There are 14 questions and 12 pages in this exam booklet. Answer each question according to the instructions given. You have two hours to answer the questions.

- The questions are organized loosely by topic. They are not ordered by difficulty nor by the number of points they are worth.

- If you find a question ambiguous, write down any assumptions you make. Be neat and legible.

- You are not required to explain your answers unless we have explicitly asked for an explanation. You may include an explanation with any answer for possible partial credit.

- Some students will be taking a make-up exam at a later date. Do not discuss this exam with anyone who has not already taken it.

- Write your name in the space below. Write your initials at the bottom of each page.

This is an open-book, open-notes, open-laptop exam, but you may NOT use your laptop, or any other device, for communication with any other entity (person or machine).

Turn all network devices, including your phone, off.

Name: SOLUTIONS

Kerberos:
1. [8 points]: Consider the following log of three transactions, T1, T2, and T3. Transactions in this system run serially, not concurrently.

The system using this log also employs cell storage and a cache, exactly as described in Lecture 17. Assume that the cache is large enough to hold all necessary values, and that the cache was flushed after T1's commit, but before any of T2's actions. It has not been flushed since then. There have been no failures of any sort.

A. After T3's update, what are the values of the variables A and B in both the cell storage and in the cache? Write your answers in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value in cell storage</th>
<th>Value in cache</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assume that the system crashes after T3's update. The pseudocode to recover this system is as follows (this code is not the same as the final Lecture 17 recovery code):

```
recover(log):
    commits = {}  # The code below lacks a "redo" phase, which is going to cause problems.
    for record r in log[len(log)-1] .. log[0]:  // read log backwards
        if r.type == COMMIT:
            commits.add(r.tid)
        if r.type == UPDATE and r.tid not in commits:  // undo
            cell_write(r.var, r.old_val)
```

B. After the system recovers from the crash, what are the values of the variables A and B in cell storage? Write your answers in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value in cell storage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Does this system, as described, provide atomicity? Select the best answer.

(a) Yes
(b) No
(c) There is not enough information to tell

Initials:
2. **[11 points]:** Phi is running a MapReduce computation on some machines in a datacenter. The datacenter is *incredibly* lightly-loaded during this process: Phi’s single MapReduce computation is the only thing running. Phi is watching some of the network traffic as this computation runs.

Phi first observes the map phase of this computation. She knows that the basic process is as follows: the controller assigns map tasks to workers; workers read input data; workers perform the map computation; workers write output data.

During the map phase, Phi observes the controller assign map tasks to ten of the machines in the datacenter. She then observes a network transfer of input data from Machine 5 to Machine 6. However, at **no point** during the map phase does she observe this type of data transfer to Machine 7 (i.e., no machine in the network sends input data to Machine 7 during the map phase).

A. **True / False** Machine 7 must not have been assigned a map task.

B. After it finishes its map computation, Phi sees Machine 6 send a message to the controller. What might the contents of this message be? Select all that apply.
   - A response to a ping from the controller
   - Output data from the map computation
   - Meta-information about output data from the map computation
   - None of the above

C. Phi knows that MapReduce utilizes GFS as one of its underlying file systems. In the context of MapReduce, what does GFS improve? Select all that apply.
   - GFS makes it more likely that the input data will be accessible throughout the MapReduce job, compared to using MapReduce with a filesystem that doesn't replicate any data.
   - GFS allows MapReduce to continue running the computation even if the controller fails.
   - GFS makes the map and reduce computations atomic. This computation *is* atomic.
   - GFS can decrease the amount of time it takes for a machine to read the input data, compared to using MapReduce with a filesystem that doesn’t replicate any data.
   - None of the above

Since Phi has gotten familiar with GFS through her use of MapReduce, she starts using GFS on its own as a file system to back a web service she’s running. She is using GFS exactly as described in the paper, with a default replication factor of three for every file.

D. Phi wants to improve the responsiveness of her system to client requests by increasing the replication factor of some files. Which type of files should she increase the replication factor for? Select the best answer.
   - Very small files
   - Very large files
   - Very popular files

---

1Recall that we use the term “controller” where the paper uses “master”.

