

Challenging the Myths of 19<sup>th</sup> Century Party Dominance:  
Evidence from Indirect Senate Elections 1871-1913

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Before the 17th Amendment went into effect in 1914, the election of United States senators by state legislatures was one of the most prominent features of American national politics. The past decade has seen a number of articles examine the consequences of switching from state legislative election to direct election of senators in the 1910s (Stewart 1992a, 1992b; King and Ellis 1996; Hibbing and Brandes Crook 1997; Wirls 1998). This literature has found a few significant direct effects of the 17th Amendment on subsequent national politics: after direct elections were instituted, the partisan composition of the Senate shifted towards the Democratic Party and away from long a period of Republican dominance. Institutional patterns changed as well in that senators had slightly longer average tenures in office, and incumbent senators were more likely to moderate their roll call voting behavior to appeal to the median state voter, rather than to the majority party in the state legislature (Haynes 1938; Stewart 1992a, 1992b; King and Ellis 1996; Hibbing and Brandes Crook 1997; Wirls 1999; Bernhard and Sala 2006).

We take a different tack from the existing body of work by exploring electoral dynamics in the state legislatures prior to the implementation of direct popular elections in 1914. Conventional wisdom about Senate elections at this time is that they were already essentially popular and controlled by party machines at the state level. The canvass, which linked state legislators with specific candidates for U.S. Senate prior to state legislature elections, was thought to serve as a direct link between voters and U.S. senators (Riker 1955; Stewart 1992a).

Rothman stated it this way:

Each state party nominated a Senate candidate in caucus, and the majority then elected its choice in formal session. This system compelled Senate hopefuls to exert wide influence. The more supporters in the caucus, the better the opportunity for nomination; the larger the numbers in the assembly, the greater

the chance for election. . . . Constituents demanded that a candidate for the legislature declare his allegiances well in advance, and state laws often compelled him to respect the pledge. Invariably, the Washington contest entered every election district. (Rothman 1966, pp. 160-161)

Accounts such as these suggest that when state legislators met after the state election, conflict and uncertainty were minimal, because the party that was victorious in the state legislative election had made their candidate for U.S. Senate part of their platform; all that was left to do was for the new legislature to ratify this choice once it convened.

Our research leads us to challenge this common characterization of Senate elections. Although it is true that virtually all U.S. senators from 1871 to 1913 were from the same party that controlled a majority of seats in the state legislature, state elections rarely settled anything more than the party of the senator. It rarely determined *which* same-party individual would go to Washington. The entire set of viable candidates striving for a Senate seat generally emerged only *after* the state general election. It was in the interval between the election and the convening of the legislature that candidates would declare themselves, lobby members of the new legislature, subject themselves to nomination by the (legislative) party caucus, and then endure the formal vote in the legislature. Incumbent senators may have already laid the groundwork for their reelection bids, but even they did not know if their party would hold the legislature, or if they would be challenged from within the party, or who would challenge them from other parties. Consequently, prognostications about the outcome of the subsequent U.S. Senate election, made immediately after state legislative elections, were often wrong.

We view the elections of U.S. senators in state legislatures as illustrations of party cohesion and strength. How successfully did leaders coordinate the members of their party in the legislature to vote in unison for a single Senate candidate? We find that party leaders were more successful when their majorities were large, but even parties that enjoyed enormous majorities

could find themselves caught in protracted Senate election fights. Extra-legislative nomination devices, such as direct primaries and conventions, helped legislatures come to closure more quickly, as did corporations, when they dominated state politics. States with strong statewide machines did not reach agreement about who would serve in the U.S. Senate any faster than states lacking such statewide machines, however.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Part I describes the process of electing senators under indirect election and highlights two cases, by way of illustration, when state legislatures controlled by large majorities were unable to elect a U.S. senator quickly. Part II describes our data collection and describes variation in the frequency of using the joint ballot method of electing U.S. senators. In Part III, we examine a series of multivariate models that seek to explain breakdowns in pre-election coordination around a single Senate candidate by the majority party. Major independent variables explored in this section include size of the majority party in the joint assembly, nomination procedures such as direct primaries and conventions, and statewide machine politics.

### I. The Process of Electing a Senator under Indirect Elections

For the period covered by this paper, Senate election procedures were covered by an 1866 law that was passed in response to controversies that arose in Senate elections prior to the Civil War.<sup>1</sup> The framework enunciated in the 1866 act provided for a two-step process. As had been typical before 1866, each chamber was required to meet separately at noon on the second Tuesday after the state legislature had organized, to vote separately for senator. On the following day at noon, the two chambers were required to meet in “joint assembly” to canvass the votes. If a majority of members of each chamber favored the same candidate, he would be

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<sup>1</sup>See Haynes 1906, chapter 2, for the background on why the law was adopted. The law may be found at U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 14, pp. 243-44.

declared elected. If one or both chambers failed to elect a senator with a majority of votes, or if the two chambers produced different majority vote winners, then the joint assembly would vote to choose a winner, acting as a single body. If no candidate secured a majority of the joint assembly, House and Senate members were required to meet together and ballot at least once a day until a senator was chosen or their legislative session adjourned *sine die*. States failing to elect a senator once the legislature had adjourned would have to endure the vacancy, since the U.S. Senate would not seat a gubernatorial appointee if the vacancy had occurred because of the failure of the legislature to elect.

The works of Riker and Rothman suggest that political parties came prepared for Senate elections by pre-selecting a favored candidate prior to the convening of the state legislature — and certainly before the legislature had begun balloting for senator. This suggests a *naïve model* of Senate elections under indirect election. Under this model, a strong political party that had a majority in both state legislative chambers would ensure that their preferred Senate candidate would be selected on the first ballot in each chamber, or by “separate ballot.” A smooth Senate election meant that the party leadership either supported a publicly popular candidate or pushed through their own candidate with the support of loyal members of the legislature. Even in the event of a split-party control state legislature, we would still expect to see cross-chamber coordination by each party to secure a victory for the preferred candidate of whichever party had a majority in the joint assembly on the first ballot held in joint session. In a split-party controlled legislature, a victory would of course depend on the size of the majority-minority ratios in each chamber, but in a competitive party state, such coordination would still be expected.

Refutations of the naïve model could come in several varieties. One variety, which we are unable to explore in depth in this paper, would be the outright inability of a majority party to

elect its candidate to the Senate. In this case, “its candidate” would be operationally defined as the candidate endorsed by the majority party caucus. Another variety, which is a superset of the first, is the inability of a majority party to engineer a quick resolution of the Senate election. The failure by parties to unify their members in the two chambers around a single Senate candidate would result in extended balloting in joint session. It is in this way that the very existence of joint session ballots for U.S. senator is evidence of a weakened party structure at the state level.

We acknowledge that the strength of the party, or party leaders, was highly variable. Party machine leaders were certainly critical, but even the “big boss” could lose. Rival factions might test the strength of top leaders. Short-term electoral setbacks might provide openings for insurgent elements within a party. Minority party legislators always had incentives to exploit divisions within the majority party, hoping for a fusion candidate. All these cracks in the party’s armor could explain the level of conflict surrounding a Senate election.

The role of money is also a factor that has been much speculated about, and many claims have been made concerning its corrupting influencing on Senate elections. The common claim is that individuals seeking a Senate seat, frequently backed by major economic interests in their state, attempted to bribe individual state legislators to vote for them. For our purposes, the question of the influence of money is not as important by itself. Instead, we are interested in knowing whether a candidate used money to buy the support of party leaders, or circumvent their opposition to his quest for a Senate seat. Did party leaders coordinate the distribution of bribery money to state legislators, and if so, does that mean that they did not have the political means to rally their rank and file to vote for their preferred candidate? How much coordination occurred between wealthy individuals (and the economic interests who backed them) and party leaders in Senate elections? In the process of collecting our data, we have already come across explicit

investigations into corruption of Senate elections, but it is unclear whether the money paid to legislators actually bought consistent support, much less an actual victory. We have anecdotal evidence that vote buyers targeted all legislators, not just members of their own party, which suggests a failure by party leaders to be the distributors of bribe money in these elections.<sup>2</sup>

One well-known episode in Gilded Age political history provides an example of party divisions undermining the ability of the majority party to coordinate around a single winning candidate. That was the situation in 1881, when New York senators Conkling and Platt resigned from the U.S. Senate, in a patronage dispute with President Garfield (Brown and Smith 1922; Alexander 1909; Gosnell 1924). Conkling figured that he and Platt would be immediately re-elected by the overwhelmingly Republican New York Assembly, showing Garfield who was the boss of New York. However, Conkling over-estimated the strength of the “stalwart” Republicans, leading to a three-month re-election fight that Conkling and Platt ultimately lost.

The Conkling/Platt affair is one of the best-known instances of majority-party failure to reach immediate agreement on the election of U.S. senators. But, it was also atypical of such cases, because it was so prominent and directly linked to national politics. Thus, we briefly present two other cases that seem more typical of intra-party disputes over Senate seats, the 1883 Minnesota election and the 1876 Kentucky election.

#### *1883 Minnesota election: A Party Divided*

In the 1883 Minnesota election, Senator William Windom, a Republican, sought reelection to a third full term that year. Republicans held a 37-10 advantage in the Senate and 72-28 advantage

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<sup>2</sup> For example, in the Montana Senate election of 1899, William Clark and his associates vigorously spent money to secure votes, and one of their targets testified before a House Select Committee investigating the charges that “They claimed to have bought an equal number of number of republicans and democrats, but they would not pay over five thousand dollars from republicans.” (*Montana House Journal*, January 8, 1899, p. 31)

in the House, for an overall advantage of 109-38 in the joint assembly. On January 16, 1883, when the two chambers of the state legislature met to ballot for U.S. senator, Republicans and Democrats were divided between two major candidates; in total, ten candidates received votes in the Senate and eleven candidates received votes in the House. Under the U.S. Senate election law (discussed above), joint sessions began the next day to break the deadlock.

For the next two weeks, the original voting blocs held steady, until the field started to narrow on the 20th ballot, held on January 31. On that day, the Democratic caucus met and agreed upon a strategy intended to deny the election to Windom (*NYT* 2/2/1883, A1). The caucus decided that if any other candidate except Windom received 35 Republican votes, Democrats would be free to abandon their Democratic candidates to vote for an anti-Windom Republican.

Also on January 31, Dwight M. Sabin, a Republican, was entered into nomination, initially receiving 16 votes. The following day (February 1, 1883) the legislature held seven ballots votes. Between 1:30PM and 2:00PM, on the fifth ballot held that day, Sabin managed to muster up votes from 56 Republicans. This induced Democrats to break ranks and rally behind Sabin. Democrats in this case were pivotal, allowing Sabin to win on the 29th overall ballot with 82 votes (69 were necessary to win).<sup>3</sup>

The Minnesota election is an example of stronger coordination among the minority party (the Democrats) than the majority party which, while victorious in electing a Republican, could not save their own incumbent.

The Minnesota case highlights the role of party caucuses in the Senate election process. It is difficult to document the number of meetings and straw votes that state legislative caucuses

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<sup>3</sup> Six years later, Sabin was unable to secure his own party's nomination, and was replaced by William Washburn, a Republican.



held, but using data from newspapers and the *Tribune Almanac*, we have identified the nomination process in 316 out of 731 of the elections covered in our study. In 250 out of those elections (79 percent), the majority party caucus met to try to determine a party nominee. The other nominations occurred as a result of primaries or state conventions. In 6 elections, the majority party was so divided they were unable to get a quorum for a nominating caucus. In the cases where one or both party caucuses were unable to reach agreement on a nominee, joint balloting was far more likely. In the case of joint ballot elections, the party caucus would frequently meet as balloting occurred to try to amass solidarity around one single candidate. Below is a brief case study of the 1876 Senate election in Kentucky, which shows the dynamics of party caucus behavior.

*Kentucky in 1876: Super-Majority Control*

James Burnie Beck (Dem.) was elected to the Senate in 1876, replacing John W. Stevenson (Dem.). The state election of 1875 had returned a heavily Democratic legislature, standing at 32-6 in the Senate, 89-11 in the House, making the joint session party margin 121-17. When the legislature convened in Frankfort, five Democrats were actively in the running: Sen. Stevenson; Beck (a member of the U.S. House); Isaac Caldwell, John Stuart Williams (former Kentucky state representative and gubernatorial candidate, later U.S. senator), and Preston H. Leslie (the governor) (*LCJ* 1/4/1876, p. 1). The Republicans, holding out the possibility that they might be able to capture the seat if the Democrats cannibalized themselves, agreed to combine their efforts around a single candidate, initially William Cassius Goodloe, a state senator from Lexington.

Although the Republicans caucused before balloting began, the Democrats did not, so on the day of separate balloting in the two chambers (January 12, 1876), five men received votes: Williams led in the House (25 of 98 votes) and Beck led in the Senate (15 of 37 votes). Sixty-

eight votes were needed for election. When the joint ballot was held the next day, positions within the two chambers held, placing Beck (40 votes) and Williams (35) neck-and-neck, with Leslie (27), Stevenson (19), and Goodloe (15) trailing behind.

Five ballots were held over the next two days, and yet no caucus of the Democrats was called to resolve the battle. The explanation put forward by the *Courier-Journal* correspondent is intriguing: Apparently the caucus rule provided that in balloting for nominations within the caucus, the bottom vote-getter was dropped in each succeeding round, until the race was reduced to two candidates if necessary. Supporters of Beck (for instance) were reluctant to call a caucus because supporters of Stevenson (for instance) would recognize this as a move to knock Stevenson out of the race, thus causing Stevenson's supporters to jump to Williams. Supporters of second-tier candidates regarded the caucus as certain death for their candidates; supporters of first-tier candidates regarded a caucus as something that would only antagonize other factions whose votes were needed. (*LCJ* 1/14/1876, p. 1).

