

Curriculum Vitae (short)

Alex Byrne

Professor of Philosophy and Head, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT

Contact

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Employment

2006- Professor of Philosophy, MIT
2002-2006 Associate Professor of Philosophy, MIT (tenured)
1999-2002 Associate Professor of Philosophy, MIT (untentured)
1995-1999 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, MIT
1994-1995 Instructor in Philosophy, MIT
1993-1994 Mellon Postdoctoral Instructor in Philosophy, Caltech

Education

1994 Ph.D., Princeton University
1989 M.A., King's College London
1988 B.A., Birkbeck College London

Research Areas

Primary: philosophy of mind; metaphysics and epistemology
Secondary: philosophy of language; twentieth century analytic philosophy; philosophy of sex and gender; philosophical logic; ethics

Publications

Papers and Commentaries

- Forthcoming "Comment on Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne," *Narrow Content, Philosophical Studies*.
- Forthcoming "Concepts, Belief, and Perception," *Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays*, ed. Christoph Demmerling and Dirk Schröder, Routledge.
- Forthcoming "Objectivist Reductionism" (with David Hilbert), in Fiona Macpherson & Derek Brown (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour*,

- Routledge.
- Forthcoming “The Science of Color and Color Vision” (with David Hilbert), in Fiona Macpherson & Derek Brown (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour*, Routledge.
- 2020 “Are Women Adult Human Females?,” *Philosophical Studies*.
- 2019 “Schellenberg’s Capacitism,” *Analysis* 79: 713-9.
- 2019 “Perception and Ordinary Objects,” *The Nature of Ordinary Objects*, ed. J. Cumpa and B. Brewer, Oxford.
- 2018 “Is Sex Socially Constructed?,” *Arc Digital*, November 30.
- 2018 “Is Sex Binary?,” *Arc Digital*, November 1.
- 2017 “Color Relationalism and Relativism” (with David Hilbert), *Topics in Cognitive Science* 9:172-92.
- 2016 “Rich or Thin?” (with Susanna Siegel), *Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Perception*, ed. B. Nanay, Routledge.
- 2016 “The Epistemic Significance of Experience,” *Philosophical Studies* 173: 947-67. Chinese translation in *A Tutorial on Special Topics in Analytical Philosophy* (2019).
- 2015 “Skepticism about the Internal World,” *The Norton Introduction to Philosophy*, ed. G. Rosen et al., W. W. Norton.
- 2014 “Perception and Evidence,” *Philosophical Studies* 170: 101-13.
- 2014 “McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism, etc.,” *Scepticism and Perceptual Justification*, ed. D. Dodd and E. Zardini, Oxford.
- 2012 “Cheating Death,” *Boston Review* January. Chinese translation in *On Death* (Hainan Press).
- 2012 “Hmm... Hill on the Paradox of Pain,” *Philosophical Studies* 161:489-96.
- 2012 “Knowing What I See,” *Introspection and Consciousness*, ed. D. Smithies and D. Stoljar, Oxford.
- 2011 “Transparency, Belief, Intention,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 85: 201-221.
- 2011 “Knowing What I Want,” *Consciousness and the Self: New Essays*, ed. J. Liu and J. Perry, Cambridge.
- 2011 “Urban Light and Color,” (with David Hilbert), *New Geographies* 3, *Urbanisms of Color*: 64-71.
- 2011 “Knowing That I Am Thinking,” *Self-Knowledge*, ed. A. Hatzimoysis, Oxford.
- 2011 “Are Colors Secondary Qualities?” (with David Hilbert), *Primary and Secondary Qualities*, ed. L. Nolan, Oxford.
- 2010 “How Do Things Look to the Color-Blind?” (with David Hilbert), *Color Ontology and Color Science*, ed. J. Cohen and M. Matthen, MIT Press.
- 2010 “Perception, Recollection, Imagination,” *Philosophical Studies* 148: 15-26.