Initials:
3. [8 points]: The image below illustrates a tree of indirect and data blocks that are part of ZFS, much like Figures 6-8 in the ZFS paper.

A. How many data blocks are pictured in the above image?

8 — The number of leaves in the tree.

B. Steve is observing a write in this filesystem. So far, three blocks shaded in gray have been copied and modified, but no other changes have been made. Thinking of this write as a transaction, has it reached its commit point yet? Select the best answer.

(a) Yes
(b) No
(c) There is not enough information to tell

The commit point is rewriting the superblock in place (Section 3.8 of the paper)

C. What is this copy-on-write technique most similar to? Select the best answer.

(a) GFS' record append
(b) Shadow copies
(c) Logging
(d) Two-phase commit

Shadow copies = make copy over data + new modification, then do atomic rename. A similar approach is copying/modifyng data + indirect blocks and then rewriting the superblock.

Initials:
4. [9 points]: Consider the following four transactions. The syntax used here is the same as we used in Lecture 18, with line numbers in front of each read() or write().

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T1</th>
<th>T2</th>
<th>T3</th>
<th>T4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1.1 write(a)</td>
<td>T2.1 read(a)</td>
<td>T3.1 read(a)</td>
<td>T4.1 read(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1.2 read(a)</td>
<td>T2.2 write(b)</td>
<td></td>
<td>T4.2 read(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T4.3 write(a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Below are three possible schedules for these four transactions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schedule 1</th>
<th>Schedule 2</th>
<th>Schedule 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1.1 write(a)</td>
<td>T1.1 write(a)</td>
<td>T1.1 write(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1.2 read(a)</td>
<td>T3.1 read(a)</td>
<td>T1.2 read(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4.1 read(b)</td>
<td>T1.2 read(a)</td>
<td>T3.1 read(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4.2 read(b)</td>
<td>T2.1 read(a)</td>
<td>T2.1 read(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3.1 read(a)</td>
<td>T2.2 write(b)</td>
<td>T4.1 read(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4.3 write(a)</td>
<td>T4.1 read(b)</td>
<td>T4.2 read(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2.1 read(a)</td>
<td>T4.2 read(b)</td>
<td>T4.3 write(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2.2 write(b)</td>
<td>T4.3 write(a)</td>
<td>T2.2 write(b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interleaved transactions are what we need to pay attention to for 2PL.

A. Which of the above schedules are conflict-serializable? Select all that apply.

(a) Schedule 1
(b) Schedule 2
(c) Schedule 3
(d) None of the schedules are conflict-serializable

B. Which of the above schedules could be produced by the basic two-phase locking protocol that uses exactly one lock per object (no separate reader/writer locks)? Select all that apply.

(a) Schedule 1
(b) Schedule 2
(c) Schedule 3
(d) None of the schedules could be produced by two-phase locking

Initials:
5. [8 points]: Consider a system running two-phase commit (2PC) for a particular transaction \( t \). There is a single coordinator, \( C \), which never fails. Three servers—\( S_1 \), \( S_2 \), and \( S_3 \)—are involved in the transaction.

A. True / False Once \( S_1 \) has written a PREPARE record to its log for \( t \), \( S_1 \) is guaranteed to commit \( t \). Can safely abort at this point still. \( S_3 \) must be ready to commit, but is not guaranteed to have received the "commit" message from \( C \) yet.

B. Suzanna observes this system at some point in time, and sees that \( S_1 \) has written both a PREPARE and COMMIT record to its log for \( t \), while \( S_2 \) has only written a PREPARE record to its log for \( t \). Select the best statement to describe this observation.
   (a) This observation is not possible in a correctly-working 2PC system.
   (b) This observation is possible, but only if Suzanna is observing the system while \( S_2 \) is recovering from a failure.
   (c) This observation is possible even if no part of the system has failed.

Assume, regardless of your answer to the previous question, that Suzanna is now dealing with a correctly-working 2PC system, and that transaction \( t \) is complete and committed on all three servers.