On the third day of the joint ballot, Stevenson dropped out. This left support for the remaining candidates as follows: Beck 47, Williams 45, Leslie 28, and Wadsworth (Rep.) 14.<sup>4</sup> A Democratic caucus was finally called that night, whereupon "filibustering commenced at the outset" (*LCJ* 1/15/1876, p. 1). With the withdrawal of Stevenson, the Democratic caucus was in a bind. It was clear by this time that Governor Leslie's support was coming from legislators who were trying to ingratiate themselves with him, but that he was never going to garner enough support from either the Williams or Beck factions to win. But if Leslie simply withdrew, his support might redistribute to Beck and Williams haphazardly, putting the Republicans in a position to choose the senator. After two more ballots, Governor Leslie withdrew and with that,

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<sup>4</sup>The Republican practice during the balloting was to shift support to a different single Republican each day.

the joint session immediately adjourned, and the Democratic caucus got to work. After battling for five straight hours through parliamentary obstacles, the caucus finally voted to endorse Beck, adjourning at 2am. The next morning Beck was elected with 106 votes to the Republican Wadsworth's 14.<sup>5</sup>

It is important to note that at no time in the proceedings was there ever any doubt that a Democrat would eventually be elected. The problem was that the balloting involved a host of up-and-coming stars of Kentucky politics, and no one wanted to needlessly insult a range of candidates, all of whom might one day rise further. Once the balloting became tricky, with two equally-balanced Democrats, the protracted balloting simply became a method to allow the Democrats to get all their ducks in a row—to make sure the party faction supporting the Governor Leslie faction would all shift in the same direction thereby ensuring the party caucus a victory for their nominee.

## II. Data Collection

Our paper is part of a larger project in which we are examining Senate elections in all states from 1871 to 1913. For the entire project, we are gathering all the actual individual ballots in each Senate election, the district and the political party of each state legislator voting for senator (where available)<sup>6</sup> and election returns for each state legislator.<sup>7</sup> In this paper, we focus on the internal behavior of state legislators during the U.S. Senate election process.

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<sup>5</sup>In Haynes's (1906, pp. 88–92) terms, this was a “stampeded election,” that is, a protracted election that, *from the perspective of the Journal*, was transformed instantly from a multi-candidate fracas to a majority party cake walk.

<sup>6</sup>Political party information for state legislators is often fugitive and variable in coverage. At one extreme, according to the archivist at the State Library, North Carolina has no existing compilation of the party affiliation of legislators who served in the state House and Senate for this time period. At the other extreme, the Kentucky State Library contains a typescript volume in which party labels have been entered for all state legislators back to the 1790s.

We started by using the *Tribune Almanac*, *Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia*, and the *New York Times* to construct a basic data set that contained aggregate information about every senator who was elected between 1871 and 1913.<sup>8</sup> Then, we proceeded to collect the roll call votes of all U.S. Senate elections during this period, coding from the state legislative journals. We treat the journals as authoritative, and we have corrected any errors in the original data set accordingly.

At the individual level, we have collected the election ballots for all 48 states that were in the Union during this period. We have now collected 98.5% of the actual ballots from state legislative journals, and anticipate completing this aspect of our data collection in the near future. There are several excellent collections of state legislative journals throughout the United States, including the Library of Congress, New York Public Library, New York State Library, Wisconsin Historical Society, and Yale University Law Library. In a few instances, we have had to rely on state libraries or archives (Arizona, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Maine) and on newspaper accounts.

We have compiled a list of every Senate election held during this time period, including both regularly scheduled (general) elections and special elections called to fill a vacancy. Our larger data set includes the election date, status, name of winning candidate, party of winning candidate, chamber party ratios, type of ballot (separate versus joint), and in the cases of joint balloting, the number of joint ballots taken. (See Appendix A for a summary table of the key elements of these data for all states.) In all, there were 731 elections for U.S. Senate seats held in

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<sup>7</sup> The state legislative election data augments data gathering efforts led by Samuel Kernell (UCSD) and Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder (MIT).

<sup>8</sup> To be more precise, we gathered data for members whose terms began between 1871 and 1913. In the great majority of cases, state legislatures elected their U.S. senators in the January of the year when the term came up for renewal. In a few cases the election was earlier. For instance, we have included a few elections held in 1870 for seats up in 1871. We have also gathered data about "special elections," that is, elections to fill vacancies. We have only gathered data for vacancies in seats whose normal terms started in 1871. For instance, if a vacancy occurred in 1872 for a seat that ran from 1869 to 1875, we did not gather data for the election.

state legislatures from 1871 to 1913, of which 87% (635) were general election, and 13% (95) were special elections, with the status of one election yet to be determined. Of the 731 Senate elections, 69% (508) were accomplished through separate balloting, 29% (214) through joint session balloting, with 1% (9) yet to be determined. One important facet of the data is that smooth and conflictual elections occurred in each state across time; some states were more prone to conflict than others were, but very few were entirely immune from it.

As the description of the legal process suggests, having to go into joint assembly in order to elect a senator (rather than simply to ratify the results of a separate ballot election) should be a basic measure of the degree of conflict over the choice of senators, across time and space. We begin with a relatively simple categorization of this degree of conflict in Senate elections in state legislatures, based on the number of ballots needed to elect a senator, and present it in Table 1.

[Table 1]

Table 1 shows that the vast majority of indirect elections to the U.S. Senate were handled in short order. Roughly three-fourths were either settled in the joint balloting on the first day or on the first round of joint assembly balloting on the second day. Still, nearly a quarter of all elections took longer, which is *prima facie* evidence that coordination problems were common enough for party leaders to be worried about holding their members in line. These elections were characterized by multiple candidates early on, and the longer the election dragged on, the more likely it was that the pool of nominees would change. As we noted above, there are numerous anecdotal accounts of these elections from the *Tribune Almanac* and newspapers that document that party leaders met constantly during these drawn out elections to try to hammer out agreement among their rank and file as to a single choice for U.S. senator. In over 2% of cases the legislative divisions were so bad that the legislative session adjourned without the choice of a

senator. Although 2 percent may not seem like a large number, considering the consequence of a vacant Senate seat in terms of lost patronage and federal service benefits, it is striking how many elections were deadlocked in this way.

The prevalence of extended joint session ballots (i.e., those that extended beyond one joint ballot) in all likelihood represents a lower-bound estimate of the prevalence of party weakness in the election of U.S. senators. That is because *at the aggregate level* it is possible that some of these quickly-executed elections occurred even though a number of majority party members exhibited disloyalty in the balloting. We are still gathering individual party memberships of state legislators, so we cannot presently take partisan analysis to that level. From informal perusal of the data, we suspect that once we are able to analyze all the individual-level roll call votes, party disloyalty levels will climb.

The next obvious question is when did these conflictual elections occur? We know from historians that the strength of parties at the state level varied considerably from decade to decade in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries<sup>9</sup> Using our aggregate data, we have graphed the percent of all Senate elections that were resolved in joint session from 1871 to 1913, separating out general from special elections, showing the graphs in Figure 1. Joint ballot elections fell precipitously around 1900, but there was a notable upturn in joint assembly elections at the very end of the time period, when third parties were pivotal in organizing many state legislatures. The uptick in joint ballots also corresponds to when the 17th Amendment was proposed to the state and being considered by those very same legislatures.

We also find regional variation in joint balloting in state legislatures, which is reported in Table 2. We have divided the nation into three regions: the former Confederacy, where there

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<sup>9</sup> For a comprehensive bibliography of studies that chronicle party organization during the period covered in this paper, see the footnotes to chapter 8 of Mayhew (1986).

were strong pressures toward single-party domination; pre-Civil War eastern and western states, where there was a mix of states with competitive parties and states with one-party dominance; and the post-Civil War western states, which often had small populations and volatile partisan dynamics. We have then divided the time period at the century break. Finally, we have divided the table into general elections and special elections.

[Table 2]

Several conclusions can be drawn from the data presented. First, special elections tended to be resolved by joint balloting more often than general elections. It appears that this is because some vacancies occurred while a legislature was sitting, or immediately before it convened. The need to hold an election caught party leaders unprepared, so that balloting more often commenced without intra-party tensions being resolved beforehand. Second, the newer western states had the highest levels of joint balloting, particularly in the nineteenth century, when most elections in this region were settled in joint assembly. Western states appeared to have been more prone to inter-party coalitions and intra-party factionalism. Sometimes the fissures were between reform and stalwart elements. Other times divisions were regional, with region frequently serving as a proxy for conflicts between economic interests within states, such as railroads, mining, or agriculture.

Third, the incidence of joint ballots dropped in the new West and South after 1900, staying roughly constant in the east. We suspect that these regional differences surrounding the *changing* prevalence of joint ballots reflects a variety of factors, most particularly changing strength of political parties after the Australian Ballot reforms and rise of Jim Crow laws in the 1890s. In the East, U.S. Senate elections often pitted machine factions against each other, or attempts to combine major- and third-party factions behind a single candidate. In the South, the

rise of the direct primary shifted factional divisions to the public realm, though why state legislators would be bound to support the primary winner is an open question. In the West, the drop in joint ballots may reflect an end of Republican Party divisions. At the moment, these are merely speculative hypotheses that we intend to explore in future work.

Having established that there was variation in the degree of conflict in Senate elections across time and regions, we return to the starting point by asking which factors might explain why state legislatures enter into joint session balloting. The simplest explanation is a partisan one: majority parties in unified legislatures should have found it easier to coordinate their members in each chamber in support of a single candidate. In a split-party-control legislature, holding the party together in the initial bicameral balloting was important only as a show-of-strength. However, majority parties in the *joint assembly* should have been able to coordinate in the combined assembly behind a single candidate.

The distribution of joint ballot elections was heavily weighted towards state legislatures with split party control, which is illustrated in Table 3. However, roughly 25 percent of legislatures controlled by the same party in both chambers still engaged in joint balloting, while roughly the same fraction of legislatures with divided control of the two chambers were able to choose senators without going into joint ballot. Why a unified-control legislature might require joint balloting to elect a senator has already been discussed. These are predominantly cases when the majority party was deeply divided, even though the nominal majority was large, or possessing a few stragglers in a session when party divisions were close. It seems more of a mystery that divided legislatures would resolve their Senate elections quickly in one-quarter of the cases. We intend to delve more deeply into these “counterexamples” in future work.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Specifically, there were 15 cases of divided party legislatures that elected a senator via separate ballot: California (1875, 1881, 1885), Missouri (1871), Alabama (1873), Louisiana (1873), Oregon (1879),



## [Table 3]

Returning to a broader view, we believe a more nuanced measure of party control can help clarify its effects on the probability of going into joint ballot session. Conflict in legislatures can occur between parties and within parties. Political scientists have long known, theoretically and practically, that political coalitions are the most fragile at the extremes of coalition size, that is, when they are narrowly small or exceptionally large. Narrowly small coalitions are more conducive to being undermined by the strategic behavior of the minority, since only a few majority coalition members need to be picked off in order to convert the previous minority into the new majority. Similarly, when the coalition sizes of two major parties are nearly equal, small blocs within parties, or minor parties, can also create difficulty in building winning coalitions, or even block the formation of winning coalitions.

At the other extreme of coalition size, outsized majorities are bountiful fodder for factionalism, which also intensified the conflict over Senate seats. This observation accords with one understanding of Riker's "size principle" (Riker 1962), which is that when political coalitions are "too large," conflict can arise as factions within the majority coalition attempt to increase the per capita value of the coalition to themselves by jettisoning "extra" coalition members.

Each of these conditions suggests that the relationship between the ease of electing senators and the size of the largest legislative party cannot be adequately described by a two category classification. Table 4 presents the data in a more precise way by breaking up unified party control into three categories: (1) both chambers controlled by a narrow majority (55% of the chamber or less), (2) one chamber controlled by a narrow majority and (3) both chambers

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Indiana (1873,1909), Iowa (1891), Nevada (1893), North Carolina (1891, 1895), Colorado (1897), and Idaho (1901).

controlled by a non-narrow majority. It further breaks up the non-unified party control into two categories: (1) each chamber controlled by a majority of different parties and (2) at least one chamber without a party majority (either a tie or a plurality).

[Table 4]

A number of things stand out in this table. The first is that the incidence of non-unified control of state legislatures plummeted in the twentieth century, from 10% of all cases (47 of 468) to 3% (7 of 250). Second, combining all the unified control cases together, over one-quarter of cases with large single-party majorities in two chambers required at least one joint ballot to resolve the election (although there is a drop-off in joint ballots that occurred when both chambers were controlled by large majorities.) While this is not strong evidence of Riker's size principle (which would be seen if the percentage of joint ballots *went up* with large majorities in two chambers), the fact that joint ballots do not go to zero as majority party margins grow very large is some support for the observation that over-sized partisan majorities are prone to fracturing.

### III. A Multivariate Model

To provide further precision to our empirical analysis, we construct a multivariate model of the breakdown in coordination within state legislatures over the election of U.S. senators before 1913. This model starts with a naïve party model (i.e., that majority parties should be able to agree to and impose their choice ahead of the start of balloting) and then adds variables to account for factors that might enhance or undermine the naïve model.

First, we define the dependent variable, which we term *breakdown of pre-election coordination*, or just *coordination breakdown*. A coordination breakdown is said to occur under one of two conditions: (1) the same party controls each chamber of the state legislature yet is

unable to effect the election of a U.S. Senate candidate in the first-day separate balloting, or (2) there is divided control of the two chambers, yet the party that holds a majority is unable to effect an election on the first joint assembly ballot. By this definition, we should exclude cases in which one or both chambers lack a majority party. This gives us 695 cases, 26.2% of observed coordination breakdowns.

### *Party control and majority party size*

Key to the basic partisan model is the issue of whether a state legislature enjoys unified partisan control and, if unified, by what margin. We measure the *size* of majority party control by the percentage of seats held by the largest party in the joint assembly. We measure whether a state legislature is *unified* with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the same party has a majority in both chambers, 0 otherwise. Because the size of the majority may function differently in the two regimes, unified control and split control, we interact the *unified* dummy with the *size* variable and (1-*size*) to allow this variable's coefficient to vary across the two regimes. To complete this part of the analysis, we include the direct effect of *unified*.

As an empirical matter, we have already noted that three observed factors affect whether there was a coordination breakdown. First, the frequency of joint ballots declined over time. Second, more recently admitted states were more likely to endure breakdowns than older states.<sup>11</sup> Third, general elections were easier to coordinate than special elections. Therefore, we added the variables *year of election*, *year of admission*, and a dummy variable for *general election* to the analysis.

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<sup>11</sup> The regional patterns examined above are strongly correlated with year-of-admission. To simplify the analysis, we focus on year-of-admission, but recognize that it may be a proxy for being a new western state, *versus* being a state that was admitted before the Civil War.

