

**Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan's National
Solidarity Programme (NSP): Sub-Treatment Interventions**

**Analysis of Impact of Election
Type on Electoral Outcomes**

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Cover Photo: A woman in Jouryan village of Daulina district in Ghor province participates in the ‘at-large’ election for the creation of the village’s Community Development Council (CDC) by casting a vote at one of the village’s polling booths on November 11, 2007. Photo by Andrew Beath.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

This paper presents initial findings of a unique experiment to test the impact of two different election procedures – ‘cluster’ and ‘at-large’ – on a range of electoral outcomes. The experiment involves 250 villages across 10 districts of six provinces in northern, eastern, central, and western Afghanistan selected to elect a Community Development Council (CDC) under the Government of Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Programme (NSP). Each of the 250 sample villages was assigned one of the two election procedures and data was subsequently collected on the outcome of elections and the characteristics of elected members, thereby enabling a rigorous examination of the direct impact of election type.

Experiment

The paper focuses on a comparison of electoral outcomes produced by the ‘cluster’ election procedure and the ‘at-large’ election procedure. Under the cluster election procedure, a male and a female member are elected to the CDC by each ‘cluster’ in a village, which is a set of contiguous households grouped together by the election organizers, and accordingly voters are restricted to voting only for people who live within their assigned cluster. Cluster elections accordingly ensure that each part of the village has a dedicated male and female resident representative, but does not necessarily ensure the election of those persons collectively preferred by all voters in the village. Under the alternative ‘at-large’ procedure, CDC members are elected based upon the number of votes garnered across the whole village, rather than just in a single cluster, and voters have no restrictions on who they are allowed to vote for. In addition, voters in at-large elections are allowed to vote for any three different candidates, while voters in cluster elections only have a single vote.

Monitoring Results

Between October 2007 and April 2007, monitors were dispatched to directly observe CDC elections in 65 villages assigned to elect a CDC using the cluster procedure and 66 villages assigned the elect a CDC using the at-large procedure. The exercise aimed to provide an independent and systematic accounting of the integrity of CDC elections and the perceptions of villagers of the election. Overall, the results of the monitoring exercise indicated that election procedures were professionally executed by Facilitating Partners (FPs) assigned to the 10 evaluation districts and that, in general, villagers exhibited a good understanding of the function of the election and of NSP. The results of the evaluation monitoring also indicate that monitored communities assigned to cluster elections were broadly similar to monitored communities assigned to at-large elections in terms of numbers of households and number of registered voters.

Experimental Results

CDC elections are found to have generally low levels of competitiveness, with relatively large numbers of effectively uncontested elections in which all of the votes cast were received by winning candidates. Female elections, in particular, were uncompetitive and there was significant variation between districts in the level of competitiveness. The districts of Balkh, Khost Wa Firing, and Sang Takht, for example, featured relatively competitive elections, while the districts of Gulran and Sherzad were highly uncompetitive. As predicted, however, at-large elections are found to be significantly more competitive than cluster elections, both for male and female candidates.

Data on the average distance between male CDC members' residences is used to test the impact of at-large electoral procedure on the geographic distribution of members elected to the CDC. No statistically significant differences are observed between mean distances between the residences of either male and female CDC members elected under the two election types when the full sample is analyzed. However, quantile regressions do reveal statistically significant differences between the two election types for smaller villages.

Statistically-significant differences are observed between at-large and cluster elections in terms of the educational attainment of male CDC members, with at-large elections producing CDCs with, on average, 4 percentage points more members with formal education, as opposed to those produced by cluster elections. No differences are observed, however, between the two election types in the educational attainment of female CDC members, 90 percent of which do not have any formal education. The two election types also produce no statistically significant differences in the ages of male or female CDC members, members of the CDC executive committee, or CDC heads. With respect to occupations of CDC members, the two election types do appear to produce some differences in the composition of the male CDC. Male CDC members elected by at-large elections, for instance, are less likely to be farmers and more likely to be laborers. This difference also exists between members of the executive committee and CDC heads in villages assigned to the two election types. No differences are observed between the two election types in the occupations of female CDC members.

Finally, the analysis finds that there is not a set of mutually consistent and individually statistically significant differences between the level of elite continuity in villages that held at-large elections, as opposed to cluster elections. In other words, it does not appear that election type has a significant impact on the probability of an existing power-holder winning election to the CDC.

Conclusion

The paper focuses specifically on the effects of election type on electoral competitiveness, geographic dispersion of elected members, human capital of elected members, and elite continuity and is not intended to provide a definitive answer on which election type is most conducive to improving the efficacy of the program in delivering improvements in general development outcomes. It is to this end that it is envisaged that later work, based on new data, will examine the effects of election type on other outcomes related to the implementation of NSP and general socio-economic and institutional characteristics and will thereby be able to provide a specific recommendation as to which election type is most conducive to successful implementation of NSP and other community-driven development (CDD) programs in analogous contexts.

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RANDOMIZED IMPACT EVALUATION OF AFGHANISTAN'S NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAMME (NSP)

ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF ELECTION TYPE ON ELECTORAL OUTCOMES[§]

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July 2, 2009

Abstract: This paper presents results of a unique experiment implemented across 250 villages in Afghanistan to investigate the impact of two different election types on the results of elections for community development councils (CDCs) established by the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). Specifically, the experiment contrasts outcomes under a 'cluster election', by which a male and female representative are elected for each section of the village, against an 'at-large election', under which council representatives are elected across the entire village. The analysis finds that the at-large procedure increases the competitiveness of elections, reduces the geographic dispersion of CDC members in smaller villages, and results in the election of male council members with higher levels of education and a distinct occupational background. The statistical significance and direction of differences observed in the correspondence between elected members and persons previously identified as village leaders indicate that neither election type has a relatively more pronounced impact on elite continuity.

I. Introduction

The effect of electoral rules on electoral outcomes is a question that has long been of interest both to academics and policy-makers, but for which the empirical investigation has been constrained by the practical difficulties in identifying exogenous sources of variation in institutions between political units. This paper describes a unique experiment - implemented in 250 villages across ten districts of Afghanistan selected for inclusion in a large-scale field experiment conducted in cooperation with the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) - under which randomized variation was introduced in the type of election used to compose the membership of government-mandated, gender-balanced Community Development Councils (CDCs). The results of the experiment are thus able to provide rigorous empirical evidence of how changes in electoral rules can impact outcomes of elections, such as electoral competitiveness, the human capital of elected members, and the level of continuity between the elected members and the pre-existing village elite.

The paper describes differences in outcomes for 241 elections, each of which was randomly selected to be conducted according to a 'cluster' procedure or an 'at-large' procedure. Under the

[§] The authors' gratefully acknowledge support from the Asia Pacific Investment Centre of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the South Asia Sustainable Development unit of the World Bank. Data collection for the study has been undertaken with support from the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan through a grant for Phase-II of the National Solidarity Programme provided by the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank. Please see <http://web.mit.edu/cfotini/www/NSP-IE/> for further information and materials pertaining to the study.

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cluster election procedure, a male and a female member are elected to the CDC by each ‘cluster’ in a village, which is a set of contiguous households grouped together by the election organizers, and accordingly voters are restricted to voting only for people who live within their assigned cluster. Cluster elections accordingly ensure that each part of the village has a dedicated male and female resident representative, but does not necessarily ensure that the persons collectively preferred by voters are elected to the council. Under the alternative ‘at-large’ procedure, CDC members are elected based upon the number of votes garnered across the whole village, rather than just in a single cluster, and voters have no restrictions on who they are allowed to vote for. In addition, voters in at-large elections are allowed to vote for any three different candidates, while voters in cluster elections only have a single vote.

As each election procedure has countervailing advantages and disadvantages, it is theoretically unclear which is most conducive to promoting the election of CDC members which succeed in their core function of implementing high-quality development projects. However, the two election types are predicted to effect clear differences in terms of immediate electoral outcomes. The at-large procedure is expected to increase the competitiveness of elections, due to the increase in the size of district magnitude and due to the increase in the number of votes available to each voter. The relaxation, by at-large elections, of the rule that each cluster in a village must have a resident male and female representative is predicted to reduce the mean difference between CDC members and to result in the election of CDC members with a higher average level of educational attainment, lower average ages, and a different occupational background. The anticipated effect of the at-large procedure on elite continuity – that is the proportion of members of the pre-existing village elites to the CDC – is difficult to predict, however, due to a number of uncertainties.

The analysis finds that, as predicted, the at-large procedure does increase the competitiveness of both male and female CDC elections as measured both by differences in the vote share and the number of unelected candidates. Although no significant differences are identified between election types in the mean level of geographic dispersion of male or female CDC members, significant differences are observed between election types with respect to the dispersion of male CDC members in smaller villages. With respect to human capital, significant differences are observed in the educational attainment and occupations of male CDC members elected by at-large elections compared to those elected by cluster elections. No differences are observed between the mean ages of male or female CDC members elected under the two procedures, however, and no differences are also observed between the educational attainment or occupation of female CDC members. Limited differences are observed between election types in the level of elite continuity.

The paper is divided into nine sections and contains two annexes. Section II provides a detailed description of the NSP, of the randomized evaluation of NSP into which the described experiment was embedded, as well as of the variations introduced in election type which are the focus of this paper. Section III reviews research of relevance to the study, including the history and structure of institutions for local governance in Afghanistan, the impact of NSP on local governance, and related field experiments. Section IV presents the findings of monitoring of CDC elections conducted across a sample of approximately half of the villages included in the experiment, including a summary of both monitors’ observations and post-vote interviews. Section V describes the hypotheses of relevance to the study and Section VI provides background information on the data sources used to evaluate the hypotheses. Section VII presents the results of the study, detailing the impact of election type on electoral competitiveness, geographic dispersion of elected members, human capital of elected members, and elite continuity. Section VIII concludes, Annex I lists villages in which violations of

treatment assignment are suspected, and Annex II includes the election manual that was written by the authors and issued to persons involved in organizing elections in the sample villages.

II. Description of Experiment

The following section presents a general description of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), the randomized evaluation of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) within which the randomized variation in the type of elections for Community Development Councils (CDCs) is embedded, and an explanation of the motivation for and specifics of the variation in election type across the 250 treatment villages included in the randomized evaluation of NSP.

II.1. National Solidarity Programme (NSP)

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) was conceived soon after the institution of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan in 2001. The idea was to use the community-driven model of aid delivery, which had gained popularity within the World Bank and among NGOs to deliver services to rural populations in less developed countries,¹ to build the new regime's support among the 80 percent of Afghanistan's population that live outside urban areas and whose previous experiences, if any, with previous incarnations of the Afghan state likely did not enamour them to the concept of central government.²

NSP, which began operations in June 2003, is structured around two major interventions at the village level. With a view to building representative institutions for village governance and exposing the rural citizenry to democratic practices and principles, NSP mandates the creation of Community Development Council (CDC) in each village. CDCs are created through a secret-ballot, universal suffrage election and composed of an equal number of men and women. The second principal intervention of NSP is to disburse 'block grants', valued at \$200 per household up to a village maximum of \$60,000, to support the implementation of projects designed and selected by the CDC in consultation with the village community. Projects are ordinarily focused on either infrastructure, such as drinking water facilities; irrigation canals; roads and bridges; electrical generators; or school construction, or services, such as training and literacy courses.³

¹ Known as "community-driven development" (CDD), this paradigm stresses the importance of participatory planning and decentralized management of development projects in order to increase project effectiveness and impact (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). Write (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007), "Community driven development is part of a broader paradigm shift responding to the well-documented critiques of top-down, modernist and authoritarian approaches that have dominated development over the last fifty years. It is supported by . . . three propositions in the literature. The first concerns the ability of decentralization to reduce the inefficiencies of centralized, state-controlled development. Closely related to that is the view that moving the locus of decision making away from central and local government bodies to communities promotes democratization. The third proposition states that the outcomes promised by the first two propositions are more likely in communities with strong capacities for collective action." (p. 230).

² (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008) write that, "[t]he intent of [NSP] was to address the process of democratization from the group level up, in parallel to the process of constitution making and rule writing at the center . . . Villages that were once the sites of neglect or predatory behavior by lower-level government functionaries were turned into the building blocks of a democratic process . . . [NSP] could . . . become a mechanism for the registration and formalization of property rights and dispute resolution at the village level" (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008), p. 206 – 208.

³ FPs are expected to provide technical assistance where necessary to help CDCs prepare the CDP, develop project proposals, and to help CDC members develop skills in accounting, procurement, contract management (Kakar, 2005). Not all projects which CDCs may propose – such as construction of mosques, purchase of land, payment of salaries to CDC members, purchase of weapons, or cultivation of illegal crops - are eligible for funding through NSP. Projects which are eligible for funding under the NSP include: transportation infrastructure (roads, bridges, culverts), irrigation infrastructure (canals, small check dams), water supply and sanitation (drinking water wells, standpipes), power (micro-hydropower, solar panels, diesel generators), public buildings (schools, health clinics, public baths), and training (vocational education, literacy). Eligible projects

NSP is executed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) of the Government of Afghanistan, but is funded by the World Bank and a consortium of bilateral donors, and implemented by around 25 NGOs, known by the program as Facilitating Partners (FPs).

II.2. Randomized Evaluation of NSP

In early 2007, the first phase of NSP concluded, at which point 17,200 villages in 279 of Afghanistan's 398 districts had received the program. There is no precise estimate of the total number of villages in Afghanistan, but the NSP office has expressed its intention to mobilize an additional 17,450 villages, although phase two of NSP (NSP-II) is proceeding with an interim goal of mobilizing 4,300 new villages over the course of two years. 2,000 of these are located in 'on-going' districts containing villages previously mobilized by NSP and 2,300 are located in 74 'new' districts, which do not contain any villages which have elected CDCs or received NSP funding.

In these 74 'new' districts, financial constraints limited the number of villages that could initially participate in NSP-II to 40. As the number of villages per district often exceeds 40, in many districts the program must be rationed.⁴ This rationing and the lack of objective village-level data that may be used to target the program facilitated an opportunity, advanced by one of the authors and agreed with MRRD and the World Bank, to randomly allocate NSP within a selection of districts in order to enable a longitudinal randomized evaluation of the economic, social, and institutional impacts of the program. Utilizing village lists, the authors identified 23 districts which contained a minimum of 65 villages and were thus deemed suitably large for randomized assignment.⁵ From these 23 districts, 12 were eliminated due to unsatisfactory security conditions and one was not contracted, thereby yielding 10 districts in which randomization of NSP and subsequent survey activities could occur.

Although, due to security constraints, none of the ten sample districts are drawn from Afghanistan's southern provinces, the districts otherwise provide a reasonably balanced sample of Afghanistan's ethnic and geographic diversity, with the western (Adraskan, Farsi, and Gulran), central highlands (Chisht-e Sharif, Daulina, and Sang Takht), northern (Balkh), north-eastern (Khost Wa Firing), and eastern (Hisarak and Sherzad) regions being covered. The ten districts also provide a representative sample of Afghanistan's ethno-linguistic diversity, with five predominantly Tajik districts (Adraskan, Chisht-e Sharif, Gulran, Daulina, and Khost Wa Firing), four predominantly Pashtun districts (Balkh, Farsi, Hisarak, and Sherzad), and one predominantly Hazara district (Sang Takht). The districts of Balkh and Gulran also contain significant numbers of Uzbek and Turkmen minorities, respectively.

proposed by CDCs are generally approved by NSP provided that they are endorsed through a village-wide consultation process; provide for equitable access; are technically and financially sound; include an operation and maintenance plan; and are funded by the community (including labor and materiel contributions) up to a level exceeding 10 percent of the total cost.

⁴ According to a list of villages provided by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) of Afghanistan, the mean number of villages in the 74 'new' NSP districts is 80.

⁵ As detailed below, the number of NSP villages that would be assigned randomly was limited to 25, with FPs being given the option to identify an additional 15 villages which could be guaranteed assignment of NSP. The threshold of 65 villages was thus obtained from these 15 'priority' villages plus the randomly selected 25 NSP villages and randomly selected 25 non-NSP villages.

Figure 1: Ten Evaluation Districts



Note: Boundaries of 10 sample districts are marked in red; provincial boundaries in pink; major rivers in light blue; district capitals with small blue stars; and Kabul with a large black star

The seven Facilitating Partners (FPs) contracted to work in the sample districts provide a mix of small and large, international and local NGOs, with three of the districts contracted to People-in-Need (PiN), a Czech NGO; two of the districts contracted to IRC, which is head-quartered in the United States; while a district each is assigned to NPO/RRAA, an Afghan NGO; InterCooperation, a Swiss NGO; AfghanAid, a UK-based NGO; Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA), an Afghan NGO; and Oxfam U.K.⁶

From each of the ten sample districts, 50 villages were selected by assigned FPs for inclusion in the study. The research team then used a matched-pair randomization procedure to select 25 ‘treatment villages’ from each district – 250 villages in total - to receive NSP following the administration of a ‘baseline survey’ in September 2007, with the remaining 250 ‘control villages’ being assigned to not receive NSP until after the conclusion of the second follow-up survey in 2010 or 2011. Within the 250 treatment villages, the authors designed and implemented two sub-treatment interventions, one of which introduced randomized variation in the type of election by which the CDC was elected, with the other randomly assigning two different procedures for selecting projects to the NSP villages participating in the evaluation.⁷ The first of these is described in Section II.3 below, while the second is detailed in accompanying paper.⁸

⁶ Adraskan is contracted to NPO/RRAA; Balkh to PiN; Chisht-e Sharif to InterCooperation; Daulina to AfghanAid; Farsi to C.H.A.; Gulran to IRC; Hisarak to PiN; Khost Wa Firing to PiN; Sang Takht to Oxfam U.K., and Sherzad to IRC.

⁷ For each sub-treatment intervention, a detailed set of implementation guidelines were prepared by the evaluation team, translated into Dari and Pashto, and provided to the FPs participating in the study. The Dari, English, and Pashto versions of the guidelines are available at: <http://web.mit.edu/cfotini/www/NSP-IE/sti.html>

⁸ This is entitled “Analysis of Impact of Variance in Election Type and Project Selection Method on Selection Outcomes” and is available at: <http://web.mit.edu/cfotini/www/NSP-IE/papers.html>

II.3. Variation in Election Type

In villages eligible for participation in NSP, elections to compose the membership of the village CDC are organized and administered by ‘social organizers’ employed by the contracted FP. The NSP Operational Manual directs FPs to organize CDC elections according to a “cluster” structure, by which villages are divided into clusters of between 5 and 25 families, and the vote choice of individual villagers is restricted to those ‘candidates’ who live in their assigned cluster.⁹ Each cluster elects a male and female representative to the CDC, which represent and report to the ‘constituents’ which live in the cluster. Accordingly, the CDC should contain an equal number of male and female CDC members, with the total size being proportional to the number of families residing in the village. Every resident of the village, whether male or female, aged eighteen years or older, who has lived in the community for at least one year, is eligible to vote in the CDC elections or to be elected for a three-year term as a CDC member.¹⁰

The chief advantage of the cluster election procedure is that each geographical area of a given village has a dedicated representative that lives in the respective cluster. By ensuring equitable representation of all the areas - or groups - in the village, the cluster procedure is considered important to ensuring that the demands of different segments of the village are articulated to the council and that there is a clear channel of communication between the council and each segment of the village. However, the procedure also can restrict the choice of voters and may negatively impact the quality of projects and the degree to which policies represent the whole village. These two concerns are explained in greater detail below:

1. *Restriction of Voter Choice:* Under a cluster election, voters may cast votes only for those candidates who also live in their demarcated cluster and thus can preclude individual voters from casting a vote in favor of their preferred candidate. The procedure may also prevent voters from collecting electing their preferred set of candidates to the council simply because those candidates are not spread evenly across the clusters of the village, but rather reside in the same area of the village. As a number of FPs have reported that the quality of project implementation under NSP is affected by the capacity of CDC members, the cluster election procedure may not only restrict voter choice, but also can conceivably work to the detriment of the implementation of successful projects.
2. *Patronage:* The local nature of representation under the cluster election system incentivizes CDC members to focus first on delivering benefits to their cluster of election, rather than considering the welfare of the whole village. Accordingly, in cases in which one or a few members of the CDC are able to disproportionately influence project selection, a cluster election system can lead to program benefits being inequitably distributed across the village.

To potentially counter these negative impacts of the cluster election system, the authors developed, in collaboration with FPs, an alternative procedure, known as an “at-large” election. Under this procedure, villagers can vote for anyone in the village they choose and are given three votes to ensure a sufficient number of people are elected to the CDC.¹¹ In addition to enabling

⁹ Under the NSP program, candidacy for CDC elections is strictly prohibited. That is, villagers interested in being elected to the CDC should not campaign in any way for the position. The use of the word ‘candidate’ here is not meant to imply that any vote-getters in CDC elections engaged in such activities.

¹⁰ The stipulations of the NSP Operational Manual also require that at least 60 percent of eligible voters must cast votes in the election in order for it to be valid.

¹¹ The innovation of permitting three votes in at-large elections was requested by a number of the participating FPs who considered it a high probability that, if villagers were accorded only one vote in at-large elections, the number of vote-getting candidates would be less than the number of CDC seats (which is proportional to the number of households in the village), thereby necessitating multiple rounds of voting. The three votes are not ranked in any way, although community members may opt not to use all of their votes.

villages to elect to the CDC exactly the set of candidates they collectively prefer, by providing for CDC members to be elected by the whole village, rather than a single specific area, the at-large procedure incentivizes CDC members to select and prioritize projects that benefit the whole village.¹² On the other hand, however, at-large election systems may not be as effective in ensuring representation for all parts of the community on the CDC.

