,” the more normative understanding of the task of global history is that it tries to challenge the localist point of view. World history is the more likely target of Monk and Herscher’s critique, especially since the scholar they cite in reference to the discipline, William H. McNeill, is generally thought of as a world historian. Global history took shape only in the last ten years and then as a general response to world history and the intensification in the previous decades of a type of scholarship that was nation-, region-, or locality-based.

I do not, however, want to belabor the difference, except to point out that global history (or even world history) is an altogether different animal from “a global history of architecture.” Unlike world history and global history, no scholarly organizations, no established peer-reviewed publication venues, and hardly even any conferences are dedicated to the subject. Whereas global history is mainly taught in humanities programs, a global history of architecture is taught in the context of a survey class in schools of architecture. If it is taught at all! In the United States, most schools of architecture continue to
teach from a Eurocentric platform, and only a small percentage
have adopted something like a global history perspective. In
Europe, the situation is even worse. The dean in a top school
in Germany told me, “Why teach global history when our stu-
dents do not even know anything about German history?” The
only history class that is required at that institution is one on
German castles. The situation is no better in other places. A
global history of architecture thus has limited institutional
traction or support.

But what exactly is it then? A global history of architecture
is not a return to the encyclopedic worldview. Nor is it a bland
validation of the great monuments of the past or the rejection
of those buildings. Finally, it is not a prioritization of the
“everyday” world, and it does not dismiss the messy reality of
how people live in complex urban, peri-urban, village, and
rural environments. And because architecture’s history goes
back thousands of years, one cannot limit a global history of
architecture to the time period after colonialism. As history, it
is built on evidence as well as on conjecture and critique. A
global history of architecture can be written from a trans-

ditional perspective, just as it can be written from a stationary
position. All of this leaves open a vast intellectual and dis-


ciplinary territory for discussion and experimentation.

But a global history of architecture—as a still relatively empty
signifier—most certainly should not be confused with an actual
discipline such as global history. Even more important, although
global history and “a global history of architecture” have the
word global in their titles, neither is a global phenomenon.
In their separate ways they are esoteric academic projects. In
other words, just because the word global is in their titles does
not mean they are globalized or even have that ambition.

What is global, however, is the recently emerging, geopoliti-
cal institutionality of architecture’s history. That is the true
subject matter of Monk and Herschel’s critique, as indicated by
the last phrase in the catenation: “the globalization of the his-
tory of architecture.” But why go after semiotic ghosts only to
let the real monster in the room off the hook.

Let me explain.

In the 1970s, the world was still understood as “The World.”
Books were written with titles such as World History in the
Making (1934), World History: The Story of Man through the Ages
(1949), History of World Peoples (1954), and World History: The
Story of Man’s Achievements (1962). In the field of archite-


cture, Sigfried Giedion’s The Eternal Present (1964) represents
the last hurrah of this approach. In good Hegelian fashion it
divides history into three ages, with modernism the culma-
tion of all architectural and space-making sensibilities. In the
1980s, this worldview began to be challenged, as was the pro-
verbial canon. Universalism was the accusatory word. In the field
of architectural studies, a generation of scholars and intellectu-
als entered into the breach, following one of perhaps four
approaches: semiotics, phenomenology, contextualism, and...
tion/vernacular studies/preservation. Among these, the last two are relevant to our discussion for the way in which they took up the question of the local.

The contextualists were inspired by Jean-François Lyotard (The Postmodern Condition, 1979), who argued that we had reached the end of the writing of history as the story of humanity and should thus seek out the plurality of small narratives that compete with one another. Peter Unger (Philosophical Relativity, 1984) went so far as to state that different contexts set different epistemic standards. In the field of cultural history, Carl Schorske (Fünf-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture, 1980) exemplified the contextualist view. In the field of architectural history, Manfredo Tafuri (Venezia o il rinascimento, 1985) offered a thesis about microhistory. Contextualists tended to view buildings not as the product of autonomous design thinking but as cultural phenomena or manifestations of power and ideology. “Critical Regionalism,” made popular by Kenneth Frampton, could also be seen as a branch of contextualism; it spawned a minidiscipline that scoured the world for overlooked local architects who could be both modern and yet close to their supposed roots.

This prolocalist attitude took shape, that is, in the era of postmodern recuperation, long before the discipline of global history even existed. The prolocalist attitude emerged at a time when no one wanted anything to do with a history that went back to the much-maligned origins of civilization, a tendency identified as the toxic residue of Enlightenment pretensions. But what at the time was an opening in the discursive/political arena quickly became a narrowing, at least in the discipline of architecture. Revisionism morphed into discipline creation.
Though the emergence of localist historiography is usually associated with postmodernism (speaking generally here for the sake of argument), one cannot see this in isolation. In fact, it paralleled the emergence of another new discipline, the “history of modern architecture.” We might forget that until the 1970s modern architecture did not have a dedicated scholarly “history.” The only history it had was given either through Giedion’s high, civilizational perspective or through the lens of “great men.” Modernist history was also taught not by scholars but by interested practitioners in the context of the studio. Only in the late 1970s did modern architecture become a proper historical field. Freed from the obligation of having to deal with architecture’s problematic “origins,” this discipline began to look almost exclusively to the history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Museum of Modern Art played its part with shows such as Louis Kahn: 1901–1974 (1974); The Architecture of the École des Beaux-Arts (1976); Le Corbusier: Architectural Drawings (1978); The Architecture of Gunnar Asplund (1978); and Russia: The Avant Garde (1979). Frampton’s Modern Architecture: A Critical History appeared in 1980.

The disciplinary restructuration of the late 1970s and 1980s is important to my argument, since the history of modern architecture in the United States usually begins with Philip Johnson and Henry-Russell Hitchcock’s International Style exhibition (Museum of Modern Art, 1932), then moves to the arrival of Walter Gropius, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, and others, before coming to the gradual dissemination of modernism into professional practices. In my view, however, modernism’s self-naturalization as an architectural practice differs from the type of modernism that began to take form as a complex, multivalent geopolitical institution in the 1980s. In that context, one has to include the first Ph.D. programs created in schools of architecture, such as MIT’s in 1975. Soon followed by others, most have produced graduates with a specialty in twentieth-century modernism. One can also point to the Venice Architecture Biennale of 1980, titled The Presence of the Past, for which Rem Koolhaas penned a polemical piece titled “Our New Sobriety.” Architecture’s return to functionalism would be marked, so Koolhaas hoped, by methodological rigor. The emergence in the 1990s of computation as a research field added to the disciplinary thickening around the modernist ethos.

Parallel to this was the rise of a movement that at first blush seemed to be a reactionary gesture: traditional architecture. Old buildings have been discussed for centuries, but the idea of putting the word traditional in front of the word architecture to indicate a type of disciplinary thinking and production developed only in the mid-to-late 1970s. Book titles demonstrate this. Take the example of Japan:

1927: A Brief History of Japanese Architecture
1930: Impressions of Japanese Architecture and the Allied Arts
1935: Japanese Architecture
1941: A Short History of Japanese Architecture
1972: Traditional Domestic Architecture of Japan
1989: Traditional Japanese Architecture (film)

The rise of traditional architecture and its corollary vernacular architecture can easily be indexed as part of an interrogation of modernity that began in the 1960s. But it was more than that. From the start, both were geopolitical movements. One need only point to legislation such as the British Museum Act (1963), the U.S. Wilderness Act (1964), the National Hispanic Heritage Week (1968), and the Indian Antiquities and Art Treasures Act (1972), all leading to the International Convention on Conservation of Natural and Cultural Heritage (1981).

The creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972) expanded the realm of traditional architecture to the great monuments of civilization. To be placed on the Heritage List, nation-states had to propose buildings to UNESCO, with the result being an increased focus on the nation-state and its architecture. Not only did we get an officially sanctioned list of great buildings, cleaned of squatters and restored for posterity; we also got apps such as Heritage, Heritage of Southeast Asia, and UNESCO World Heritage that feature thousands of pictures that reinforce the aesthetic beauty of the various national sites.

The dynamic of the purification of architectural/national imaginaries played itself out at the Erbil Citadel in Iraqi Kurdistan, the subject of Monk and Herscher’s analysis. First,
the ostensibly “difficult social and health conditions within the Citadel,” as local authorities described it, convinced the Kurdistan Regional Government to evacuate the citadel, which they did in 2006. The High Commission for Erbil Citadel Revitalisation was then established and mandated to document the citadel’s historic heritage and plan for its so-called revitalization. The International Council on Monuments and Sites noted, in the language of modernization, that “the erection of shelters using looted building materials (252 shacks out of 588 inventoried buildings) have considerably undermined the integrity of the nominated property.” Nonetheless, in 2014, the site, which by then was “not inhabited,” was accepted for inclusion on the Heritage List.

The effort is symptomatic of the newly globalized connection between modernization and the UNESCO-approved nationalization of architecture’s history.

All this was magnified by the emergence of national museums. More national museums have been created in the last twenty years than in the previous one hundred. These museums need exhibitions (and curators) that emphasize the priority of the nation-state. We increasingly get books with titles along the lines of The Art and Architecture of Turkey, The Art and Architecture of Cambodia, The Architecture of Kenya, Mongolian Architecture, Chinese Architecture, The Temples of Korea, and so forth. This type of cultural nationalism has now become standard operating procedure around the world. As a result, the proverbial canon, critiqued so strongly in the 1970s, is stronger today than it ever was, for it was in essence outsourced to the geopolitics of the nation-state.

The ethics of the alliance between local planning boards,
historians, researchers, national politics, curatorialship, and international institutions, all convinced of the righteousness of their efforts, is something that should be vigorously debated, but my point—since I am here only concerned with the “history” question and not the humanitarian issue—is that the type of supporting role that “history” plays in all of this should not be confused with history as a humanistic discipline. This is a history operating within the confines of powerful, narcissistic regimes of epistemological production that did not exist prior to the 1980s. That is, the intellectual and political project that began to take shape in the 1970s, often within the context of identity politics and postcolonial sensibilities, came to be magnified and formalized by a political-industrial matrix that was grounded in internationally sanctioned, nation-affirming, and nation-building ideologies.

The impact on architectural teaching was profound. In India, for example, in 1983, the Council for Architecture mandated in new standards for architectural education that students should “study the various styles of Architecture and methods of construction through the ages in the world with emphasis on Indian Architecture.”2 Even as late as 2013, the recommended curriculum in India listed ten books dedicated to architectural history. Five had the word India in the title. The rest were on Greece, Rome, the Romanesque, the Gothic, and the contemporary, including readings from that nineteenth-century classic, History of Architecture, by Banister Fletcher.3 Clearly the old Eurocentric view is now “balanced” by a nation-centric view, one that is repeated in countries worldwide. In Japan, one of the leading design schools, announces this on its website:

The first year training teaches the fundamentals of spatial design. Beginning with human dimensions as a base, the spatial scale gradually expands as the subject of design is developed, moving through lighting, fashion, furniture and interior design. . . . Students then learn the elements of architecture through classes on planning and general construction, while a class on Japanese architectural history cultivates foundational learning as an architect.4

On the surface of things, the preservation industry, nation-based historiography, and traditional architecture (again, with their disciplinary foundations in a world of journals, publications, researchers, conferences, institutions, and apps) were seen as disciplines in opposition to modernism, when in reality tradition and modernism are two sides of the same phenomenon, which to some degree explains the profound lack of any kind of organized critique.

Today scholars are well aware of the false duality between tradition and modernism, but that is not how the disciplinary field of architecture and art history operates, especially in contexts outside of the United States.5 Take, for example, the Leeum, Samsung Museum of Art in Seoul, Korea, with its
Museum for Traditional Korean Art designed by Mario Botta, and—in a separate building—its Museum of Modern Art designed by Jean Nouvel. Botta was seen by the Korean patrons as a good candidate for the job of designing the Museum for Traditional Korean Art. As a good Eurocentric, the argument went, he would be sympathetic to Korea’s nation-centrism. Therein lies the problem I have been talking about: the institutionalization, nationalization, bureaucratization, and curatorialization of the division of modern and tradition. This is a global problem that legitimizes Eurocentrism as just one manifestation of many types of centrism.

Historians of modern architecture have more or less turned a blind eye to this entire problem. The result is an unholy alliance in which old buildings in schools of architecture around the world are taught by preservationists, often with localist leanings, whereas the twentieth-century buildings are increasingly taught by historians, producing an odd reversal of expectations. Architectural history—the discipline—has almost become a code word for the history of modernism, whereas the “historical”—now sadly often called “the premodern”—is allied with epistemologies that champion the proverbial “pride of place.”

In the United States, the narrative restrictions that have been placed on the architectural object were exacerbated when, in the last two decades, in order to make room for the two new disciplines in the tenure system, representatives of fields such as anthropology and sociology (not to mention the old Eurocentric discipline of Renaissance architecture), which were often seen as part of the standard architectural curriculum until the 1970s, simply vanished. Today in the United States, one finds fewer and fewer architectural history scholars.
who work on material that is older than the nineteenth century. This silent purge has gone uncritiqued and is having a profound and largely negative impact on the field. The type of purification and magnification of architecture’s history that one finds in the context of preservation parallels the purification, in schools of architecture, of architecture’s broader history.

What, then, as Monk and Herscher write, “endows each historicized building with a status consistent with an expanded definition of architecture”? I do not think the answer is “the globalization of architecture’s history” as associated in their minds with something called “a global history of architecture” but rather the expanded field of architecture itself—and, more precisely, its late-twentieth-century, supersized, modernist ideology. As a global matrix, this expanded field uses the discipline we call “history” as just another part of the self-naturalization of the modern while in the same breath trying to naturalize and universalize its nation-based protocols. The problem, therefore, is not history but the disciplining of history. The problem is not globalization but its more precise variant, nationalization, and the globally sanctioned attempt to naturalize its various epistemological productions. In the last three decades this has become a historical phenomenon in its own right, one that leads us, paradoxically, into the belly of the beast: the modern geopolitical.

To summarize: The 1970s saw the beginning of a transformation across the board in academe. This was an exciting moment of epistemological recuperation and institution building. But beginning in the 1980s, the emergent disciplinary realities of modernism and preservation, riding on the coattails of globalization, expanded their horizons beyond expectations and became the new normal. The institutions of today that define and protect these disciplines are, however, marked by an increasing intransigence and lack of flexibility. This means that, as valuable as the disciplinary innovation was back in the 1970s and 1980s, one has to make the transition into a different mind-set in order to finish the fight.

Which brings me back to that slippery word global.

In the face of intractable philosophical critiques, we can remove global from our vocabulary and see it as just an abbreviation of the word globalization. But that would be to ignore an unexpected opportunity to rethink the production of knowledge. With that in mind, a global history of architecture—not as it has merely there to re-produce the universal but as that which is actively suppressed by it—bears witness to the inscribed limitations of architecture’s status quo. As such its first disciplinary task is to expose the epistemological regimes—the globally enforced antiglobals—that define a whole spectrum of museological/administrative/pedagogical/curatorial practices that lie at the core of the architectural world. A global history of architecture is not a discipline; it is an accusation.
Notes

1. I assume that Monk and Herscher’s critique of universalism is the classic one that tries to expose metaphysical operations that destroy difference, whether by sublating difference into identity or excising it from identity. I also assume that the authors are claiming that universalism has become concretized through the word *global* and, in that sense, that the word itself is the carrier of a dialectic vitality that operates for the sole purpose of completing its mission of “presence.” The issue is that in detaching *global* from *globalization*, and then relinking the phrases, Monk and Herscher play on semantic slippages that keep them from digging deeper into what exactly is being “globalized” in the ultimate condition of the “globalization of architecture’s history.” In this response, I am more interested in showing how relations of power construct realms of objectivity. In this way we avoid the problem of a “false positive” (so to speak) of guilt by semantic association.

2. In its 2014 *Conditions for Accreditation*, the National Architectural Accrediting Board (NAAB) requires “History and Global Culture: Understanding of the parallel and divergent histories of architecture and the cultural norms of a variety of indigenous, vernacular, local, and regional settings in terms of their political, economic, social, ecological, and technological factors.” NAAB, *2014 Conditions for Accreditation* (Washington, DC: NAAB, 2014), 16, http://www.naab.org/accreditation/2014_Conditions. Though this is the beginning of the conversation, NAAB’s understanding of what “global” represents derives from ideas generated in the 1970s. The assumption, for example, that global history “starts” with indigenous cultures and moves its way up the political ladder is not what I mean by *global*.

3. I use the word *transhorizon* to include more than just issues of trade and commerce and the spread of ideas, technologies, disease, and so on. A history that moves across the horizon can be produced in many ways, including by comparative analysis or the narrative of imaginary travels. A global history does not even require that history cross the horizon in any real sense of the word. A single building can be discussed from a global-history point of view.

4. I am not sure how to read their use of the word *globalization*. They cannot possibly mean that architectural history plays a direct role in the economics of neoliberal capitalism. They probably mean that architectural history is somehow being globalized without, however, explaining how it is thus disseminated throughout the world. “Globalization” is a semiotic indicator of the spirit of universalism present in a global architectural history’s discourse. In chasing after the word *global*, Monk and Herscher thus wind up facing the problem of how the universal manifests itself in the concrete. For Monk and Herscher it does so in various texts produced by intellectuals in the field. These texts, they then imply, conceal their true class-specific meaning in the interest of a dominant ideology whose workings can best be exposed to view through an immanent critique of unwitting self-revelations. In this critique, perhaps deriving from Antonio Gramsci, the intellectuals they discuss are presented as a type of alienated class participating blindly—if not stubbornly—in a process that both enforces and propagates the hegemony of the universal. The problem, as I see it, is not the intellectuals, legitimate targets though they may be (including me), but a broader system of empowerment. That is, the problem is bigger than the authors imply.

5. The semiotic approach was pursued by Charles Jencks and others, but since it did not develop an extensive institutional footprint I leave it for a different discussion. Some strands also moved in the direction of poststructuralism and postcolonialism, but these were generally small in scale and existed at the upper end of the academic ladder. As to the phenomenologists, they championed an existentialist-type of “being-in-the-world.” Readings centered on Martin Heidegger, Gaston Bachelard, and later, though in a more limited way, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.
6. This has been the subject of a vast amount of speculation. Edward Soja’s identification of the “spatial turn” in the social sciences is one example.


9. ICOMOS, 82.

10. ICOMOS, 79; and UNESCO World Heritage Committee, 189–91.


16. This is condensed from a series of discussions I had at the opening of the museum in 2004, when I and others presented papers. Botta gave a talk focusing on his admiration of the European cathedral, admitting that this sensibility, rather than any familiarity with Korean culture, was what got him the commission.

17. The UNESCO-ification of architecture and the complex role UNESCO plays in geopolitical epistemologies has come increasingly under interrogation by several scholars in the field. Here, my point focuses only on the sanctioned divisions of academic labor, which produce a false global.


19. My view of the use of the word global is more elastic than that of Monk and Herscher. Instead of seeing global as filled only with toxicity, I argue that the word can be redeemed and that its status of signifier can be reopened, indeed must be reopened, precisely because we have to face the challenge of what global means or could mean in the future—in a world that is indeed global, if more in imagination than reality.

20. The problem of teaching a class called Global History of Architecture—as humble a problem as that might at first seem—forces the academic world to confront the built-in mechanisms that passively oppose the teaching of a global history of architecture, as well as to actively resist a more expansive notion of what it might mean to be “global.” The solution is not to reshape Ph.D. education and tenure expectations but to understand first the struc-
tural disconnect between how a Ph.D. topic is produced and how a global history of architecture is produced. The former falls into the category of disciplines that ground themselves in books and peer-reviewed publications. The latter has a target audience that consists namely of architecture students, who, in principle at least, are expected to take survey classes that introduce the broader parameters of the history of the field. Such classes, usually taught by the professors at the bottom of the academic food chain, are often seen as far too trivial for advanced scholars. The problem is all the more acute since architecture education today promotes the worldview of what is now cumulatively called the “creative class.” In a so-called globalized world, a world without obvious unifying narratives, architectural education emphasizes the universality of creativity, and this usually points the efforts of the students in the direction of modernist anti-historicism, with its built-in resistance to deep histories and the critiques necessary to come to grips with cultural questions in the twenty-first century. Students travel the world with studio professors and engage in issues far from their homeland. The assumption is that if one removes -ization from the word globalization, one magically gets to “global,” and then, if one throws a historian into the mix, one gets to “global history.” But the proximity of a global studio to global history is fool’s gold. Global history is not created through the accidents and arbitrariness of global travel and globally scaled education.