Table 5 reports the probit coefficients from an analysis of when Senate ballots produced a coordination breakdown. The first column reports the coefficients associated with a simple probit analysis. The second column reports the “impact” of the coefficients in the first column. “Impact” in this case is either (1) the first derivative of the variable in question, evaluated at the overall average probability of a breakdown, in the case of continuous variables or (2) the probability difference between dummy variables at the zero and one values. The third column performs the same analysis with a conditional logit analysis, which can be thought of as a “fixed effects” logit. We conducted this final analysis hoping to control more completely for unmeasured state-specific effects.

[Table 5]

The first column results conform to our initial expectations. For both split and unified control of the legislature, narrow partisan margins were more likely to produce joint ballots than wide margins. Joint ballots became less common across time; the later a state was admitted, the more joint ballots were held. Finally, general elections had fewer joint ballots than special elections. The conditional logit results are substantively similar, with the standard errors being relatively larger.

One of the most interesting results from Table 5 concerns the different operation of the majority party margin on the probability of having a coordination breakdown. To illustrate this difference, Figure 2 plots out the estimated probability of a breakdown, for both the unified and split regime, as a function of majority party size. Note that the predicted probabilities diverge the most when the joint assembly margin is the closest. When the two chambers were controlled by different parties and the overall legislature was closely matched, there was a high probability of forcing the election into joint assembly, once we control for other factors. In these cases the

two parties were undoubtedly treating the separate ballots as opportunities to put forward the two contending major party candidates, with the joint assembly battle then settling the matter.

However, when the two chambers were controlled by different parties, but the joint assembly was heavily weighted toward the majority party, the joint assembly minority party had little practical hope of eventually prevailing in the joint assembly, even if they could lure away a few wavering majority party members.

[Figure 2]

Our informal perusal of the individual roll calls suggests that minority party capitulation in these cases often came about by the joint assembly minority party simply abstaining on the first day of voting. In that way the minority party could bow to the inevitable without taking the dishonorable path of actually voting in favor of the joint assembly majority party's U.S. Senate candidate.

Once the coordination breakdown had occurred, joint balloting began. Another measure of the degree of breakdown is how many joint ballots it took to resolve the election. To estimate this, we conducted a negative binomial regression, with the dependent variable being the number of joint ballots required to settle the election, conditional on going into joint ballot. Because the legislature has already gone into joint session in this model, we exclude the variable for split or unified control. We include the size of the majority party in the joint assembly, election year, year state admitted, and whether the election was general (regularly scheduled) or special as our independent variables. We report the results of the estimation in Table 6. Here we see that the only strong effect is the size of the majority.

[Table 6]

In Figure 3, we have graphed the predicted values of the dependent variable against majority size, setting all the other variables at their means, and displaying separate lines for unified and split state legislatures. First, the effect that is overwhelming is the vertical distance between the two lines. For identical majority party sizes in joint assembly, resolving the election quickly still hinged on whether the two chambers were controlled by the same party. We do not believe that this effect is due to formal mechanisms available to party leaders, except to the degree that control over the floor was an important strategic tool that could have been wielded by the presiding officer, who was usually one of the party leaders from one of the chambers. The effect could also be picking up the depth of informal networks that could have been deployed, depending on whether the two chambers were controlled by the same party.

[Figure 3]

#### *Nominations Process*

The factors we have been exploring thus far have been purely internal to the state legislatures. We now turn our attention to formal factors that structured the choice of U.S. senator, but which were conceptually external to the legislatures. We start by examining nominating procedures. An initial reading of caucus accounts leads us to believe that state legislators generally took caucus proceedings very seriously, since caucus votes were binding on everyone attending. Because of this, legislators were careful in specifying in the call whether party meetings were caucuses or “conferences,” the latter being meetings in which any votes would be merely advisory. Also because of this, there was always keen interest in seeing who actually attended caucus meetings, since anyone who was absent would still be a free agent. Retribution against caucus disloyalty could be swift and direct. Therefore, it is easy to understand how caucus decisions could be enforced.

As we explained earlier, we have confirmed cases of state legislative party caucuses only in a subset of our election data. We are interested in understanding whether one-ballot caucuses produced more harmonious election proceedings than multi-ballot caucuses, but such analysis must await future work. We hypothesize that when the party caucus did agree on a nominee, subsequent ballot conflict was reduced. However, despite the fact that our stylized facts indicate that a large majority of parties held caucuses before these elections, we do not include the caucus data itself in our quantitative analysis because we have not yet coded caucus proceedings for all of the elections in our data set,

Where we do have more concrete data is on the external party pressures that began to impinge on state legislators, first through state party conventions, and then later through party primaries and direct election schemes, such as the “Oregon Plan.” Conventions and direct primaries were other methods of attempting to coordinate around party candidates and effect their easy election. However, around 80% of state legislators turned over from session-to-session, and with most having few political ambitions beyond the state legislature, there was very little in the way of electoral responsiveness on the part of state legislators. In other words, state legislators simply did not have strong incentives to follow the recommendations of a state convention absent other inducements offered to them during the Senate election process. Therefore, our expectation is that these nominating procedures, at least prior to 1900, exerted a weak influence. On the other hand, if they do appear to be effective, that would suggest that the more direct form of party coercion, the caucus, was probably even more effective.

Until we can compile a complete nominating mechanism data set, we use data collected by Andrea C. Campbell, which records whether winning U.S. Senate candidates were nominated by state convention and/or direct primary, starting in 1877 (see Campbell 2002). Using her data,

we can augment the analysis reported in Table 6 to see what effect these mechanisms had on selecting senators. We report the results in Table 7.

[Table 7]

The focus in Table 7 is on the coefficients associated with being nominated by a state convention or direct primary. Controlling for the partisanship of the state legislature, both made it more likely that elections would be decided quickly.

Among variables that appear in both Table 6 and Table 7, the addition of controls for nomination method causes some coefficients to be changed. Because the samples in Tables 6 and 7 are different (we lose over 100 cases in Table 8, for reasons we need to explore), we should treat these differences cautiously. It is interesting that the *election year* and *year of admission* coefficients only change somewhat. Because direct primaries and conventions emerged later in the time period, and tended to appear in the newer states, the drop-off in coordination breakdowns over time do not appear to be largely due to an increase in extra-legislative forms of nomination, such as direct primaries.

#### *Party machines and corporate influence*

Other party-related factors at play in the election of U.S. senators were the presence of party machines and corporate influence. Mayhew (1986, chap. 8) notes that the effectiveness of state party organizations varied considerably across space and time following the Civil War. Their reach peaked around 1900. Even at their height, many machines were purely local, whereas others were statewide. Mayhew also notes that corporate influence could either overlap with or complement the influence exerted by party machines.

We make an initial foray into estimating the relative effect of party and corporate “machines” on the outcomes of U.S. Senate elections and the relative amount of conflict



involved in resolving them. Unfortunately, as far as we know, there does not exist a single, comprehensive coding of state party strength around 1900. The closest approximation is provided by Mayhew's (1986, chap. 8) summary of the literature in *Placing Parties in American Politics*. Based on a reading of Mayhew, we have coded states according to whether they were judged to have a strong state-wide party machine around 1900, or not. Mayhew stays scrupulously close to the literature, providing judgments for 22 out of 48 states on this dimension, reserving judgment for the 26 states about which insufficient scholarship exists to reach firm conclusions. (An exception is Indiana. We are less conservative than Mayhew in coding Indiana to have a strong statewide party machine, despite the formal literature being thin.) We deal with the omission of these 26 states in two ways. First, we created a variable, *Mayhew party strength*, that was coded +1 if he judged the state to have a statewide party organizations, -1 if he affirmatively judged the state to have no statewide party organizations, and 0 if the literature was insufficient to reach a conclusion on the matter.<sup>12</sup> Second, we conduct the analysis by simply excluding the states that have not been sufficiently studied.

Similarly, we rely on Mayhew's analysis to code for states in which corporations (mostly railroads and mining) dominated state politics. This variable, *Mayhew corporation strength*, was coded 1 for California, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, and New Hampshire, and 0 otherwise.

Table 8 reports the results of this analysis. Whether due to measurement error or the lack of a strong effect, having strong statewide party organizations did not appreciably help legislatures coordinate around Senate candidates. Controlling for everything, strong-party states

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<sup>12</sup> The strong party states were Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode island, Virginia, West Virginia., and Wisconsin. The weak party states were California, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas.

were 1%-to-2% points less likely to have coordination breakdowns. This effect is significantly weaker (substantively and statistically) than having corporation dominance of state politics.

[Table 8]

Recall that our dependent variable measures the degree to which state legislatures can easily elect a U.S. senator. The results in Table 8 suggest that legislatures in corporation-dominated states were faster at resolving U.S. senate elections than legislatures in party-dominated states. That does not mean that party organizations lacked influence, however. Mayhew's reading of the party literature is sensitive to statewide operations. Our own initial reading of many Senate election fights convinces us that they often devolved into battles *between* different party factions within a state. Therefore, in future work we will need to focus on coding states for not only strength of party machines, but also for the degree of friction between machines from the same party within states. Our efforts will also include refining Mayhew's measure of economic interests in states by looking at census data for economic industry concentration, as well as population density to reflect increasing power among urban political machines.

#### IV. Conclusion

In this paper, we analyzed U.S. Senate elections in the indirect era as a source of evidence as to the unity and strength of state political parties during this time. It is clear to us that state party machines were not so monolithic and powerful as commonly imagined. In essence, this line of research is contributing to building a more comprehensive picture of party politics during the years 1871-1913, as well as the importance of the relationship between the state government and the federal government, as mediated by U.S. senators. The high degree of conflict that we have uncovered in these elections indicates that the office of U.S. Senator held significant importance

in state politics, whether as a reward for loyalty to strong party organizations, or a mechanism of control for corporate interests, or as a symbol of regional competition and conflict within the state.

We posed a relatively simple set of hypotheses about how successful party leaders could be in coordinating their rank and file to vote for their preferred candidate. Not surprisingly, we found that unified control of both chambers of a state legislature made it easier to resolve an election in separate balloting, while split-party control increased the likelihood of going into extended joint assembly sessions to elect a senator. We also found that narrow majority party control of both chambers yielded more conflict than larger majorities, but that supermajority control could also lead to highly factionalized balloting. We also identified cases where split-party legislatures resolved their elections relatively quickly, a finding we intend to explore further.

In addition to the size of partisan majorities in both chambers, other factors, such as state convention nominations of Senate candidates, and the dominance of corporate interests in a state also lead to a quicker resolution of the Senate election. All indications are that these variables also help explain conflict in Senate elections but we recognize that we need to expand and refine both these measures, especially the indicator of party strength and unity statewide.

This project still has many avenues yet to be fully pursued. In addition to thoroughly coding the activities of legislative caucuses, we are in the midst of entering individual roll call data for each election, both for the organization of the chambers and for Senate balloting. We are coupling this data with comprehensive state legislative rosters, which include the party affiliation of the legislator and the type of district he represented (e.g. urban, rural). These two data sets combined will be used to construct measures of party cohesion within the state

legislatures; for example, we fully expect to see joint balloting occur in legislatures that take longer to organize their chamber than in legislatures who do so smoothly and quickly at the convening of their sessions. We also intend to look at coalition shifting across legislators during extended balloting in joint session to see which factors may explain loyalty to a single candidate as opposed to patterns of constant vote switching.

To the extent that the incentive structure for individual state legislators, as well as candidates for the U.S. Senator, was determined in large part to the variables identified above, it is our hope that this project will provide an opportunity for scholars of modern legislative and electoral politics to glean insights into the power of institutional arrangements on electoral outcomes.

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Figure 1. Percentage of U.S. Senate elections decided in a joint ballot of state legislatures, 1871 to 1913.






Figure 2. Probability of coordination breakdown as a function of size of majority party in joint convention, by unified and split control of the state legislature.




Figure 3. Estimated average number of ballots to resolve joint convention balloting, as a function of size of majority party in joint convention.




Table 1. Categories of conflict in state legislatures during U.S. Senate elections

<b>Degree of conflict</b>	<b>Election Status</b>	<b>Conditions</b>	<b>Number (pct.)</b>
Lowest	Separate election	A majority is able to coordinate and elect the same candidate in each chamber.	508 (69%)
	Joint balloting with 1 ballot	A majority of the joint assembly (House and Senate members together) is able to coordinate to elect a candidate; they may or may not belong to the same party.	58 (8%)
	Joint balloting with between 2 and 4 ballots	A majority is unable to secure a majority in joint convention on the first ballot, but manages to forge a winning coalition in a short amount of time, without taking a break from legislative business	23 (3%)
	Joint balloting with more than 4 ballots	A majority is unable to secure a majority in joint convention in support a single candidate, and balloting continues into the following week, if not longer. Typically, these elections are characterized by majority party factionalism or third party strength. (Average number of ballots = 34.1; median = 24; maximum = 209)	115 (16%)
Highest	Deadlock	The legislature adjourns <i>sine die</i> without electing a U.S. senator. The dynamics are similar to the previous category	17 (2%)
Unknown			10 (1.2%)
Total			731 (100%)

Table 2. Joint Balloting for U.S. Senator in state legislatures by region. (Numbers in parentheses are the number of cases in each cell. The percentages are the fraction of time U.S. Senate elections were settled by joint ballot.

General elections	1899 and earlier	1901 and later	Total
Former Confederacy	33.3% (108)	7.4% (54)	24.7% (162)
Pre-Civil War Eastern & Western States	28.9% (228)	22.4% (107)	26.9% (335)
Post-Civil War Western States	52.8% (72)	18.3% (60)	37.1% (132)
Total	34.3% (408)	17.6% (221)	28.5% (629)

Special elections	1899 and earlier	1901 and later	Total
Former Confederacy	29.4% (17)	33.3% (9)	30.8% (26)
Pre-Civil War Eastern & Western States	37.5% (40)	25.0% (16)	33.9% (56)
Post-Civil War Western States	85.7% (7)	50.0% (4)	72.7% (11)
Total	40.6% (64)	27.6% (29)	37.6% (93)

Table 3. Frequency of joint ballot elections by party control of state legislature, all elections. (Numbers in parentheses are the number of cases in each cell. The percentages are the fraction of time U.S. Senate elections were settled by joint ballot.)