Under both election methods, the FP is required to first segment the village into geographically-contiguous clusters containing between 5 and 25 families, each of which is to be assigned a unique number of name. Social organizers employed by the FP were further directed to draft a village map with clusters and enclosed dwellings clearly displayed and to display it in a public area in the village. The number of CDC members is proportional to the number of clusters, with each having both an assigned male and female representative. Thus, even under at-large elections, it is expected that clusters will be created and will have a dedicated male and female representative, even if they don't necessarily live in the cluster. A detailed description of the procedures for organizing cluster and at-large elections is provided in the *STI-1 Guide for Social Organizers* in the annex.¹³

Of the 250 villages across the ten evaluation districts that were selected both for participation in NSP and to be surveyed under the evaluation, half were randomly assigned to elect CDC members through the conventional 'cluster' election procedure, while the other half were assigned to elect CDC members through the 'at-large' election procedure. Due to this random assignment of election type across a relatively large sample of 250 villages, it can confidently be assumed that any statistically-significant differences in averages of election results or other outcomes of interest that emerge between villages assigned to each election procedure are caused by the difference in election type.

III. Related Research

Given rural Afghanistan's history of invidious interventions by central government actors, the diverse nature of customary local governance structures, and the depth of cultural conservatism, the extent to which CDCs alter de facto institutions for local governance is of particular interest. To provide further information on the context in which the experiment was conducted, this section discussed the structure of history of rural Afghanistan and prevailing institutions for local governance, previous research on NSP's impact on local governance structures, and related experiments conducted elsewhere in the developing work.

Section III.1 provides an account of the history of state-building efforts in Afghanistan and of the relationship between the central government and the rural population; describes the structure of existing and/or defunct institutions of local governance; and outlines findings from research into the current status of women in rural Afghanistan. Section III.2 summarizes findings from qualitative and quantitative research conducted by others into the implementation and effects of NSP, focusing on the issues of elite capture; legitimacy of the program and its activities; effects on community attitudes and participation in local governance; and the economic impacts. Section III.3 describes field experiments similar to those proposed by this study.

¹² A type of 'at-large' election procedure is used to elect Afghanistan's lower house of parliament, the *Wolesi Jirga*, as multiple members are elected from each province, which contrasts with the 'single-member district' procedure employed by electoral systems inspired by the Westminster model.

¹³ Dari and Pashto translations of the guide provided to representatives of the FPs for training social organizers and other staff in the two election methods are available for download here:
<http://web.mit.edu/cfotini/www/NSP-IE/sti.html>

III.1. Local Governance Structures in Afghanistan

The relationship between the diverse series of regimes that have constituted Afghanistan's central government over the past century and the population of the country's tens of thousands of villages and nomadic encampments has been one of general neglect, punctuated by periodic extractive intrusions from the capitals of Kabul and Kandahar.¹⁴ This history, and the country's rugged and varied topography, have bequeathed the people of Afghanistan with a complex yet nebulous web of informal institutions for local governance that have developed in the absence of, and sometimes in opposition to, attempts by central government to project authority down to the village-level. The following sections present an overview of interventions by various central governments into rural Afghanistan, of the present status of customary institutions for local governance, and of the role in local governance and village life left to women by Afghanistan's history, institutions, and culture.

Historical Relationship between Central Government and Rural Afghanistan

Prior to 1880, the central government of Afghanistan was largely invisible to its rural population.¹⁵ This changed dramatically with the ascension of Abdur Rahman Khan, who, in his twenty one year reign, engaged in a brutal form of what has been described as "internal imperialism",¹⁶ introducing conscription across the country, establishing a system of provincial governorates and Islamic courts at the sub-provincial level,¹⁷ imposing heavy taxation and conversion on the ethnic and religious Hazara minority,¹⁸ forcibly transplanting restive Pashtun tribes from southern Afghanistan to northern Afghanistan,¹⁹ and violently converting the inhabitants of the isolated province of *Kafiristan* to Islam.²⁰ In what was "the first systematic experience individuals had with the government[,] . . . Abdur Rahman . . . ended up harming virtually every group in the country".²¹

Following Abdur Rahman's death in 1901, it wasn't until 1919 that the central government, now led by the new emir Amanullah, again sought to project its authority to the countryside. Having won Afghanistan's independence, Amanullah introduced animal and land taxes to attempt to compensate for the loss of British subsidies and support ambitious modernization projects.²² This was not well received among the rural population who would see little in return for their payments, especially when it was aggravated further by efforts to strengthen the power of government-mandated local Islamic courts; test and certify local religious leaders;²³ and implement "divine ordinances" to abolish or discourage certain ingrained tribal customs, such as

¹⁴ (Boesen, 2004) reports that "[f]rom the perspective of local communities . . . the government has largely been an extractive one-way system in which local communities were mostly involved through the various edicts and decrees, extraction of taxation, and conscription of labour for public works and recruits to the national army." (p. 5)

¹⁵ (Brick, 2008), p. 17

¹⁶ (Dupree, 1980), p. 417, cited in (Noelle-Karimi, 2006), p. 4

¹⁷ (Amin, 2007) and (Noelle-Karimi, 2006), p. 4. (Noelle-Karimi, 2006) assesses that the "extension of Islamic jurisprudence met with little approval among the local population. Lacking the values and the integrity embodied by the tribal assembly, the Islamic courts enjoyed hardly any public esteem . . . The government agenda of creating a unitary legal system based Islamic law proved impossible to implement in practice. From the village perspective, state law was considered alien and corrupt from the village perspective, whereas the local institution of the jirga continued to stand for equity and selfcontainedness as cornerstones of tribal identity." (p. 4 – 5)

¹⁸ (Wikipedia, 2008)

¹⁹ (Amin, 2007)

²⁰ (Amin, 2007)

²¹ (Brick, 2008), p. 17

²² (Shahrani, 2005), p. 669, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 18

²³ (Shahrani, 2005) and (Gregorian, 1969), cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 19

child marriage, extravagant wedding festivities, and polygamy.²⁴ An attempt by Amanullah to introduce national ID cards was perceived as a precursor to conscription,²⁵ inciting further revolt. Local leaders were called upon to implement the reforms, but ultimately formed a quasi-alliance to oppose Amanullah's initiatives and his reign generally, which ended with the desertion of the army in 1929.

During the Musahiban Dynasty, lessons of previous state-building efforts were well heeded and the regimes of Nadir Shah (1929 – 1933), Zahir Shah (1933 – 1973), and Daoud Khan (1973 – 1978) took “great care not to antagonize [communities] with the capacity to mobilize opposition to its rule”.²⁶ The remit of the state-mandated courts established by Abdur Rahman and Amanullah was curtailed and the authority of local institutions to resolve cases with tribal customs was reinstated.²⁷ The collection of taxes from the countryside was allowed to decline to the extent that revenues were insufficient to support local administrative expenses.²⁸ The relationship between Afghanistan's central government and the rural population accordingly reverted to its historical equilibrium of “wide psychological distance”, with limited extraction and interference from the center and limited participation from the periphery.²⁹

A *coup d'état* by the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1978 ushered in a period of violence and institutional flux. In a fashion reminiscent of earlier failed state-building efforts, the PDPA sought to subvert the authority of local leaders and implement various edicts and projects at the village-level. As many of the policies that the PDPA was seeking to implement – such as female emancipation, literacy campaigns, secularization, agricultural collectivization, land reform, and transformation of local governance structures – stridently clashed with customary norms and usurped autonomy previously ascribed to local institutions, the backlash against the government and the auxiliary Soviet forces was fierce, and ultimately very successful.³⁰ Yet, as the authority of the central government virtually disintegrated within the martial milieu that was created by the Soviet invasion and persisted well beyond the withdrawal, local institutions came under increasing stress from *mujahedeen* commanders and factional warlords. In areas located along supply routes for weapons and materiel, traditional authorities were superseded by “a new elite of commanders who primarily derived their authority from external sources of funding and could afford to challenge local patterns of decision making”, but in other areas, commanders grew in political stature, but deferred to local leaders on civil matters.³¹

²⁴ (Shahrani, 2005), p. 669, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 18

²⁵ (Shahrani, 2005), p. 669, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 18

²⁶ (Saikal & Maley, 1991), cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 20. One exception was an attempt by Daoud to create “peace councils” to settle “minor disputes concerning civil, property and family issues” among villagers in Kabul province, as well as district councils and rural development councils (Noelle-Karimi, 2006), p. 5. However, as the “peace councils were solely composed of men appointed by the local judges, they were perceived as an extension of government and lacked the legitimacy to perform their tasks in an effective manner” (Noelle-Karimi, 2006), p. 5.

²⁷ (Brick, 2008), p. 21 - 22.

²⁸ (Barfield, 1984), p. 177, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 21

²⁹ (Barfield, 1984), p. 172, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 22. Despite the post-1964 attempts of Zahir Shah and Daoud Khan to transform Afghanistan into a constitutional democracy, according to (Boesen, 2004), “there was in practice very limited participation in elections in rural areas.” (p. 5)

³⁰ (Wikipedia, 2009) and (Brick, 2008), p. 25

³¹ (Noelle-Karimi, 2006), p. 7. (Noelle-Karimi, 2006) notes that, “[i]n many areas, the prolonged conflict with the Communist government was accompanied by the creation of new and at times more comprehensive units of decision making . . . [T]hese bodies were generally known as *shura* . . . , an evocative term associated with the early Islamic institution by that name. As a rule, the *shuras* resembled the traditional village councils and only met as the need arose to tackle specific issues.” (p. 7).

Although the authority of the Taliban, which ruled over Kabul and much of the rest of Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001, was constrained by its inability to decisively dispel factional opponents, the regime nevertheless effected one of the most brutal state-building efforts in Afghanistan's history. Many Taliban functionaries had been educated in Pakistani *madrassas* and had little appreciation of norms of local leadership in Afghanistan,³² but although their dictates ran contrary to norms and undermined customary governance structures, the zealous brutality with which they were accompanied ensured their implementation. Among other things, the Taliban appointed local judges to enforce *Wahhabi* law over tribal law;³³ conscripted men to serve as soldiers and civil servants;³⁴ placed draconian restrictions on dress, media, and the education of women; massacred civilians in northern and central Afghanistan;³⁵ and restructured village governance structures around local clergyman, mandating that only those trained in Islamic law should serve as heads of village councils and given them authority to select their own councilors.³⁶

In the post-Taliban period, NSP has been used as the primary vehicle for projecting the authority of the new administration to the countryside and, eight years after the fall of the Taliban, CDCs remain the only government-mandated institutions created at the village-level.³⁷ The 2004 constitution mandates the recognition of official elected village councils and MRRD has recently disseminated a new by-law that, in addition to a variety of development- and project-related functions, assigns CDCs the responsibility to record “the population statistics in the community, including the number of men and women, births, mortality, and marriages”.³⁸

Structure of Customary Institutions

The experience of successive state-building efforts by various governing regimes between 1880 and 2001 was of “broken promises [and] outright repression” and has left “a deep-rooted suspicion and distrust of central authority” among the rural population.³⁹ Whether or not this history and prevailing attitudes towards central government have served to strengthen or weaken customary structures of local governance,⁴⁰ rural Afghanistan remains to this day generally bereft

³² (Rashid, 2000) reports that Taliban leaders opposed “tribal and feudal structures” and sought to eliminate them from local leadership roles (p. 92). The Taliban were relatively explicit about their contempt for consultative governance, with the Taliban spokesperson, Mullah Wakil, reporting that: “For us, consultation is not necessary. We believe that this in line with [Islamic law]. We abide by the Amir’s view even if he alone takes this view . . . Mullah Omar will be the highest authority and will not be able to implement any decision to which he does not agree” ((Al-Majallah, 1996), cited in (Wikipedia, 2009).

³³ (Rashid, 2000), p. 102 – 103, cited in (Noelle-Karimi, 2006), p. 7. (Brick, 2008) also reports that “the Taliban also tried to eliminate use of the Pashtun customary law, *Pashtunwali*, which contradicts some Islamic jurisprudence” (p. 10). However, as (Noelle-Karimi, 2006) reports, “[o]ther aspects of the administration of justice . . . clearly reflect the impact of [tribal law]. While the execution by stoning as a punishment for adultery conforms with [Islamic law], the Taliban revealed their adhesion to tribal laws by dispensing with the necessity of hearing the prescribed number of witnesses before the judgment.”

³⁴ (Wikipedia, 2009). As reported by (Brick, 2008), even in their political base of Kandahar, the Taliban managed to stir up a revolt through proposing to re-introduce conscription. (p. 28)

³⁵ (Wikipedia, 2009)

³⁶ (Nojumi et al, 2004), p. 38

³⁷ At the time of writing, the lowest form of formal governance is the district administrator, known as a *Uloswol*.

³⁸ (Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006), p. 7, 11, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 19 – 20. As noted by (Brick, 2008), many of these functions are currently undertaken by village headmen and other customary leaders (p. 20).

³⁹ (Boesen, 2004), p. 6

⁴⁰ Arguing in favor of the former, (Shahrani, 1998) writes “In the name of creating national unity, the state . . . systematically undermined the identity and local autonomy of distinct ethnic and sectarian communities. In response, the local communities saw the state as the main source of their oppression and they devised complex social mechanisms to insulate themselves from direct contact with government agents and agencies . . . Local communities isolated themselves from corrupt government officials by creating community-based parallel

of any formalized structure of governance or conflict resolution at the sub-district or village level.⁴¹ Instead, what generally exists is a complex and nebulous web of interwoven structures of informal governance, which, in some cases, exist at the village-level and, in other cases, exist at the pan-village level.

Table 1: Summary of Functions of Institutions of Local Governance in Rural Afghanistan

Position	Titles		Customary Functions
Headman	<i>Malik</i>	<i>Arbab</i>	Common interlocutor between village and official government representatives, such as the district governor; Generally responsible for transmitting edicts from government agencies to villagers, certifying official documents for villagers, and for lobbying government agencies on behalf of villages; May assist in the resolution of disputes.
	<i>Qariyadar</i>	<i>Qalantar</i>	
(Landowner)	<i>Khan</i>	<i>Zamindar</i>	
	<i>Khadadar</i>	<i>Arbab</i>	
Clergyman	<i>Mullah</i>	<i>Imam</i>	Perform religious rites, such as leading prayers and delivering sermons; May also be called upon to treat illnesses, instruct children, and mediate disputes based on religious law; May collect and manage resources for mosques and other facilities and for charity; Appointed by Taliban to head and compose village councils.
	<i>Mawlawi</i>	<i>Mullah Masjid</i>	
	<i>‘Alim</i>	<i>Rohani</i>	
(Religious Council)	<i>Ulema</i>	<i>Rohanion</i>	
Council	<i>Shura</i>	<i>Jirga</i>	Resolution of disputes and other problems affecting the village community; May also serve to organize funerals or weddings or to receive important guest; Generally do not have a regular membership or meeting schedule, but composed of familial elders and other notables as is appropriate to the issue at hand.
	<i>Majilis</i>	<i>Jalasa</i>	
	<i>Malaka</i>		
(Elders)	<i>Bazarg-e Qaum</i>	<i>Rish-e Safidan</i>	
	<i>Spinzheri</i>	<i>Oq Soqol</i>	

Source: (Kakar, 2005) and (Brick, 2008)

A typology of local governance in rural Afghanistan, which, by virtue of the lack of relevant data and the often antiquated and collectively conflicting nature of anthropological accounts, is neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive, nor even always applicable, consists of the following institutions:⁴² a village headman, nobleman, or large landowner;⁴³ a member of the clergy;⁴⁴ and a deliberative body comprised of elders or other respected religious leaders or noblemen.⁴⁵ Table 1 illustrates the typology, while a description of the characteristics, functions, and selection procedures for the three different institutions follows:

power structures . . . to resolve internal problems locally through their own trusted leaders, both religious and secular.” (p. 230, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 8 – 9).

⁴¹ According to (Boesen, 2004), “[i]n Afghanistan there is historically little or no tradition of formalized community participation in political decision-making or development planning, either on a national or local level” (p. 5). Presently, the lowest level of government is the district administrator, known as the *Uloswol*.

⁴² The typology is drawn from (Brick, 2008)

⁴³ In different parts of Afghanistan, the village headman may be known as: *Malik*; *Arbab*; *Qariyadar*; or *Qalantar*, although the latter term is often used for urban precincts. A large landowner or nobleman is often known as a *Khan*, *Zamindar*, or *Khadadar*, with the term *Beg* also being used in Uzbek areas. In villages where water resources are of particular economic significance, a *Mirab* is appointed to manage the local water supply and irrigation systems.

⁴⁴ The most common phrase ascribed to clergymen is *Mullah*; although *Imam* [formally-trained religious leader]; *Mullah Imam*; *Mawlali* [religious teacher]; *Mullah Masjid* (Mosque Mullah); *‘Alim* (religious scholar), and *Rohani* are also used. *Ulema* and *Rohanion* are plural forms of *‘Alim* and *Rohani* respectively and are used to denote a council of religious scholars.

⁴⁵ In Afghanistan, a council is usually called a *Shura* (‘council’ in Arabic), although *Jirga* (‘circle’ in Arabic) is also used in Pashto-speaking areas. In Dari-speaking areas, tribal elders are known either by the phrase *Bazarg-e*

Headmen: While not a formal position ensconced in law,⁴⁶ the village headmen commonly serves as the “‘broker’ between the village and the government at the district level” and the “the representative of the people to the government”.⁴⁷ This role can encompass “the reception of new edicts from the district office and reading and explaining them to the community”, certifying “official documents such as government ID card applications and land tenure transactions”,⁴⁸ and holding meetings with district administrators to “discuss issues of security, development, and governance”.⁴⁹ Headmen are also expected by villagers to lobby the government and can also often called upon to assist in the resolution of local conflicts and disputes.⁵⁰ Generally, headmen govern over a small number of villages composing a total of around 1,000 families.⁵¹

There appears to be wide variation in the methods by which headmen are selected. Although some may be elected by the people or at least chosen through some form of consultative process,⁵² on the basis of their character,⁵³ skills,⁵⁴ or experience, scholars generally describe them as large landowners or other wealthy noblemen who effectively inherit the position.⁵⁵ Others report that personalities appointed to the role can be “front-[men] for the people

Qaum [literal translation] or *Rish-e Safidan* [whitebeards], while in Pashto-speaking areas they are known as *Spinzheri*, and in Uzbek-speaking areas as *Oq Soqol*.

⁴⁶ Although village headmen are not identified “in any official law or in the constitution”, they often will have “stamps or seals” issued to them by the district administrator (Brick, 2008), p. 12). (Brick, 2008) also reports that “[i]n most communities of Afghanistan, [headmen] remain the recognized representative of communities to the government” and many district administrators “consider the [headman] to be the representative of the government in the community” (p. 20).

⁴⁷ (Brick, 2008), p. 9. (Brick, 2008) reports that “previous governments tried to co-opt the *maliks* to serve their own purposes. Under King Zahir Shah (1930-1973) and his cousin Sardar Daud Khan (1973-78), government administrations tried to use the *maliks* or appoint their own to extract land tax in rural areas. The Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government tried to appoint their own “parallel” *maliks* to villages as representatives of the community party during the 1980s” (p. 30).

⁴⁸ (Brick, 2008), p. 45

⁴⁹ (Boesen, 2004), p. 43 and (Brick, 2008), p. 11

⁵⁰ (Boesen, 2004) and (Kakar, 2005). (Hager, 1983) reports that the headman provides “the public service of representing and mediating between groups so as to build more inclusive unity” in the village (p. 95, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 13)

⁵¹ (Brick, 2008), p. 9

⁵² (Nojumi et al, 2004) observe the process as follows: “[m]embers of the village shura elect one person and introduce him to the district authority. The district [administrator] then signs legal documents appointing the person as [headman] and sends those documents to the primary district court. After a series of additional legal processes, the court issues an entitlement seal that recognizes him as the [headman] of that particular village” (p. 46). (Brick, 2008) reports that in “Heart province . . . , I found evidence that [headmen] were elected through the use of ballot boxes. In most areas, they are selected using consensus procedures typical in [village councils]” (p. 12).

⁵³ (Boesen, 2004), p. 43 and (Nojumi, 2002) writes that headmen “generally put the welfare of the community above their own and are the most important members of the Afghan national political system, although they do not hold formal political office” (p. 5, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 9). (Hager, 1983) asserts that the village headman is usually a “descriptive title” for a “self-made man who achieve[s] their position through personality, not age or genealogical position . . . they create unity out of difference, or restore a previous unity...they are patrons, acting on behalf of trusting clients, but use their own initiative in action, risking their followers’ disapproval; they speak to government as representatives rather than delegates” (p. 94, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 9).

⁵⁴ As headmen are often called upon to administer village affairs in consultation with district government officials and to communicate government decrees and other decisions to villagers, some basic literacy skills are often required for the position (Brick, 2008), p. 9).