Suzanna wants to optimize the performance of her system for the next transaction, \( t' \). She decides to allow \( C \) to send \( S_1 \) a COMMIT message for transaction \( t' \) as soon as \( S_1 \) has responded to the PREPARE message for transaction \( t' \), regardless of whether \( S_2 \) or \( S_3 \) have responded to their PREPARE messages yet.

C. Assume that \( C \) does not fail, and that no messages from \( C \) to any other machines are lost. However, if a server fails, it will not receive any messages sent to it while it's down. With Suzanna's modification, and no others, is her system still correct?
   (a) Yes
   (b) No

6. [4 points]: Consider a replicated state machine with a single coordinator \( C \), a single view server \( V \), and three replicas: \( S_1 \), \( S_2 \), and \( S_3 \). Currently, \( S_1 \) is the primary, and \( S_2 \) and \( S_3 \) are both backups; in terms of the view table, the current view—View 1—is 1: \( S_1 \), \( S_2 \), \( S_3 \).

This replicated state machine is attempting to achieve single-copy consistency.

A. True / False \( S_1 \) is allowed to complete updates and respond to \( C \) as long as it has received an ACK from at least one of \( S_2 \) or \( S_3 \).

B. True / False If \( S_3 \) fails, the view server does not need to update the view table to a new view (2: \( S_1 \), \( S_2 \)) because there is still one backup available.

For A: This is a recipe for disaster. We could end up in a state where \( S_2 \) got half the updates \& \( S_3 \) got the other half. If \( S_1 \) fails, neither backup is correct.

For B: False. At least two reasons:
1. \( S_1 \) needs ACK from all backups, so the view server needs to make it "official" that \( S_3 \) is no longer up \& running.

Initials:
2. If \( S_3 \) comes back online \& \( S_1 \) is no longer running, it's not going to work.
7. [8 points]: A distributed system stores the value of a variable \( x \) on multiple replicas. At time 0, a process sends the write \( x=0 \) to this system through some primary replica \( P \). For the next twenty seconds, this same process sends a write to the system (again, through \( P \)) that increases the value of \( x \) by two every second. I.e., at time 1 the process sends \( x=2 \); at time 2, \( x=4 \); etc., all the way up to \( x=40 \) at time 20.

No servers in this system fail, and no messages are lost. No other processes write to the variable \( x \). You can assume that the first write (\( x=0 \)) has made it to all replicas, i.e., there are no replicas that are storing an undefined value for \( x \).

At time 10.1, Jay reads the value of \( x \) from this system on Replica \( A \); the system returns \( x=20 \). At time 20.1, Jay reads the value of \( x \) again, this time from Replica \( B \) (\( A \), \( B \), and \( P \) are all different replicas).

The value that Jay reads at time 20.1 is affected by the type of consistency that the system provides. For each of the consistency models below, state the smallest possible value that Jay could read for \( x \).

A. Eventual consistency:

Anything goes!

B. Consistent prefix:

The fact that Jay already read \( x=20 \) does not matter here.

C. Bounded staleness, with a staleness bound of 15 seconds

10

D. Monotonic reads

Note: Not 22. No older than his previous read, but not necessarily newer.

Initials:
8. [8 points]: Kriti owns four systems for storing usernames and passwords. Each of these systems stores salted hashes; they differ in how the salt is generated, and the type of hash function they use.

- System A uses “slow” hash functions and random six-digit salts (where the digits are taken from the numbers 0-9).
- System B uses “fast” hash functions and random six-digit salts.
- System C uses “slow” hash functions and a fixed six-digit salt. In this system, every user has the same salt.
- System D uses “fast” hash functions and a fixed six-digit salt.

Katrina gains access to each system and wants to determine which users are using one of the top ten most popular passwords. Suppose that it takes Katrina one second to compute a single slow hash, and one millisecond (\(\frac{1}{1000}\) of a second) to calculate a single fast hash.

The longer it takes Katrina to determine which users are using the top ten most popular passwords, the more secure the system is.