	1899 and earlier	1901 and later	Total
Split control	74.5% (51)	71.4% (7)	74.1% (58)
Unified control	30.4% (421)	17.7% (243)	25.8% (664)
Total	35.2% (472)	19.2% (250)	29.6% (722)

Table 4. Joint Session Balloting for U.S. Senator by degree of party control of state legislature. (Numbers in parentheses are the number of cases in each cell. The percentages are the fraction of time U.S. Senate elections were settled by joint ballot.)

Party Distribution	1899 and earlier	1901 and later	Total
Non-unified control:			
Plurality control	65.6% (32)	75.0% (4)	66.7% (36)
Split control	93.3% (15)	66.7% (3)	88.9% (18)
Unified control:			
House and Senate narrow margin of majority control	41.7% (12)	60.0% (5)	47.1% (17)
House or Senate narrow margin of party control	51.2% (41)	50.0% (22)	50.8% (63)
House and Senate wide margin of party control	27.7% (368)	13.4% (216)	22.4% (584)
Total	34.8% (468)	19.2% (250)	29.4% (718)

Table 5. Predicting the probability of coordination breakdown for U.S. Senate elections in state legislatures, 1871–1913.

Variable	Simple probit		Conditional logit (Fixed effects)
	Coefficient	Effect(a)	Coefficient
Joint maj. pct. × unified control	-0.016 (0.004)	-0.0050 (0.0013)	-0.039 (0.009)
Joint maj. pct. × (1- unified control)	-0.080 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.014)	-0.15 (0.11)
Unified control	-3.85 (2.44)	-0.79 (0.036)	-6.37 (5.80)
Election year	-0.0087 (0.0043)	-0.0028 (0.0014)	-0.016 (0.008)
Year state admitted	0.0035 (0.0015)	0.0011 (0.0004)	—
General election	-0.40 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.06)	-0.77 (0.27)
Intercept	14.71 (8.46)	---	—
N	694	---	670
Llf	-378.97	---	-226.14
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.05	---	.07

(a) First derivative, at the mean, for continuous variables, and difference in probabilities for dummy variables

Table 6. Predicting the number of joint ballots, given a coordination breakdown. (General negative binomial regression.)

Variable	Coefficient
Joint maj. pct.	-0.028 (0.007)
Election year	0.015 (0.009)
Year state admitted	0.0005 (0.0025)
General election	0.091 (0.252)
Intercept	-24.00 (16.31)
$\log(\alpha)$	0.41 (0.10)
$\alpha$	1.51 (0.15)
N	177
Llf	-705.25
Pseudo $R^2$	.02



Table 7. Predicting the probability of coordination breakdown for U.S. senator elections in state legislatures, 1871–1913, with measures of nomination method.

Variable	Simple probit		Conditional logit (Fixed effects)
	Coefficient	Effect(a)	Coefficient
Joint maj. pct. × unified control	-0.015 (0.005)	-0.0043 (0.0013)	-0.034 (0.011)
Joint maj. pct. × (1- unified control)	-0.44 (0.20)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.66 (0.36)
Unified control	-22.23 (10.44)	-0.94 (0.04)	-32.40 (18.66)
Election year	-0.0073 (0.0055)	-0.0021 (0.0016)	-0.013 (0.011)
Year state admitted	0.0060 (0.0017)	-.0017 (0.0005)	—
General election	-0.19 (0.21)	-0.058 (0.069)	-0.22 (0.39)
Nomination method:			
Party convention	-1.15 (0.47)	-0.19 (0.04)	-2.21 (1.08)
Direct primary	-0.44 (0.25)	-0.11 (0.05)	-1.06 (0.52)
Intercept		---	—
N	568	---	525
Llf	-284.95	---	-185.60
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.09	---	.11

(a) First derivative, at the mean, for continuous variables, and difference in probabilities for dummy variables

Table 8. Predicting the probability of coordination breakdown for U.S. senator elections in state legislatures, 1871–1913, with measures of nomination method and party organizational strength.

Variable	All observations		Excluding states with no party organization coding	
	Coefficient	Effect(a)	Coefficient	Effect(a)
Joint maj. pct. × unified control	-0.020 (0.005)	-0.0055 (0.0015)	-0.018 (0.008)	-0.0038 (0.0016)
Joint maj. pct. × (1-unified control)	-0.46 (0.16)	-0.12 (0.04)	-0.46 (0.15)	-0.095 (0.033)
Unified control	-23.21 (8.58)	-0.95 (0.03)	-23.02 (8.03)	-0.97 (0.02)
Election year	-0.0094 (0.0076)	-0.0025 (0.0020)	-0.0088 (0.011)	-0.0018 (0.0022)
Year state admitted	0.0067 (0.0019)	0.0018 (0.0005)	0.0039 (0.0032)	0.00081 (0.00066)
General election	-0.43 (0.25)	-0.13 (0.085)	-0.72 (0.37)	-0.20 (0.13)
Nomination method:				
Party convention	-1.01 (0.44)	-0.17 (0.04)	-5.94 (und.)	-0.21 (0.03)
Direct primary	-0.40 (0.27)	-0.093 (0.052)	-0.45 (0.40)	-0.076 (0.053)
Organizational strength ~ 1900:				
Party	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.012 (0.026)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.022 (0.021)
Corporations	-0.59 (0.27)	-0.13 (0.04)	-1.11 (0.46)	-0.14 (0.03)
Intercept	30.06 (16.19)	—	33.99 (22.54)	—
N	486	—	249	
Llf	-229.57	—	-116.81	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.12	—	.14	

(a) First derivative, at the mean, for continuous variables, and difference in probabilities for dummy variables

Appendix A: Summary of Senate election cases, for terms beginning in 1871 and later								
State	Class	Seat year	General or Special election	Election date	Name of winner	Party of winner	Separate or Joint Ballot	Number of joint ballots
Alabama	2	1871	G	12/10/1872	Sykes, Francis	D	Joint	3
Alabama	2	1871	G	12/7/1870	Goldthwaite, George	D	Unknown	0
Alabama	3	1873	G	12/4/1872	Spencer, George E.	R	Separate	0
Alabama	2	1877	G	11/29/1876	Morgan, John T.	D	Joint	1
Alabama	3	1879	G	11/28/1878	Houston, George S.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	3	1879	S	11/23/1880	Pugh, James L.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	2	1883	G	11/29/1882	Morgan, John T.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	3	1885	G	11/26/1884	Pugh, James L.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	2	1889	G	11/28/1888	Morgan, John T.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	3	1891	G	11/28/1890	Pugh, James L.	D	Joint	2
Alabama	2	1895	G	11/28/1894	Morgan, John T.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	3	1897	G	11/25/1896	Pettus, Edmund W.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	2	1901	G	11/28/1900	Morgan, John T.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	3	1903	G	1/28/1903	Pettus, Edmund W.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	2	1907	G	1/23/1907	Morgan, John T.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	2	1907	S	7/16/1907	Bankhead, John H.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	3	1909	G	1/23/1907	Pettus, Edmund W.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	3	1909	S1	8/7/1907	Johnston, Joseph F.	D	Separate	0
Alabama	2	1913	G	11/18/1911	Bankhead, John H.	D	Separate	0
Arizona	3	1909	G	3/26/1912	Ashurst, Henry F.	D	Separate	0
Arizona	1	1911	G	3/26/1912	Smith, Marcus A.	D	Separate	0
Arkansas	2	1871	G	1/10/1871	Clayton, Powell	R	Separate	0
Arkansas	3	1873	G	1/18/1871	Dorsey, Stephen W.	R	Separate	0
Arkansas	2	1877	G	1/16/1877	Garland, Augustus H.	D	Separate	0
Arkansas	3	1879	G	1/25/1879	Walker, James D.	D	Joint	7
Arkansas	2	1883	G	3/20/1885	Berry, James	D	Joint	5
Arkansas	2	1883	G	1883?	Deadlock?		Joint	Unknown
Arkansas	3	1885	G	1/31/1885	Jones, James K.	D	Joint	30
Arkansas	2	1889	G	1/29/1889	Berry, James	D	Separate	0
Arkansas	3	1891	G	1/20/1891	Jones, James K.	D	Separate	0
Arkansas	2	1895	G	1/29/1895	Berry, James	D	Separate	0
Arkansas	3	1897	G	1/19/1897	Jones, James K.	D	Separate	0
Arkansas	2	1901	G	1/22/1901	Berry, James	D	Separate	0
Arkansas	3	1903	G	1/20/1903	Clarke, James P.	D	Separate	0
Arkansas	2	1907	G	1/29/1907	Davis, Jeff	D	Separate	0
Arkansas	2	1907	S	1/28/1913	Kavanaugh, William M.	D	Separate	0
Arkansas	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Clarke, James P.	D	Separate	0
Arkansas	2	1913	G	1/19/1913	Robinson, Joseph	D	Joint	1
California	3	1873	G	12/20/1871	Sargent, Aaron	R	Joint	1
California	1	1873	S	1/5/1874	Hager, John S	D	Joint	11
California	1	1875	G	12/20/1873	Booth, Newton	IR	Separate	0
California	3	1879	G	12/19/1877	Farley, James T.	D	Separate	0
California	1	1881	G	1/11/1881	Miller, John F.	R	Separate	0
California	1	1881	S	8/3/1886	Williams, Abram P.	R	Separate	0
California	3	1885	G	1/27/1885	Stanford, Leland	R	Separate	0
California	1	1887	G	1/19/1887	Hearst, George	D	Joint	1
California	3	1891	G	1/13/1891	Stanford, Leland	R	Separate	0
California	1	1893	G	1/18/1893	White, Stephen F.	D	Joint	1
California	3	1897	G	1/13/1897	Perkins, George C.	R	Separate	0
California	1	1899	G	3/18/1899	Deadlock		Joint	103
California	1	1899	S	2/7/1900	Bard, Thomas	R	Separate	0
California	3	1903	G	1/14/1903	Perkins, George C.	R	Separate	0
California	1	1905	G	1/11/1905	Flint, Frank P.	R	Joint	1
California	3	1909	G	1/12/1909	Hughes, George C., Jr.	D	Separate	0
California	1	1911	G	1/11/1911	Works, John D.	R	Separate	0
Colorado	2	1871	G	11/14/1876	Teller, Henry M.	R	Separate	0
Colorado	3	1873	G	11/14/1876	Chaffee, Jerome	R	Separate	0
Colorado	2	1877	G	11/14/1876	Teller, Henry M.	R	Separate	0
Colorado	2	1877	S	1/27/1883	Tabor, Horace A.W.	R	Joint	10
Colorado	3	1879	G	1/14/1879	Hill, Nathaniel P.	R	Separate	0
Colorado	2	1883	G	1/27/1883	Bowen, Thomas M.	R	Joint	10
Colorado	3	1885	G	1/20/1885	Teller, Henry M.	R	Joint	1
Colorado	2	1889	G	1/15/1889	Wolcott, Edward	R	Separate	0

State	Class	Seat year	General or Special election	Election date	Name of winner	Party of winner	Separate or Joint Ballot	Number of joint ballots
Colorado	3	1891	G	1/20/1891	Teller, Henry M.	R	Joint	1
Colorado	2	1895	G	1/16/1895	Wolcott, Edward	R	Joint	1
Colorado	3	1897	G	1/19/1897	Teller, Henry M.	Sil R.	Separate	0
Colorado	2	1901	G	1/15/1901	Patterson, Thomas M.	D	Separate	0
Colorado	3	1903	G	1/24/1903	Teller, Henry M.	D	Joint	4
Colorado	2	1907	G	1/15/1907	Guggenheim, Simon	R	Separate	0
Colorado	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Hughes, Charles J., Jr.	D	Separate	0
Colorado	3	1909	S	5/6/1911	Deadlock		Joint	90
Colorado	3	1909	S	1/14/1913	Thomas, Charles S	D	Separate	0
Colorado	2	1913	G	1/14/1913	Shafroth, John	D	Separate	0
Connecticut	3	1873	G	5/15/1872	Ferry, Orris	LR	Joint	1
Connecticut	1	1875	G	5/20/1874	Eaton, William W.	D	Separate	0
Connecticut	3	1876	S	5/17/1876	Barnum, William	D	Separate	0
Connecticut	3	1879	G	1/21/1879	Platt, Orville H.	R	Separate	0
Connecticut	1	1881	G	1/18/1881	Hawley, Joseph R.	R	Separate	0
Connecticut	3	1885	G	1/20/1885	Platt, Orville H.	R	Separate	0
Connecticut	1	1887	G	1/18/1887	Hawley, Joseph R.	R	Separate	0
Connecticut	3	1891	G	1/21/1891	Platt, Orville H.	R	Joint	1
Connecticut	1	1893	G	1/18/1893	Hawley, Joseph R.	R	Joint	1
Connecticut	3	1897	G	1/19/1897	Platt, Orville H.	R	Separate	0
Connecticut	1	1899	G	1/17/1899	Hawley, Joseph R.	R	Separate	0
Connecticut	3	1903	G	1/20/1903	Platt, Orville H.	R	Separate	0
Connecticut	3	1903	S	5/9/1905	Brandagee, Frank B.	R	Separate	0
Connecticut	1	1905	G	1/17/1905	Bulkeley, Morgan G.	R	Separate	0
Connecticut	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Brandagee, Frank B.	R	Separate	0
Connecticut	1	1911	G	1/17/1911	McLean, George P.	R	Separate	0
Delaware	2	1871	G	1/17/1871	Saulsbury, Eli	D	Separate	0
Delaware	1	1875	G	1/19/1875	Bayard, Thomas F.	D	Separate	0
Delaware	2	1877	G	1/16/1877	Saulsbury, Eli	D	Separate	0
Delaware	1	1881	G	1/18/1881	Bayard, Thomas F.	D	Separate	0
Delaware	2	1883	G	1/16/1883	Saulsbury, Eli	D	Separate	0
Delaware	1	1887	G	1/18/1887	Gray, George	D	Separate	0
Delaware	2	1889	G	1/16/1889	Higgins, Anthony	R	Joint	1
Delaware	1	1893	G	1/17/1893	Gray, George	D	Separate	0
Delaware	2	1895	G	1/19/1897	Kenney, Richard R.	Sil. D	Joint	1
Delaware	2	1895	G	5/9/1895	Deadlock		Joint	209
Delaware	1	1899	G	3/13/1899	Deadlock		Joint	114
Delaware	1	1899	S	3/2/1903	Ball, Lewis Heisler	Anti-Addicks R	Joint	36
Delaware	1	1899	S	3/8/1901	Deadlock		Joint	46
Delaware	2	1901	G	3/9/1901	deadlock		Joint	45
Delaware	2	1901	S	3/2/1903	Allee, James Frank	Addicks R	Joint	36
Delaware	1	1905	G	3/23/1905	Deadlock		Joint	48
Delaware	1	1905	S	6/12/1906	DuPont, Henry A.	R	Separate	0
Delaware	2	1907	G	1/15/1907	Richardson, Harry A.	R	Separate	0
Delaware	1	1911	G	1/25/1911	DuPont, Henry A.	R	Joint	1
Delaware	2	1913	G	1/29/1913	Saulsbury, Willard	D	Joint	10
Florida	3	1873	G	1/31/1873	Conover, Simon	R	Joint	21
Florida	1	1875	G	2/11/1875	Jones, James K.	D	Joint	24
Florida	3	1879	G	1/21/1879	Call, Wilkinson	D	Separate	0
Florida	1	1881	G	1/18/1881	Jones, Charles W.	D	Separate	0
Florida	3	1885	G	1/20/1885	Call, Wilkinson	D	Separate	0
Florida	1	1887	G	5/19/1887	Pasco, Samuel	D	Joint	25
Florida	3	1891	G	5/26/1891	Call, Wilkinson	D	Joint	30
Florida	1	1893	G	1/18/1893	Pasco, Samuel	D	Separate	0
Florida	3	1897	G	5/14/1897	Mallory, Stephen R.	D	Joint	25
Florida	1	1899	G	4/19/1899	Taliaferro, James P.	D	Joint	1
Florida	3	1903	G	4/21/1903	Mallory, Stephen R.	D	Separate	0
Florida	1	1905	G	4/18/1905	Taliaferro, James P.	D	Separate	0
Florida	3	1909	G	4/20/1909	Fletcher, Duncan	D	Separate	0
Florida	1	1911	G	4/8/1911	Bryan, Nathan P.	D	Separate	0
Georgia	2	1871	G	11/15/1871	Norwood, Thomas	D	Separate	0
Georgia	3	1873	G	1/23/1873	Gordon, John B.	D	Joint	5
Georgia	2	1877	G	1/26/1877	Hill, Benjamin H.	D	Joint	3
Georgia	2	1877	S	11/15/1882	Barrow, Pope	D	Joint	1