⁵⁵ (Kakar, 2005) and (Brick, 2008), p. 11. Of course, elections and the election of wealthy landowners or noblemen are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, (Nojumi et al, 2004) observe that: “people tend to elect individuals who are more financially secure than the rest of the community” because those who are “economically independent are [are] less likely to see out [their] people to the central government or become corrupted by armed political grounds, commanders, or NGOs” (p. 46).

who hold the real influence in a particular community” or may have gained their status through martial authority, or were appointed by the central government during the 1970s or 1980s.⁵⁶ Given the variation, there is significant debate among scholars as to whether headmen serve as a form of feudal lord or as an accountable and efficient form of local governance.⁵⁷

Clergy: Religious authority at the village level is commonly provided by one or more *mullahs*, which typically have not received formal religious training, but conduct religious rites and services “regularly and professionally”.⁵⁸ As the “spiritual leader of the village”, *mullahs* often serve “the role of the judge, the teacher, and in the absence of a doctor, the role of the village leader” and are commonly called upon to “mediate disputes, not only within the community but between communities as well”, but especially “regarding family or other personal issues.”⁵⁹ *Mullahs* are also often commonly responsible for collecting and managing resources to support the indigent and to maintain mosques and other facilities, giving them a unique authority “amongst the power brokers of the village”.⁶⁰ According to one observer, “[i]t is not easy for anyone, including other powerful people such as [large landowners] and [village headmen] to confront the *mullah* in public”.⁶¹

Although *mullahs* form “part of a broad network of religious leaders that include formally trained priests (*imams*), judges (*qazı*), scholars (*malwani*), and those who have gone on religious pilgrimages (*haji / karbalaye*)” . . . [d]ue to the decentralized nature of religious leadership in Islam, [they] usually can operate autonomously from religious administration and hierarchy”, but are subject to political influences.⁶² The Taliban attempted to increase the authority of *mullahs* by appointing them to head village councils and paying salaries to them,⁶³ but also sought to ensure they enforced the Taliban interpretation of Islamic law.⁶⁴ However, the power accorded to *Mullahs* by the Taliban may have withered over recent years “because people are suspicious of [their] political affiliations” and have generally been replaced as head of village councils.⁶⁵

Councils / Elders: The primary vehicle for conflict resolution at the local level is the village or pan-village council. Given the absence of accessible and trusted formal legal remedies,

⁵⁶ (Boesen, 2004), p. 5, (Brick, 2008), p. 30, and (Kakar, 2005). (Nojumi et al, 2004) report accounts from “local residents in the rural districts that many of the [headman] and members of the district [council] are under the direct influence of the local commanders or *jihadi* political leaders” and that, in most rural districts in Kabul province, “a significant number of those who became [headmen] were affiliated with the dominant political party or powerful local commanders” (p. 46 – 47).

⁵⁷ (Brick, 2008) argues that headmen “are generally accountable” as are “paid through a community contribution system”, if they are not independently wealthy, and “can be overthrown if they do not serve the will of people or if the community views the next-in-line as weak or incapable of performing his duties”. This, rather than serving as feudal lord, the governance institution of village headmen has “endured for centuries and remains a highly salient and flexible form of governance that is more responsive to citizen demands than any other form of government in the country although they can be extractive and imperfect” (p. 8).

⁵⁸ (Dorransoro, 2005), p. 48, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 9

⁵⁹ (Rahmani, 2006), p. 13 and (Brick, 2008), p. 10

⁶⁰ (Newell, 1972) reports that “[i]ndividual mullahs subsist upon fees for ceremonial and advisory services on behalf of their clients and often receive endowments of land or agricultural income from the villages or tribes who engage them. Many mullahs cultivate or at least oversee their own land. The support of corporate institutions, such as schools, mosques, and monasteries has traditionally come from endowments based upon land – the concept of waqf. Customarily, the mullahs have managed this income on their own behalf” (p. 26 – 27, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 10).

⁶¹ (Rahmani, 2006), p. 13, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 10.

⁶² (Brick, 2008), p. 9

⁶³ (Nojumi et al, 2004), p. 38

⁶⁴ (Brick, 2008), p. 10

⁶⁵ (Nojumi et al, 2004), p. 46

these councils are established as the primary forum to “solve disputes, settle grievances, and find remedies for local issues”.⁶⁶ Customarily, these councils do not convene according to a predetermined schedule and do not even have a consistent organizational structure or membership,⁶⁷ with meetings only being called following the development of a problem, such as a land dispute or a breakdown in intra-communal relations.⁶⁸ Councils are ordinarily composed of elders (or ‘white-beards’) of all “extended families of a village or tribal group”.⁶⁹ In principle, council business is conducted according to a consensus-based decision-making procedure, although this “principle is [often] compromised by the social inequality . . . pronounced throughout rural areas”.⁷⁰ The ability of councils to enforce decisions or mediation outcomes with sanctions often varies: in some cases they can be ignored with impunity, while in others decisions are often enforced by tribal militias.⁷¹

Recognizing their importance in establishing codes of conduct and dispensing justice at the local level, the Taliban appointed *mullahs* to head village council councils and bestowed upon them the authority to “select four to five adult male members of the village . . . who together [with the *mullah*] formed the village [council]”.⁷² It is not clear, however, to what extent these reforms were enacted or have persisted in the post-Taliban period.

Afghanistan’s local governance institutions are often contrastingly characterized by scholars and bureaucrats as either feudal and exploitative or weak and ineffectual.⁷³ A number of recent studies, however, argue that the tri-partite system of local governance represents a well-balanced separation of powers which has evolved in the absence of central government authority to efficiently deliver public services.⁷⁴ According to (Brick, 2008), each of the three main customary

⁶⁶ (Nojumi et al, 2004), p. 37. Using data from the 2005 Nationwide Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), (Brick, 2008) concludes that “when a community has a *shura* 90 percent [of villagers] claimed to use them to resolve land-related disputes. Over 60 percent claimed to use their *shura* to resolve security and water resource management issues” (p. 8).

⁶⁷ (Nojumi et al, 2004), p. 37

⁶⁸ (Affolter et al, 2006; Kakar, 2005). Councils may also perform administrative functions, such as organizing funerals or wedding ceremonies, or receiving important guests.

⁶⁹ Reports (Rahmani, 2006), council membership is a “traditional position that is normally given to old men who are widely respected and trusted for their honesty and goodwill. Almost every village has at least a few of these men who are considered to be the legislative body of the village . . . Power brokers refer any legislative issue that concern broader village interests to these elders.” (p. 14 – 15, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 7 – 8).

⁷⁰ (Boesen, 2004), p. 6

⁷¹ (Nojumi et al, 2004), p. 37 and (Boesen, 2004), p. 44

⁷² (Nojumi et al, 2004), p. 38

⁷³ A powerful example of the latter view is provided by (Starr, 2006), who writes that, “Afghanistan presents the fundamental issues of nation-building in the starkest light possible. The immensity of the task . . . was staggering. Even before the Soviet invasion of 1979, the country had been miserably poor and governed with only a thin web of civic institutions. The Soviet invasion and occupation, civil war, and then Taliban rule left the country and its partially built structures of rule in utter shambles. It is no exaggeration to say that by the time the Taliban fell, the entire country had become, for the nation-builder, a *tabula rasa*”. (p. 107, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 17). Yet, as (Chopra & Hohe, 2004) write, “[t]here is never a vacuum of power on the ground. Even where there is the complete absence of an identifiable state government or any semblance of governing institutions – as was the case when Indonesian forces withdrew from East Timor or when Somalia disintegrated – traditional structures evolve, social organization is redefined, and people continue to survive, filling the space; if it ever existed in the first place” (p. 298).

⁷⁴ Such efficient customary institutions are, of course, not unique to Afghanistan. As (Bardhan, 2006) notes: “In the context of these pervasive market and government failures, it is often pointed out that local community organization that has a stable membership and well-developed mechanisms for transmitting private information and enforcing social norms among its members has the potential to provide sometimes more efficient coordination than either the state or the market...But community organizations “fail” too when they are “captured” by elite (or sectarian) interests or are hamstrung by the secession by the rich and talented from local communities, and they may face covariate risks and costs of small scale” (p. 18, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 24). In addition, (Brick, 2008) cites (Boettke & Coyne, 2005), (Dixit, 2004), (Gibson et al, 2000), (Olson, 1971),

institutions “derives power “from separate sources of authority or legitimacy”: councils “from the will of the people in the community”; *mullahs* from “religious legitimacy”; and headmen from “tradition and government recognition”.⁷⁵ Checks between branches constrain power, with councils of elders able to depose headmen who are “not responsive or [fail] to represent the community interests to the government” and providing oversight of the village clergy, who in turn “can veto programs or policies that violate religious norms”, while the “fluid and generally open membership of [councils] ensures that power is not concentrated amongst one group”.⁷⁶

Supporting the view of an efficient and well-balanced customary structure for local governance, surveys of rural Afghanistan generally report high levels of satisfaction with the effectiveness and responsiveness of local customary institutions. (Brick, 2008) cites a 2007 survey in which “83 percent of those surveyed felt their local councils were accessible to them and 78 percent of those asked felt their local councils were fair and trusted”.⁷⁷ Statistical analysis conducted based on data from a 2005 nationwide household survey further indicates that “the presence of a [council] has a statistically significant effect on the prevention of land disputes”, that when community members utilize council-based mechanisms “to resolve disputes, the likelihood of resolution increases”, and those who used councils to resolve their dispute “are far more satisfied with the outcome than those who used state courts”, indicating that customary councils remain a significant provider of public goods in rural Afghanistan.⁷⁸

However, while the tri-partite institution may provide a default structure for local governance that is both accepted and efficient, the situation is complicated by the institutional vestiges of previous wars and regimes, during which ideological functionaries and paramilitaries seized authority over local civil domains.⁷⁹ The influence of Taliban-appointed *mullahs* and paramilitary commanders over village councils and governance is a particular area of uncertainty.⁸⁰ A field

(Ostrom, 1990), (Ostrom, 2005), (Platteau, 1991), (Tsai, 2006), (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001), and (Wade, 1988) as recognizing “the ability of individuals to overcome collective dilemmas to provide public goods in the absence of external, third-party enforcement” (p. 2).

⁷⁵ (Brick, 2008), p. 18. (Saikal & Maley, 1991) report that “[t]o superficial observers rural society may have appeared feudal, with [landowners] and [headmen] exercising absolute power, either as landed aristocrats or creditors, over landless or debt-ridden peasants. The reality in most areas was far more complex. Authority within micro-societies traditionally was exercised by a [council], within the influence of the [landowner or headman] within the assembly determined by a complex range of factors, including the individual’s social position, mediating skills, and institutional resources at his disposal.” (p. 15, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 7).

⁷⁶ (Brick, 2008), p. 18. The power of individual actors is also constrained by the fact that land in Afghanistan is distributed relatively equally, relative to neighboring countries (Rubin, 2002), p. 35 – 37, cited in (Brick, 2008), p. 17).

⁷⁷ (Brick, 2008), p. 10. The survey is (Asia Foundation, 2007)

⁷⁸ (Brick, 2008), p. 28 - 9. In contrast, it is found that “when the community approaches a *malik* or a CDC it is no more likely to have the dispute resolved.” (p. 28). It is posited that the higher satisfaction accruing to those who use customary councils to resolve disputes relative to those who use state courts is “that due to the lack of binding constraints on local government officials, individuals may experience corruption or other distortion when they use government offices to resolve disputes. Because there are no formal constraints on their activity, they may be more corrupt than the constrained customary organizations” (p. 29).

⁷⁹ There is some debate as to what extent “the traditional system of local self governance broke down during [the recent] decades of warfare”, although (Brick, 2008) reports “significant evidence that the system of local governance has evolved and has not broken down to the extent that some have suggested” (p. 30).

⁸⁰ Another potential source of instability has been the creation by governmental and non-governmental actors of “community councils . . . for development or project implementation purposes in communities. As early as the 1950s, under the premiership of Daud Khan, the government created Community Development Councils with elected leaders, deputies, secretaries, and treasurers – a form directly mimicked in the current design of NSP. Subsequent governments – including the Communists and the Taliban – all used *shura*-type interventions in the community level to either as elements of welfare transfer or as elements to gain access to communities. Over the past decades, donors and NGOs have created *shuras* to gain community support and buy-in for particular programs. For example, during the war in the 1980s, nearly all major donors used *shuras* created by mujahedeen

survey conducted in late 2003 across six provinces of Afghanistan, for instance, found that councils in some areas have been revitalized “based on direct participation and the rule of customary law”,⁸¹ while in other areas, village communities and deposed leaders have experienced difficulties in extracting councils from the “influence of commanders and armed political groups”.⁸²

Status of Women

There is little disagreement about the peripheral role accorded to women by customary governance structures. In most parts of rural Afghanistan,⁸³ women in rural areas are restricted by the principle of *purdah* which stipulates that women should be generally hidden from public observation and thereby precludes them from involvement in communal gatherings.⁸⁴ Accordingly, local governance is a strictly male-dominated activity and “[w]omen are never allowed to participate . . . , except in very unusual circumstances, for example, when they may act on behalf of a deceased husband”.⁸⁵

III.2. Institutional Impact of NSP

Since the commencement of NSP in 2003, research has been conducted on the implementation and effects of the program.⁸⁶ Many of these studies are anecdotal in nature, with conclusions based on analysis of one-time semi-structured, qualitative interviews with villagers, CDC members, and other institutional actors in a relatively small number of villages in which NSP has been implemented, and, as such, lack a comparison group and any objective means to test hypotheses.⁸⁷ These studies do, however, provide a valuable record of challenges faced in NSP implementation and indicate a number of effects that may be attributable to the program. A summary of the main observations of research of NSP is provided below, beginning with findings of the ability of elites to capture NSP and of the participation of women in NSP activities; followed by observations about the legitimacy accorded to the CDC by villagers; and concluded by accounts of NSP’s impact on the attitudes of villagers towards democratic norms, gender roles, and the central government

commanders to distribute aid and promote community development projects. Currently, a plethora of NGOs and donors continue to create their own *shuras* for specific projects that are in parallel to the CDCs. Communities throughout Afghanistan may be suffering from *shura*-fatigue. Throughout the decades donors and their NGO projects have come and gone resulting in communities that have very low expectations of NGOs and short time horizons. Communities are adept at creating and disbanding *shuras* to implement development projects.” (Brick, 2008), p. 24)

⁸¹ (Nojumi et al, 2004), p. 40

⁸² (Nojumi et al, 2004), p. 45. (Brick, 2008) likens the role of paramilitary commanders to that of “Olsonian ‘roving bandits’” who are endogenous to state failure and can be “expected to fail to provide public goods largely because they are unconstrained in their ability to extract resources” (p. 18).

⁸³ The main exception is in the central highlands region dominated by the *Hazara* minority, which practices *Shi’a* Islam and holds significantly more liberal views towards the involvement of women in community affairs than is the case among other ethnicities in Afghanistan, particularly the Pashtuns which dominate southern and eastern Afghanistan.

⁸⁴ (Brick, 2008), p. 29. *Purdah* translates literally as “curtain”.

⁸⁵ (Boesen, 2004), p. 6

⁸⁶ These include: (Affolter et al, 2006); (Barakat, 2006); (Boesen, 2004); (Brick, 2008), (Brick, 2008), (Brick, 2008), (Kakar, 2005); (Noelle-Karimi, 2006); and (Torabi, 2007)

⁸⁷ The partial exceptions to this are (Barakat, 2006), where, in addition to interviews with CDC members and villagers in 18 villages included in NSP, interviews with local leaders and villagers were also conducted in 6 communities not included in the NSP”, which “were in the same geographical areas as CDCs where interviews and household surveys were conducted, and matched as far as possible in relation to common indicators of socio-economic conditions and ethnic composition” (p. 70) and (Brick, 2008), which supplements qualitative research with regression analysis of NSP impacts on disputes and dispute resolution based on a 2005 household survey of Afghanistan.

Elite Capture and Female Participation

A number of observers have reported that paramilitaries or other power-holders have attempted to disrupt or prevent CDC elections or otherwise interfere with NSP implementation, although it is unclear to what extent this has been a problem.⁸⁸ In some cases, local authorities have presented FPs with a list of people that they feel should compose the CDC or have requested that NSP be implemented by the existing village council or power-holders. In addition, there have been a few reports of local power-holders who were not elected to the CDC refusing to accept the results and resorting to violence in protest.⁸⁹ (Noelle-Karimi, 2006) observes that “the local elite of commanders, *mullahs* and landowners have considered the promised NSP block grants too attractive a resource to forego the temptation of imposing themselves on the CDC elections”.⁹⁰ There are some reports that, among villagers themselves, CDC elections have “caused fears and negative attitudes towards the [program]”, with people fearing “that the NSP was a cover for national political agendas related to or identical with the national political elections.”⁹¹

The extent to which paramilitaries, customary power-holders, or other local elites have captured CDCs is uncertain.⁹² (Boesen, 2004) recounts an estimate by one FP that “the presence of local elite persons in the CDCs was estimated to be as high as 50 – 70 percent” and (Barakat, 2006) concedes that, while “new leaders are chosen from the well educated and articulate, . . . elites inevitably tend to dominate the CDCs [and] traditional leaders remain influential”.⁹³ However, other observers report that CDC members are distinctly younger and more educated than customary power-holders,⁹⁴ that clergymen are rarely elected to the CDC,⁹⁵ and that “the NSP

⁸⁸ (Kakar, 2005) recounts the experience of one FP which, upon approaching a community, was rebuffed by the local headman and elders who argued that a council already existed and that NSP should work through them. However, after the FP threatened to withdraw from the community, they agreed lest the community be excluded from NSP. The headman was not elected in the CDC elections. In addition, (Kakar, 2005) reports that NSP has sometimes been accused of being a communist program or intended to convert people to Christianity. Of the general problem of community development programs being captured by local elites, (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007) write, “Community governance is particularly vulnerable to elite capture because participants enter the process from unequal positions of power: they have asymmetrical social positions, disparate access to economic resources, varying levels of knowledge of political protocols and procedures and different literacy rates” (p. 233).

⁸⁹ Boesen (2004) reports that a number of the FPs reported cases of commanders, mullahs, landlords, and village headmen trying to prevent people from voting or influence the outcome of the election and describes one case where a local commander who had a history of expropriating wheat from villagers tried to pressure the community to elect him to the CDC, but was rebuffed by the villagers (p. 39 – 40). (Boesen, 2004) concludes that, “[a]ttempts to gain access to [the NSP block grants] through forcible influence over CDC elections on the part of local elites, commanders, or parties have . . . been a significant problem in relation to NSP in many provinces” (p. 39) and that “there were some cases of commanders attempting to force the community members to elect them as chairmen of the CDC”. (p. 39). (Kakar, 2005) notes a “case in Laghman where the Malik was not elected and started firing a weapon”, causing “a person to be injured” and another “instance in Herat where a local commander was not elected to a CDC, when he expected to be. He caused a lot of problems, so [FP] held elections again. In the second round of elections he was not elected either, but he was satisfied with the results and stopped working against the CDC.” (Kakar, 2005) reports that Such problems have generally been resolved with recourse to regional office holders, such as district authorities, or by holding a second CDC election, or defining the function of CDCs in terms of project delivery, rather than local governance.

⁹⁰ (Noelle-Karimi, 2006), p. 2

⁹¹ (Boesen, 2004), p. 19

⁹² (Torabi, 2007) reports that there is large variation between communities in how “[t]raditional and war-generated institutions [react] to the elections”, with some integrating “into the newly born CDCs” and others interrupting or opposing them”, while some “religious groups . . . considered elections a western concept and criticized women’s participation in them” (p. 23).

⁹³ (Barakat, 2006), p. 91

⁹⁴ (Boesen, 2004), p. 46

⁹⁵ (Brick, 2008) observes that “In only three communities out of 32 did we find a mullah or other religious figure to be a member of the CDC (in that case, the mullah was the head of the CDC)” (p. 45).

process is seen by the public to be reducing the power of warlords and corrupt elites over the communities and establishing a form of governance that they trust to represent their interests”.⁹⁶ This latter view is, however, contradicted by (Brick, 2008) who reports that NSP has, in some cases, encouraged “the return of ‘roving bandits’ such as commanders”, who forcibly seize control over NSP activities and then seek to embezzle block grants.⁹⁷ Accordingly, there appears to be wide variation in the composition of CDCs, with some CDCs merely replicating existing structures of local governance, others introducing a younger and more educated set of village leaders, while still others serving to attract, re-empower, and enrich hitherto peripheral paramilitary commanders.

Although NSP mandates that men and women are to be equally represented on the CDC and participate equally in project selection and management, such notions are “new and disturbing in relation to the most central and fundamental values and norms of Afghan culture and society, namely those that concern gender relations in the context of the family and family [honor]”.⁹⁸ This disruption is reported by one observer to have “cause[d] deep tensions or anxieties within most communities”, which have resulted in women being denied meaningful participation in the program, despite women’s strong interest in such.⁹⁹ Female villagers interviewed about their experience in NSP reported that they “that they needed the permission of their husband, brother, son or other male guardian . . . in order to be allowed to participate in elections” and “were mostly told by the husband or male relative whom they should vote for” or otherwise gave their votes to male relatives.¹⁰⁰ Women elected to the CDC also reported that they needed men’s permission to “participate in women’s [councils] or women’s committees as representatives” and were sometimes denied.¹⁰¹ The inability of women to have a meaningful role in NSP activities

⁹⁶ (Noelle-Karimi, 2006), p. 44 and (Barakat, 2006), p. 91. According to (Noelle-Karimi, 2006), “Given its orientation towards the planning and implementation of developmental projects, . . . younger candidates known for their formal education and their ability to interact with aid agencies enjoy a certain edge over the traditional opinion leaders” (p. 2). (Boesen, 2004) also reports that “it was found through observations and discussions that there were signs of changing trends with regard to the age of shura members towards including younger members”, but also that elders who had previously been members of the customary council had also been “elected as members of the CDC” as well (p. 44).