- 2009 “God,” *Boston Review* January/February (a ‘notable essay’ in *Best American Essays 2010*)
- 2008 “Basic Sensible Qualities and the Structure of Appearance” (with David Hilbert), *Philosophical Issues* 18: 385-405.
- 2007 “Do We See More Than We Can Access?” (with David Hilbert and Susanna Siegel), *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 30: 501-2. (Comment on Block, “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.”)
- 2007 “Possibility and Imagination,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 21: 125-44.
- 2008 “Either/Or: Disjunctivism for Dummies” (with Heather Logue), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, ed. A. Haddock and F. Macpherson, Oxford.
- 2007 “Soames on Quine and Davidson,” *Philosophical Studies* 135: 439-49.
- 2007 “Knowing Right and Wrong: Is Morality a Natural Phenomenon?,” *Boston Review* March/April. Polish translation in *Filozofuj!* (2019).
- 2007 “Truest Blue” (with David Hilbert), *Analysis* 67: 87-92.
- 2007 “Color Primitivism” (with David Hilbert), *Erkenntnis* 66: 73-105.
- 2006 “Comments” (on Cohen, Mizrahi, Maund, and Levine), *Dialectica* 60: 337-40.
- 2006 “Color and the Mind-Body Problem,” *Dialectica* 60: 223-44.
- 2006 “Hoffman’s “Proof” of the Logical Possibility of Spectrum Inversion” (with David Hilbert), *Consciousness and Cognition* 15: 48-50.
- 2006 “Qualia ain’t in the Head” (with Michael Tye), *Noûs* 40: 241-55.
- 2006 “What Mind-Body Problem?,” *Boston Review* May/June: 27-30. Polish translation in *Filozofuj!* (2019).
- 2006 “Bad Intensions” (with James Pryor), *Two-Dimensional Semantics*, ed. M. García-Carpintero and J. Macià, Oxford.
- 2005 “Introspection,” *Philosophical Topics* 33: 79-104.
- 2005 “Knowing Our Minds”, *Boston Review* November/December. Polish translation in *Filozofuj!* (2018).
- 2005 “Is Snow White?,” *Boston Review* April/May. Polish translation in *Filozofuj!* (2015).
- 2005 “Perception and Conceptual Content,” *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, ed. E. Sosa and M. Steup, Blackwell.
- 2004 “What Phenomenal Consciousness is Like,” *Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness*, ed. R. Gennaro, John Benjamins.
- 2004 “Hardin, Tye, and Color Physicalism” (with David Hilbert), *Journal of Philosophy* 101: 37-43.
- 2004 “How Hard are the Sceptical Paradoxes?,” *Noûs* 38: 299-325.
- 2003 “Color Realism Revisited” (with David Hilbert), *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 26: 791-4.

- 2003 "Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content," *Philosophical Studies* 113: 261-74. (Symposium on Tye, *Consciousness, Color, and Content*.)
- 2003 "Color Realism and Color Science" (with David Hilbert), *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 26: 3-21. Reprinted as "Réalité des Couleurs et Science des Couleurs," trans. F. Perrodin, *Pratiques* 18: 9-75 (2007).
- 2003 "Color Realism Redux" (with David Hilbert), *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 26: 52-63.
- 2003 "Color and Similarity," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66: 641-65.
- 2002 "DON'T PANIC: Tye's intentionalist theory of consciousness," *A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind* symposium on Tye's *Consciousness, Color, and Content*, <http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/tyesymp_byrne.htm>.
- 2002 "Something About Mary," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 63: 123-40 (special issue: the philosophy of Terry Horgan).
- 2002 "Yes, Virginia, Lemons are Yellow," *Philosophical Studies* 108: 213-22 (special issue: Pacific APA 2001).
- 2002 "Semantic Values?," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65: 201-7. (Symposium on Lance and Hawthorne, *The Grammar of Meaning*.)
- 2001 "Intentionalism Defended," *Philosophical Review* 110: 199-240.
- 2001 "Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and others," *Philosophical Quarterly* 51: 238-45.
- 2000 "Chalmers' Two-Dimensional Argument Against Physicalism," *MIT Working Papers in Linguistics and Philosophy* 1: 1-20.
- 1999 "Cosmic Hermeneutics," *Philosophical Perspectives* 13: 347-83.
- 1999 "Chalmers on Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics" (with Ned Hall), *Philosophy of Science* 66: 370-90.
- 1999 "Subjectivity is No Barrier," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 22: 949-50. (Comment on Palmer, "Color, Consciousness, and the Isomorphism Constraint.")
- 1999 "Two Radical Neuron Doctrines" (with David Hilbert), *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 22: 833. (Comment on Gold and Stoljar, "A Neuron Doctrine in Philosophy of Neuroscience.")
- 1998 "Interpretivism," *European Review of Philosophy* 3: 199-223.
- 1998 "Against the PCA-analysis" (with Ned Hall), *Analysis* 58: 38-44.
- 1998 "Dennett versus Gibson," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 21: 751-2. (Comment on Pessoa et al., "Finding Out About Filling-In.")
- 1997 "Unique Hues" (with David Hilbert), *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 20: 184-5. (Comment on Saunders and van Brakel, "Are there Nontrivial Constraints on Colour Categorization?")
- 1997 "Colors and Reflectances" (with David Hilbert), in *Readings on Color volume 1*, eds. A. Byrne and D. R. Hilbert, MIT Press: 263-88.

- 1997 “David Hume, David Lewis, and Decision Theory” (with Alan Hájek), *Mind* 106: 411-28.
- 1997 “Some Like It HOT: consciousness and higher-order thoughts,” *Philosophical Studies* 86: 103-29.
- 1996 “On Misinterpreting Kripke’s Wittgenstein,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61: 339-43.
- 1996 “Spin Control: comment on McDowell’s *Mind and World*,” *Philosophical Issues* 7: 261-73.
- 1996 “In Defence of the Hybrid View” (with Michael Thau), *Mind* 105: 139-49.
- 1995 “Perception and Causation” (with David Hilbert), *Journal of Philosophy* 92: 323-9.
- 1993 “Truth in Fiction: the story continued,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 71: 24-35.

Encyclopedia Articles

- 2009 “Robert Stalnaker,” “Judith Jarvis Thomson,” “Sydney Shoemaker,” *A Companion to Metaphysics* (second edition), ed. J. Kim, E. Sosa, and G. Rosenkrantz, Wiley.
- 2009 “Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities,” *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*, ed. B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, and S. Walter, Oxford.
- 2007 “Colour Vision, Philosophical Issues About” (with David Hilbert), *Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science*, Macmillan.
- 2006 “Intentionality,” *The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia*, ed. S. Sarkar and J. Pfeifer, Routledge.
- 2005 “Private Language Problem (addendum),” *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (second edition), Macmillan.
- 2004 “Inverted Qualia,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-inverted/>
- 1994 “Behaviourism,” *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. S. D. Guttenplan, Blackwell: 132-40.

Reviews

- Forthcoming Review of *A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour*, by Keith Allen.
- 2013 Review of *Phenomenal Intentionality*, ed. Uriah Kriegel, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* 2013.09.19.
- 2012 Review of *The Opacity of Mind*, by Peter Carruthers, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* 2012.05.11.
- 2011 Review Essay of *Speaking My Mind*, by Dorit Bar-On, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 83: 705-17.
- 2010 Review of *Seeing, Doing and Knowing*, by Mohan Matthen, *Mind* 119: 1206-10.

- 2006 Review of *There's Something About Mary*, eds. P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, and D. Stoljar, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* 2006.01.20.
- 2004 "Necessary Truths: Scott Soames's *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century*" (with Ned Hall), *Boston Review* October/November: 34-6.
- 2004 Review of *Purple Haze*, by Joseph Levine, *Philosophical Review* 111: 594-7.
- 2004 Critical notice of *Consciousness, Color, and Content*, by Michael Tye, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 68: 245-7.
- 2001 Review of *Phenomenal Consciousness*, by Peter Carruthers, *Mind* 110: 1057-62.
- 2001 Review of *The Quest for Reality*, by Barry Stroud, *Philosophical Quarterly* 51: 395-8.
- 1999 Review of *Problems of Vision*, by Gerald Vision, *Philosophical Review* 108: 415-8.
- 1998 Review of *Philosophy of Mind*, by Jaegwon Kim, *Philosophical Review* 107: 113-5.
- 1994 Review of *Belief and Meaning*, by Akeel Bilgrami, *Philosophical Review* 103: 356-8.
- 1993 Review of *The Nature of Fiction*, by Gregory Currie, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 71: 503-5.
- 1993 Review of *Matters of Metaphysics*, by D. H. Mellor, *Philosophical Review* 102: 285-7.

Books

Trouble With Gender, in preparation for Oxford University Press.

Philosophy of Mind, in preparation for Princeton University Press.

Transparency and Self-Knowledge (Oxford, 2018).

Edited Books

- 2018 *Norton Introduction to Philosophy*, second edition, edited with Gideon Rosen, Elizabeth Harman, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Shiffrin, W. W. Norton.
- 2015 *Norton Introduction to Philosophy*, edited with Gideon Rosen, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Shiffrin, W. W. Norton.
- 2009 *Disjunctivism*, edited with Heather Logue, MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy, MIT Press.
- 2006 *Content and Modality: themes from the philosophy of Robert Stalnaker*, edited with Judith Thomson, Oxford University Press.
- 2001 *Fact and Value: essays on ethics and metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson*, edited with Robert Stalnaker and Ralph Wedgwood, MIT Press.
- 1997 *Readings on Color, volume 1: the Philosophy of Color*, edited with David

Hilbert, MIT Press.
 1997 *Readings on Color, volume 2: the Science of Color*, edited with David Hilbert, MIT Press.

Editorial/Board Work, Etc.

Co-editor, philosophy of mind, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015-
 Member, The Memory Network, 2014-
 Scientific Advisory Board, Institute of Philosophy Centre for the Study of the Senses, 2010-
 Editor, PhilPapers, 2009-
 Co-investigator, Network for Sensory Research, 2011-
 Editorial Board, Philosophy Compass (Blackwell), 2005-
 Editorial Board, MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy, 2004-13
 Philosophical Gourmet Report Advisory Board, 2003-15
 Editorial Board, *Philosophical Studies*, 2002-