State	Class	Seat year	General or Special election	Election date	Name of winner	Party of winner	Separate or Joint Ballot	Number of joint ballots
Georgia	3	1879	G	11/20/1878	Gordon, John B.	D	Separate	0
Georgia	3	1879	S	11/17/1880	Brown, Joseph E.	D	Separate	0
Georgia	2	1883	G	11/15/1882	Colquitt, Alfred H.	D	Joint	1
Georgia	3	1885	G	11/19/1884	Brown, Joseph E.	D	Separate	0
Georgia	2	1889	G	11/21/1888	Colquitt, Alfred H.	D	Separate	0
Georgia	3	1891	G	11/19/1890	Gordon, John B.	D	Separate	0
Georgia	2	1895	G	11/7/1894	Bacon, Augustus O.	D	Separate	0
Georgia	2	1895	S	11/7/1894	Walsh, Patrick	D	Separate	0
Georgia	3	1897	G	1/28/1897	Clay, Alexander Stephens	D	Joint	22
Georgia	2	1901	G	11/7/1900	Bacon, Augustus O.	D	Separate	0
Georgia	3	1903	G	11/5/1902	Clay, Alexander Stephens	D	Separate	0
Georgia	2	1907	G	7/10/1907	Bacon, Augustus O.	D	Separate	0
Georgia	3	1909	G	7/7/1909	Clay, Alexander Stephens	D	Separate	0
Georgia	3	1909	S	7/12/1911	Smith, Hoke	D	Joint	1
Georgia	2	1913	G	6/15/1912	Bacon, Augustus O.	D	Separate	0
Idaho	3	1885	S	12/18/1890	McConnell, William J	R	Unknown	0
Idaho	2	1889	S	12/18/1890	Shoup, George L	R	Unknown	0
Idaho	3	1891	G	12/18/1890	Dubois, Frederick T.	R	Joint	Unknown
Idaho	2	1895	G	3/7/1895	Shoup, George L	R	Joint	51
Idaho	3	1897	G	1/28/1897	Heitfeld, Henry	Pop	Joint	22
Idaho	2	1901	G	1/15/1901	Dubold, Frederick T.	D	Separate	0
Idaho	3	1903	G	1/13/1903	Heyburn, Weldon B.	R	Separate	0
Idaho	2	1907	G	1/15/1907	Borah, William E.	R	Separate	0
Idaho	3	1909	G	11/12/1909	Heyburn, Weldon B.	R	Separate	0
Idaho	2	1913	G	1/14/1913	Borah, William E.	R	Separate	0
Idaho	3	1913	S	1/24/1913	Brady, James	R	Joint	30
Illinois	3	1871	G	1/17/1871	Logan, John A.	R	Separate	0
Illinois	2	1873	G	1/21/1873	Oglesby, Richard	R	Separate	0
Illinois	3	1877	G	1/25/1877	Davis, David	I	Joint	40
Illinois	2	1879	G	1/21/1879	Logan, John A.	R	Separate	0
Illinois	3	1883	G	1/17/1883	Cullom, Shelby M.	R	Joint	1
Illinois	2	1885	G	5/19/1885	Logan, John A.	R	Joint	118
Illinois	2	1885	S	1/18/1887	Farwell, Charles B.	R	Separate	0
Illinois	3	1889	G	1/22/1889	Cullom, Shelby M.	R	Separate	0
Illinois	2	1891	G	3/11/1891	Palmer, John McAuley	D	Joint	154
Illinois	3	1895	G	1/22/1895	Cullom, Shelby M.	R	Separate	0
Illinois	2	1897	G	1/20/1897	Mason, William E.	R	Separate	0
Illinois	3	1901	G	1/22/1901	Cullom, Shelby M.	R	Separate	0
Illinois	2	1903	G	1/20/1903	Hopkins, Albert J.	R	Separate	0
Illinois	3	1907	G	1/22/1907	Cullom, Shelby M.	R	Separate	0
Illinois	2	1909	G	5/26/1909	Lorimer, William	R	Joint	95
Illinois	2	1909	S	3/25/1913	Sherman, Lawrence	R	Joint	14
Illinois	3	1913	G	3/24/1913	Lewis, James H	D	Joint	15
Indiana	3	1873	G	11/26/1872	Morton, Oliver H.P.T.	R	Separate	0
Indiana	3	1873	S	1/21/1879	Voorhees, Daniel W.	D	Separate	0
Indiana	1	1875	G	1/20/1875	McDonald, Joseph	D	Joint	1
Indiana	1	1881	G	1/19/1881	Harrison, Benjamin	R	Joint	1
Indiana	3	1885	G	1/20/1885	Voorhees, Daniel W.	D	Separate	0
Indiana	1	1887	G	2/1/1887	Turpie, David	D	Joint	16
Indiana	3	1891	G	1/20/1891	Voorhees, Daniel W.	D	Separate	0
Indiana	1	1893	G	1/17/1893	Turpie, David	D	Separate	0
Indiana	3	1897	G	1/19/1897	Fairbanks, Charles W.	R	Separate	0
Indiana	1	1899	G	1/17/1899	Beveridge, Albert J.	R	Separate	0
Indiana	3	1903	G	1/20/1903	Fairbanks, Charles W.	R	Separate	0
Indiana	3	1903	S	1/17/1905	Hemenway, James A.	R	Separate	0
Indiana	1	1905	G	1/17/1905	Beveridge, Albert J.	R	Separate	0
Indiana	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Shively, Benjamin F.	D	Separate	0
Indiana	1	1911	G	1/17/1911	Kern, John W.	D	Separate	0
Iowa	2	1871	G	1/19/1870	Wright, George G.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	3	1873	G	1/17/1872	Allison, William B.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	2	1877	G	1/26/1876	Kirkwood, Samuel Jordan	R	Separate	0
Iowa	2	1877	S	1/25/1882	McDill, James Wilson	R	Separate	0
Iowa	3	1879	G	1/24/1878	Allison, William B.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	2	1883	G	1/24/1882	Wilson, James F.	R	Separate	0

State	Class	Seat year	General or Special election	Election date	Name of winner	Party of winner	Separate or Joint Ballot	Number of joint ballots
Iowa	3	1885	G	1/23/1884	Allison, William B.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	2	1889	G	1/17/1888	Wilson, James F.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	3	1891	G	3/4/1890	Allison, William B.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	2	1895	G	1/24/1894	Gear, John H.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	3	1897	G	1/21/1896	Allison, William B.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	2	1901	G	1/16/1900	Gear, John H.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	2	1901	S	1/22/1902	Dolliver, Jonathan P.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	3	1903	G	1/22/1902	Allison, William B.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	2	1907	G	1/22/1907	Dolliver, Jonathan P.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	2	1907	S	4/12/1911	Kenyon, William S	R	Joint	67
Iowa	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Cummins, Albert B.	R	Separate	0
Iowa	2	1913	G	1/22/1913	Kenyon, William S	R	Separate	0
Kansas	2	1871	G	1/25/1871	Caldwell, Alexander	R	Joint	1
Kansas	2	1871	S	2/2/1874	Harvey, James	R	Joint	5
Kansas	3	1873	G	1/27/1873	Ingalls, John J.	R	Joint	1
Kansas	2	1877	G	1/31/1877	Plumb, Preston B.	R	Joint	16
Kansas	3	1879	G	1/31/1879	Ingalls, John J.	R	Joint	4
Kansas	2	1883	G	1/23/1883	Plumb, Preston B.	R	Separate	0
Kansas	3	1885	G	1/27/1885	Ingalls, John J.	R	Separate	0
Kansas	2	1889	G	1/22/1889	Plumb, Preston B.	R	Separate	0
Kansas	3	1891	G	1/28/1891	Peffer, Ailliam A.	FA	Joint	1
Kansas	2	1895	G	1/23/1895	Baker, Lucian	R	Joint	1
Kansas	3	1897	G	1/26/1897	Harris, William A.	Pop	Separate	0
Kansas	2	1901	G	1/22/1901	Burton, J.R.	R	Separate	0
Kansas	3	1903	G	1/27/1903	Long, Chester I	R	Separate	0
Kansas	2	1907	G	1/22/1907	Curtis, Charles	R	Separate	0
Kansas	3	1909	G	1/26/1909	Bristow, Joseph L	R	Separate	0
Kansas	2	1913	G	1/28/1913	Thompson, William H	D	Separate	0
Kentucky	2	1871	G	12/16/1869	Stevenson, John W.	D	Joint	5
Kentucky	3	1873	G	12/19/1872	McCreery, Thomas C.	D	Separate	0
Kentucky	2	1877	G	1/18/1876	Beck, James B	D	Joint	11
Kentucky	3	1879	G	1/17/1878	Williams, John S.	D	Joint	11
Kentucky	2	1883	G	12/6/1881	Beck, James B	D	Separate	0
Kentucky	3	1885	G	2/6/1884	Blackburn, Joseph C.S.	D	Joint	19
Kentucky	2	1889	G	1/11/1888	Beck, James B	D	Separate	0
Kentucky	2	1889	S1	5/17/1890	Carlisle, John G.	D	Joint	4
Kentucky	2	1889	S2	?/1/1893	Lindsay, William	D	Separate	0
Kentucky	3	1891	G	1/7/1890	Blackburn, Joseph C.S.	D	Separate	0
Kentucky	2	1895	G	1/17/1894	Lindsay, William	D	Separate	0
Kentucky	3	1897	G	3/17/1896	Deadlock		Joint	52
Kentucky	3	1897	G	4/28/1897	Deboe, William	R	Joint	60
Kentucky	2	1901	G	1/9/1900	Blackburn, Joseph C.S.	D	Separate	0
Kentucky	3	1903	G	1/14/1902	McCreary, James B.	D	Separate	0
Kentucky	2	1907	G	1/17/1906	Paynter, Thomas H.	D	Separate	0
Kentucky	3	1909	G	2/28/1908	Bradley, William O.	R	Joint	29
Kentucky	2	1913	G	1/9/1912	James, Ollie M.	D	Separate	0
Louisiana	2	1871	G	1/11/1871	West, J R	R	Separate	0
Louisiana	3	1873	S	1/12/1876	Eustis, James B.	D	Separate	0
Louisiana	2	1877	G	1/10/1877	Kellogg, William Pitt	R	Joint	45
Louisiana	3	1879	G	1/31/1879	Jonas, Benjamin F.	D	Joint	15
Louisiana	2	1883	G	1/22/1880	Gibson, Randall L.	D	Joint	2
Louisiana	3	1885	G	5/20/1884	Eustis, James B.	D	Separate	0
Louisiana	2	1889	G	5/22/1888	Gibson, Randall L.	D	Joint	6
Louisiana	3	1891	G	5/30/1888	White, Edward D.	D	Joint	6
Louisiana	2	1895	G	5/23/1894	Caffery, Donelson	D	Joint	1
Louisiana	2	1895	G	7/7/1892	Deadlock		Joint	33
Louisiana	3	1897	G	5/28/1896	McEnery, Douglas	D	Joint	6
Louisiana	2	1901	G	5/22/1900	Foster, Murphy J.	D	Separate	0
Louisiana	3	1903	G	5/22/1900	McEnery, Douglas	D	Separate	0
Louisiana	2	1907	G	5/17/1904	Foster, Murphy J.	D	Separate	0
Louisiana	3	1909	G	5/19/1908	McEnery, Douglas	D	Separate	0
Louisiana	2	1913	G	5/21/1912	Ransdell, Joseph E.	D	Separate	0
Maine	2	1871	G	1/17/1870	Morrill, Lott M.	R	Separate	0
Maine	2	1871	S	1/16/1877	Blaine, James G.	R	Separate	0