⁹⁷ (Brick, 2008), p. 37. (Torabi, 2007) also provides an account of one village, where, “[a]fter the elections finished . . . , the son of a commander [linked to a network of other commanders and police chiefs and protected by one of the leaders in the Parliament]. . . forcefully obtained the position of the treasurer of the CDC” and “took the money of the first [block grant] installment for his own business and did not return it” (p. 21, 23). (Brick, 2008) recounts the case of one village which had elected the village headman to head the CDC, but once “the amount of money flowing into the village increased” as a result of NSP, “local commanders took greater interests in village activities” and eventually “took charge of village activities, . . . [and] encouraged the [headman] to resign his position and dismantled the beginnings of female participation.” As a result of the commander’s intervention, even the deputy head of the CDC “did not seem to have any information about CDC meetings or any other activities since the commander wrestled control of the organization from the community”, while “the new head of the CDC (the commander) bought two cars for himself since the CDC started its work” and villagers also speculated “that the CDC cashier, a close ally of the commander, bought two cars with CDC money” (p. 38).

⁹⁸ (Boesen, 2004), p. 48

⁹⁹ (Boesen, 2004), p. 48

¹⁰⁰ (Boesen, 2004), p. 49 and (Barakat, 2006), p. 92

¹⁰¹ (Boesen, 2004), p. 38 – 9. (Boesen, 2004) reports that “In several villages . . . , the female representatives elected were not allowed by their husbands to participate . . . [and] [i]n two communities visited . . . , the women were afraid to participate in the meetings [or have their names recorded by the Facilitating Partner] due to fear of their husband’s anger . . . , [having] been told by the men that the staff of the [Facilitating Partner] would . . . take them away to Kabul to make them ‘like Kabul women or even like foreigners’ and make them forget how to behave properly as Afghan women. In several communities . . . , the women explained that failing to obtain permission from male relatives could lead to the husband divorcing them . . . , [which would result in the] woman [losing] not only her access to livelihoods through her husband’s lineage, but also her children.” (p. 38 – 9). (Barakat, 2006) also reports a case in one village where “two women CDC members, for cultural reasons,

was in turn reflected in a lack of information among women about NSP activities,¹⁰² as well as a de-prioritization of projects favored by or benefiting women.¹⁰³ (Barakat, 2006), however, report that in most communities, “women CDC members clearly had a leadership role for the women in the community and were able to discuss and represent women’s interests” and that NSP “undoubtedly strengthened the role of women in governance”, even though “they clearly did not have a role as leaders of the whole community”.¹⁰⁴

Legitimacy

Perspectives on the extent to which CDCs are accepted by village communities and incorporated into structures of village governance and decision-making differ. (Noelle-Karimi, 2006) contends that “CDCs have overwhelmingly been accepted by the local population”,¹⁰⁵ while (Boesen, 2004) reports that, “[i]n many districts, the CDC [is] . . . perceived as an established and legitimate institution in a wider context than NSP” and “as a new [council] which [is] different from the village councils or other institutions that had existed before”,¹⁰⁶ perceptions which are said to be driven by an appreciation among villagers that the CDC is “elected by the whole community on a democratic basis without direct deference to traditional power-holders” and is

could not participate in CDC meetings but made representations on behalf of women individually to elders or male relatives on the CDC” (p. 70). According to (Boesen, 2004), men often explain that “women were too busy in the house and with carpet-weaving” to participate in community cooperation. “In many cases, men simply maintained that there was need for women to participate in the CDC work, ‘because the development problems were common to all, and women did not have special problems.’”. However, according to Boesen, “women mostly commented that men did not want to discuss the women’s problems” (p. 50). (Boesen, 2004) also relates an account of female CDC who held the office of treasurer and “had been elected due to her education and skills and experience as an accountant . . ., [but] was not invited to the meetings of the CDC because . . . the meetings were held in the mosque where she was not allowed to go” (p. 53). (Boesen, 2004) also reports that “there appeared to exist an age hierarchy among women concerning access to participation in NSP. Older women stated that their daughters-in-law should not go to meetings or participate in NSP activities” as it was “their duty to stay at home to do the housework and look after the children.” (p. 24, 51).

¹⁰² (Brick, 2008) reports that, “[i]n many communities, female CDC members were not aware of CDC activities in their communities. Often, they complained that they were selected to satisfy an FP requirement and had no actual role in the community and no voice in how NSP funds are spent in communities. Many women discussed the fact that they were only known as members of the CDC to outsiders visiting the village who sought to speak with female CDC members. The female researchers working on this research project had a difficult time finding females who had detailed knowledge of CDC activities in their communities. Even women who are members of the CDC (or even head of the female CDC) had only rudimentary knowledge of CDC activity in their communities.”

¹⁰³ Writes (Boesen, 2004), “Usually it was very difficult for women to influence the CDC to include the women’s projects in the community’s proposals for NSP . . . [and] it was not a common practice of the CDC to plan for the budgeting and management of the block grant in order to ensure that the costs of women’s projects could also be covered” (p. 55). (Barakat, 2006) reports that “Women do not have a direct say in the process of prioritization and project selection . . . However, women do have their own sets of priorities for gender specific initiatives – health training, micro enterprise and literacy, which remain largely unaddressed” (p. 59). An interesting account of the lengths male CDC members would go to in order to ensure women’s projects are not implemented is provided by (Brick, 2008), “[i]n one community, women chose to use NSP funds to start an animal husbandry project. The FP in this particular district mandated separate projects for women. Members of the male CDC did not want to allocate resources for a separate female project and discussed this issue several times with the FP, but the FP would not give in to their demands. According to the women in the community, the men bought several sheep for the women in the community to satisfy the needs of the FP. After completing the project, the men quickly sold the sheep at the bazaar and purchased more solar panels for the community (the men in the community selected solar panels as their subproject).” (p. 38 – 39).

¹⁰⁴ (Barakat, 2006), p. 70

¹⁰⁵ (Noelle-Karimi, 2006), p. 2

¹⁰⁶ (Boesen, 2004), p. 43, 58

“registered and authori[z]ed by the government”.¹⁰⁷ (Brick, 2008) contends, however, that “in general, community members (both CDC and non-CDC members) view their own CDCs as tools for project implementation and rarely view the CDC as a broader governance mechanism”¹⁰⁸ and that, “[i]n most communities, the individuals interviewed could only identify the members of the CDC executive committee . . . [and] were not aware of other CDC members”.¹⁰⁹ One observer notes that, in remote areas “characterized by generally suspicious or antagonistic attitudes towards foreigners, these negative attitudes have often led to the rejection of or outright hostility towards NSP” and its branding as “a ‘foreign’ and anti-Islamic [program] which aims at religious conversion and abolishment of traditional Afghan values, especially concerning women and family”.¹¹⁰

A key test of the legitimacy of the CDC, and the ability of NSP to change local structures of governance, is whether it assumes roles in village governance and dispute resolution traditionally accorded to customary institutions. One of the more interesting observations of the potentially transformative power of CDCs is provided by (Boesen, 2004), which reports that in “the future, communities envisioned that . . . the CDC could be a forum for appointing . . . a new, competent and reliable headman or a mullah. If this becomes practical in the future, the CDC would contribute significantly to changing the customary local-level relations of power and dependency in relation to local power structures, including mullahs and [headmen].”¹¹¹ (Barakat, 2006) concludes that, while there is great variation in the role of CDCs, even “where traditional leadership is not only entrenched but is also still respected by communities . . . , a gradual transfer of authority is being negotiated with a degree of goodwill on both sides”.¹¹² However, (Barakat,

¹⁰⁷ (Boesen, 2004), p. 43 – 44. (Boesen, 2004) reports that “the formal authorization of the CDC by the government through MRRD, and the official stamp and registration in the provincial MRRD office, was perceived as essential with regard to the legitimacy of the CDC in the communities” (p. 58).

¹⁰⁸ (Brick, 2008), p. 22

¹⁰⁹ (Brick, 2008), p. 25

¹¹⁰ (Boesen, 2004), p. 22. (Boesen, 2004) observes that “the communities’ perceptions of NSP were affected by a number of factors, including: (1) “The general attitude towards external aid, earlier experience of NGO assistance, and the relations with the facilitating staff of the FP in the communities, as well as the perceptions and understanding of the project in the community (which was closely related to the quality of the informational and community mobilization of the FP); (2) The socio-economic composition of the communities and the existence of relatively egalitarian structures with regard to wealth or poverty . . . [T]here are indications that, in communities with marked wealth and power differences, the more wealthy community members such as landowners and commanders would generally not be very interested in participation, due to fears that the participation on equal terms of the whole community would constitute a threat to their power; (3) The exposure of villagers to “foreigners” and Western ideas. Such exposure tended to contribute to a positive attitude to the participation in NSP. On the other hand, remote communities that had been relatively isolated, or had negative experiences with the world outside their district, tend to be more hesitant or resistant to the change that participation in NSP would entail.” (p. 19).

¹¹¹ (Boesen, 2004), p. 47

¹¹² (Barakat, 2006), p. 81. (Barakat, 2006) provides the following accounting of the role of CDCs in the villages surveyed: “Eight of the 18 CDCs surveyed appeared to be, as they said, the sole leadership of their communities. In the case of the 3 majority Hazara communities in Bamyan and Balkh, the CDCs were not otherwise well established, for example, in terms of project implementation, but there appeared to be no pre-existing formal institutions of governance. In Kundoz and Nangarhar, two established CDCs felt that they were fully in charge, but they had clearly had to negotiate with pre-existing authority figures. In the majority Arab community in Balkh, the traditional *shura* had disbanded when the village joined the NSP, and this was also the pattern in Kabul where the peacebuilding exercises in preparation for the elections to the CDC had involved negotiating the inclusion of traditional leaders in the CDC, which then became the sole institution. In a further 8 communities in Badghis, Balkh, Nangarhar, Paktika and Takhar, a transitional phase of shared leadership with the pre-existing traditional councils or leaders (*arbabs/maliks* and *mullahs*) was evident. In these villages there was clearly a process of negotiation and cooperation, with some individuals belonging to both authorities. On the whole, the CDC authority was fully recognized in the area of democratic participation in community development, while traditional figures retained the political leadership (representation to government and arbitration of disputes). However, CDC members described how they were increasingly called on to fulfil these

2006) also notes that in villages “where the NSP concept has not been fully taken up the tendency is for the CDC to be seen as responsible for the implementation of a community development plan, while traditional leaders . . . and religious leaders continue to represent the community to government and arbitrate disputes”.¹¹³ (Barakat, 2006) reports that CDCs are often called upon to resolve “tribal, clan and familial tensions even where higher authorities proved ineffective”,¹¹⁴ although (Brick, 2008) observes that even when CDCs become involved in dispute resolution, “they are unable to do this work without the assistance of traditional and religious authorities”, and even in their core competencies, such as project selection, “CDC members actively sought the input and approval of religious leaders for project decisions”, thereby indicating that the mandate of the CDC is constrained by that of customary authorities.¹¹⁵ In statistical analysis performed using a nationwide 2005 household survey, (Brick, 2008) also found that CDCs have a negligible impact on the resolution or recording of disputes and “has no preventative impact” on the incidence of disputes, suggesting the governance role of CDCs may be limited.¹¹⁶

Community Attitudes and Participation

Observers generally note that the implementation of NSP improves attitudes towards the government. (Barakat, 2006) notes that “NSP communities . . . have a significantly more [favorable] opinion of the government” and an “optimism for the future that non-NSP communities do not share”, while “non-NSP communities have a strong distrust for government and little faith in its ability to address their problems”.¹¹⁷ Officials in provincial and district branches of government also perceive “a significant improvement in the relationship between the participating communities and government” following the implementation of NSP, according to (Barakat, 2006).¹¹⁸ (Brick, 2008) also observes that “[w]here villagers recognize that NSP funds are from the government, individual attitudes towards the government improve”, although statistical analysis conducted by (Brick, 2008) finds that there is “no evidence that the presence of [CDCs] increases the probability that an individual will report a crime to authorities”, which could be symptomatic of a failure of NSP to “build effective links between citizens and the government”.¹¹⁹

Research on NSP reports generally high levels of acceptance by villagers of secret-ballot elections, although it is unclear to what extent this is motivated by a belief in the virtues of

roles because they often enjoyed more trust from the villagers. Some of these CDC thought it was simply a matter of time before the CDC assumed a complete leadership role. Others thought the two authorities were complementary. In a recently formed CDC in Kundoz, the process was more conflictual. The CDC clearly enjoyed a good deal of acceptance by the general population, but its authority to represent the community was contested by some influential individuals with close (and allegedly corrupt) links to the district administration. However, the CDC members were prepared to be patient and work for change. As they put it, ‘Some people try to exert their influence but we hope things will change gradually. In another CDC in Takhar, which claimed to be the sole form of government in the village, the researchers nevertheless observed that, ‘Despite the absence of any other form of government in the village, the CDC members are under the influence of other elders and the *mullah* of the mosque.’ The CDC members themselves said nothing could be decided without consulting them.” (p. 70 – 71).

¹¹³ (Barakat, 2006), p. 91

¹¹⁴ (Barakat, 2006), p. 38 - 9

¹¹⁵ (Brick, 2008), p. 45

¹¹⁶ (Brick, 2008), p. 27 – 30

¹¹⁷ (Barakat, 2006), p. 11. (Barakat, 2006) also notes that in non-NSP communities “there are many misplaced perceptions about the government, and Afghanistan in general, because there has not been any formal contact with governmental organizations to clarify the facts. As one villager put it, in a non-NSP community, ‘the government has done nothing for us’” (p. 11).

¹¹⁸ (Barakat, 2006), p. 38

¹¹⁹ (Brick, 2008), p. 27

democratic systems of government or by an eagerness to facilitate reception of block grants. (Boesen, 2004) reports that secret-ballot elections were “highly appreciated” as “free . . . , fair [and] clean” and that while elections “were primarily perceived by the community members as an instrument and project-focused context of NSP”, they were also “seen as a new mechanism and institution for strengthening community cooperation and enabling the community to address other problems in the future”.¹²⁰ (Boesen, 2004) indicates that the experience of NSP elections “may have generated positive expectations of democratic participation” in national governance and quotes villagers as proposing that cabinet members might be elected in an election similar to the CDC election,¹²¹ while also reporting that one agency involved in voter registration for the 2004 national elections found “that the task of explaining the concept of elections and universal voting rights . . . was very easy in the communities that were involved in NSP, compared to non-NSP communities”.¹²² (Brick, 2008) finds that, in one district, “the experience of participating in CDC elections encouraged community members to begin holding elections for their [headman] as well”.¹²³ In some cases, however, there have been reports of a “conflict between the practices of secret voting and local customs of community decision-making by discussion and hand-raising”, with some people, especially women, expressing the view that “secret voting could invite cheating and thus be misused and unfair”.¹²⁴

Observational studies of NSP generally credit the program with “directly strengthen[ing] inter and intra-community relations” and in “bringing together different family and tribal groups that had previously been antagonistic, by means of the [ward election system] and negotiated sharing of the leadership roles”.¹²⁵ (Barakat, 2006), for instance, reports that “[p]articipation in decision-making and collective effort for the community is greatly increased by creation of the CDC”.¹²⁶ (Brick, 2008), however, observes that the “lack of self-enforcing accountability mechanisms within a CDC and the large infusions of cash the program injects into a community may be a source of contention that generates, rather than prevents, conflict” and performs statistical analysis to indicate that “CDCs actually increase the likelihood of community-level disputes that require outside assistance to resolve” and “increases the probability that a person is the victim of violence”, indicating “increases the odds that an individual will be involved in a dispute as well as be the victim of a violent crime”.¹²⁷ In addition, (Barakat, 2006) notes that the introduction of NSP has created a “few instances of intra-community conflict” over issues such as “the location of the project and payments for the maintenance of the project”, which have, “[a]t times . . . undermined the stability in the community.”¹²⁸ One aspect of NSP which may ultimately serve to aggravate tension in divided communities is the organization of CDC elections around wards,

¹²⁰ (Boesen, 2004), p. 29 – 30, 36 - 37

¹²¹ (Boesen, 2004), p. 40 - 41

¹²² (Boesen, 2004), p. 40

¹²³ (Brick, 2008), p. 48

¹²⁴ (Boesen, 2004), p. 37

¹²⁵ (Barakat, 2006), p. 38, 79. (Barakat, 2006) reports that the “impact of the NSP on community governance was remarked on by a large majority of the householders. This was most commonly expressed as ‘unity’, ‘solidarity’, or ‘working together’. Eighty-six per cent of the respondents (90 per cent of women) volunteered this description of the impact of the CDC on their lives” (p. 84).

¹²⁶ (Barakat, 2006), p. 91. (Barakat, 2006) reports that “participation in discussing community priorities ranged between 50 and 90 per cent in CDC communities, compared to the matched communities where 28 per cent described limited consultation only, and the majority had no participation. Eighty per cent in CDC communities participated in project implementation, but only half that number (all men) did any community work in the matched communities” (p. 91).

¹²⁷ (Brick, 2008), p. 28, 40

¹²⁸ (Barakat, 2006), p. 111

which “normally comprise . . . a kinship group” and which may therefore enhance tribal solidarity and competition between tribes over resources.¹²⁹

Given the radical intervention provided by NSP to involve women in CDC elections and project selection, planning, and management, the program’s impact on gender relations within villages is of particular interest. Unfortunately, the nature of the observational studies hitherto conducted on NSP limits the quality of information on such impacts, although (Boesen, 2004) does note that there appeared to be “an emerging, albeit slow, change of attitudes on the part of the male population” towards the involvement of women in the process of village governance and management of development projects.¹³⁰ Many observers, however, agree that NSP has delivered “one key benefit” by providing women of the village with a forum where they can discuss not just NSP-related matters, but also “health, domestic violence, literacy” and other issues they “could not discuss before”, whereas before NSP, “women were not allowed to mix outside of their household”.¹³¹

III.3. Field Experiments

The study under discussion is probably most closely related to research reported in (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004), which assesses effects of policies to reserve chief positions on directly-elected village councils for women, scheduled castes and tribes in the Indian states of West Bengal and Rajasthan.¹³² Under the policy, one-third of elections are randomly selected to be restricted to women candidates, with elections reserved for scheduled castes and tribes according to their representation in the district population.¹³³ Due to the random assignment of villages to the reservation policy, differences between the types of goods provided by the reserved and unreserved councils can be attributed directly to effects of the policy. Women chiefs in West Bengal are found to cause “a net increase in the participation of women, and a decline in the participation of men” in village councils, but there are no such effects in Rajasthan. In both states, it is observed that women chiefs “invest more in goods that are relevant to the needs of local women: water and roads in West Bengal; water in Rajasthan” and “invest less in goods that are less relevant to the needs of women: non-formal education centers in West

¹²⁹ (Boesen, 2004), p. 30. (Boesen, 2004) also reports that, “[i]n all districts included in the study, community members mentioned the concept of *khaumi* (lineage solidarity) as important in relation to voting as well as to community cooperation” (p. 30).

¹³⁰ (Boesen, 2004), p. 49

¹³¹ (Barakat, 2006), p. 59 – 60. (Barakat, 2006) reports that in one village, “the women said they had not even known each other, though [neighbors], until they were able to meet in the women’s [council]” (p. 84).

¹³² (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004) reports that, since 1992, all Indian states except Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have introduced reforms which required that “one-third of the seats in all Panchayat councils, as well as one third of the [council chief] positions, must be reserved for women. Seats and Pradhans positions were also reserved for the two disadvantaged minorities in India, scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST), in the form of mandated representation proportional to each minority’s population share in each district.” The “local councils [are] directly elected by the people [and] are responsible for making decisions on an array of public good decisions. Twice a year, the councils must also convene village meetings (Gram Sabhas), where the villagers must approve their plan and their budget.” The reservation policy was implemented in order to ensure that the government’s decentralization policy did not disadvantage the “the interests of weaker segments of the population”.

¹³³ (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004) describe the random selection procedure as follows: “In both states, a specific set of rules ensures the random selection of GPs where the office of Pradhan was to be reserved. All GPs in a district are ranked in consecutive order according to their serial legislative number (an administrative number pre-dating this reform). GPs that have less than 5% SCs (or STs) are excluded from the list of possible SC (or ST) reservation. A table of random numbers (in the electoral law) is then used to determine the seats that are to be reserved for SCs and STs, according to the numbers that need to be reserved in these particular districts. They are then ranked in three separate lists, according to whether or not the seats had been reserved for a SC, for a ST, or are unreserved. Using these lists, every third GP starting with the first on the list is reserved for a woman Pradhan in the first election.”

