# 6.1800 Spring 2024 Lecture #20: Replicated State Machines high availability + single-copy consistency



# 6.1800 in the news



Inside the Guian Data Center of China Unicom, which uses artificial intelligence in its operations. TAO LIANG / XINHUA VIA GETTY IMAGES

https://e360.yale.edu/features/artificial-intelligence-climate-energy-emissions

## As Use of A.I. Soars, So Does the Energy and Water It Requires

Generative artificial intelligence uses massive amounts of energy for computation and data storage and millions of gallons of water to cool the equipment at data centers. Now, legislators and regulators – in the U.S. and the EU – are starting to demand accountability.

BY DAVID BERREBY · FEBRUARY 6, 2024



# 6.1800 in the news

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/21/us/spacex-rocket-dust-texas.html

## SpaceX's Starship Kicked Up a Dust Cloud, Leaving Texans With a Mess

Residents of Port Isabel said that their city was covered in grime following SpaceX's rocket launch on Thursday. The city said there was no "immediate concern for people's health."





The SpaceX Starship test flight caused dust and debris to travel miles from the launch site in Boca Chica, Texas, on Tuesday. Abraham Pineda-Jacome/EPA, via Shutterstock





# 6.1800 in the news



BY SOPHIE LEWIS APRIL 26, 2021 / 12:18 PM / CBS NEWS

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https://www.cbsnews.com/news/beavers-shut-down-internet-tumbler-ridge-britishcolumbia-canada-chewing-stealing-cables-dam/

#### how does the physical infrastructure of our systems impact the environment?

when is it harmful? can it be helpful?

#### The Global Internet Is Being Attacked by Sharks, Google Confirms

**BY WILL OREMUS** 

AUG 15, 2014 • 3:23 PM



Sharks' attraction to undersea fiber-optic cables has been well-documented over the years.

https://slate.com/technology/2014/08/shark-attacksthreaten-google-s-undersea-internet-cables-video.html

our goal is to build reliable systems from unreliable components. we want to build systems that serve many clients, store a lot of data, perform well, all while keeping availability high

#### **transactions** — which provide **atomicity** and **isolation** — make it easier for us to reason about failures

our job in lecture is to understand how a system *implements* these two abstractions. how do our systems guarantee atomicity? how do they guarantee isolation?

**atomicity:** provided by **logging**, which gives better performance than shadow copies\* at the cost of some added complexity; two-phase **commit** gives us multi-site atomicity

isolation: provided by two-phase locking



\* shadow copies are used in some systems



attempt 1: nothing special, just two copies of the data







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#### Mosquito Capital @MosquitoCapital · Nov 18, 2022

50) Replication. Oh no. Um. You have, say... 5 primary regions. Each region has a copy of all mission-critical data. One day, some eng realizes that some data in A is different in B. This is \*apocalyptically\* bad. Which region is correct? How do you decide? How do you fix it?

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attempt 2: make one replica the primary replica, and have coordinators in place to help manage failures

clients communicate only with **C**, not with replicas



primary chooses order of operations, decides all nondeterministic values

primary ACKs coordinator only after it's sure that **backup** has all updates



attempt 2: make one replica the primary replica, and have coordinators in place to help manage failures

clients communicate only with **C**, not with replicas



**all** coordinators send requests to the **primary** server, which avoids the problem we saw in our first attempt

primary chooses order of operations, decides all nondeterministic values

**primary** ACKs **coordinator** only after it's sure that **backup** has all updates



attempt 2: make one replica the primary replica, and have coordinators in place to help manage failures

clients communicate only with C, not with replicas



ideally, S<sub>1</sub> recovers at some point, or we get some other replacement machine, and we go back to having both a primary and a backup. but for the purposes of this example, we're just concerned about correctly switching over to the backup server



attempt 2: make one replica the primary replica, and have coordinators in place to help manage failures



for a single transaction, a client would communicate with a single coordinator



suppose that all machines remain up, but that there is a **network partition** that effectively splits this network in half

attempt 2: make one replica the primary replica, and have coordinators in place to help manage failures