State	Class	Seat year	General or Special election	Election date	Name of winner	Party of winner	Separate or Joint Ballot	Number of joint ballots
Maine	1	1875	G	1/19/1875	Hamlin, Hannibal	R	Separate	0
Maine	2	1877	G	1/16/1877	Blaine, James G.	R	Separate	0
Maine	2	1877	S	3/15/1881	Frye, William P.	R	Separate	0
Maine	1	1881	G	1/18/1881	Hale, Eugene	R	Separate	0
Maine	2	1883	G	1/16/1883	Frye, William P.	R	Separate	0
Maine	1	1887	G	1/18/1887	Hale, Eugene	R	Separate	0
Maine	2	1889	G	1/15/1889	Frye, William P.	R	Separate	0
Maine	1	1893	G	1/17/1893	Hale, Eugene	R	Separate	0
Maine	2	1895	G	1/15/1895	Frye, William P.	R	Separate	0
Maine	1	1899	G	1/17/1899	Hale, Eugene	R	Separate	0
Maine	2	1901	G	1/15/1901	Frye, William P.	R	Separate	0
Maine	1	1905	G	1/17/1905	Hale, Eugene	R	Separate	0
Maine	2	1907	G	1/15/1907	Frye, William P.	R	Separate	0
Maine	2	1907	S	4/2/1912	Gardner, Obadiah	D	Separate	0
Maine	1	1911	G	1/17/1911	Johnson, Charles F.	D	Separate	0
Maine	2	1913	G	1/14/1913	Burleigh, Edwin C.	R	Separate	0
Maryland	3	1873	G	1/19/1872	Dennis, George R	D	Joint	7
Maryland	1	1875	G	1/20/1874	Whyte, WP	D	Separate	0
Maryland	3	1879	G	1/18/1878	Groome, James B.	D	Joint	4
Maryland	1	1881	G	1/20/1880	Gorman, Arthur P.	D	Separate	0
Maryland	3	1885	G	1/18/1884	Wilson, Ephraim K.	D	Joint	11
Maryland	1	1887	G	1/19/1886	Gorman, Arthur P.	D	Separate	0
Maryland	3	1891	G	1/14/1890	Wilson, Ephraim K.	D	Separate	0
Maryland	3	1891	S	1/21/1892	Gibson, Charles	D	Joint	2
Maryland	1	1893	G	1/19/1892	Gorman, Arthur P.	D	Separate	0
Maryland	3	1897	G	1/22/1896	Wellington, George L.	R	Joint	8
Maryland	1	1899	G	1/25/1898	McComas, Louis E.	R	Joint	9
Maryland	3	1903	G	1/14/1902	Gorman, Arthur P.	D	Separate	0
Maryland	3	1903	S	1/14/1908	Whyte, WP	D	Separate	0
Maryland	1	1905	G	2/4/1904	Rayner, Isidor	D	Joint	12
Maryland	3	1909	G	1/15/1908	Smith, John Walter	D	Joint	1
Maryland	1	1911	G	1/18/1910	Rayner, Isidor	D	Separate	0
Massachusetts	2	1871	G	1/17/1871	Wilson, Henry	R	Separate	0
Massachusetts	2	1871	S	3/12/1873	Boutwell, George S.	R	Separate	0
Massachusetts	1	1875	G	1/20/1875	Dawes, Henry L.	R	Joint	2
Massachusetts	2	1877	G	1/19/1877	Hoar, George F.	R	Joint	5
Massachusetts	1	1881	G	1/18/1881	Dawes, Henry L.	R	Separate	0
Massachusetts	2	1883	G	1/18/1883	Hoar, George F.	R	Joint	3
Massachusetts	1	1887	G	1/18/1887	Dawes, Henry L.	R	Joint	1
Massachusetts	2	1889	G	1/15/1889	Hoar, George F.	R	Separate	0
Massachusetts	1	1893	G	1/17/1893	Lodge, Henry Cabot	R	Separate	0
Massachusetts	2	1895	G	1/15/1895	Hoar, George F.	R	Separate	0
Massachusetts	1	1899	G	1/17/1899	Lodge, Henry Cabot	R	Separate	0
Massachusetts	2	1901	G	1/15/1901	Hoar, George F.	R	Separate	0
Massachusetts	2	1901	S	1/17/1905	Crane, W. Murray	R	Separate	0
Massachusetts	1	1905	G	1/17/1905	Lodge, Henry Cabot	R	Separate	0
Massachusetts	2	1907	G	1/15/1907	Crane, W. Murray	R	Separate	0
Massachusetts	1	1911	G	1/17/1911	Lodge, Henry Cabot	R	Joint	1
Massachusetts	2	1913	G	1/14/1913	Weeks, John W.	R	Separate	0
Michigan	2	1871	G	1/17/1871	Ferry, Thomas W.	R	Separate	0
Michigan	1	1875	G	1/20/1875	Christiency, Isaac P.	R	Joint	2
Michigan	1	1875	S1	2/18/1879	Chandler, Zachariah	R	Separate	0
Michigan	1	1875	S2	1/18/1881	Baldwin, Henry P.	R	Separate	0
Michigan	2	1877	G	1/16/1877	Ferry, Thomas W.	R	Separate	0
Michigan	1	1881	G	1/18/1881	Conger, Omar D.	R	Separate	0
Michigan	2	1883	G	3/1/1883	Palmer, Thomas W.	R	Joint	81
Michigan	1	1887	G	1/18/1887	Stockbridge, Francis B.	R	Separate	0
Michigan	2	1889	G	1/15/1889	McMillan, James	R	Separate	0
Michigan	1	1893	G	1/17/1893	Stockbridge, Francis B.	R	Separate	0
Michigan	1	1893	S	1/15/1895	Burrows, Julius C.	R	Separate	0
Michigan	2	1895	G	1/15/1895	McMillan, James	R	Separate	0
Michigan	1	1899	G	1/17/1899	Burrows, Julius C.	R	Separate	0
Michigan	2	1901	G	1/15/1901	McMillan, James	R	Separate	0
Michigan	2	1901	S	1/20/1903	Alger, Russell A.	R	Separate	0

State	Class	Seat year	General or Special election	Election date	Name of winner	Party of winner	Separate or Joint Ballot	Number of joint ballots
Michigan	1	1905	G	1/17/1905	Burrows, Julius C.	R	Separate	0
Michigan	2	1907	G	1/15/1907	Smith, William Alden	R	Separate	0
Michigan	1	1911	G	1/17/1911	Townsend, Charles E.	R	Separate	0
Michigan	2	1913	G	1/14/1913	Smith, William Alden	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	2	1871	G	1/17/1871	Windom, William	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	2	1871	S	1/17/1871	Stearns, Ozora (st)	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	1	1875	G	2/19/1875	McMillan, Samuel J.R.	R	Joint	32
Minnesota	2	1877	G	1/16/1877	Windom, William	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	2	1877	S	10/25/1881	Windom, William	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	1	1881	G	1/18/1881	McMillan, Samuel J.R.	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	2	1883	G	2/1/1883	Sabin, Dwight M.	R	Joint	28
Minnesota	1	1887	G	1/18/1887	Davis, Cushman K.	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	2	1889	G	1/23/1889	Washburn, William D.	R	Joint	1
Minnesota	1	1893	G	1/18/1893	Davis, Cushman K.	R	Joint	1
Minnesota	2	1895	G	1/23/1895	Nelson, Knute	R	Joint	1
Minnesota	1	1899	G	1/18/1899	Davis, Cushman K.	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	1	1899	S	1/22/1901	Clapp, Moses E.	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	2	1901	G	1/22/1901	Nelson, Knute	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	1	1905	G	1/17/1905	Clapp, Moses E.	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	2	1907	G	1/22/1907	Nelson, Knute	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	1	1911	G	1/17/1911	Clapp, Moses E.	R	Separate	0
Minnesota	2	1913	G	1/21/1913	Nelson, Knute	R	Separate	0
Mississippi	2	1871	G	1/18/1870	Alcorn, James L	R	Separate	0
Mississippi	1	1875	G	2/3/1874	Bruce, Blanche K	R	Separate	0
Mississippi	2	1877	G	1/18/1876	Lamar, Lucius Q.C.	D	Separate	0
Mississippi	1	1881	G	1/22/1880	George, James Z.	D	Joint	2
Mississippi	2	1883	G	1/17/1882	Lamar, Lucius Q.C.	D	Separate	0
Mississippi	2	1883	S	1/19/1886	Walthall, Edward C.	D	Separate	0
Mississippi	1	1887	G	1/19/1886	George, James Z.	D	Separate	0
Mississippi	2	1889	G	1/17/1888	Walthall, Edward C.	D	Separate	0
Mississippi	2	1889	S	2/7/1894	McLaurin, Anselm J.	D	Joint	7
Mississippi	1	1893	G	1/19/1892	George, James Z.	D	Separate	0
Mississippi	2	1895	G	1/19/1892	Walthall, Edward C.	D	Separate	0
Mississippi	1	1895	S	1/24/1896	Money, Hernando de Soto	D	Joint	3
Mississippi	1	1899	S	1/16/1900	Sullivan, Will VanAmberg	D	Separate	0
Mississippi	2	1901	G	1/16/1900	McLaurin, Anselm J.	D	Separate	0
Mississippi	1	1905	G	1/19/1904	Money, Hernando de Soto	D	Separate	0
Mississippi	2	1907	G	1/19/1904	McLaurin, Anselm J.	D	Separate	0
Mississippi	2	1907	S	2/22/1910	Percy, Le Roy	D	Joint	26
Mississippi	1	1911	G	1/21/1908	Williams, John Sharp	D	Separate	0
Mississippi	2	1913	G	1/16/1912	Vardiman, James K.	D	Separate	0
Missouri	3	1871	S	1/17/1871	Blair, Francis P	D	Separate	0
Missouri	3	1873	G	1/14/1873	Boby, Lewis V	D	Separate	0
Missouri	1	1875	G	1/19/1875	Cockrell, Francis M.	D	Separate	0
Missouri	3	1879	G	1/21/1879	Vest, George G.	D	Separate	0
Missouri	3	1879	S	1/21/1879	Shields, James	D	Separate	0
Missouri	1	1881	G	1/18/1881	Cockrell, Francis M.	D	Separate	0
Missouri	3	1885	G	1/21/1885	Vest, George G.	D	Separate	0
Missouri	1	1887	G	1/18/1887	Cockrell, Francis M.	D	Separate	0
Missouri	3	1891	G	1/20/1891	Vest, George G.	D	Separate	0
Missouri	1	1893	G	1/17/1893	Cockrell, Francis M.	D	Separate	0
Missouri	3	1897	G	1/20/1897	Vest, George G.	D	Separate	0
Missouri	1	1899	G	1/18/1899	Cockrell, Francis M.	D	Separate	0
Missouri	3	1903	G	1/20/1903	Stone, William J.	D	Separate	0
Missouri	1	1905	G	3/18/1905	Warner, William	R	Joint	66
Missouri	3	1909	G	1/20/1909	Stone, William J.	D	Joint	1
Missouri	1	1911	G	1/17/1911	Reed, James A.	D	Separate	0
Montana	1	1887	G	1/1/1890	Sanders, Wilbur F.	R	Unknown	0
Montana	2	1889	G	1/2/1890	Powers, Thomas C.	R	Unknown	0
Montana	1	1893	G	3/2/1893	Deadlock		Joint	53
Montana	1	1893	S	1/16/1895	Mantle, Lee	R	Joint	1
Montana	2	1895	G	1/16/1895	Carter, T.H.	R	Separate	0
Montana	1	1899	G	1/28/1899	Clark, William A.	D	Joint	17
Montana	1	1899	S	3/7/1901	Gibson, Paris	D	Joint	65



State	Class	Seat year	General or Special election	Election date	Name of winner	Party of winner	Separate or Joint Ballot	Number of joint ballots
Montana	2	1901	G	1/16/1901	Clark, William A.	D	Joint	1
Montana	1	1905	G	1/16/1905	Carter, Thomas H.	R	Joint	6
Montana	2	1907	G	1/15/1907	Dixon, Joseph M.	R	Separate	0
Montana	1	1911	G	3/2/1911	Meyers, Henry L.	D	Joint	79
Montana	2	1913	G	1/14/1913	Walsh, TJ	D	Separate	0
Nebraska	2	1871	G	1/18/1871	Hitchcock, PW	R	Joint	2
Nebraska	1	1875	G	1/22/1875	Paddock, Algernon S.	R	Joint	5
Nebraska	2	1877	G	1/18/1877	Saunders, Alvin	R	Joint	3
Nebraska	1	1881	G	1/24/1881	Van Wyck, Charles H.	R	Joint	17
Nebraska	2	1883	G	1/31/1883	Manderson, Charles F.	R	Joint	17
Nebraska	1	1887	G	1/21/1887	Paddock, Algernon S.	R	Joint	15
Nebraska	2	1889	G	1/16/1889	Manderson, Charles F.	R	Separate	0
Nebraska	1	1893	G	2/7/1893	Allen, William V.	Peo.	Joint	18
Nebraska	2	1895	G	1/15/1895	Thurston, John M.	R	Separate	0
Nebraska	1	1899	G	3/8/1899	Hayward, Monroe	R	Joint	43
Nebraska	2	1901	G	3/28/1901	Millard, Joseph H.	R	Joint	54
Nebraska	1	1905	G	1/17/1905	Burkett, Elmer	R	Separate	0
Nebraska	2	1907	G	1/15/1907	Brown, Norris	R	Separate	0
Nebraska	1	1911	G	1/17/1911	Hitchcock, Gilbert M.	D	Separate	0
Nebraska	2	1913	G	1/21/1913	Norris, George	R	Separate	0
Nevada	3	1873	G	1/20/1873	Jones, John P.	R	Separate	0
Nevada	1	1875	G	1/13/1875	Sharon, William	R	Separate	0
Nevada	3	1879	G	1/14/1879	Jones, John P.	R	Separate	0
Nevada	1	1881	G	1/11/1881	Fair, James G.	D	Joint	1
Nevada	3	1885	G	1/20/1885	Jones, John P.	R	Separate	0
Nevada	1	1887	G	1/11/1887	Stewart, William M.	R	Separate	0
Nevada	3	1891	G	1/27/1891	Jones, John P.	R	Separate	0
Nevada	1	1893	G	1/25/1893	Stewart, William M.	Sil	Separate	0
Nevada	3	1897	G	1/26/1897	Jones, John P.	R	Separate	0
Nevada	1	1899	G	1/25/1899	Stewart, William M.	Sil	Separate	0
Nevada	3	1903	G	1/27/1903	Newlands, Francis G	D	Separate	0
Nevada	1	1905	G	1/25/1905	Nixon, George S.	R	Joint	1
Nevada	3	1909	G	1/26/1909	Newlands, Francis G	D	Separate	0
Nevada	1	1911	G	1/24/1911	Nixon, George S.	R	Separate	0
Nevada	1	1913	S	1/28/1913	Pittman, Key	D	Separate	0
New Hampshire	2	1871	G	6/14/1870	Cragin, Aaron	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	3	1873	G	6/18/1872	Wadleigh, Bainbridge	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	2	1877	G	6/20/1876	Rollins, Edward	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	3	1879	G	6/17/1879	Blair, Henry W.	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	2	1883	G	8/2/1883	Pike, Austin F.	R	Joint	42
New Hampshire	2	1883	G	1881	Deadlock---House refused to ballot		Impasse	N/A
New Hampshire	2	1883	S	6/14/1887	Chandler, William E.	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	3	1885	G	6/16/1885	Blair, Henry W.	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	2	1889	G	6/18/1889	Chandler, William E.	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	3	1891	G	1/20/1891	Gallinger, Jacob H.	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	2	1895	G	1/15/1895	Chandler, William E.	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	3	1897	G	1/19/1897	Gallinger, Jacob H.	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	2	1901	G	1/15/1901	Burnham, Henry E.	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	3	1903	G	1/20/1903	Gallinger, Jacob H.	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	2	1907	G	1/15/1907	Burnham, Henry E.	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Gallinger, Jacob H.	R	Separate	0
New Hampshire	2	1913	G	3/13/1913	Hollis, Henry	D	Joint	43
New Jersey	2	1871	G	1/27/1871	Freylinghuysen, Frederick	R	Separate	0
New Jersey	1	1875	G	1/26/1875	Randolph, Theodore	D	Separate	0
New Jersey	2	1877	G	1/24/1877	McPherson, John R.	D	Separate	0
New Jersey	1	1881	G	1/25/1881	Sewell, William J.	R	Separate	0
New Jersey	2	1883	G	1/24/1883	McPherson, John R.	D	Joint	1
New Jersey	1	1887	G	3/2/1887	Blodgett, Rufus	D	Joint	15
New Jersey	2	1889	G	1/22/1889	McPherson, John R.	D	Separate	0
New Jersey	1	1893	G	1/24/1893	Smith, James, Jr.	D	Separate	0
New Jersey	2	1895	G	1/22/1895	Sewell, W.J	R	Separate	0
New Jersey	1	1899	G	1/24/1899	Kean, John	R	Separate	0
New Jersey	2	1901	G	1/22/1901	Sewell, W.J	R	Separate	0
New Jersey	2	1901	S	1/28/1902	Dryden, John F.	R	Separate	0