Bengal; roads in Rajasthan”.¹³⁴ Where reservations exist for scheduled tribes and castes, it is observed that the types of public investments undertaken by the councils does not change, but that reservation councils are more likely to direct investments to hamlets populated by scheduled tribes or castes.¹³⁵

IV. Summary of CDC Election Monitoring

Between October 2007 and April 2007,¹³⁶ monitors were dispatched to directly observe CDC elections in 65 villages assigned to elect a CDC using the cluster procedure (hereafter ‘cluster villages’) and 66 villages assigned the elect a CDC using the at-large procedure (hereafter ‘at-large villages’).¹³⁷ The exercise aimed to provide an independent and systematic accounting of the integrity of CDC elections and the perceptions of villagers of the election.¹³⁸ In each monitored village, monitors completed four instruments:¹³⁹ (1) a “post-vote interview” administered to 1,675 male voters to collect information concerning perceptions of the election process;¹⁴⁰; (3) three “polling station detailed reports” recording detailed information concerning voting procedures, of which 350 were completed;¹⁴¹ (3) “polling station reports” to collect basic information on the location and design of polling stations not selected for detailed monitoring, of which 434 were completed;¹⁴²; (2) an “election report” summarizing monitors’ impressions of the voting process, of which 131 were completed.¹⁴³

Overall, the results of the monitoring exercise indicated that sub-project selection procedures were professionally executed by Facilitating Partners (FPs) assigned to the 10 evaluation districts and that, in general, villagers exhibited a good understanding of the function of the sub-project selection procedure and of NSP. The results of the evaluation monitoring also indicate that monitored communities assigned to cluster elections were broadly similar to monitored communities assigned to at-large elections in terms of numbers of households and number of

¹³⁴ (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004)

¹³⁵ The analysis excludes the Pradhan’s village from the sample in order to show “that the observed differences are not due to the direct effect of the Pradhan putting more goods next to his own home.”

¹³⁶ CDC Elections in Adraskan and Farsi districts were conducted between October and November 2007. In Balkh, Daulina, Hisarak, Khost Wa Firing, and Sang Takht, CDC elections were between November and December 2007. CDC elections in Sherzad, Gulran and Chisht-e Sharif were held between February and April 2008.

¹³⁷ Within districts, villages were selected for election monitoring in order to ensure balance across time and space, with the monitors visiting elections held early, in the middle, as well as late in the election schedule for the district.

¹³⁸ The main duty of the election monitor was to observe the conduct of CDC elections and to interview voters about the election process. In the event that a monitor witnessed a problem with the election, he was instructed to document it in detail. If the problem was determined to be grave -if voting was not taking place at all, if village leaders were intimidating voters, or such - the election monitor was instructed to contact the evaluation coordinator in Kabul. The monitor was explicitly instructed not to interfere in the election process or try to affect the outcome in any way. Although FPs knew their work would be subjected to monitoring, they were not aware when that would happen as the monitoring schedule was confidential, only known by the evaluation team and the monitor.

¹³⁹ A detailed description of these instruments is available on p. 6 of the CDC Election Monitoring Report. The CDC election monitoring instruments themselves are available on pp. 25 - 33 of the same report. In order to standardize the monitoring process, the evaluation team provided detailed written guidelines for CDC election monitors, which are available for inspection at: <http://web.mit.edu/cfotini/www/NSP-IE/surveycdc.html>

¹⁴⁰ Due to cultural sensitivities, it was not ordinarily possible for male CDC monitors to interview female voters, so the post-vote interviews were administered only to men. Of the 1,675 interviews, 861 occurred in cluster villages and 814 occurred in at-large villages.

¹⁴¹ 183 polling station detailed reports were completed in cluster villages and 167 were in at-large villages.

¹⁴² 247 polling station reports were completed in cluster villages and 187 were completed in at-large villages.

¹⁴³ 64 were completed in cluster villages and 66 were completed in at-large villages.

registered voters.¹⁴⁴ However, the results of the monitoring also indicate that the wrong election type was implemented in a number of villages,¹⁴⁵ which marginally reduces the chance of finding significant difference between the election types, even if such differences exist.

IV.1. Monitors' Observations

This section presents information reported by election monitors through the polling station reports, polling station detailed reports, and election reports. Information relating to the cluster-wise division of villagers is presented first, followed by that relating to the voting process, and concluded with information on the vote count and election results. The observations of the monitors indicate that, in general, FPs were able to successfully implement election procedures prescribed by the NSP program and the election guidelines provided by the evaluation team.¹⁴⁶

Cluster-Wise Division of Villages

In both cluster and at-large villages, FPs divided villages into clusters as required, with no significant differences between cluster and at-large villages in the number of clusters per village. FPs appeared to have undertaken the necessary steps to ensure that clusters were rationally and clearly defined and that villagers were aware of their cluster. Election monitors reported that clusters were uniquely identified, either by name or number, in all of the monitored NSP evaluation communities. In approximately 80 percent of the monitored NSP evaluation communities, election monitors also reported that the map of the village displaying the clusters had been drawn accurately.¹⁴⁷

Voting Process

All polling stations in the monitored villages had an eligible voter registration list and, in 97 percent of polling stations, the names of those who voted were marked off the list of eligible voters.¹⁴⁸ In 90 percent of monitored elections, names on the voter registration list were different for each polling station.¹⁴⁹ Polling stations contained an average of four supervisors per polling station and 96 percent of polling stations had a procedure to check voters' names against the eligible voter's registration list.¹⁵⁰ In three-quarters of monitored villages, the thumbs of those who voted were marked with ink, although this did not occur at all in monitored elections in Adraskan, in half of elections in Chisht-e Sharif, and three elections in Farsi. Monitors judged that 87 percent of polling stations has been designed so as to assure the privacy of voters, and with the exception of elections in Daulina and Sang Takht, polling stations had separate polling booths for men and women. Monitors also judged that, in 96 percent of monitored polling stations, the design of the ballot box would not allow for tampering.

Across the 131 monitored villages, monitors reported no instances where ballot papers or ballot boxes may have been changed before the counting of the votes, indicating that instances of electoral fraud seemed to be largely absent. In addition, the overall electoral process was

¹⁴⁴ For a breakdown of number of households and number of registered voters by district and by electoral method in the monitored communities see pp.4-5 of the CDC Election Monitoring Report: <http://web.mit.edu/cfotini/www/NSP-IE/CDCE-MR.pdf>

¹⁴⁵ There are 21 such villages. The list of villages can be found in Annex I.

¹⁴⁶ For a detailed discussion of monitoring results, see pages 8 - 14 of CDC Election Monitoring Report.

¹⁴⁷ The maps were missing 8 out of 10 monitored villages in Hisarak, and were drawn inaccurately in one village each in Adraskan (5 villages), Balkh (2) Chisht-e Sharif (1), Daulina (1), Gulran (2), Farsi (4), and Sherzad (1).

¹⁴⁸ There were four villages where the names of men voting were not immediately marked off from the list. Three villages were in Adraskan and one in Daulina.

¹⁴⁹ There were five villages in which some names appeared in voters' lists in more than one polling stations, which appeared in Adraskan (1 village), Daulina (2 villages), Sang Takht (1 village), and Sherzad.

¹⁵⁰ The ten villages in which this rule was violated were in Adraskan (1), Balkh (2), Chisht-e Sharif (2), Daulina (2), Gulran (1), Hisarak (1), and Sherzad (1).

conducted in a generally unobstructed fashion. In 99 percent of polling stations subjected to detailed monitoring, there was nobody at the polling station telling people who to vote for or interfering with the process.¹⁵¹ However, in 13 villages, monitors raised doubts about the overall freedom and fairness of the elections, with nine of these relating to activities at only one polling station in the village, while issues relating to activities at two or more polling stations were raised in four villages.¹⁵²

Vote Count and Election Results

The results of the election monitoring indicate that FPs correctly implemented at-large and cluster elections in the majority of cases.¹⁵³ As demonstrated in Figure 2 below, in 75 percent of villages assigned to elect CDCs by the cluster procedure, CDC members were selected based upon the number of votes received in each cluster, while in only 9 percent of villages were CDC members elected based upon the total number of votes across the village. In 74 percent of villages assigned to elect CDCs by the at-large procedure, CDC members were determined based upon the total number of votes across the whole village, with 12 percent of at-large villages using the cluster procedure to select CDC members. Compliance with the assigned vote-count procedures appears to have been best in Balkh and Chisht-e Sharif, with compliance appearing to be worst in Farsi and Hisarak.

Figure 2: Method of Vote Count, by District and Assigned Type of Election

Villages Assigned Cluster Elections



Villages Assigned At-Large Election



In the vast majority of cases, monitors adjudged the vote counts to be accurate and fair and, In 97 percent of villages, monitors reported that villagers were not obstructed from observing the vote count.¹⁵⁴ In 98 percent of monitored elections, the people receiving the highest number of votes were the people who became CDC members,¹⁵⁵ and, in 97 percent of cases, the vote counts of the implementing FPs matched those of the election monitor.¹⁵⁶ In 98 percent of the villages, monitors reported that they believed that the votes were fairly counted and in 96 percent

¹⁵¹ There were five exceptions, which occurred in Adraskan (1), Balkh (1), Daulina (1), Gulran (1), and Hisarak (1).

¹⁵² Doubts about activities at one polling station were raised in villages in Adraskan (1), Balkh (4), Daulina (2), Gulran (2), Hisarak (1), Sang Takht (1), and Sherzad (1), while doubts about more than two but not all polling stations were raised in Balkh (3), and doubts about all polling stations were raised in one village in Balkh.

¹⁵³ There was a total of 18 villages in which the method of selection of CDC members does not match the prescribed method of election.

¹⁵⁴ Obstructions occurred in Adraskan (1), Khost Wa Firing (1), and Sherzad (2).

¹⁵⁵ There were two exceptions in villages in Khost Wa Firing and Sherzad.


¹⁵⁶ Discrepancies were observed in Chisht-e Sharif (1), Farsi (1), and Gulran (1).

of villages monitors reported that they believe the electoral results represented the will of the people.¹⁵⁷


In cluster villages, elections resulted in the election of the correct number of CDC members (one male, one female) per cluster 89 percent of the time. As is to be expected, this occurred more frequently under the at-large procedure, with 35 percent of at-large villages having more than two members per cluster of residence elected to the council. This information is graphically displayed in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Number of CDC Members Per Cluster

Villages Assigned Cluster Elections



Villages Assigned At-Large Election



In 98 percent of monitored villages, election results were announced following the counting of the vote.¹⁵⁸ The mean attendance at the announcement of the election results was 47 persons, which represents an average of 17 percent of registered voters. As displayed in Figure 4 below, attendance was particularly high in Khost Wa Firing, but was relatively low in Farsi. The median attendance at the results announcements was higher in cluster villages, although the mean levels are statistically indistinguishable. In only three villages were incidents reported following the announcement of the election results.¹⁵⁹


¹⁵⁷ Instances of improprieties in vote count were reported in Balkh (1), Chisht-e Sharif (1) and Farsi (1). The villages were monitors did not feel confident that the elections reflected the will of the people, were, in addition to Chisht-e Sharif (2), Daulina (1), and Sang Takht (1).

¹⁵⁸ In the two instances where election results were not announced, only in one village in Farsi were there no plans made to publicly announce the results. In another village in Farsi, a written sheet displaying the election results was posted in the village.

¹⁵⁹ Two of these occurred in Chisht-e Sharif and one occurred in Khost Wa Firing.

Figure 4: Attendance at Announcement of Election Results**District Level Aggregates**

Dist.	Obs.	Avg.	Min.	1 st Q	Med.	3 rd Q	Max.
Adr.	22	34	0	16	30	40	100
Bal.	12	46	18	23	38	65	90
CeS	15	53	25	30	40	58	150
Dau.	9	50	0	20	30	50	225
Far.	13	21	15	18	22	24	25
Gul.	10	42	10	21	35	49	100
His.	9	57	0	32	48	85	120
KWF	11	51	0	34	65	70	81
S.T.	15	46	0	25	35	50	150
She.	13	47	10	30	50	60	101
Total	129	47	0	25	40	60	225

Median Attendance, by District and Election Assignment

IV.2. Post-Vote Interviews

The following section presents results from 1,675 post-vote interviews conducted across the 131 monitored villages in the 10 evaluation districts. Results relating to the procedural aspects of the election, such as the vote choices under the two election types and the number of the votes, are presented first, followed by questions relating to the integrity of the election, with questions relating to voters' knowledge of NSP and the functions of the CDC concluding. Results from the post-vote interviews indicate that voters in NSP evaluation villages exhibit a high level of engagement with the electoral process and a solid understanding of both the procedural and substantive aspects of the election.


Procedural Aspects

The overwhelming majority of voters interviewed by election monitors accurately reported the name and number of their cluster. Of particular interest is that the voters in at-large villages (94 percent) were only marginally less likely to accurately identify their cluster than voters in cluster villages (97 percent), indicating that, even in at-large elections, FPs either organized voting by cluster or ensured that voters were well-informed about their cluster of assignment. When asked if they could vote for anyone in the village or just for people from their cluster, 88 percent of respondents in cluster villages and 74 percent of respondents in at-large villages gave the correct response. In nine out of the 66 at-large villages, none of the respondents gave the right answer, indicating that the wrong election procedure had been administered, while in another four at-large communities, roughly two-thirds of the respondents got the answer wrong.¹⁶⁰ In the remaining 53 at-large communities, on average more than 85 percent of voters gave the correct response. A breakdown, by district and election type, of voters responses concerning restrictions on vote choice is presented in Figure 5 below.


¹⁶⁰ Most of these villages were in Adraskan, Sang Takht and Khost Wa Firing. A full breakdown of the proportion of responses is provided in Appendix VI.

Figure 5: Restrictions on Vote Choice, by District and Election Type

Villages Assigned Cluster Elections




Villages Assigned At-Large Election




The number of votes which respondents reported having generally corresponded with the election type prescribed for the village. For instance, 94 percent of respondents in cluster elections correctly responded that they had only vote, while 80 percent of respondents in at-large villages said they had could vote for three people. A breakdown by district and election type is presented in Figure 6 below.

Figure 6: Number of Votes, by District and Election Type

Villages Assigned Cluster Elections




Villages Assigned At-Large Election




As show in Figure 7, the number of different people which respondents reported voting for was largely similar, although with a higher proportion of respondents reporting to have just voted for two people, indicating that some people exercised their right not to use all their votes.

Figure 7: Number of People Voted For, by District and Election Type

Villages Assigned Cluster Elections



Villages Assigned At-Large Election




Integrity of Election

Voters interviewed by election monitors perceived the CDC election process as democratic, with some 97 percent of respondents indicating that CDC members were selected based on number of votes or were chosen by villagers, and 94 percent of respondents reported that they believed the secrecy of the vote to have been upheld. Overall, 80 percent of respondents stated that membership to the CDC is determined based on vote counts, with 17 percent saying that the village chooses CDC members without referring to the specific method of selection. Further confirming the general sense that CDC elections were held in a free and fair manner, 97 percent of respondents reported that they made their own decision for whom to vote, with only a very small fraction of the respondents suggesting their choice was determined by others.¹⁶¹

When asked about the primary considerations that informed their vote, respondents reported that candidates' honesty and religious piety ranked the highest among their priorities, followed by considerations for the candidate's education and his commitment to the community. A summary of responses for individual districts, as well as for the full sample, is presented in Figure 8 below.

¹⁶¹ For the 3 percent of respondents who stated that someone else decided who they should vote for, 45 percent said that they were influenced by a family member, 20 percent said that they were influenced by a friend, and 16 percent claimed to have been influenced by a village leader.


Figure 8: Primary Consideration in Vote Decision



Knowledge of NSP and CDC Election Process

During the post-vote interview, respondents were asked questions to gauge their knowledge of NSP and the activities of the CDC. Across the ten districts, 83 percent of respondents had heard of NSP, although curiously only 33 percent of respondents in Gulran and 56 percent of respondents in Chisht-e Sharif claimed to have heard of the program.¹⁶²


Figure 9: Proportion of Post-Vote Interviewees Who Claimed To Have Heard of NSP



Voters were also asked who organized the CDC election, a question which allowed for multiple responses if the interviewee provided them. Across the full sample, some 90 percent of respondents mentioned the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the NSP program and / or an FP or NGO, and 73 percent of respondents mentioning MRRD or NSP. MRRD was the most frequently cited individual responses, accounting for 47 percent of the total, closely followed by NSP (46 percent). An FP or NGO was cited by approximately 37 percent of people interviewed, with the Government of Afghanistan or Hamid Karzai mentioned by 28 percent of respondents. Three percent of interviewees mentioned that the election had been organized by foreigners. A graphical illustration of the responses, at both the district-level and for the full sample, is presented in Figure 10 below.


¹⁶² For a detailed breakdown by village, please see Appendix V

Figure 10: Perceived Responsibility for Organizing CDC Election¹⁶³



Respondents were also asked about their perception of the function of the CDC to be. 74 percent answered that the purpose of the CDC is to “help villagers”, or words to that effect; 53 percent of respondents mentioned that the CDC exists to implement development projects, while 22 percent answered that they believed that the CDC would function to resolve disputes between villagers. A relatively low number – 14 percent - mentioned that the CDC would serve as a village council or *shura*, while 10 percent ascribed another function to the CDC. The respective graphic is presented in Figure 11 below.

Figure 11: Perceived Functions of CDC¹⁶⁴




The first question in the post-vote interview asked respondents about the purpose of the election. 48 percent of respondents correctly answered that the election was for the CDC, while another 42 percent of respondents answered that the election was for the *Hambastagi Shura*, a name commonly ascribed by Afghan villagers to CDCs. 4 percent of interviewees responded that the election was for the village council. When asked whether they believed the CDC, or whatever they believed they were electing, was a part of the Government of Afghanistan, 92 percent of respondents responded in the affirmative, results that are presented also at the district level in Figure 12 below.

¹⁶³ The question asked, “who organized this election?” and allowed for multiple responses to be given. Percentages presented on the graph are in terms of the total number of respondents who provided an answer and accordingly often sum to more than 100 percent.

¹⁶⁴ The question asked, “Who organized this election?” and allowed for multiple responses to be given

Figure 12: Perceptions of Interviewees As To Whether CDC is a Part of Government



V. Hypotheses

The two election types under study in this experiment both have theoretical advantages and disadvantages. The cluster procedure mandates representation of each part of the village on the CDC and, in this sense, is likely to result in a membership that is more representative of different geographically dispersed groups in the village. The cluster procedure also potentially better facilitates accountability of CDC members by providing for a clear reporting mechanism between representatives and the cluster that elected them. However, cluster elections potentially interfere with the election of the set of members most preferred by voters, which may have deleterious consequences for the ability of the council to select, implement, and monitor projects. In addition, the representative relationship created by cluster elections encourages members to favor projects that benefit their cluster over projects that benefit the whole village.

The at-large election method avoids these two pitfalls, as it eschews constraints on the choice of voters and should thereby result in a CDC that is more closely aligned to the preferences of the voters. As the increase in district magnitude associated with the at-large elections renders coordination more difficult, it can be expected that at-large elections will be more competitive than cluster elections. However, the nature of the representative relationship between CDC members elected through at-large elections is not likely to be as strong as those elected through cluster elections, as it may not be effective in ensuring all parts of the village are represented on the CDC and may complicate the reporting relationship between the CDC and villagers.

The countervailing advantages of each election method make it difficult to make clear predictions as to how the variation will affect the effectiveness of NSP, generally, but do, however, point to a number of differences in election outcomes and the qualities of elected members which can be expected between villages assigned to the two different election types. These expected differences are outlined below in the form of hypotheses, with specifications as to how each hypothesis is to be tested.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ On dependent and independent variables, superscripts denote time periods corresponding to phases of data collection: t denotes the period prior to the initiation of NSP activities (i.e., baseline survey); $t + 1$ denotes the period during which CDC elections are held; $t + 2$ denotes the period during which projects are selected; $t + 3$ denotes the period during which projects are undertaken and completed; $t + 4$ denotes the period following the completion of projects during which the first follow-up survey is administered; and $t + 5$ denotes the period during which the second follow-up survey is administered. On dependent and independent variables, subscripts denote the unit of analysis: i denotes an individual villager; x denotes a member of the CDC or village leadership; and y denotes a village. On coefficients, superscripts denote the reference category to which the hypothesis falls into and the subscript denotes the reference number of the hypothesis within the reference category.

1. **Electoral Competitiveness:** At-large elections are expected to be more competitive than cluster elections, since the increase in the magnitude of districts for at-large elections is expected to reduce the efficacy of, and potential, for voter-intimidation or other attempts at coordinating the votes of villagers. In addition, voters in at-large elections are to have three votes, while voters in ward elections only have one vote, a difference which also reduces the chance of coordination in at-large elections.

The hypothesis is operationalized by two different specifications. The first of these relates to the number of unelected candidates, is and the associated prediction is as follows, where the dependent variable is the number of unelected candidates in village, x , and AL is a dummy variable which assumes a value of 1 if the village y has been assigned an at-large election and which assumes a value of 0 if the village has been assigned a cluster election:

$$Unelected_x^{t+1} = \alpha_x + \beta_1^C AL_x^{t+1} + \varepsilon_x \quad \text{where } \beta_1^C > 0 \quad H_1^C$$

The second specification tests the impact of election type on the distribution of votes between elected and unelected candidates, where the dependent variable is the ratio of votes garnered by elected CDC member, x , to the total votes cast in the village, y :

$$\frac{Votes_x^{t+1}}{Votes_y^{t+1}} = \alpha_x + \beta_2^C AL_x^{t+1} + \varepsilon_x \quad \text{where } \beta_2^C < 0 \quad H_2^C$$

2. **Geographical Distribution of Elected Members:** Since cluster elections require that each part of the village have a dedicated male and female CDC member, members elected by this procedure can be through cluster elections are expected to be more geographically dispersed compared to members selected in at-large villages, where no restrictions are placed through the election procedure on the geographic distribution of CDC members.