A. Write down the systems in order of least secure to most secure. Pay attention to the time differences for a slow vs. a fast hash.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{System A:} & \quad 10 \text{ passwords} \times 10^6 \text{ salts} = 10^7 \text{ slow hashes} \to 10^7 \text{ seconds} \\
\text{System B:} & \quad 10 \text{ passwords} \times 10^6 \text{ salts} = 10^7 \text{ fast hashes} \to 10^2 \times 10^{-3} = 10^4 \text{ seconds} \\
\text{System C:} & \quad 10 \text{ passwords} \times 1 \text{ salt} = 10 \text{ slow hashes} \to 10 \text{ seconds} \\
\text{System D:} & \quad 10 \text{ passwords} \times 1 \text{ salt} = 10 \text{ fast hashes} \to 10 \times 10^{-3} = \frac{1}{1000} \text{ second} \\
\end{align*}
\]

**Answer:** D, C, B, A

B. Even though Kritii is doing her best to keep her systems secure, the name of the specific hash function that she’s using is leaked to the public. Does this leak substantially affect the security of her system? Select the best answer.

(a) Yes  There can only be a few known hash functions; we assume an attacker knows them.
(b) No

C. In Part A, did you write down the systems in order from least secure to most secure? We will not give partial credit if you accidentally write them in reverse order (i.e., most secure to least secure). (This part of this question is worth zero points)

Initials:
9. [6 points]: Consider the code below. This code is nearly identical to one of the examples from Lecture 22; the only change is the addition of two new variables, \( x \) and \( y \)

```c
void win() {
    printf("code flow successfully changed\n");
}

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    volatile int (*fp)();
    char x; // This line and the next are new
    char y;
    char buffer[64];
    fp = 0;
    gets(buffer);
    if(fp) {
        printf("calling function pointer, jumping to 0x%08x\n", fp);
        fp();
    }
}
```

Amir runs this code on a machine that has no protection against stack-smashing. On his machine, integers are four bytes long and characters are one byte long. Any pointers—e.g., the base pointer, the instruction pointer—are also four bytes long. When a function is called, the following happens:

1. Any arguments to the function are pushed onto the stack
2. The base pointer (BP) is pushed onto the stack
3. The instruction pointer (IP) is pushed onto the stack
4. Local variables to the function are pushed onto the stack

The list above describes everything that happens on the stack. There aren’t, e.g., any other pointers pushed onto the stack between BP and IP. Amir’s goal is to overwrite the variable \( fp \) and force the function \( \text{win()} \) to be called, by inputting a string that is longer than 64 bytes into this program.

A. How long should Amir’s string be, in bytes?

\[ 64 + 1 + r + 4 = 70. \text{ Have to overwrite buffer, } x, y, \text{ and } fp. \]

There is\( r \) 4 bytes are where the address of \( \text{win}() \) needs to go.

B. Where should the address of \( \text{win}() \) appear in the string? Select the best answer.

(a) As the first four bytes of the string
(b) As the final four bytes of the string
(c) Anywhere; it doesn’t matter, so long as the address is there
(d) The address of \( \text{win}() \) doesn’t need to appear in the string to get the code to jump to this function; Amir can use a random string, and it will work

Initials:
10. [9 points]: Alice and Bob are trying to communicate via a secure channel. They have correctly and securely shared two unique symmetric keys (one for each direction of communication). Alice and Bob also each have their own public/secret key pairs, and have shared the public keys correctly and securely. Only Alice and Bob know their respective secret keys.

Alice runs the secure channel protocol correctly, by doing the following:

1. Calculating \( c = encrypt(k_a, m_a, seq_a) \), where \( m_a \) is the original message, \( k_a \) is the symmetric key that Alice uses to Bob, and \( seq_a \) is the appropriate sequence number.

2. Calculating \( h = MAC(k_a, c) \).

3. Calculating \( sig = sign(secret\_key_a, m_a, seq_a) \), where \( secret\_key_a \) is Alice’s secret key.

4. Sending \( c|h|sig \) to Bob.

Bob, however, is tired of all of work he has to do to receive the message.

A. Upon receiving a transmission, Bob checks that the received MAC is correct, but does not verify the signature. What attack(s) does this open Alice and Bob to? Select all that apply.

(a) A passive on-path attacker—one who observes messages but does not tamper with them—who does not know \( k_a \) could read the contents of Alice’s message to Bob.

(b) An active on-path attacker could tamper with Alice’s message and go undiscovered by Bob.