 $C_1$  keeps using  $S_1$  as primary, with no backup



for a single transaction, a client would communicate with a single coordinator



 $C_2$  begins using  $S_2$  as primary, with no backup

because two different replicas both think that they are the **primary** replica, our data can become inconsistent

a network partition means that machines on the same side of this line can communicate with each other, but not with machines on the other side



attempt 3: use a view server to determine which replica is primary, in hopes that we can deal with network partitions





view # | primary 1 S1

**view server** keeps a table that maintains a sequence of views

view server alerts primary/backups about their roles



attempt 3: use a view server to determine which replica is primary, in hopes that we can deal with network partitions

coordinators make requests to view server to find out which replica is primary



views server keeps a table that maintains a sequence of views



/ | backup S2





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views

question: in our set-up, there is one view server for this entire system, whereas there can be multiple coordinators. why might having a single view server help us when failures (such as the examples you've already seen) occur?



attempt 3: use a view server to determine which replica is primary, in hopes that we can deal with network partitions



#### what happens if the primary replica fails?



attempt 3: use a view server to determine which replica is primary, in hopes that we can deal with network partitions



only interested in safely making  $S_2$  the new primary.

#### what happens if the primary replica fails?



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attempt 3: use a view server to determine which replica is primary, in hopes that we can deal with network partitions



#### what happens if a network partition prevents S<sub>1</sub> from communicating with VS?

in a sense, this is the worst possible partition: VS is going to presume S<sub>1</sub> has failed (and so switch to using S<sub>2</sub> as a backup), while S<sub>1</sub> can still communicate with everyone *except* VS



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at this stage, VS thinks S<sub>2</sub> is primary; S<sub>2</sub> and S<sub>1</sub> think S<sub>1</sub> is primary



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if **S<sub>1</sub>** receives any requests from C, it will behave as primary with S<sub>2</sub> as backup







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if **S**<sub>1</sub> receives any requests from C, it will behave as primary with S<sub>2</sub> as backup

if S<sub>2</sub> receives any requests from **C**, it will reject them; it believes that it is the backup (and so does not communicate directly with C)

> new detail: backups reject any requests from coordinators







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at this stage, VS and S<sub>2</sub> think S<sub>2</sub> is primary; S<sub>1</sub> thinks S<sub>1</sub> is primary

if **S1** receives any requests from C, it won't be able to get an ACK from  $S_2$ , and so will reject







attempt 3: use a view server to determine which replica is primary, in hopes that we can deal with network partitions



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if **S**<sub>1</sub> receives any requests from C, it won't be able to get an ACK from  $S_2$ , and so will reject

if S<sub>2</sub> receives any requests from C, it will respond as the primary (in line with what VS expects)







attempt 3: use a view server to determine which replica is primary, in hopes that we can deal with network partitions

**important rule:** if a machine is primary in view n, it must have been primary or backup in view n-1 (with the exception of view 1, when we're just starting)



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expects)







attempt 3: use a view server to determine which replica is primary, in hopes that we can deal with network partitions





view # | primary 1 S1

#### what happens if VS fails?

find out in Tuesday's recitation



## replicated state machines



if a machine is primary in view n, it **must** have been primary or backup in view n-1 (with the exception of view 1, when we're just starting)

(both of these events can happen in the case of certain types of failures)

primary/backup ping view **server** so that **view server** can discover failures

> **primary** sends updates to, gets ACKs from **backup** (as before)

primary **must** get an ACK from its backups before completing the update

backups will **reject** any requests that they get directly from coordinators; primary will reject any update that comes from a backup





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replicated state machines (RSMs) provide **single-copy consistency**: externally, it appears as if there is a single copy of the data, though internally there are replicas

RSMs use a **primary/backup** mechanism for replication. the view server ensures that only one replica acts as the primary, and can recruit new backups if servers fail

to extend this model to handle view-server failures, we need a mechanism to provide **distributed** consensus; see tomorrow's recitation

