Over a year after the event, the government response to Hurricane Katrina remains a controversial issue. While some defend the government's actions in the weeks following the hurricane, the widespread opinion holds that the government failed to respond in a timely manner, a notion echoed by a congressional report tellingly titled "A Failure of Initiative" (
"Failure")
1.
Government Response to Katrina
The federal government had been making preparations for a large scale disaster in New Orleans since 2002. The director of FEMA at the time, Joe Allbaugh, ordered an examination of the possibility of a hurricane hitting the city that year (USC Annenberg 2005). In June of 2004, FEMA conducted the “Hurricane Pam” drill, which simulated a storm in which New Orleans was almost completely devastated. The drill was followed by more government preparation for a storm like Hurricane Katrina (FEMA 2004).
Before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Governor Katherine Babineaux Blanco declared a state of emergency in Louisiana on August 26, 2005, and asked President Bush to do the same at the federal level the next day, a request with which he complied. This authorized FEMA to organize and mobilize resources as it saw fit to help the residents of New Orleans (Office of the Press Secretary 2005). The same day, the mayor of New Orleans, C. Ray Nagin, declared a voluntary evacuation of the city. This evacuation became mandatory the very next day, August 28, the day before the hurricane hit the city. Many residents did not have the ability to leave the city, so the Superdome was opened as a site for residents to weather the storm (USC Annenberg 2005).
The hurricane hit on August 29th. As a direct response, FEMA mobilized 1,000 Homeland Security workers to provide assistance to the city (USC Annenberg 2005). In an effort to organize the response, FEMA also asked that no firefighters or ambulance crew respond to areas hit by Hurricane Katrina without being first mobilized by local and state authorities, a declaration that undoubtedly slowed response to the disaster (FEMA 2005). FEMA seemed almost unwilling to accept help from non-government organizations. For example, the American Red Cross was not allowed into New Orleans following the disaster and was unable to supplement the government’s response (American Red Cross 2005). By August 30th, the Superdome was packed past capacity, with at least 20,000 people residing in the building. The situation in the Superdome eventually became so bad that it had to be evacuated the next day (USC Annenberg 2005).
As the situation unfolded, it became clear that the government’s response was inadequate and inefficient. The federal government did not have adequate information concerning the true devastation that the hurricane had caused (White House). Despite the quantity of government workers in the area, the effects of the hurricane continued to wreak havoc on the city with people still stranded in New Orleans and looters robbing stores left and right. Firefighters from around the country were called to the region to help with the federal government’s response. Many of these firefighters were not able to put their skills to use in rescue operations, but instead had to spend time handing out flyers for FEMA to residents of New Orleans (USC Annenberg 2005). The organizations in charge of search and rescue, the Urban Search and Rescue and the Civil Search and Rescue, did not coordinate their efforts and lacked a strategy for their mission (White House). The government’s response to natural disasters is certainly something that can be improved.
Corruption
Louisiana has a long history of corruption. Much of it can be traced back to the reign of former governor
Huey Long, who kept a secret police force and repeatedly took money from state funds for his own purposes. After his death in 1935, corruption continued to thrive in Louisiana. In 1939, numerous state officials, including the president of Louisiana State University and the governor, Richard Leche were indicted for embezzlement. The governorship continued to be a hotbed of corruption during the 1970s through the 1990s when Governor Edwin Edwards was in office. Edwards was able to get off on more than twenty charges of corruption and was reelected to his post several times by the voters of Louisiana (Schulte 2005).
More recently, corruption has remained prominent in the state, although the governorship has improved. State judges have been convicted of bribery and a U.S. representative’s has been investigated for corruption (Schulte 2005). Even a short time before Hurricane Katrina hit, for example, Marc Morial, a former mayor of New Orleans was charged with fraud (Gelinas 2005). The police department has also long been under fire for corruption, bribery, and brutality (Mulrine 2005).
Corruption remained evident even after Hurricane Katrina hit. There have also been reports of no-bid rebuilding contracts being given to companies that are tied to government officials. Some of these contractors have been accused of readily employing illegal aliens to do much of the rebuilding work. There are also reports of these illegal aliens going unpaid for the work that they do. This corruption seems to extend to the police department. Many spoke out against the department’s response to Hurricane Katrina, including the fact that some officers left their posts after the hurricane hit. One of the most prominent critics, Captain Tim Bayard, who spoke to the U.S. Senate about the police department’s response, was transferred to an almost insignificant desk job, seemingly as a result of his criticism of the department. The city has also been accused of keeping records of police officers who did not actually exist in order to make the department look larger.