Again, the hypothesis is operationalized by two specifications. The first is based on a dependent variable measures the geographic dispersion of GPS coordinates of the houses of CDC members, as follows:

$$\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n GPS_x^2 - (\sum_{x=1}^n GPS_x)^2/n}{n-1} = \alpha_y + \beta_1^G AL_y^{t+1} + \varepsilon_y \quad \text{where } \beta_1^G < 0 \quad H_1^G$$

The second specification is based on a dependent variable which simply measures the proportion of clusters that contain a resident representative:

$$\frac{Resident_x^{t+1}}{Clusters_x^{t+1}} = \alpha_x + \beta_3^C AL_x^{t+1} + \varepsilon_x \quad \text{where } \beta_2^G < 0 \quad H_2^G$$

3. **Human Capital of Elected Members:** Assuming voters in CDC elections prefer to elect CDC members with higher human capital and that such residents are not evenly dispersed throughout the village, it is expected that CDC members elected through at-large elections will, on average, have higher levels of human capital than CDC members elected through cluster elections. The hypothesis is operationalized through three specifications, which relate to the education level of elected members, the average age of election members, and the occupation of elected members. Each of these is presented in turn below.

For reasons discussed above, it is expected that CDC members elected by at-large elections will have higher levels of educational attainment than those elected through cluster elections. The specification used to test this sub-hypothesis is as follows, where the dependent variable measures the proportion of CDC members who have no formal education:

$$\frac{Uneducated_x^{t+1}}{CDC\ Members_x^{t+1}} = \alpha_y + \beta_1^H AL_y^{t+1} + \varepsilon_y$$

where $\beta_1^H < 0$

H₁^H

It is assumed, perhaps controversially, that voters have a preference for younger candidates and that, as a result of a further assumption that the preferred younger candidates are not evenly dispersed throughout the village, that the average age of CDCs elected by at-large elections will be younger than those elected by cluster elections. The specification used to test this sub-hypothesis is as follows, where the dependent variable measures the average age of CDC members:

$$\overline{Age}_x^{t+1} = \alpha_x + \beta_2^H AL_x^{t+1} + \varepsilon_x$$

where $\beta_1^C < 0$

H₂^H

It is further expected that CDC members elected by at-large elections will be engaged in occupations necessitating a higher level of human capital. The specification used to test this sub-hypothesis is as follows, where the dependent variable measures the proportion of CDC members who are primarily agriculturally employed:

$$\frac{Farmers_x^{t+1}}{CDC\ Members_x^{t+1}} = \alpha_y + \beta_3^H AL_y^{t+1} + \varepsilon_y$$

where $\beta_1^H < 0$

H₃^H

In addition to CDC members, the specifications are also tested to examine differences between election types in the human capital of CDC heads and members of the CDC executive committee below.

4. **Elite Continuity:** The effect of at-large elections on the probability of existing power-holders being elected is ambiguous. On the one hand, the increase in district magnitude and the number of votes per individual that go along with at-large elections should reduce the efficacy of, and potential, for voter-intimidation or other attempts at coordinating the votes of villagers,¹⁶⁶ thereby limiting the ‘incumbency advantage’ and reducing the probability of incumbent village leaders being elected to the CDC. On the other hand and in so far as it can be assumed that incumbent village leaders are concentrated in particular wards and that voters prefer to elect incumbents to the CDC,¹⁶⁷ the elimination of geographic constraints in voting that accompany the at-large method may increase the probability of existing leaders being elected to the CDC.¹⁶⁸ The hypothesis is operationalized through two specifications,

¹⁶⁶ Due to similar reasoning, the districts for the parliament of Afghanistan (*Wolesi Jirga*) were set at the province level. As provinces in Afghanistan are relatively large (there are 34 in the whole country), this made it both more difficult for prospective candidates to intimidate potential voters in the lead-up to the election and more difficult for unsuccessful candidates to punish voters in the aftermath of the election. For similar reasons, the results of the presidential election in 2005 were tallied only at the provincial level.

¹⁶⁷ Some readers may object to his assumption, arguing that villagers may not necessarily “prefer” to elect incumbent power-holders, but feel compelled to do so, either by cultural norms or by active intimidation by incumbents and their proxies. There are a few ways in which the study may be able to determine whether incumbent-capture of CDCs arises as a result of voter-preferences, on the one hand, or active or passive intimidation, on the other hand. For example, the change in attitudes towards leaders ex-ante and ex-post should inform if villagers are happy with their leaders and the way their leaders treat them. Another way would be to look at the project preferences of leaders and those of their constituents. The more these preferences align, the more likely it is that these leaders were elected fairly.

¹⁶⁸ Some observers may object to his assumption, arguing that villagers may not necessarily “prefer” to elect incumbent power-holders, but feel compelled to do so, either by cultural norms or by active intimidation by incumbents and their proxies. There are a few ways in which the study may be able to determine whether incumbent-capture of CDCs arises as a result of voter-preferences, on the one hand, or active or passive intimidation, on the other hand. For example, the change in attitudes towards leaders ex-ante and ex-post should inform if villagers are happy with their leaders and the way their leaders treat them. Another way would be to

the first of which measures the probability that a CDC member had been previously identified as a village leader and the second of which measures the probability of an identified village leader being elected to the CDC.

The first specification tests the effect of election type on the probability that a CDC member was previously identified as a village leader, where the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if the elected CDC member x held a leadership position in the village at time t prior to the CDC election and a value of 0 otherwise.

$$\text{Member.Leader}_x^{t+1} = \alpha_x + \beta_1^E AL_x^{t+1} + \varepsilon_x \quad \text{where } \beta_1^E = ?$$

H_1^E

The second specification tests the effect of election type on the probability that a person previously identified as a village leader was elected to the CDC, where the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if the village leader x at time t prior to the CDC election was elected to the CDC and a value of 0 otherwise.

$$\text{Leader.Elected}_x^{t+1} = \alpha_x + \beta_2^E AL_x^{t+1} + \varepsilon_x \quad \text{where } \beta_2^E = ?$$

H_2^E

In addition to CDC members, the specifications are also tested to examine differences between election types in the human capital of CDC heads and members of the CDC executive committee below.

VI. Data Sources and Terminology

The following sections present information on the data sources used in this paper to test the hypotheses outlined in Section V above and provide definitions of some of the technical terminology used below to refer to CDC elections.

VI.1. Data Sources

Data used in this paper to test the aforementioned hypotheses generally comes from three sources: (1) information on election candidates and elected CDC members supplied for villages in the ten evaluation districts by Facilitating Partners (FPs), at the request of the evaluation team; (2) GPS coordinates of the residences of CDC members collected by monitors employed by the evaluation team; and (3) data from the baseline survey for the NSP impact evaluation collected across the ten evaluation districts during August and September 2007 by enumerators employed by the Vulnerability Analysis Unit. Each of these is discussed below.

Information Supplied by FPs

At the request of the evaluation team, FPs working in the ten evaluation district collected most of the information used to test hypotheses relating to electoral competitiveness and the human capital of elected members. Specifically, FPs provided information on election results, including the number of votes received by elected and unelected candidates, and the identity of candidates selected for positions on the executive council of the CDC. FPs also provided information on the personal characteristics of successful and unsuccessful candidates, including their gender, age, educational attainment, and occupation, as well as their cluster of residence and representation, if applicable. Overall, data was provided for 4,068 elected CDC members from 241 villages,¹⁶⁹ and

look at the project preferences of leaders and those of their constituents. The more these preferences align, the more likely it is that these leaders were elected fairly.

¹⁶⁹ The data is missing information for nine villages assigned to the treatment group: *Shenawar* and *Mama Khail* in Sherzad, *Khanjar* in Hisarak, *Kargeyani* in Khost Wa Firing, *Shadman* in Gulran, and *Rjna* in Chisht-e Sharif, *Bume Duldul*, *Dahane Nawseb* and *Ranaw* in Sang Takht. The data also includes information for three

for 1,161 candidates from 151 villages who received at least one vote, but were not elected to CDC.

Geographical Coordinates

Monitors of the evaluation team collected the data on geographical coordinates of the residences of male CDC members for 1,436 individuals in 173 communities in all evaluation districts except Farsi. Information on the coordinates of the residences of female CDC members was collected for 250 individuals from 44 communities in the districts of Daulina and Sang Takht.

Baseline Survey¹⁷⁰

Information on the identity of village leaders prior to CDC elections is provided by data from the baseline survey of the NSP impact evaluation, which was conducted during August and September of 2007 and consisted of four separate survey instruments: a male household questionnaire, a male focus group questionnaire, a female focus group questionnaire, and a female individual questionnaire administered to participants in the female focus group.

The male household questionnaire was designed to be administered to ten randomly-selected male heads-of household in each village and was administered to 4,895 respondents in all 500 evaluation villages. The male focus group questionnaire was generally administered to groups of village leaders and/or members of the village council and involved a total of 5,334 participants. The female focus group questionnaire was administered to a group of women who tended to overwhelmingly be wives or other relatives of the village leaders and/or members of the local council and involved a total of 3,670 participants across 496 villages. The female individual questionnaire was administered to the same participants as the female focus group but was conducted on a one-to-one basis, involving 3,398 women in 496 villages.

VI.2. Terminology

The following section provides definitions of some technical terminology used in the report:

Candidate

The word “candidate” is used in the report to refer to persons who received at least one vote in the CDC election. For example, “unelected candidates” are those persons that received at least one vote, but were not elected to the CDC. It is important to note, however, that the practice of candidacy – by which persons interested in becoming a member of the CDC declare that interest publicly and campaign for the position – is expressly forbidden by the NSP Operational Manual. The use of the word ‘candidate’ here is not meant to imply, thus, that any of the vote-getters engaged in campaigning for a position of a CDC member.

Executive Office / Executive Committee:

Each CDC has four ‘executive’ positions which collectively comprise the ‘executive committee’ of the council. These are ‘CDC Head’, ‘Deputy Head’, ‘Treasurer’, ‘Secretary’. These positions are sometimes shared between the male and female members of the CDC, while in other cases parallel male and female ‘executive committees’ are formed within a single CDC.

villages that were assigned to the control group, but were mistakenly mobilized: *Khangi* in Hisarak, and *Ranyo* and *Dahan Say* in Sang Takht.

¹⁷⁰ A comprehensive accounting of the results of the baseline survey is presented in the Baseline Survey Report, which is available for download at: <http://web.mit.edu/cfotini/www/NSP-IE/BSR.pdf>

VII. Results

The sections below present the results of the analysis of the impact of election type on electoral competitiveness (Section VII.1), the geographic distribution of elected members (Section VII.2), the human capital of elected members (Section VII.3), and elite continuity (Section VII.4). In addition to a comparison of outcomes between cluster and at-large villages, information on variation between districts is also presented.

The analysis finds that, as predicted, the at-large procedure does increase the competitiveness of both male and female CDC elections as measured both by differences in the vote share and the number of unelected candidates. Although no significant differences are identified between election types in the mean level of geographic dispersion of male or female CDC members, significant differences are observed between election types with respect to the dispersion of male CDC members in smaller villages. With respect to human capital, significant differences are observed in the educational attainment and occupations of male CDC members elected by at-large elections compared to those elected by cluster elections. No differences are observed between the mean ages of male or female CDC members elected under the two procedures, however, and no differences are also observed between the educational attainment or occupation of female CDC members. Limited differences are observed between election types in the level of elite continuity.

VII.1. Election Results and Electoral Competitiveness

The at-large election method contains two principal alterations from the cluster election method, both of which are theorized to increase electoral competitiveness. First, at-large elections expand the magnitude of districts – or, in other words, the “voter space” over which candidates compete for votes – which can be expected to reduce the efficacy of, and potential for voter-intimidation or other attempts at coordinating the votes of villagers. Secondly, under the design of the experiment, voters in at-large elections have three votes which they can cast for any three separate candidates, a difference which also reduces the efficacy of voter coordination and also yields a positive semi-definite impact on the number of candidates that will receive votes. Accordingly, it seems relatively uncontroversial that at-large elections will increase electoral competitiveness.

The following sections present a summary of the results of CDC elections and the selection of CDC members to hold executive office as a member of the CDC executive committee, with information on the number of elected and unelected candidates presented first, followed by an analysis of the distribution of votes. CDC elections are found to have generally low levels of competitiveness, with relatively large numbers of effectively uncontested elections in which all of the votes cast were received by winning candidates. Female elections, in particular, were uncompetitive and there was significant variation between districts in the level of competitiveness. The districts of Balkh, Khost Wa Firing, and Sang Takht, for example, featured relatively competitive elections, while the districts of Gulran and Sherzad were highly uncompetitive. As predicted, however, at-large elections are found to be significantly more competitive than cluster elections, both for male and female candidates.

Number of Elected and Unelected Candidates

Across the ten evaluation districts, the median Community Development Council (CDC) is composed of seven male and seven female members. On average, CDCs composed by a cluster election tend to have slightly more male members than those CDCs composed by an at-large election, but the difference is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. A statistically and quantitatively significant difference is observed, however, between the election types in the

number of unelected candidates. In villages assigned to hold at-large elections, for instance, an average of eight candidates were unelected, compared to an average of just two candidates in villages assigned cluster elections. Male elections generally resulted in more unelected candidates than female elections, with the median female CDC election resulting in no unelected candidates, as opposed to two unelected candidates for the median male CDC election. A summary of statistical information pertaining to the numbers of elected and unelected candidates in at-large elections, cluster elections, and across the full sample is presented in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Number of Elected and Unelected Candidates, by Election Type and Gender

	Cluster		At- Large		Total	
	Elected	Unelect.	Elected	Unelect.	Elected	Unelect.
Male and Female CDC Elections						
Number of Villages	122	122	119	119	241	241
Mean	17.0	2.0	16.6	7.7	16.8	4.8
Median	14.5	0.0	14.0	5.0	14.0	2.0
Standard Deviation	7.3	3.2	7.0	8.2	7.2	6.8
Minimum	8	0	8	0	8	0
Maximum	30	16	30	38	30	38
Male CDC Elections						
Number of Villages	122	122	119	119	241	241
Mean	8.6	1.6	8.4	5.5	8.5	4.8
Median	7.5	0.0	7.0	4.0	7.0	2.0
Standard Deviation	3.6	2.6	3.5	6.3	3.6	6.8
Minimum	4	0	4	0	4	0
Maximum	15	15	15	37	15	38
Female CDC Elections						
Number of Villages	122	122	119	119	241	241
Mean	8.4	0.4	8.3	2.3	8.4	1.3
Median	7.0	0.0	7.0	1.0	7.0	0.0
Standard Deviation	3.7	1.3	3.6	3.4	3.6	2.7
Minimum	4	0	3	0	3	0
Maximum	15	8	15	14	15	14

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

Table 3 below presents information on the number of elected and unelected male and female CDC candidates. On average, CDCs are relatively large in Hisarak (23 members), Balkh (20 members) and Daulina (19 members), and relatively small in Sang Takht (10 members), Khost Wa Firing (14 members), and Farsi (14 members). These differences accord with differences between districts in the average number of households per village, as per the mandate in the NSP operational manual that the size of the CDC should be proportional to the number of households in the village.¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ For more on village size see page 32 of the Baseline Survey Report, which is available at: <http://web.mit.edu/cfotini/www/NSP-IE/BSR.pdf>

Table 3: Number of Elected and Unelected Candidates, by District and Gender


Male and Female CDC Elections											
District	Villages	Mean		Median		Std. Dev.		Minimum		Maximum	
		Elec.	Unel.	Elec.	Unel.	Elec.	Unel.	Elec.	Unel.	Elec.	Unel.
Adraskan	25	15.8	1.7	14.0	2.0	6.5	1.0	10	0	30	4
Balkh	25	19.9	11.8	19.0	9.0	7.4	10.2	10	0	30	38
Chisht-e Sharif	24	16.4	5.7	12.0	5.0	7.4	4.4	9	0	30	16
Daulina	25	18.7	5.1	16.0	3.0	7.7	5.9	10	0	30	19
Farsi	25	13.9	3.2	12.0	3.0	6.2	2.9	8	0	30	9
Gulran	24	19.6	0.8	17.0	0.0	8.2	2.7	10	0	30	13
Hisarak	25	22.8	5.7	24.0	2.0	7.1	7.0	10	0	30	20
Khost Wa Firing	24	13.8	7.2	12.0	0.0	3.5	9.8	10	0	21	34
Sang Takht	24	10.3	7.1	10.0	6.5	0.7	6.5	10	0	12	27
Sherzad	23	17.1	0.5	16.0	0.0	5.5	1.4	10	0	30	6
Total	244	16.8	4.9	14.0	2.0	7.2	6.8	8	0	30	38

Male Elections											
Adraskan	25	7.9	1.7	7.0	2.0	3.3	1.0	5	0	15	4
Balkh	25	10.0	10.6	10.0	9.0	3.7	9.2	5	0	15	37
Chisht-e Sharif	24	8.2	4.0	6.0	3.5	3.6	3.6	5	0	15	11
Daulina	25	9.5	3.6	9.0	2.0	3.8	4.5	5	0	15	17
Farsi	25	7.0	2.4	6.0	2.0	3.1	2.1	4	0	15	7
Gulran	24	9.8	0.3	8.5	0.0	4.1	0.8	5	0	15	3
Hisarak	25	11.4	2.9	12.0	2.0	3.5	3.1	5	0	15	10
Khost Wa Firing	24	7.3	4.2	7.0	0.0	1.8	5.7	5	0	11	21
Sang Takht	24	5.1	5.0	5.0	4.0	0.3	5.1	5	0	6	20
Sherzad	23	8.6	0.5	8.0	0.0	2.7	1.4	5	0	15	6
Total	244	8.5	3.5	7.0	2.0	3.6	5.2	4	0	15	37

Female Elections											
Adraskan	25	7.9	0.0	7.0	0.0	3.3	0.0	5	0	15	0
Balkh	25	10.0	1.2	9.0	0.0	3.7	2.5	5	0	15	10
Chisht-e Sharif	24	8.2	1.7	6.0	0.5	3.8	2.3	4	0	15	8
Daulina	25	9.2	1.4	8.0	0.0	3.9	2.2	5	0	15	8
Farsi	25	6.8	0.8	6.0	0.0	3.1	1.3	3	0	15	5
Gulran	24	9.8	0.4	8.5	0.0	4.1	2.0	5	0	15	10
Hisarak	25	11.4	2.8	12.0	0.0	3.6	4.6	5	0	15	14
Khost Wa Firing	24	6.5	3.0	6.0	0.0	1.8	4.3	4	0	10	13
Sang Takht	24	5.1	2.1	5.0	1.0	0.3	2.0	5	0	6	7
Sherzad	23	8.6	0.0	8.0	0.0	2.7	0.0	5	0	15	0
Total	244	8.4	1.4	7.0	0.0	3.6	2.7	3	0	15	14

NSP regulations stipulate that CDCs are to contain equal numbers of men and women. Across the ten evaluation districts, the average number of male CDC members is slightly higher than the number of female CDC members, with 23 CDCs being comprised of more male than female members and six CDCs being composed of more female than male members. There is large variance between districts, however, with CDCs in Khost Wa Firing being noticeably unbalanced, with 14 out of 24 villages having more male than female CDC members and 3 villages with CDCs with a gender gap of more than one member. Balkh, Chisht-e Sharif, Daulina, and Farsi also contain villages with more male than female CDC members, while in Balkh, Chisht-e Sharif, Gulran, and Hisarak also include a single CDC each with one more female member. A graphical breakdown by district of the gender balance of CDCs is presented in Figure 13 below.

Figure 13: Gender Balance of CDCs, by District



Competitiveness of CDC Elections

The general level of competitiveness of CDC elections was low. A randomly-selected male candidate had a 71 percent chance of being elected to the CDC, with a randomly-selected female candidate having an 86 percent chance.¹⁷² At-large elections were generally more competitive than cluster elections, with male candidate having an 85 percent chance of election under the former, compared to a 60 percent chance under the latter.¹⁷³ Among female candidates, the corresponding figures were 95 percent in cluster elections and 78 percent in at-large elections.¹⁷⁴

Wide variation was observed between districts in the level of competitiveness of CDC elections, particularly for male candidates. Male CDC elections in Gulran and Sherzad were highly non-competitive, with a randomly-selected male candidate experiencing a 97 percent chance of being elected in Gulran and a 95 percent chance in Sherzad.¹⁷⁵ In contrast, male CDC elections in Balkh and Sang Takht were relatively competitive, with a randomly-selected male candidate facing just a 48 percent chance of being elected in Balkh and a 52 percent chance in Sang Takht. Adraskan, Gulran, and Sherzad held the least competitive female elections, with a randomly-selected female candidate standing a 100 percent, 96 percent, and 100 percent chance of election respectively, and Khost Wa Firing and Sang Takht had the most competitive elections, with rates of 68 percent and 72 percent respectively. Figure 14 below graphically represents the probabilities of election of male and female candidates, broken down by district and type of election.

