Published: Winter 1997

Global negotiation in the face of uncertain science

by Adil Najam

Imagine you were asked to represent your country or your organization in an international treaty negotiation focused on managing the use of organochlorines at a global scale. Managing the Global Use of Organochlorines: A Negotiation Simulation, or the `Chlorine Game' has placed senior diplomats, industry leaders, academics, government decision makers, nongovernmental organizations and environmental activists from all continents of the world in exactly this role.

This hypothetical but realistic simulation, which is available from the Program on Negotiation's Clearinghouse, was developed as part of the MIT Chlorine Project. Originally developed at MIT's Department of Urban Studies and Planning (DUSP) under the direction of Professor Lawrence Susskind, who heads the MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program, it has since been revised by me to suit the goals of my doctoral dissertation.

Organo-what?

Played over an eight hour period, the simulation is based on a scenario in which the United Nations convenes an international meeting of representatives from eight countries and four nongovernmental groups (NGOs) to discuss the possible shape of a global treaty on managing the use of organochlorines. Organochlorines are organic chemical compounds which include chlorine. A growing body of scientific research-which is new and the subject of considerable debate-targets chlorine compounds as highly dangerous and the possible cause of cancer and other health problems.

Chlorine, an unstable element that quickly combines with others to form useful compounds, is ubiquitous in modern industrial society; in fact, more than 25 percent of the 60,000 chemicals in use today either contain chlorine or rely on it for their production. Such commonly known products as `PVC' piping, floor tiles, shoe soles, electrical insulation, and hundreds of other all contain organochlorines-to say nothing about its use in water purification, pharmaceuticals, bleaching, dry cleaning agents, and numerous industrial cleaning processes.

Negotiation setting

The 13 negotiating roles in the simulation are played by representatives of the U.S., Japan, Norway, Germany, Czech Republic, China, India, Brazil, two environmental NGOs, one industry group, one scientific organization, and a U.N.-appointed chairperson. Each participant is given extensive role instructions based on detailed research into how these roles have tended to behave in international environmental negotiations in the past.

Great effort has been invested in making the instructions comprehensive, representative and realistic. The confidential instructions of each party are organized as a set of memos from various domestic stakeholders-thus, for example, the delegate representing India receives a set of memos which include a position paper from the foreign office, a letter from the National Planning Commission, another from a trade group representing Indian Chemical manufactures, and yet another from a coalition of environmental NGOs. The instructions are organized in this fashion to highlight the two-level structure of international decision-making where internal negotiations within each country or organization are at least as important as the larger international negotiation. Each player is also provided with a packet of general instructions which includes a background paper with technical information on the ecological and economic aspects of the organochlorine industry.

Armed with this information, but encouraged to apply their own knowledge and expertise, the players are then given the mandate of deliberating on four key issues regarding the management of organochlorines: the scope of the problem; possible actions; financing; and governance structures.

The goal is not as much to come up with a formal treaty as to begin outlining the contours of consensus and dissent on these issues and to list various options and strategies for dealing with them. Innovative approaches to the treaty-making process are built into the design of the game: representation at the table is expanded with the inclusion of NGOs; prenegotiation negotiation amongst key parties is facilitated; exercises aimed at developing a mutual appreciation of each other's interests and concerns are included; and opportunities are provided for the players to test out different coalition strategies.

Although a full draft of a likely global treaty on the management of organochlorines is often not completed in the limited time available to the players, the outlines of a possible approach that can be taken invariably begin to emerge. Most often, the first outline of a draft convention or resolution is adopted. More importantly, the simulation offer an opportunity for participants to think in a focused and systematic fashion about the pros and cons of various options.

The game also provides the players with a deeper appreciation of how the international treaty-making system operates and how various countries and actors in the global arena tend to behave. Often, the most profound learning and the biggest surprise for the players comes from having to think and argue in a role different to their own real life; they gain a deeper appreciation of why these actors react as they do to international environmental issues.

As in any such simulation, the most important key to the learning is the post-game debriefing. Although any number of issues can be explored and highlighted by using the simulation, key issues that invariably emerge include: North-South environmental differences, the use and abuse of science in international decision-making, the possibility of joint-gains through creative negotiation strategies, the role of the chair as mediator and facilitator, the intertwined nature of issues relating to environment and development, and the role of coalitions. Detailed teaching notes have been prepared for the simulation to facilitate its use in a variety of educational settings.

Dissertation research

With fellowship support from the MIT's Kann Rasmussen Initiative in Environmental Leadership and the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School I conducted a number of `test runs' of the chlorine game to revise and refine it to fit my doctoral research on the group behavior of the developing countries in international environmental negotiations. Over the last six months, I have conducted a number of `dissertation runs' of the simulation in various countries.

Using `expert' `informed' participants-having similar experiential or knowledge bases to those who might actually be involved in such negotiation-is vital to this research. To seek a global mix of such participants `dissertation runs' of the simulation have been conducted in Tokyo, Japan (at the Tokyo Institute of Technology); Islamabad, Pakistan (at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute); Geneva, Switzerland (Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiation); and Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A. (at MIT). Ninety-nine participants from thirty-two different countries have participated in these runs and have included Ambassador-level diplomats, senior governmental and industry decision-makers, leading environmental activists, faculty members, and advanced graduate students. Future runs are planned at the U.N. headquarters in New York and at the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) in Nairobi, Kenya.

< Four variants of the simulation are being used in these `dissertation runs'. Each encourages the developing country roles to adopt a particular group or coalitional strategy, while trying to keep all else constant. This is done by keeping the base scenario (as contained in the original set of general and confidential instructions) exactly the same for each variant. A set of confidential faxes that particular participants receive at particular points of time in particular variants of the game are used as the device for introducing the variation. In addition, another control device is introduced into the simulation through a set of mock `press conferences'. These also serve the purpose of reinforcing the importance of domestic constituencies and the larger public audiences which are critical `off-the-table' actors in international negotiation.

The purpose of using this simulation as part of a doctoral dissertation is not to produce quantitative data but as a tool for facilitating the exploration of innovative approaches to international environmental negotiation. The special utility of using a negotiation simulation to study complex global environmental politics emerges from the paucity of actual cases or real opportunities to `test out' alternative strategies and approaches.

Simulations can provide a forum which encourages innovative thinking and new ideas that might not otherwise emerge. (After all, it is just a game!) The fundamental purpose of using the simulation approach to studying international environmental politics is to encourage creative, innovative thinking about problems that defy treatment by more conventional analytic approaches and methods.

Adil Najam, a doctoral degree candidate at MIT, was a Graduate research Fellow at the Program on Negotiation during the 1995-96 academic year. This article is an updated adaptation of a report Najam prepared for the October 1996 issue of MIT Environment, a monthly newsletter edited by Dr. Teresa Hill.


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