As a result of these actions and the long history of corruption, the city council of New Orleans has created the office of an Inspector General, who will be investigating corruption throughout the city. Our plan takes a look at the position that the city council has created and gives an endorsement of the inspector general.
Government Structure and New Orleans Rehabilitation Management
Following the government hierarchy top-down of the management of New Orleans with regard to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, there exists the following: FEMA, Donald Powell as Federal Coordinator of Gulf Coast Rebuilding, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development all at the federal government level, the Louisiana Recovery Authority at the state level, and locally the New Orleans City Council and Mayor.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been responsible for a very broad array of activities following Hurricane Katrina. In recent months, however, their focus has centered on property damage, clean-up, and compensation. In neighborhoods that suffered extensive damage to housing and infrastructure during the storm and which have seen little to no redevelopment, either private or publicly initiated, FEMA has taken charge of the gutting and clearing out of affected properties for the purposes of rehabilitation or demolition.
Meanwhile, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has been responsible for the rehabilitation of damaged public housing in an effort to prompt the return of displaced residents. As of recently, over 2500 pre-Katrina residents have utilized this opportunity to return. However, this is still only a small fraction of the displaced population of New Orleans as a whole seeing as how some neighborhoods were for the most part completely devoid of public housing, such as the Lower Ninth Ward. Furthermore, branching out from HUD also is the Road Home Program, an effort compiled by Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco and the Louisiana Recovery Authority that compensates qualifying property owners for up to $150,000 (provided for by HUD) for damages endured during the storm for the purpose of repairing or reconstructing homes.
Also functioning at the federal level of government is the Federal Coordinator of Gulf Coast Rebuilding, a position currently held by Donald Powell, previously chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). As of October of 2006, Powell has remained fairly inactive in his position, maintaining a low profile and making only minor decisions in spite of his position to catalyze sweeping change in New Orleans by intervening and coordinating efforts between the federal, state, and local levels of government. Nonetheless, his overarching authority from city to federal government provides him the ability to make and act on decisions while bypassing the bureaucratic lag typical of government, hence being able to act effectively by always adapting to the evolving situation at all levels.
Set up at the state level, the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA), created following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita by Louisiana governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, exists for the purpose of coordinating between differing interests of the city, across jurisdictions, and across different levels of government. The authority is represented by a combination of thirteen committees and task forces responsible for issues ranging from housing and the environment to long term community planning. The LRA has also established short and long-term plans. The LRA’s short-term plan in brief is to assess the situation and establish goals and priorities. The long-term plan is to engage the public in the process through parish-unique meetings and public forums, the outcome being that recommendations and comments made during these meetings could be addressed and implemented during the ensuing planning and reconstruction.
At the local level of the city of New Orleans, the office of Mayor, currently occupied by Ray Nagin, and the New Orleans City Council are the central establishments for governance of the local area. Mayor Nagin’s initial reaction to the Hurricane Katrina disaster were delayed, ambiguous, and proved unpopular. Nonetheless reelected, however, Nagin has since maintained a low profile, making few public appearances and speeches and making little public knowledge of current efforts underway or plans under review for New Orleans. It is highly advisable that, in order to promote a full-hearted recovery effort, the Mayor become much more visible, proactive, and open about ideas under consideration in order to receive public feedback. The current and future role of the city council is to act as a check on the mayor and represent the varying demographics of New Orleans.
Also at the local level, and as a result of the disreputable history of the New Orleans city government, a recently proposed and approved office of Inspector General will exist for the sole purpose of acting as a check on local government corruption, being chosen so as to have no personal interests in the region (to be unbiased), to have wide discretionary powers, and so as to have the legal power to prosecute upon discovering illegal government activity.
As an American city, New Orleans is equally subject to the top-down, federal, state, and local government hierarchy that typifies all other cities in the US. Hence, as proven by example from a plethora of other cities, such a chain-of-order is completely suitable for the city and will be more than sufficient to address the needs of a city-wide rehabilitation.