(c) None of the above.

B. Bob, begrudgingly, decides to check that the signature verifies. However, he doesn’t process the sequence numbers correctly; rather than making sure he has received the next-expected sequence number and discarding duplicate messages, he simply ignores the sequence number and processes every message. What attack(s) does this open Alice and Bob to? Select all that apply.

(a) An active on-path attacker could successfully launch a replay attack by sending Bob additional copies of messages from Alice.

(b) An active on-path attacker could successfully launch a reflection attack at Alice by sending Alice copies of messages she sent to Bob.

(c) None of the above

C. Bob gives in and decides to process sequence numbers correctly. However, he convinces Alice to use a standard hash function rather than a MAC. I.e., in Step 2, Alice calculates \( h = hash(c) \). Bob still checks that the hash of the ciphertext matches what Alice sent (just as he would check that a received MAC was correct). What attack(s) does this open Alice and Bob to? Select all that apply.

(a) A passive on-path attacker could pre-compute many hashes and determine the value of \( m_a \) with a higher probability than otherwise

(b) An active on-path attacker could tamper with Alice’s message and go undiscovered by Bob

(c) None of the above

Initials:
11. [4 points]: Which of the following problems with DNS does DNSSEC attempt to solve? Select all that apply.

- DNSSEC does not provide confidentiality
- Adversaries can observe the contents of messages between a DNS client and a nameserver
- Adversaries can utilize the DNS infrastructure to mount DDoS attacks
- DNSSEC makes this worse!
- Adversaries can masquerade as valid nameservers
- Adversaries can tamper with the contents of messages between a DNS client and a nameserver
- None of the above

12. [3 points]: Recall the DNS amplification attack from Lecture 25. Most botnets rely on this attack, or similar amplification attacks, to generate the bulk of their traffic. The Mirai botnet, however, does not. Why not? Select the best answer.

- Mirai bots were not programmed to execute amplification attacks.
- Mirai bots were mostly resource-constrained devices, which are more appropriate for executing other styles of DDoS attacks (e.g., TCP-state attacks).
- The majority of DNS nameservers blocked traffic from Mirai bots, rendering a DNS amplification attack ineffective.

13. [6 points]: Sabrina is experimenting with the toy example in Listing 1 of the Meltdown paper. She is using a system that has 4096-byte pages, just like in the paper. However, in her experiments, she uses the number 2048 where the example uses 4096; Sabrina’s code is shown below:

```c
1 raise_exception();
2 // the line below is never reached
3 access(probe_array[data * 2048])
```

Sabrina runs this changed example on her system. She observes that the access time for Page 63 is around 200 milliseconds; for every other page, the access time is around 400 milliseconds. Assume that pages are numbered starting at 0.

Given Sabrina’s observations, what is the value of data? If there is more than one possible value of data, list them all.

```
| 126, 127 |
```

Initials:
14. [6 points]: The TAs are experimenting with different approaches to Tor. In each section below, write a single sentence describing the problem with the TA’s proposed scheme. Do not write more than one sentence.

A. Felipe proposes using Tor, but instead of using three proxies, he uses one hundred proxies between the source and destination.

Latency - it will take a long time to travel from A to S.

B. Amelia proposes using Tor, but with a single proxy. Traffic travels from the source, through this proxy, to the destination.

The proxy knows A, and S are communicating.

C. Jessica proposes using Tor with three proxies, but does not use onion routing. The source encrypts the data using the destination’s public key, and proxies along the way only update packet headers. There are no “layers” of encryption to remove.

Attacker can observe some data from A → P1 and P3 → S.

In the second half of 6.033, what was your primary means of consuming the lecture material? This question is worth zero points; we’re interested in understanding what resources (recordings, notes, etc.) to offer students in Spring 2023.

(a) I watched the majority of lectures live and in the room.
(b) I watched the majority of lectures online, but at the regular time (MW2).
(c) I watched the majority of lectures online before the next day’s recitation
(d) I watched the majority of lectures online, but not before the next day’s recitation.
(e) I didn’t watch the majority of lectures, but used the slides and notes.
(f) None of the above.

Initials: