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not replace established truths with new ones so much as open them up to a protean reversibility of witty improvisation, one which overturns the impediments of aphorism with increasing ingenuity at the cost of moral certainty. As Helen puts into motion her bed trick with Bertram, her virtuosity is countered with an equally disturbing embrace of ethical relativism.

In the fifth and least satisfying chapter, Clark explores speaker-audience reflexivity in wit as the key to successful rhetoric in *Troilus and Cressida*. While Clark attempts to recategorize rhetoric in the play in order to explore its generic fluidity and self-consciousness, the argument eventually abandons these efforts by returning to the classic Aristotelian distinctions of suasion in logos, ethos, and pathos. Clark is drawn to the sophisticated, but vexing, 1609 quarto address to the reader as an entry into the play's use of wit. While the provocative advertisement of the "Never writer" announces wit as an obvious selling point, it does not offer ready terms to apply to a formal critique of wit here. In fact, it is never clear how Clark's subsequent categories follow specifically from the play's preface. In the second half of the chapter, Clark reads the Trojan council's debate to continue the war (2.2) in terms of audience reflexivity, analyzing how the council gratifies itself with a definition of honor rooted in its own self-image, to the exclusion of rational argument: "The Trojan council exalts its own adherence, and implicitly that of Greeks as well, to a sense of masculine self-display and reflexivity based on opinions of others who count, or on their perceived opinion of others' opinions about themselves" (116).

The strength of Clark's study lies in its impressive command of rich, varied, and copious evidence. Indeed, it is a pleasure to observe just how many instances of chiasmus or aphorism can be teased out of these plays for examination and comment. To this degree, the book leaves us with fresh material to consider under any perspective, rhetorical or otherwise. Yet there is something fundamentally unsatisfying in the argument's evolving definition of the "problematic," one which winds up too often echoing established certitudes about the problem play, and not sufficiently testing these assumptions against new models. For all of its admirable detail, the book's conclusions about the problem plays remain exercises in New Critical argument, reaffirming the formalist admiration for irony, rather than delving into the scholarly and ideological interests that underlie such a narrow interpretive focus. Despite this caveat, readers of the book will find their appreciation for Shakespeare's use of rhetoric in these plays finely honed.

*Shakespeare, Memory and Performance*. Edited by PETER HOLLAND.

Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Illus. Pp. xx + 358. \$99.00 cloth.

Reviewed by ALEXANDER C. Y. HUANG

This is the first book-length study devoted to memory and Shakespeare performance studies, to "creatively inaccurate" memories (3), written and mechanical records (xix), and the cultural memory enacted in theatrical, cinematic, textual,

and museum spaces. The case studies show that “the memories of Shakespeare and performance and their intersections are less reliable, most vulnerable, at exactly the points at which they appear most secure” (19). The volume aims to examine “the concerns of memory” as they “move from the acts of remembering within the plays to the acts of remembering the plays themselves in performance,” among other issues (2). The goal is achieved with grace in the thirteen essays, complemented by fifty-one illustrations. As Peter Holland recognizes in the introduction, “Memory has . . . become a distinctly fashionable topic in the humanities these days, moving far beyond . . . departments of psychology” (3). However, none of the books so far, important in their own rights (Frances Yates’s *The Art of Memory* [1966; 2001], Marvin Carlson’s *The Haunted Stage* [2001], Garrett Sullivan’s *Memory and Forgetting in English Renaissance Drama* [2005]), addresses explicitly the issues of performativity and memory unique to Shakespeare studies. *Shakespeare, Memory and Performance* opens with a foreword by Stanley Wells that acknowledges the necessity of the acts of memorializing performances and complicates the common urge to seek objectivity in records of performance. In the afterword, Stephen Orgel shares his memories of a series of Shakespeare plays he attended from the 1940s to 1969 and suggests that the history of theater is also a history of desire “essential to the creation of our selves” (349).

The first part, “Shakespeare’s Performances of Memory,” contains three essays on the function of memory in early modern playtexts’ “performances of their arguments” (5). Bruce R. Smith traces the movement of memory in different moments of *King Lear*’s history from Shakespeare’s writing of the script through its original stage presentation and textual presence to the truth claims of film and video. He argues that “the *King Lear* that hit the boards in 1605 or 1606 was not the first link in a chain of memory but a new link in an already established chain” (29). He maintains that memory consists in perpetual movement between “two very different ways of knowing” (42): speaking what one feels and what one ought to say. John J. Joughin’s chapter examines the performance of grief and Shakespeare’s “memorial aesthetics” in *Hamlet* and *Richard II*. Anthony B. Dawson delineates a different aspect of memorial acts, specifically, how Marlowe’s *Dido, Queen of Carthage* and Shakespeare’s *Tempest* recall and represent Virgil’s *Aeneid*.

Michael Cordner’s and Margaret Jane Kidnie’s essays in the next section turn to the intersections between the performance and editorial practices as acts of cultural memory, warning against the editorial tendency to dictate what actors should or should not do. Cordner believes that Nicholas Brooke’s Oxford and A. R. Braunmuller’s Cambridge editions of *Macbeth*, respectable as they are, “fail to use . . . relevant testimony from the play’s rich theatre history” (90), while Kidnie attends to why actors and editors choose to memorize specific aspects of the plays or performances, which contributes to the “disruptive intertextual effect of citation” (132).