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New Jersey	1	1905	G	1/24/1905	Kean, John	R	Separate	0
New Jersey	2	1907	G	2/5/1907	Briggs, Frank O.	R	Joint	6
New Jersey	1	1911	G	1/25/1911	Martine, James E.	D	Joint	1
New Jersey	1	1913	G	1/28/1913	Hughes, William	D	Separate	0
New Mexico	2	1907	G	3/27/1912	Fall, Albert	R	Joint	7
New Mexico	1	1911	G	3/27/1912	Catron, Thomas B.	R	Joint	7
New Mexico	1	1913	G	6/4/1913	Fall, Albert	R	Separate	0
New York	3	1873	G	1/21/1873	Conkling, Roscoe	R	Separate	0
New York	1	1875	G	1/20/1875	Kernan, Francis	D	Joint	1
New York	3	1879	G	1/18/1879	Conkling, Roscoe	R	Separate	0
New York	3	1879	S	7/22/1881	Lapham, Elbridge G.	R	Joint	56
New York	1	1881	G	1/18/1881	Platt, Thomas C.	R	Separate	0
New York	1	1881	S	7/16/1881	Miller, Warner	R	Joint	48
New York	3	1885	G	1/20/1885	Evarts, William M.	R	Separate	0
New York	1	1887	G	1/20/1887	Hiscock, Frank	R	Joint	2
New York	3	1891	G	1/20/1891	Hill, David B.	D	Separate	0
New York	1	1893	G	1/17/1893	Murphy, Edward	D	Separate	0
New York	3	1897	G	1/18/1897	Platt, Thomas C.	R	Separate	0
New York	1	1899	G	1/18/1899	Depew, Chauncey	R	Separate	0
New York	3	1903	G	1/19/1903	Platt, Thomas C.	R	Separate	0
New York	1	1905	G	1/17/1905	Depew, Chauncey	R	Separate	0
New York	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Root, Elihu	R	Separate	0
New York	1	1911	G	3/3/1911	O'Gorman, James A.	D	Joint	63
North Carolina	2	1871	G	11/29/1870	Vance, Zebulon	D	Separate	0
North Carolina	2	1871	S	1/30/1872	Ransom, Matthew W	D	Separate	0
North Carolina	3	1873	G	12/3/1872	Merrimom, Augustus	D	Joint	7
North Carolina	2	1877	G	11/28/1876	Ransom, Matthew W.	D	Separate	0
North Carolina	3	1879	G	1/21/1879	Vance, Zebulon	D	Separate	0
North Carolina	2	1883	G	1/16/1883	Ransom, Matthew W.	D	Separate	0
North Carolina	3	1885	G	1/20/1885	Vance, Zebulon	D	Separate	0
North Carolina	2	1889	G	1/22/1889	Ransom, Matthew W.	D	Separate	0
North Carolina	3	1891	G	1/20/1891	Vance, Zebulon B.	D	Separate	0
North Carolina	3	1891	S	1/22/1895	Pritchard, Jeter C.	R	Separate	0
North Carolina	2	1895	G	1/23/1895	Butler, Marion W.	R+Pop	Separate	0
North Carolina	3	1897	G	1/20/1897	Pritchard, Jeter C.	R	Joint	1
North Carolina	2	1901	G	1/22/1901	Simmons, F.M.	D	Separate	0
North Carolina	3	1903	G	1/30/1903	Overman, Lee S.	D	Joint	8
North Carolina	2	1907	G	1/22/1907	Simmons, F.M.	D	Separate	0
North Carolina	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Overman, Lee S.	D	Separate	0
North Carolina	2	1913	G	1/21/1913	Simmons, F.M.	D	Separate	0
North Dakota	3	1885	G	11/20/1889	Pierce, Gilbert A.	R	Separate	0
North Dakota	1	1887	G	11/25/1889	Casey, Lyman R.	R	Joint	10
North Dakota	3	1891	G	1/23/1891	Hansbrough, Henry C.	R	Joint	17
North Dakota	1	1893	G	2/20/1893	Roach, William N.	D	Joint	61
North Dakota	3	1897	G	1/15/1897	Hansbrough, Henry C.	R	Separate	0
North Dakota	1	1899	G	1/20/1899	McCumber, Porter J.	R	Joint	3
North Dakota	3	1903	G	1/20/1903	Hansbrough, Henry C.	R	Separate	0
North Dakota	1	1905	G	1/17/1905	McCumber, Porter J.	R	Separate	0
North Dakota	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Johnson, M.N.	R	Separate	0
North Dakota	1	1911	G	1/17/1911	McCumber, Porter J.	R	Separate	0
Ohio	3	1873	G	1/10/1872	Sherman, John	R	Joint	1
Ohio	3	1873	S	3/20/1877	Matthews, Stanley	R	Separate	0
Ohio	1	1875	G	1/13/1874	Thurman, Allen G	D	Separate	0
Ohio	3	1879	G	1/15/1878	Pendleton, George H.	D	Separate	0
Ohio	1	1881	G	1/13/1880	Garfield, James A.	R	Separate	0
Ohio	1	1881	S	1/18/1881	Sherman, John	R	Separate	0
Ohio	3	1885	G	1/15/1884	Payne, Henry B.	D	Separate	0
Ohio	1	1887	G	1/12/1886	Sherman, John	R	Separate	0
Ohio	3	1891	G	1/15/1890	Brice, Calvin S.	R	Separate	0
Ohio	1	1893	G	1/12/1892	Sherman, John	R	Separate	0
Ohio	1	1893	S	1/12/1898	Hanna, Marcus	R	Joint	1
Ohio	3	1897	G	1/15/1896	Foraker, Joseph B.	R	Separate	0
Ohio	1	1899	G	1/12/1898	Hanna, Marcus	R	Joint	1
Ohio	3	1903	G	1/14/1902	Foraker, Joseph B.	R	Separate	0

State	Class	Seat year	General or Special election	Election date	Name of winner	Party of winner	Separate or Joint Ballot	Number of joint ballots
Ohio	1	1905	G	1/12/1904	Hanna, Marcus	R	Separate	0
Ohio	1	1905	S	3/1/1904	Dick, Charles	R	Separate	0
Ohio	3	1909	G	1/12/1909	Burton, Theodore E.	R	Separate	0
Ohio	1	1911	G	1/10/1911	Pomerene, Atlee	D	Separate	0
Oklahoma	3	1903	G	12/11/1907	Gore, Thomas p.	D	Separate	0
Oklahoma	2	1907	G	12/11/1907	Owen, Robert L.	D	Separate	0
Oklahoma	3	1909	G	1/20/1909	Gore, Thomas p.	D	Separate	0
Oklahoma	2	1913	G	1/22/1913	Owen, Robert L.	D	Separate	0
Oregon	2	1871	G	9/21/1870	Kelly, James K	D	Separate	0
Oregon	3	1873	G	9/30/1872	Mitchell, John H	R	Joint	5
Oregon	2	1877	G	9/23/1876	Grover, La Fayette	D	Joint	5
Oregon	3	1879	G	9/18/1878	Slater, James H.	D	Separate	0
Oregon	2	1883	G	10/20/1882	Dolph, Joseph N.	R	Joint	78
Oregon	3	1885	G	2/21/1885	Deadlock		Joint	69
Oregon	3	1885	S	11/19/1885	Mitchell, John H.	R	Joint	2
Oregon	2	1889	G	1/22/1889	Dolph, Joseph N.	R	Separate	0
Oregon	3	1891	G	1/20/1891	Mitchell, John H.	R	Separate	0
Oregon	2	1895	G	2/23/1895	McBride, Gorge W.	R	Joint	57
Oregon	3	1897	G		Deadlock		Joint	Unknown
Oregon	3	1897	S	10/8/1898	Simon, Joseph	R	Joint	4
Oregon	2	1901	G	2/23/1901	Mitchell, John H.	R	Joint	52
Oregon	3	1903	G	2/20/1903	Fulton, Charles W.	R	Joint	43
Oregon	2	1907	G	1/22/1907	Bourne, Jonathan, Jr.	R	Separate	0
Oregon	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Chamberlain, George E.	D	Separate	0
Oregon	2	1913	G	1/21/1913	Lane, Harry	D	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	3	1873	S	3/30/1877	Cameron, James Donald	R	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	1	1875	G	1/20/1875	Wallace, William A	D	Joint	1
Pennsylvania	3	1879	G	1/21/1879	Cameron, James Donald	R	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	1	1881	G	2/23/1881	Mitchell, John I.	R	Joint	35
Pennsylvania	3	1885	G	1/20/1885	Cameron, James Donald	R	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	1	1887	G	1/18/1887	Quay, Matthew S.	R	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	3	1891	G	1/20/1891	Cameron, James Donald	R	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	1	1893	G	1/17/1893	Quay, Matthew S.	R	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	3	1897	G	1/19/1897	Penrose, Boise	R	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	1	1899	G	4/19/1899	Deadlock		Joint	79
Pennsylvania	1	1899	S	1/15/1901	Quay, Matthew S.	R	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	3	1903	G	1/20/1903	Penrose, Boise	R	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	1	1905	G	1/17/1905	Knox, Philander C.	R	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	1	1905	S	3/16/1909	Oliver, George T.	R	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Penrose, Boise	R	Separate	0
Pennsylvania	1	1911	G	1/17/1911	Oliver, George T.	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	2	1871	G	6/14/1870	Anthony, Henry B.	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	1	1875	G	1/26/1875	Burnside, Ambrose	R	Joint	28
Rhode Island	2	1877	G	6/13/1876	Anthony, Henry B.	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	1	1881	G	6/8/1880	Burnside, Ambrose E.	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	1	1881	S	10/5/1881	Aldrich, Nelson W.	R	Joint	1
Rhode Island	2	1883	G	6/14/1882	Anthony, Henry B.	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	2	1883	S	1/20/1885	Chace, Jonathan	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	1	1887	G	6/8/1886	Aldrich, Nelson W.	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	2	1889	G	6/12/1888	Chace, Jonathan	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	2	1889	S	4/10/1889	Dixon, Nathan F.	R	Joint	8
Rhode Island	1	1893	G	6/14/1892	Aldrich, Nelson W.	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	2	1895	G	6/13/1894	Wetmore, George P.	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	1	1899	G	6/14/1899	Aldrich, Nelson W.	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	2	1901	G	6/13/1901	Wetmore, George P.	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	1	1905	G	1/17/1905	Aldrich, Nelson W.	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	2	1907	G	4/23/1907	Deadlock		Joint	81
Rhode Island	2	1907	G	1/21/1908	Wetmore, George P.	R	Separate	0
Rhode Island	1	1911	G	1/18/1911	Lippitt, Henry F.	R	Joint	1
Rhode Island	2	1913	G	1/21/1913	Colt, LeBaron Bradford	R	Separate	0
South Carolina	2	1871	G	12/7/1870	Robertson, Thomas J	R	Separate	0
South Carolina	2	1873	G	12/10/1872	Patterson, John J	R	Separate	0
South Carolina	2	1877	G	12/19/1876	Butler, Matthew C.	D	Joint	1
South Carolina	3	1879	G	12/10/1878	Hampton, Wade	D	Separate	0