¹⁷² As reported in

Table 4 below, a total of 2,036 male vote-getters were elected to the CDC and 839 male vote-getters were not elected, while a total of 1,996 female vote-getters were elected to the CDC and 321 female vote-getters were not elected.

¹⁷³ A total of 1,041 male candidates received votes in cluster elections and were elected to the CDC, while 188 vote-getters did not. In at-large elections, 995 male candidates received votes and were elected to the CDC and 651 vote-getters were not.

¹⁷⁴ A total of 1,011 female candidates received votes in cluster elections and were elected to the CDC, while 53 vote-getters did not. In at-large elections, 985 male candidates received votes and were elected to the CDC and 268 vote-getters were not.

¹⁷⁵ Although Gulran and Sherzad are on opposite sides of Afghanistan (Sherzad bordering Pakistan and Gulran bordering Iran and Turkmenistan) and have very different demographic, economic, ethno-linguistic, and topographic profiles, both districts were mobilized by IRC, the implementation strategies of which presumably explain the high level of non-competitiveness in the elections.

Figure 14: Probability of Election of Candidate to CDC, by Gender, District, and Election Type





Figure 15 displays a breakdown, for each district and type of election, of the number of unelected candidates per CDC election. As the graph illustrates, the high probabilities that candidates experienced for election to the CDC translated into a high proportion of uncontested elections in which the winning candidates receiving all of the votes cast. Although male CDC elections were generally more competitive than female CDC elections, uncontested male CDC elections were still relatively frequent, particularly under the cluster procedure. For instance, 57 percent of cluster elections resulted in no unelected male vote-getters and a further 28 percent resulted in between only one and three men who received votes but were not elected. At-large elections were significantly more contested, with only 21 percent of elections across the ten districts going uncontested and some 50 percent of elections resulting in four or more unelected candidates.

Male CDC elections in Balkh were the most highly contested of the ten districts, with only one of 25 elections in the district being uncontested and 17 of 25 resulting in the non-election of four or more vote-getters. Elections in Sang Takht were also relatively competitive, with only 3 of 22 elections being uncontested, as were elections in Chisht-e Sharif, where a quarter of elections were uncontested. At the other end of the spectrum, elections in Gulran and Sherzad were highly non-competitive, with 83 percent and 87 percent of elections respectively going uncontested.


Figure 15: Number of Unelected Male Candidates Per CDC Election, by District and Election Type



As noted above, male elections were generally much more competitive than female elections. Nevertheless, a clear difference was observed between the cluster and at-large procedure in the number of contested elections, with 84 percent of female cluster elections being uncontested, as compared to 49 percent of female at-large elections. In Balkh, for instance, the share of male candidate elected to CDC was 48 percent, as compared to 90 percent for female candidates. Only in Sang Takht (82 percent) and Chisht-e Sharif (49 percent), were a majority of the female CDC elections contested. By contrast, only in Khost Wa Firing (54 percent), Gulran (83 percent), and Sherzad (87 percent), were a majority of male CDC elections uncontested.

Elections for the male CDC were more competitive than the female elections, although the difference in competitiveness between cluster and at-large elections was present in both gender partitions. In 84 percent of female cluster elections, all women receiving votes were elected to the CDC, with this happening in 49 percent of at-large elections. Variation was also observed between districts. The incidence of electoral contestation was highest in Sang Takht, where just four of 22 female CDC elections proceeded without the non-election of voter-getters. In Adraskan and Sherzad, however, all of the votes cast in female CDC elections went to the women who were elected to the CDC. In Gulran, just one of 24 female CDC elections was contested.

Figure 16: Number of Unelected Female Candidates Per CDC Election, by District and Election Type



Distribution of Votes between Elected and Unelected Candidates

The relatively low level of electoral competitiveness is reflected in distribution of votes between elected and unelected candidates, although as with other measures of electoral competitiveness, there is a clear difference between cluster and at-large elections in the distribution of votes. In 121 villages with cluster elections, the share of votes received by elected candidates was 97 percent, while in 119 communities with at-large elections, the corresponding figure was 92 percent.¹⁷⁶ In 67 of 121 villages with cluster elections and 24 of 119 villages with at-large elections, there was not a single candidate who received at least one vote and was not elected. This difference is statistically significant, indicating that the at-large procedure produces more competitive electoral outcomes than the cluster-based procedure.

Table 4 below presents information on the distribution of votes between elected and unelected candidates, broken down by election type and gender.

¹⁷⁶ The difference is statistically significant at the one percent level.

Table 4: Distribution of Votes Between Elected and Unelected Candidates, by Election Type and Gender

	Cluster		At- Large		Total	
	Elected	Unelect.	Elected	Unelect.	Elected	Unelect.
Male Candidates						
Number of Candidates	1,041	188	995	651	2,036	839
Mean	<u>15.5</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>43.2</u>	<u>6.0</u>	29.0	5.5
Median	15.0	2.0	35.0	2.0	18.0	2.0
Standard Deviation	6.3	4.7	36.4	8.3	29.4	8.3
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1
Maximum	71	31	327	69	327	69
Female Candidates						
Number of Candidates	1,011	53	985	268	1,996	321
Mean	<u>17.9</u>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>37.7</u>	<u>9.1</u>	27.7	8.4
Median	17.0	4.0	29.0	5.0	20.0	4.0
Standard Deviation	7.5	3.6	28.6	10.0	23.0	9.4
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1
Maximum	67	15	202	72	202	72

Note: Differences in means between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

Table 5 below presents the district-level breakdown of the distribution of votes between elected and unelected male and female candidates.

Table 5: Distribution of Votes Between Elected and Unelected Candidates, by District and Gender

Male Candidates												
District	Candidates		Mean		Median		Std. Dev.		Minimum		Maximum	
	Ele.	Unel.	Elec.	Unel.	Elec.	Unel.	Elec.	Unel.	Elec.	Unel.	Elec.	Unel.
Adraskan	197	42	21.9	2.1	15.0	2.0	16.7	0.9	5	1	118	5
Balkh	249	265	35.7	3.1	29.0	1.0	30.2	4.3	1	1	217	26
Chisht-e Sharif	197	94	24.7	6.0	17.0	2.0	19.1	8.4	2	1	122	57
Daulina	237	91	34.5	9.2	21.0	6.0	27.2	10.3	3	1	137	69
Farsi	176	60	39.6	8.3	24.0	4.0	33.3	10.2	1	1	166	47
Gulran	235	7	33.1	1.0	15.0	1.0	48.3	0.0	1	1	327	1
Hisarak	269	63	17.6	3.0	16.0	3.0	13.5	1.8	2	1	162	8
Khost Wa Firing	174	100	24.9	7.4	16.0	2.5	16.4	8.5	4	1	91	30
Sang Takht	113	106	27.0	8.0	22.0	4.0	19.5	9.4	3	1	94	43
Sherzad	189	11	31.9	5.5	17.0	6.0	36.7	4.5	1	1	198	13
Female Candidates												
Adraskan	197	0	29.5	-	20.0	-	20.3	-	10	-	111	-
Balkh	249	28	40.5	11.0	31.0	3.0	28.5	15.6	6	1	202	72
Chisht-e Sharif	196	41	28.9	6.5	20.0	5.0	19.8	4.5	7	1	110	18
Daulina	231	36	34.3	11.3	21.0	13.0	25.7	7.8	7	1	127	29
Farsi	171	20	24.3	7.4	21.0	6.0	13.6	7.5	6	1	83	36
Gulran	235	10	18.8	1.2	17.0	1.0	14.6	0.4	2	1	162	2
Hisarak	270	70	17	3.5	17.0	3.0	4	1.4	8	1	33	7
Khost Wa Firing	156	72	28.7	15.9	20.5	16.5	20.7	10.6	8	1	116	46
Sang Takht	113	44	16.5	3.7	14.0	2.0	12.5	6.1	1	1	64	38
Sherzad	178	0	35	-	19.5	-	37.7	-	1	-	202	-

In addition to increasing the competitiveness of CDC elections, the at-large procedure also increased the correlation between a candidates' selection to a position on the CDC executive council – comprised of a head, deputy head, treasurer, and secretary - and the total number of votes they receive in the election.¹⁷⁷

Table 6 below presents summary statistics on the ranking of candidates (as measured by the total number of votes received by that candidate) selected to positions on the CDC executive council, as well as general CDC members. As is demonstrated in the table, in villages with at-large elections, there is a clear correlation between the number of votes received by a candidate and their likelihood of being selected to the executive council. In cluster elections, however, the number of votes received only a weak effect on a candidate's chance of selection to the executive council.¹⁷⁸

Table 6: Vote-Ranking of Candidates Awarded Positions, by Position and Gender

Male CDC Members															
Head				Deputy Head			Treasurer			Secretary			General Member		
	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.
Observations	120	118	238	101	100	201	112	114	226	114	108	222	1,041	995	2,036
Mean	<u>8.0</u>	<u>3.8</u>	5.9	<u>10.2</u>	<u>5.8</u>	8.0	<u>8.6</u>	<u>6.5</u>	7.5	9.4	8.4	8.9	<u>11.4</u>	<u>10.1</u>	10.8
Median	7.0	2.0	3.5	9.0	4.0	6.0	7.0	5.5	6.0	8.0	7.0	7.0	10.0	9.0	9.0
Std. Dev.	6.3	4.4	5.9	7.2	4.6	6.5	6.2	4.7	5.6	6.0	5.7	5.9	7.4	7.4	7.4
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Maximum	27	23	27	30	25	30	28	29	29	30	27	30	35	38	38

Female CDC Members															
Observations	84	83	167	103	99	202	89	84	173	90	90	180	1,011	985	1,996
Mean	4.4	5.8	5.1	6.4	6.2	6.3	5.8	7.8	6.8	6.4	7.7	7.1	<u>8.1</u>	<u>10.2</u>	9.1
Median	3.0	4.0	3.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	<u>4.0</u>	<u>7.0</u>	6.0	5.0	7.0	6.0	6.0	8.0	8.0
Std. Dev.	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.3	4.7	5.0	5.1	5.3	5.3	5.9	5.1	5.5	6.4	7.0	6.8
Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Maximum	30	27	30	25	24	25	31	32	32	28	29	29	31	35	35

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

¹⁷⁷ It is important to note, however, that in a cluster election, the number of votes a candidate can receive is constrained by the size of their assigned cluster and accordingly vote totals in cluster-elections do not represent the level of popularity of a candidate across the village. In at-large elections, however, there is a much clearer link between the number of votes received by a candidate and that person's popularity in the village. Accordingly, it cannot be inferred from these results that a person of particular prominence in a village would face a higher probability of being selected to the executive council under an at-large procedure vis-à-vis a cluster procedure.

¹⁷⁸ An interesting result concerns the differences between the two election procedures in the relative average rankings of the individuals assigned to different positions in the executive council. In at-large elections, for instance, the male candidate assigned to the Deputy Head position on average has a lower number of votes than the person assigned to the Head position, the Treasurer has on average less votes than the man assigned to the Deputy Head position, and the Secretary has less votes than the man assigned to the Treasurer position. In cluster elections for the male CDC, however, the Treasurer has a higher number of average votes than the Secretary who has a higher number of average votes than the Deputy Head. The Head has a higher number of average votes than any of the others.

VII.2. Geographic Distribution of Elected Members

A key procedural difference between cluster and at-large elections is that, under the former, voters in the election are restricted to casting votes only for individuals who live within their assigned cluster (a form of ‘neighborhood’ demarcated by the FP), whereas no such restriction is imposed upon voters in at-large elections. Accordingly, under at-large elections, it is possible that all members elected to a village CDC live in close proximity to one another in one part of the village, while cluster elections essentially guarantee that the houses of CDC members will be spread across the village domain.

A basic test of the effectiveness of the at-large electoral procedure is thus to examine the effect of election-type on the geographic distribution of members elected to the CDC. This section uses data on the average distance between male CDC members’ residences calculated from geo-references collected across nine districts and across two districts for female CDC members’ residences to perform such a test.¹⁷⁹ While there are no statistically significant differences between mean distances between the residences of either male and female CDC members elected under the two election types when the full sample is analyzed, quantile regressions do reveal statistically significant differences between the two election types for smaller villages. The sections below present the analysis, beginning with male CDC members, followed by female CDC members.

Male CDC Members

Table 7 presents summary statistics relating to the average distance between residences of male CDC members within the same village, by both election type and district. The results indicate that the mean distance between residences of CDC members is slightly higher in villages with at-large elections, compared to those with cluster elections. This is the opposite effect than was expected, although it is statistically insignificant. The median value of the distance, which is less susceptible to outlying values, is lower in at-large villages, although the difference is also statistically insignificant. Large differences are observed between districts, however, with villages in Daulina having the largest average distance between CDC members, at 767 meters, and Sherzad having the smallest, at 197 meters.

Table 7: Distance in Meters between Residences of Male CDC Members, by Election Type and District


	Cluster	At-Large	Adr.	Bal.	CeS	Dau.	Gul.	His.	KWF	S.T.	She.	Total
Villages	83	85	25	23	22	23	10	12	22	19	12	168
Mean	485.3	520.4	539.2	575.1	426.9	767.2	389.0	351.2	380.0	628.8	196.6	503.1
Median	365.3	320.7	281.5	391.8	340.3	633.5	233.2	132.5	353.6	723.7	211.7	336.8
S.D.	380.6	529.8	547.4	486.7	397.7	584.5	417.4	518.0	206.2	387.5	94.0	461.1
Min	38.0	44.9	86.0	109.0	54.9	102.3	44.9	37.9	120.2	73.0	64.6	37.9
Max	1,891.1	2,323.4	2,275.0	2,105.7	1,899.4	2,323.4	1,482.1	1,714.2	1,011.4	1,419.6	381.2	2,323.4

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

¹⁷⁹ Residence geo-references were collected for a total of 1,436 male CDC members across 173 villages in all evaluation districts, with the exception of the restive district of Farsi in Herat province. Owing to cultural constraints, GPS coordinates were collected for just 250 female CDC members from 44 villages in the districts of Daulina and Sang Takht. In order to limit bias on the results owing to outlying values and mistakes in the recording of GPS coordinates, a decision was made to observations in which the pair-wise distance between CDC members exceeded 5 kilometers. The total number of excluded values were 209 out of 12,954 observations, 64 of which were in Hisarak, and 50 of which were in one village in Hisarak, possibly indicating an error in data collection or entry.

Although a comparison of differences in means and medians did not produce evidence of any significant differences between the effect of the two election procedures on the distance between male CDC members, it is feasible that the election procedures may have an impact that is not uniform across the distribution. This may arise, for example, if voters in relatively more compact villages have different preferences vis-à-vis electing CDC members who all live in one section of the village, as compared to voters that live in more expansive villages. In such a case, the effect of at-large elections on the distance between CDC members' residences would be significant for more compact villages, but would be insignificant in larger villages. In order to test, at different levels of the distribution, the impact of the two election types on the geographic distribution of elected members, quantile regressions are employed, the results of which pertaining to male CDC elections are presented in Figure 17 below. The regressions find that the effect of at-large elections is negative and often statistically significant for lower quantiles, but is statistically indistinguishable from zero at higher quantiles. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that at-large elections lead to smaller distances between CDC members in smaller villages, but have no significant effect in larger villages.

Figure 17: Quantile Regression of Effect of At-Large Elections on Distance between Male CDC Members



Note: The solid line shows the difference between quantiles of the average distance between male CDC members in communities with at-large and cluster elections. Dotted lines indicate 95% confidence interval for the coefficients.

An additional means to examine the impact of the two election systems is to examine the cluster of residence of elected CDC members. In villages with cluster elections, all clusters have a 'resident' male and female CDC member from the cluster elected to CDC by design, although this does not need to be the case with at-large elections. Election results indicate that, of the 119 villages with at-large elections for which data is available, 85 villages have resident CDC members (either male or female) for each cluster. In 29 villages each cluster has both male and female representative. Overall, 94 percent of clusters in villages assigned at-large elections have resident CDC (male or female) members. In 72 percent of clusters there are both male and female resident CDC members. Of the 34 villages in which at-large elections occurred and where each cluster does not have a resident CDC representative, only in three do less than a half of the clusters have a resident member,¹⁸⁰ with there being only one village in which all CDC members live in the same one cluster.¹⁸¹ Accordingly, it does not appear that the at-large election system had a significant impact on the probability of a cluster having a resident CDC member.

¹⁸⁰ These villages are *Chashma Owajiha* and *Tanorha* in Chisht-i Sharif and *Gar Khail* in Sherzad

¹⁸¹ *Tanorha* in Chisht-i Sharif

Female CDC Members

Table 8 below presents summary statistics relating to the average distance between residences of female CDC members within the same village, by both election type and district. The results indicate that the mean and median distance between residences of female CDC members is higher in villages with cluster elections, although neither effect is statistically significant due to the small sample. Curiously, distances between the dwellings of female CDC members in Sang Takht district are relatively large, with a median level of 727 meters. This compares to a median distance of just 212 meters between male CDC members. The median distance between dwellings of female CDC members in both districts (362 meters in Khost Wa Firing and 727 meters in Sang Takht) is just slightly larger than the median distance between dwellings of male CDC members in the district (354 and 724 meters respectively).


Table 8: Distance in Meters between Residences of Female CDC Members, by Election Type and District

	Cluster	At-Large	KWF	S.T.	Total
Villages	21	20	22	19	41
Mean	587.4	443.3	373.9	682.9	517.1
Median	511.8	380.6	361.6	726.9	431.4
S.D.	339.9	371.4	209.3	425.0	358.6
Min	137.2	71.1	100.1	71.1	71.1
Max	1,185.1	1,668.2	1,054.5	1,668.2	1,668.2

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

Figure 18 presents the results of quantile regressions for the distance between dwellings of female CDC members in the two districts of Khost Wa Firing and Sang Takht. The results indicate that the effect of at-large elections is negative for all quantiles, although these differences are never statistically significant.

Figure 18: Quantile Regression of Effect of At-Large Elections on Distance between Female CDC Members



Note: The solid line shows the difference between quantiles of the average distance between male CDC members in communities with at-large and cluster elections. Dotted lines indicate 95% confidence interval for the coefficients.

VII.3. Human Capital of Elected Members

As discussed in Section V above, if it is to be assumed that voters in CDC elections prefer to elect members with higher human capital – for example, villagers with higher levels of education, villagers that are older, or villagers from skilled occupations – and if it is to be also assumed that villagers with higher human capital are not evenly dispersed across the village, at-large elections should, on average, result in the election of CDC members with higher levels of human capital. The effect of election type on different measures of human capital is, thus, an important question of interest.

This section presents evidence on the impact of election type on the educational attainment, age, and occupation of CDC members, as well as variation between districts in the aforementioned variables. Statistically-significant differences are observed between at-large and cluster elections in terms of the educational attainment of CDC members, with at-large elections producing CDCs with, on average, 4 percentage points more members with formal education, as opposed to those produced by cluster elections. No differences are, however, observed between the two election types in the educational attainment of female CDC members. The two election types also produce no statistically-significant differences in the ages of male or female CDC members, members of the CDC executive committee, or CDC heads. With respect to occupations of CDC members, the two election types do appear to produce some differences in the composition of the male CDC. Male CDC members elected by at-large elections, for instance, are less likely to be farmers and more likely to be laborers, differences which hold for members of the executive committee, and for CDC heads. No differences are observed between the two election types in the occupations of female CDC members, however.

Educational Attainment

This section presents information pertaining to the educational attainment of unelected candidates, CDC members, members of the CDC executive council, and CDC heads. Reflecting underlying gender differences in the educational attainment of the underlying population, male CDC members are found to be much higher educated than female CDC members, with only 10 percent of female CDC members claiming to have received any formal education. Among village males, a clear progression is found in the educational attainment of the different categories on which data is available, with CDC members (45 percent are formal educated) better educated than unelected candidates (29 percent), executive committee members (57 percent) better educated than CDC members, and CDC heads (63 percent) better educated than all others.¹⁸² Differences are observed between the average-level of educational attainment of male CDCs elected by at-large elections, vis-à-vis cluster elections, with at-large CDCs having 4 percent more members who have some formal education, although no significant differences are noticed among the educational attainment of female CDC members. Interestingly, male CDC heads elected by at-large elections are found to be less well educated than counterparts elected through cluster elections. Relatively wide discrepancies are noted between districts in the educational attainment of male and female CDC members, executive committee members, and CDC heads, although at the least in the case of men, these differences generally reflect differences observed during the baseline survey in the educational attainment of the underlying population. Khost Wa Firing and Sang Takht have the best educated male CDCs, while male CDC members in Adraskan have the lowest levels of attainment. Among female CDCs, educational attainment is highest also in Khost Wa Firing and Sang Takht, while few, if any, female CDC members in Adraskan, Daulina, Farsi, Hisarak, and Sherzad have any formal education.

¹⁸² A similar comparison cannot be made for women owing the lack of data on educational attainment for seven districts for unelected female candidates and for two districts for female CDC heads.