The third section, “Performance Memory: Costumes and Bodies,” extends Kidnie’s point about the problem of representation in live performance archives to nostalgia. Barbara Hodgdon’s essay, aptly titled “Shopping in the Archives:

Material Memories,” looks at archival politics in the archive of the Royal Shakespeare Company (RSC) and what she calls “communal epistemology in which looking functions as a form of discourse” (138). Carol Chillington Rutter’s essay provides a fascinating account of lost props in the same archives, in particular, one of the handkerchiefs in the RSC’s productions of *Othello*—present only in the form of photographic images. Complementing these two essays on the archives and the lost presence of performance, Holland turns to forgetting and forgetfulness—when a performer’s memory fails. Among the stage and screen performances examined is Kristian Levring’s *The King Is Alive* (1999), a Dogme95 film about reconstruction and fragmented performances of the play by a group of tourists stranded in the African desert. Holland’s points about the characters’ reconstruction of the playtext and the cultural meaning of Shakespeare would be interesting to read along with Thomas Cartelli and Katherine Rowe’s discussion in *New Wave Shakespeare on Screen* (2007) of the same issue in camerawork patterns and the subtitled lines spoken by Kanana, one of the characters in Levring’s film.

Reconstructing performances is the subject of the next section. Russell Jackson explores the ideology of early sound films of Shakespeare to “preserve a ‘great performance’” (238), focusing on the transformation of Elisabeth Bergner’s stage performance as Rosalind to Paul Czinner’s 1936 film *As You Like It*. In Michael Dobson’s analysis of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century rediscovery of open-air theater (such as the Open Air Theatre in Regent’s Park, London), such performance spaces are signs of nostalgia for preindustrial England.

Of further note are the last section’s thought-provoking essays on the technologies of memory and their transformative effects on cinema, television, and museums. W. B. Worthen revisits Michael Almereyda’s *Hamlet*, a film well known to Shakespeareans, and demonstrates that it is defined by confrontations and collaborations between digital technology, theater, and editing practices. Robert Shaughnessy’s essay considers the relationship between the urge to memorialize performances and the anxiety about televised live theater, as shown by recent developments of media culture in the use of television screens in Simon McBurney’s 2004 production of *Measure for Measure* at the Royal National Theatre. On the other hand, as much as a “nakedly theatrical engagement with . . . the performance event” (307) such as the live BBC broadcast of a 2003 London Globe staging of *Richard II* may provide archival access to theater for those who are absent from the scene, it also complicates the conventional theatrical “rhetoric of the real” (322). Dennis Kennedy concludes this section by comparing the memory of performance and performance historiography to the cultural functions of the museum. At stake are not only the archival and political values of performance memory but also the space of forgetting created by the notion of remembering.

As with most collections, the chapters, case studies, and anecdotes by necessity do not always cohere, but the differences are always interesting. Readers are called upon, quite appropriately, to perform the work of memory, to take the five sections

of the book as “markers for the closer connections between certain chapters” rather than “impermeable divisions” (5). Students and scholars of Shakespeare and performance studies will have much to learn from this groundbreaking collection for years to come.

*Double Vision: Moral Philosophy and Shakespearean Drama.* By TZACHI ZAMIR. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007. Illus. Pp. xv + 234. \$37.50 cloth.

Reviewed by RICHARD STRIER

As the title indicates, *Double Vision* has its eye on two different realms and audiences: that of Shakespeare criticism and that of philosophy—less “moral philosophy,” actually, than philosophy and /or /of literature. The book’s largest claim is to speak of “the gratifying insights that [Shakespeare’s] writings yield when brought into close dialogue with philosophical concerns” (xiii). This aim obviously commits the author to specifying the “gratifying insights”—an oddly hedonistic conception of knowledge—that each play (supposedly) produces. And this formulation also suggests that “philosophical concerns” are being brought to the plays rather than arising from them. Part of Zamir’s courage is his willingness to specify the insights the plays contain, although this sometimes involves him in banalities or dubious metaphysics. The charge that his method involves seeing philosophy as something outside the plays being studied is one that he is prepared to answer, since he views the issues he treats as ones of interest to the plays themselves. Zamir would perhaps be better off in treating all literary criticism as (implicitly) philosophical, so that “doing criticism” with a certain self-consciousness is also “doing philosophy.” This is the route that Stanley Cavell takes, and his work shadows Zamir’s. But Zamir has a defensible investment in keeping “the philosophical” a particular category.

The opening chapters in part 1, “Philosophical Criticism in Theory,” specify what sorts of insights literary works (of high quality) provide. Zamir pushes hard for the value of what he calls “rational nonvalid argument” (11). These are claims that are not strictly provable but that can be justified by appeals to particular and general experiences, rationally examined. Zamir is quite convincing on the importance of this realm, its place in the history of rhetoric, and its neglect by (most) philosophers. These sorts of claims are, mostly, those on which we run our lives. Where Zamir gets into trouble is in trying to demonstrate that great literature and art teach morally approvable values. His analysis of Michelangelo’s David as teaching us something about the virtue of courage is a disaster, since it has almost nothing to do with the experience of viewing this statue. Here, the danger of letting a thesis about the work eclipse the work is (unwittingly) dramatized. Zamir’s claims about the importance of terms like “deepening” and “enriching” (3, 22, et passim) are much better in relation to what works of art do, but he does not provide an analysis of these terms. It would be helpful if he did more philosophy