State	Class	Seat year	General or Special election	Election date	Name of winner	Party of winner	Separate or Joint Ballot	Number of joint ballots
South Carolina	2	1883	G	12/5/1882	Butler, Matthew C.	D	Separate	0
South Carolina	3	1885	G	12/9/1884	Hampton, Wade	D	Separate	0
South Carolina	2	1889	G	12/12/1888	Butler, Matthew C.	D	Separate	0
South Carolina	3	1891	G	12/11/1890	Irby, John L.M.	D	Joint	5
South Carolina	2	1895	G	12/12/1894	Tillman, Benjamin R.	D	Separate	0
South Carolina	3	1897	G	1/26/1895	Earle, Joseph H.	D	Separate	0
South Carolina	3	1897	S	1/25/1898	McLaurin, John L.	D	Separate	0
South Carolina	2	1901	G	1/15/1901	Tillman, Benjamin R.	D	Separate	0
South Carolina	3	1903	G	1/27/1903	Latimer, Asbury C.	D	Separate	0
South Carolina	2	1907	G	1/22/1907	Tillman, Benjamin R.	D	Separate	0
South Carolina	3	1909	G	1/26/1909	Smith, E.D.	D	Separate	0
South Carolina	2	1913	G	1/28/1913	Tillman, Benjamin R.	D	Separate	0
South Dakota	3	1885	G	10/17/1889	Moody, Gideon C.	R	Separate	0
South Dakota	2	1889	G	10/17/1889	Pettigrew, Richard F.	R	Separate	0
South Dakota	3	1891	G	2/16/1891	Kyle, James H.	I	Joint	39
South Dakota	2	1895	G	1/23/1895	Pettigrew, Richard F.	R	Separate	0
South Dakota	3	1897	G	2/18/1897	Kyle, James H.	I+R	Joint	27
South Dakota	2	1901	G	1/22/1901	Gamble, Robert J.	R	Separate	0
South Dakota	3	1903	G	1/20/1903	Kittredge, Alfred B.	R	Separate	0
South Dakota	2	1907	G	1/22/1907	Gamble, Robert J.	R	Separate	0
South Dakota	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Crawford, Coe I	R	Separate	0
South Dakota	2	1913	G	1/22/1913	Sterling, Thomas	R	Joint	1
Tennessee	2	1871	G	10/21/1869	Cooper, Henry	D	Joint	7
Tennessee	1	1875	G	1/26/1875	Johnson, Andrew	D	Joint	55
Tennessee	1	1875	S	1/19/1877	Bailey, James E.	D	Joint	74
Tennessee	2	1877	G	1/10/1877	Harris, Isham G.	D	Separate	0
Tennessee	1	1881	G	1/26/1881	Jackson, Howell E.	D	Joint	30
Tennessee	1	1881	S	1/18/1887	Whitthorne, Washington C.	D	Separate	0
Tennessee	2	1883	G	1/16/1883	Harris, Isham G.	D	Separate	0
Tennessee	1	1887	G	1/25/1887	Bate, William B.	D	Joint	6
Tennessee	2	1889	G	1/15/1889	Harris, Isham G.	D	Separate	0
Tennessee	1	1893	G	1/17/1893	Bates, William B.	D	Separate	0
Tennessee	2	1895	G	1/23/1895	Harris, Isham G.	D	Separate	0
Tennessee	2	1895	S	2/1/1899	Turley, Thomas B.	D	Joint	Unknown
Tennessee	1	1899	G	1/11/1899	Bates, William B.	D	Separate	0
Tennessee	2	1901	G	1/15/1901	Carmack, E.W.	D	Separate	0
Tennessee	1	1905	G	1/10/1905	Bates, William B.	D	Separate	0
Tennessee	1	1905	S	3/21/1905	Frazier, James B.	D	Separate	0
Tennessee	2	1907	G	1/15/1907	Taylor, Robert L.	D	Separate	0
Tennessee	1	1911	G	1/23/1911	Lea, Luke	D	Joint	11
Tennessee	2	1913	G	1/23/1913	Shields, John E	D	Joint	7
Tennessee	2	1913	S	1/24/1913	Webb, William R	D	Joint	8
Texas	2	1871	G	1/24/1871	Hamilton, Morgan	R	Separate	0
Texas	1	1875	G	1/??/1874	Maxey, Sam Bell	D	Unknown	0
Texas	2	1877			Coke, Richard	D	Unknown	0
Texas	1	1881	G	1/25/1881	Maxey, Sam Bell	D	Separate	0
Texas	2	1883	G	1/23/1883	Coke, Richard	D	Separate	0
Texas	1	1887	G	2/1/1887	Reagan, John H.	D	Joint	30
Texas	1	1887	S	3/22/1892	Mills, Roger Q.	D	Separate	0
Texas	2	1889	G	1/22/1889	Coke, Richard	D	Separate	0
Texas	1	1893	G	3/22/1892	Mills, Roger Q.	D	Separate	0
Texas	2	1895	G	1/22/1895	Chilton, Horace	D	Separate	0
Texas	1	1899	G	1/25/1899	Culberson, Charles A.	D	Separate	0
Texas	2	1901	G	1/22/1901	Bailey, Joseph W.	D	Separate	0
Texas	1	1905	G	1/25/1905	Culberson, Charles A.	D	Separate	0
Texas	2	1907	G	1/22/1907	Bailey, Joseph W.	D	Separate	0
Texas	1	1911	G	1/24/1911	Culberson, Charles A.	D	Separate	0
Texas	2	1913	G	1/28/1913	Sheppard, Morris	D	Separate	0
Texas	2	1913	S	1/28/1913	Sheppard, Morris	D	Separate	0
Utah	3	1891	G	1/22/1896	Brown, Arthur	R	Separate	0
Utah	1	1893	G	1/22/1896	Cannon, Frank J	R	Separate	0
Utah	3	1897	G	2/1/1897	Rawlins, Joseph L.	D	Joint	53
Utah	1	1899	G		Deadlock		Joint	114
Utah	1	1899	S	1/23/1901	Kearns, Thomas	R	Joint	1

State	Class	Seat year	General or Special election	Election date	Name of winner	Party of winner	Separate or Joint Ballot	Number of joint ballots
Utah	3	1903	G	1/20/1903	Smoot, Reed	R	Separate	0
Utah	1	1905	G	1/17/1905	Sutherland, George	R	Separate	0
Utah	3	1909	G	1/19/1909	Smoot, Reed	R	Separate	0
Utah	1	1911	G	1/17/1911	Sutherland, George	R	Separate	0
Vermont	3	1873	G	10/15/1872	Morrill, Justin S.	R	Separate	0
Vermont	1	1875	G	10/20/1874	Edmunds, George F.	R	Separate	0
Vermont	3	1879	G	10/15/1878	Morrill, Justin S.	R	Separate	0
Vermont	1	1881	G	10/19/1880	Edmunds, George F.	R	Separate	0
Vermont	3	1885	G	10/14/1884	Morrill, Justin S.	R	Separate	0
Vermont	1	1887	G	10/19/1886	Edmunds, George F.	R	Separate	0
Vermont	1	1887	S	10/18/1892	Proctor, Redfield	R	Separate	0
Vermont	3	1891	G	10/14/1890	Morrill, Justin S.	R	Separate	0
Vermont	1	1893	G	10/18/1892	Proctor, Redfield	R	Separate	0
Vermont	3	1897	G	10/20/1896	Morrill, Justin S.	R	Separate	0
Vermont	3	1897	S	10/18/1900	Dillingham, William P.	R	Joint	3
Vermont	1	1899	G	10/19/1898	Proctor, Redfield	R	Separate	0
Vermont	3	1903	G	10/14/1902	Dillingham, William P.	R	Separate	0
Vermont	1	1905	G	10/18/1904	Proctor, Redfield	R	Separate	0
Vermont	1	1905	S	10/20/1908	Page, Carroll S.	R	Separate	0
Vermont	3	1909	G	10/20/1908	Dillingham, William P.	R	Separate	0
Vermont	1	1911	G	10/18/1910	Page, Carroll S.	R	Separate	0
Virginia	2	1871	G	3/14/1871	Johnston, John W	D	Separate	0
Virginia	1	1875	G	1/13/1874	Withers, Robert E	D	Separate	0
Virginia	2	1877	G	12/16/1875	Johnston, John W	D	Joint	1
Virginia	1	1881	G	12/16/1879	Mahone, William	Readjuster	Separate	0
Virginia	2	1883	G	12/20/1881	Riddleberger, Harrison H	Readjuster	Separate	0
Virginia	1	1887	G	12/15/1885	Daniel, John W.	D	Separate	0
Virginia	2	1889	G	12/20/1887	Barbour, John S.	D	Separate	0
Virginia	2	1889	S	12/19/1893	Hunton, Eppa	D	Separate	0
Virginia	1	1893	G	12/15/1891	Daniel, John W.	D	Separate	0
Virginia	2	1895	G	12/19/1893	Martin, Thomas B.	D	Separate	0
Virginia	1	1899	G	12/14/1897	Daniel, John W.	D	Separate	0
Virginia	2	1901	G	12/19/1899	Martin, Thomas B.	D	Separate	0
Virginia	1	1905	G	1/26/1904	Daniel, John W.	D	Separate	0
Virginia	2	1907	G	1/23/1906	Martin, Thomas B.	D	Separate	0
Virginia	1	1911	G	1/25/1910	Daniel, John W.	D	Separate	0
Virginia	1	1911	S	1/23/1912	Swanson, Claude A	D	Separate	0
Virginia	2	1913	G	1/23/1912	Martin, Thomas B.	D	Separate	0
Washington	3	1885	G	11/19/1889	Squire, Watson C.	R	Separate	0
Washington	1	1887	G	11/19/1889	Allen, John B.	R	Separate	0
Washington	3	1891	G	1/21/1891	Squire, Watson C.	R	Joint	1
Washington	1	1893	G	3/9/1893	Deadlock		Joint	101
Washington	1	1893	S	2/1/1895	Wilson, John L	R	Joint	28
Washington	3	1897	G	1/29/1897	Turner, George F.	Silv. R.	Joint	25
Washington	1	1899	G	2/1/1899	Foster, Addison	R	Joint	24
Washington	3	1903	G	1/29/1903	Ankeny, Levi	R	Joint	13
Washington	1	1905	G	1/27/1905	Piles, Samuel H.	R	Joint	13
Washington	3	1909	G	1/20/1909	Jones, Wesley L.	R	Separate	0
Washington	1	1911	G	1/17/1911	Poindexter, Miles	R	Separate	0
West Virginia	1	1875	G	2/17/1875	Caperton, Allen T	D	Joint	23
West Virginia	1	1875	S	1/26/1877	Hereford, Frank	D	Joint	5
West Virginia	2	1877	G	1/26/1877	Davis, Henry G.	D	Joint	4
West Virginia	1	1881	G	1/25/1881	Camden, Johnson N.	D	Separate	0
West Virginia	2	1883	G	1/23/1883	Kenna, John E.	D	Separate	0
West Virginia	1	1887	G		Faulkner, Charles James	D	Unknown	0
West Virginia	2	1889	G	2/21/1889	Kenna, John E.	D	Joint	45
West Virginia	1	1893	G	1/24/1893	Faulkner, Charles James	D	Separate	0
West Virginia	2	1895	G	1/23/1895	Elkins, Stephen B.	R	Unknown	0
West Virginia	1	1899	G	1/25/1899	Scott, Nathan B.	R	Joint	1
West Virginia	2	1901	G	1/22/1901	Elkins, Stephen B.	R	Separate	0
West Virginia	1	1905	G	1/24/1905	Scott, Nathan B.	R	Separate	0
West Virginia	2	1907	G	1/22/1907	Elkins, Stephen B.	R	Separate	0
West Virginia	2	1907	S	2/1/1911	Watson, Clarence W.	D	Joint	1
West Virginia	1	1911	G	2/1/1911	Chilton, William E.	D	Joint	1

State	Class	Seat year	General or Special election	Election date	Name of winner	Party of winner	Separate or Joint Ballot	Number of joint ballots
West Virginia	2	1913	G	2/21/1913	Goff, Nathan	R	Joint	15
Wisconsin	3	1873	G	1/21/1873	Howe, Timothy O	R	Separate	0
Wisconsin	1	1875	G	2/3/1875	Cameron, Angus	R	Joint	11
Wisconsin	3	1879	G	1/22/1879	Carpenter, Matthew H.	R	Joint	1
Wisconsin	3	1879	S	3/10/1881	Cameron, Angus	R	Joint	1
Wisconsin	1	1881	G	1/25/1881	Sawyer, Philetus	R	Separate	0
Wisconsin	3	1885	G	1/27/1885	Spooner, John C.	R	Separate	0
Wisconsin	1	1887	G	1/25/1887	Sawyer, Philetus	R	Separate	0
Wisconsin	3	1891	G	1/27/1891	Wilas, William F.	D	Separate	0
Wisconsin	1	1893	G	1/27/1893	Mitchell, John L.	D	Joint	3
Wisconsin	3	1897	G	1/26/1897	Spooner, John C.	R	Separate	0
Wisconsin	1	1899	G	1/31/1899	Quarles, Joseph V.	R	Joint	6
Wisconsin	3	1903	G	1/27/1903	Spooner, John C.	R	Separate	0
Wisconsin	1	1905	G	1/24/1905	LaFollette, Robert M.	R	Separate	0
Wisconsin	3	1909	G	4/4/1909	Stephenson, Isaac	R	Joint	Unknown
Wisconsin	3	1909	G	1/27/1909	Stephenson, Isaac	R	Separate	0
Wisconsin	1	1911	G	1/24/1911	LaFollette, Robert M.	R	Separate	0
Wyoming	1	1887	G	11/15/1890	Carey, Joseph M.	R	Separate	0
Wyoming	2	1889	G	11/18/1890	Warren, Francis E.	R	Joint	7
Wyoming	1	1893	G		Deadlock		Joint	31
Wyoming	1	1893	S	1/22/1895	Clark, Clarence Don	R	Separate	0
Wyoming	2	1895	G	1/22/1895	Warren, Francis E.	R	Separate	0
Wyoming	1	1899	G	1/24/1899	Clark, Clarence Don	R	Separate	0
Wyoming	2	1901	G	1/22/1901	Warren, Francis E.	R	Separate	0
Wyoming	1	1905	G	1/24/1905	Clark, Clarence Don	R	Separate	0
Wyoming	2	1907	G	1/22/1907	Warren, Francis E.	R	Separate	0
Wyoming	1	1911	G	1/24/1911	Clark, Clarence Don	R	Separate	0
Wyoming	2	1913	G	1/28/1913	Warren, Francis E.	R	Separate	0