Male Candidates

Information relating to the highest level of education attained by unelected candidates, CDC members, members of the CDC executive committee, and CDC heads is presented in Table 9. Overall, 55 percent of CDC members do not have any formal education, 12 percent report religious school as their highest level of educational attainment, 16 percent have attended up to the primary level, with 17 percent attending school beyond that. Members of the CDC executive committee are, on average, better educated, with 43 percent reporting that they have had no formal education, 17 percent reporting that they were educated at a *madrassa* or mosque school, 18 percent claiming to have received at least some primary education, and 22 percent being educated at the secondary or higher level. CDC Heads are even better educated, with only 37 percent reporting no formal education of any kind and 21 percent citing religious school as their highest level of education. Among men which received votes, but which were not elected to the CDC, a much higher proportion - 71 percent- were reported to have no formal education.

Table 9: Educational Attainment of Male Unelected Candidates, Male CDC Members, Male CDC Executive Committee Members, and Male CDC Heads, by Election Type

	Unelected Candidates			CDC Members			Executive Committee			Head		
	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.
No Education	<u>90.9%</u>	<u>62.1%</u>	70.7%	57.1%	53.2%	55.2%	42.4%	43.3%	42.8%	32.2%	41.0%	36.6%
Religious School	3.9%	11.0%	8.9%	10.8%	13.1%	11.9%	16.0%	17.8%	16.9%	21.5%	20.5%	21.0%
Primary School	5.2%	15.4%	12.4%	17.1%	15.5%	16.3%	19.7%	15.6%	17.7%	20.7%	17.9%	19.3%
Secondary School	<u>0.0%</u>	<u>11.5%</u>	8.1%	8.3%	7.8%	8.1%	11.5%	9.9%	10.7%	13.2%	7.7%	10.5%
High School	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	<u>6.4%</u>	<u>9.6%</u>	8.0%	9.8%	12.6%	11.2%	11.6%	12.0%	11.8%
University	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.8%	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	0.8%	0.9%	0.8%
Observations	77	182	259	1,048	988	2,036	451	443	894	121	117	238

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

As shown in Figure 19 below, CDCs composed by at-large elections are, on average, better educated, with at-large CDCs having, on average, 4 percent more members with some formal education, and 3 percent more members with a high-school or university education. Accordingly, it appears that at-large elections do indeed result in the election of CDC members with higher levels of education. Among the members of the CDC executive committee, however, there are negligible differences between at-large and cluster CDCs in average educational attainment as measured by the proportion which have received some form of educational attainment. Interestingly, CDC heads elected through at-large elections are, on average, less well educated than counterparts elected through cluster elections, with a nine percentage point difference in the proportion of CDC heads who have received some form of formal education. The difference is mainly accounted for at the primary and secondary school level, with 34 percent of cluster CDC heads having received a primary or secondary school education, compared to 26 percent of at-large CDC heads.

Figure 19: Educational Attainment of Male Unelected Candidates, Male CDC Members, Male CDC Executive Committee Members, and Male CDC Heads, by Election Type




Table 10 provides a district-level breakdown of the educational attainment of unelected male candidates (“Un.”) and elected male members of the CDC (“El.”), the latter of which is also graphically represented in Figure 20. Information on the educational attainment of unelected candidates was not provided for Balkh, Daulina, and Sang Takht. In addition, information on the educational attainment of CDC members in Sang Takht was commonly provided as an assessment of the literacy of the respective member, rather than for the highest level of schooling.¹⁸³

Table 10: Educational Attainment of Unelected Male Candidates and Male CDC Members, by District

	Adraskan		Balkh		CeS		Daulina		Farsi		Gulran		Hisarak		KWF		S.T.		Sherzad	
	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.
NFE	100%	91%	-	44%	74%	43%	-	63%	-	43%	100%	51%	100%	71%	49%	37%	-	19%	100%	66%
Rel.	0%	9%	-	9%	16%	16%	-	32%	-	47%	0%	2%	0%	0%	8%	2%	-	2%	0%	1%
Pri.	0%	0%	-	26%	7%	28%	-	0%	-	7%	0%	34%	0%	11%	25%	10%	-	64%	0%	2%
Sec.	0%	0%	-	13%	3%	9%	-	2%	-	3%	0%	11%	0%	7%	18%	14%	-	11%	0%	12%
H.S.	0%	0%	-	6%	0%	4%	-	2%	-	1%	0%	2%	0%	9%	0%	37%	-	5%	0%	19%
Uni.	0%	0%	-	2%	0%	1%	-	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	1%	-	0%	0%	0%
Ob.	40	197	0	247	95	197	0	237	0	176	8	235	7	268	100	174	0	111	9	194


Table 11 provides a district-level breakdown of the educational attainment of male members of the CDC executive committee (“E.C.”) and male CDC heads (“He.”), information which is also graphically represented in Figure 22 and Figure 23 respectively.

¹⁸³ An assumption was accordingly made to assign those with some literacy to the primary school category and those assessed to be illiterate as having no formal education.

Table 11: Educational Attainment of Male Executive Committee Members and Male CDC Heads, by District

	Adraskan		Balkh		CeS		Daulina		Farsi		Gulran		Hisarak		KWF		S.T.		Sherzad	
	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.
NFE	84%	64%	32%	29%	29%	29%	48%	32%	35%	32%	36%	25%	56%	63%	20%	29%	7%	5%	58%	52%
Rel.	16%	36%	10%	17%	20%	8%	50%	64%	51%	56%	2%	4%	1%	0%	2%	4%	5%	10%	1%	4%
Pri.	0%	0%	28%	29%	32%	38%	0%	0%	9%	8%	42%	38%	11%	17%	11%	13%	65%	55%	3%	4%
Sec.	0%	0%	18%	13%	10%	8%	0%	0%	4%	0%	17%	21%	14%	8%	19%	21%	19%	25%	13%	13%
H.S.	0%	0%	10%	8%	7%	13%	2%	4%	1%	4%	3%	13%	16%	13%	47%	33%	5%	5%	24%	26%
Uni.	0%	0%	1%	4%	1%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Ob.	100	25	99	24	96	24	96	25	98	25	95	24	95	24	81	24	43	20	91	23

As demonstrated in Figure 20, variation between districts in the educational attainment of CDC members and the executive committee is sizeable, with 91 percent of CDC members in Adraskan having no formal education, compared to 37 percent in Khost Wa Firing and just 18 percent Sang Takht.¹⁸⁴ The proportion of CDC members in both categories claiming religious school as their highest level of education was highest in Daulina (32 percent), Farsi (47 percent), and lowest in Gulran, Hisarak, Khost Wa Firing, and Sherzad. Education at the secondary school or higher levels was most frequently observed among CDC members in Gulran (32 percent), Khost Wa Firing (54 percent), Sang Takht (32 percent), and Sherzad (39 percent), but was very rarely observed in Adraskan (0 percent), Daulina (4 percent), and Farsi (4 percent). The educational attainment of CDC members in Khost Wa Firing was particularly noteworthy, with 38 percent claiming a high school or university education.¹⁸⁵

Figure 20: Educational Attainment of Male CDC Members


The share of male CDC members with no formal education (55 percent) is significantly lower than that of the group of randomly-selected male head-of-household respondents interviewed during the baseline survey (72 percent), with CDC members more frequently reporting attainment at each class of education. In all of the ten evaluation districts except Adraskan, CDCs had higher average levels of educational attainment than the baseline sample of male head-of-household respondents, although the degree of difference varied. In Sang Takht, the discrepancy was particularly wide, with only 18 percent of male CDC members reporting no

¹⁸⁴ As noted above, educational attainment for CDC members in Sang Takht was commonly reported as an assessment of the person's literacy. A decision was made to categorize persons who could read and/or write as having a primary-school education, which could feasibly lead to an overestimate of the educational attainment of CDC members and office holders in Sang Takht.

¹⁸⁵ This is in part of a reflection of the relatively high-level of educational attainment of the general male population in Khost Wa Firing, however, where, as shown in Figure 21, only 49 percent of respondents have no formal education.


formal education, compared to 64 percent of male household respondents.¹⁸⁶ Large differences were also observed in Balkh (44 percent compared to 80 percent), Chisht-e Sharif (44 percent compared to 69 percent), and Gulran (52 percent compared to 80 percent). Relatively small differences between the education of CDC members and male household respondents was observed in Adraskan (91 percent compared to 88 percent), Hisarak (69 percent compared to 74 percent), and Sherzad (66 percent compared to 71 percent).

Figure 21: Educational Attainment of Male Head-of-Household Respondents in Baseline Survey



As noted above, members of the executive committee of the male CDC are generally better educated than the regular CDC membership, with 43 percent of executive committee members reporting no formal education, compared to 55 percent of CDC members. This pattern holds across the evaluation districts, with the executive committee reporting higher average levels of education than the general CDC membership in all ten districts, although there are large differences between districts in educational attainment. As with the general CDC membership, executive committee members in Adraskan have the lowest educational attainment (84 percent report no formal education), compared to 20 percent in Khost Wa Firing and 6 percent in Sang Takht. The educational attainment of executive committee members in Gulran and Sherzad is also relatively low, with 56 percent and 58 percent of executive committee members respectively, having no formal education.


Figure 22: Educational Attainment of Male CDC Executive Committee



¹⁸⁶ This result is potentially due, however, to the issue noted above regarding the method by which the educational attainment of CDC members in Sang Takht was reported.


Male CDC heads are, in turn, better educated on average than male executive committee members, with only 36 percent of male CDC heads reporting no formal education compared to 43 percent executive committee members. In all of the ten evaluation districts except Balkh, CDC heads had higher average levels of educational attainment than executive committee members, with the degree of difference varying from 20 percentage points in Adraskan and 16 percentage points in Daulina to negligible levels in Balkh, Chisht-e Sharif, and Farsi.

Figure 23: Educational Attainment of Male CDC Heads



As is demonstrated with a comparison between Figure 22, Figure 23, and Figure 24 below, male members of the CDC executive committee and male CDC heads are generally better educated than the group of village leaders interviewed for the male focus group during the NSP baseline survey. Only 43 percent of executive committee members and 36 percent of CDC heads reported no formal education, for example, compared to 58 percent of male focus group respondents. The proportion of executive committee members that had received a secondary or high school education, in particular, was higher, with a combined 21 percent of executive committee members reporting either school as their highest level of education, while only 11 percent of male focus group respondents reported such. Across all then evaluation districts except Sherzad, the average level of education of executive committee members was higher than that of focus group respondents, although the discrepancy varied between districts. In Farsi, for example, almost no difference was observed, while large differentials were observed in Sang Takht (only 7 percent of executive committee members reported no formal education, compared to 46 percent of male focus group respondents), Balkh (32 percent to 68 percent), Gulran (35 percent to 69 percent), and Hisarak (56 percent to 80 percent).

Figure 24: Educational Attainment of Male Focus Group Respondents



Female Candidates

Information relating to the highest level of education attained by unelected candidates, CDC members, members of the CDC executive committee, and CDC heads is presented in Table 12. Overall, 90 percent of female CDC members do not have any formal education, while less than one percent report religious school as their highest level of educational attainment, 7 percent have attended up to the primary level, with 3 percent attending school beyond that. Members of the female CDC executive committee are, on average, better educated, with 83 percent reporting that they have had no formal education,¹⁸⁷ 1 percent reporting that they were educated at a *madrassa* or mosque school, 11 percent claiming to have received at least some primary education, and 7 percent being educated at the secondary or higher level. Among heads of female CDCs, 86 percent report no formal education of any kind, 9 percent reported an exclusively primary education, and 5 percent reported education at the secondary or higher level., although these differences lack statistical significance A comparison of the aggregate educational attainment of CDC heads and the other categories is obscured, however, by the absence of data for the former for two districts.

Table 12: Education of Female Unelected Candidates, Female CDC Members, Female CDC Executive Committee Members, and Female CDC Heads, by Election Type

	Unelected Candidates			CDC Members			Executive Committee			Head		
	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.
No Education	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>77.4%</u>	80.6%	89.5%	90.5%	90.0%	83.2%	84.0%	83.6%	88.4%	83.1%	85.8%
Religious School	0.0%	0.9%	0.8%	0.1%	0.4%	0.2%	0.3%	0.8%	0.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Primary School	<u>0.0%</u>	<u>12.3%</u>	10.5%	7.2%	6.7%	7.0%	10.7%	11.0%	10.8%	8.1%	9.6%	8.9%
Secondary School	<u>0.0%</u>	<u>8.5%</u>	7.3%	2.1%	1.8%	2.0%	4.8%	2.8%	3.8%	3.5%	3.6%	3.6%
High School	0.0%	0.9%	0.8%	1.1%	0.5%	0.8%	1.1%	1.4%	1.2%	0.0%	3.6%	1.8%
University	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Observations	18	106	124	1,028	982	2,010	374	356	730	86	83	169

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

As demonstrated in Figure 25 below, there is a relatively small and statistical insignificant difference between the average level of education of female CDC members elected by cluster elections, as compared to at-large elections, with 89 percent of women elected by cluster elections having no education as compared to 91 percent of women elected by at-large elections. Relatively small differences are also observed for members of the female executive committee (83 percent for cluster elections, compared to 84 percent for at-large elections), and female CDC heads (88 percent and 83 percent). Accordingly, for female candidates, it appears that the type of election produces no differences in the educational attainment of elected members.

¹⁸⁷ The difference in the proportion of the female CDC members and the female executive committee members which have not received any formal education is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Figure 25: Education of Female Unelected Candidates, Female CDC Members, Female CDC Executive Committee Members, and Female CDC Heads, by Election Type




Table 13 provides a district-level breakdown of the educational attainment of unelected female candidates (“Un.”) and elected female members of the CDC (El.), the latter of which is also graphically represented in Figure 26. Information on the educational attainment of unelected candidates was not provided for Adraskan, Balkh, Daulina, Farsi, Hisarak, and Sang Takht, thereby rendering it difficult to make comparisons between differences in the educational attainment of unelected and elected candidates. In addition, information on the educational attainment of CDC members in Sang Takht was commonly provided as an assessment of the literacy of the respective member, rather than for the highest level of schooling.

Table 13: Educational Attainment of Female CDC Members and Female Executive Committee, by District


	Adraskan		Balkh		CeS		Daulina		Farsi		Gulran		Hisarak		KWF		S.T.		Sherzad	
	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.
NFE	-	100%	100%	85%	98%	89%	-	100%	-	98%	100%	80%	-	99%	68%	81%	-	46%	-	100%
Rel.	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	-	0%	-	1%	0%	0%	-	0%	1%	0%	-	1%	-	0%
Pri.	-	0%	0%	11%	3%	9%	-	0%	-	1%	0%	16%	-	1%	16%	3%	-	45%	-	0%
Sec.	-	0%	0%	3%	0%	1%	-	0%	-	0%	0%	4%	-	0%	12%	9%	-	8%	-	0%
H.S.	-	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	-	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	1%	7%	-	0%	-	0%
Uni.	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	-	0%
Ob.	0	197	1	249	40	197	0	231	0	171	10	234	0	270	73	155	0	110	0	196

Table 14 provides a district-level breakdown of the educational attainment of female members of the CDC executive committee (“E.C.”) and female CDC heads (He.), information which is also graphically represented in Figure 27 and Figure 28 respectively. Information on the educational attainment of female CDC heads was not provided for Daulina and Khost Wa Firing.

Table 14: Educational Attainment of Male Executive Committee Members and Male CDC Heads, by District

	Adraskan		Balkh		CeS		Daulina		Farsi		Gulran		Hisarak		KWF		S.T.		Sherzad	
	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.
No	100%	100%	78%	81%	85%	83%	100%	-	97%	100%	68%	57%	96%	83%	29%	-	20%	50%	100%	100%
Rel.	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	-	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%
Pri.	0%	0%	15%	8%	10%	13%	0%	-	1%	0%	25%	30%	3%	13%	0%	-	61%	0%	0%	0%
Sec.	0%	0%	4%	4%	1%	4%	0%	-	0%	0%	8%	13%	0%	0%	47%	-	18%	50%	0%	0%
H.S.	0%	0%	3%	8%	1%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	4%	24%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%
Uni.	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%
Ob.	100	25	100	26 ¹⁸⁸	96	24	3	0	90	22	93	23	96	24	17	0	44	2	91	23


As with male CDC members, there is notable variation between districts in the educational attainment of female CDC members. In Sang Takht, for example, only 48 percent of female CDC members. Balkh (85 percent), Gulran (80 percent), and Khost Wa Firing (81 percent) also have relatively educated female CDCs. The educational attainment of female CDC members is lowest in Adraskan, Daulina, Hisarak, and Sherzad, where either none or very few of the female CDC members have any formal education.

Figure 26: Educational Attainment of Female CDC Members

As noted above, female members of the executive committee are generally better educated than the regular female CDC membership, with 83 percent of executive committee members reporting no formal education, compared to 89 percent of CDC members. This pattern held across the evaluation districts, with the executive committee reporting higher average levels of education than the general CDC membership in all of the districts in which at least one of the CDC members has received a formal education. The educational attainment of female executive committee members in Khost Wa Firing and Sang Takht is particularly notable. In Khost Wa Firing, for instance, 47 percent of members have a secondary education and 24 percent have a high school education, while in Sang Takht, 54 percent have a primary education (or are literate) and 24 percent have a secondary education.

¹⁸⁸ Data on two female CDC heads is reported for *Palas Push* village in Balkh district.

Figure 27: Educational Attainment of Female CDC Executive Committee




It is difficult to make comparisons at the aggregate level between the educational attainment of female CDC heads and executive committee members due to the absence of data for the former for two districts. Among the districts for which data is available, however, female CDC heads do appear to be generally better educated, with the exception of Sang Takht, where one of the two female CDC heads has no education, while the other has been educated up to class seven.

Figure 28: Educational Attainment of Female CDC Heads



The share of female CDC members, members of the female executive committee, and female CDC heads with no formal education is significantly lower than that of the group of female respondents interviewed during the baseline survey (95 percent). In Adraskan, Daulina, Farsi, Hisarak, and Sherzad, however, CDC members and/or members of the executive committee had, on average, lower levels of educational attainment than female baseline respondents from the district. On the other hand, huge discrepancies were observed in the other direction in Gulran (80 percent of CDC members, 68 percent of executive committee members, and 54 percent of CDC heads have no education, versus 100 percent of baseline respondents), Khost Wa Firing (81 percent and 29 percent versus 90 percent), and Sang Takht (45 percent, 20 percent, and 50 percent versus 100 percent).

Figure 29: Educational Attainment of Male Household Respondents



Age

This section presents information pertaining to the age of unelected candidates, CDC members, members of the CDC executive council, and CDC heads. Across the full sample, both male and female CDC members have a median age of 40 years. No difference in median ages is observed between male members of the CDC and male members of the executive committee, although both are older, on average, than unelected candidates, and younger than CDC heads. In addition, no difference is observed between the median ages of female CDC members, female executive committee members, and female CDC heads, although as with the men, female unelected candidates are, on average, younger, indicating that both male and female voters prefer older candidates. No significant difference in means is observed between the ages of candidates elected by at-large or cluster elections, although differences between districts are sizeable. In Sang Takht district, male and female CDCs and executive committees are significantly younger than both CDC members from other districts and participants from the district interviewed during the baseline survey, while male CDCs in Adraskan, Balkh, and Hisarak and female CDCs in Farsi are older than CDCs in other districts and the sample of baseline participants.

Male Candidates

Information relating to the age of unelected male candidates, male CDC members, male members of the CDC executive committee, and male CDC heads is presented in Table 15. Unelected male candidates are, on average, younger than male CDC members, with a mean age of 40 years and a median age of 38, compared to a mean of 43 and a median of 40 for CDC members. Male members of the CDC executive committee tend to have approximately the same age profile as the general CDC membership, although CDC heads are, on average, older, with a mean and median age of 45 years.

Table 15: Age of Male Unelected Male Candidates, Male CDC Members, Male CDC Executive Committee Members, and Male CDC Heads, by Election Type

	Unelected Candidates			CDC Members			Executive Committee			Head		
	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.
Observations	191	528	719	1,049	992	2,041	452	445	897	121	118	239
Mean	39.5	39.9	39.8	43.1	42.2	42.7	42.5	42.3	42.4	45.5	45.1	45.3
Minimum	18	18	18	19	18	18	20	18	18	24	18	18
1 st Quartile	30	30	30	35	32	34	33	35	34	37	37	37
Median	38	40	39	42	40	40	41	40	40	45	45	45
3 rd Quartile	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	55	50	54
Maximum	75	80	80	85	80	85	80	80	80	80	75	80

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

A graphical display of the distribution of ages between unelected male candidates, male CDC members, male executive committee members, and male CDC heads in cluster villages and those in at-large villages is presented in Figure 30 below. A comparison of means indicates that the type of election has no significant effect on the ages of unelected candidates, CDC members, members of the CDC executive committee, and CDC heads, although at-large elections do appear to result in the election of more members of the executive committee and CDC heads that in their 40s, as opposed to other age brackets.

Figure 30: Age of Male Unelected Candidates, Female CDC Members, Female CDC Executive Committee Members, and Female CDC Heads, by Election Type




Table 16 and Figure 31 below present information relating to the ages of unelected candidates. As displayed, there is some variation between districts in the median ages of male unelected candidates, with candidates in Daulina (30 years) being, on average, younger and candidates in Balkh (44 years) being older than in other districts.

Table 16: Age of Unelected Candidates

Dist.	Obs.	Avg.	Min.	1 st Q	Med.	3 rd Q	Max.
Adr.	42	35.5	19	25	34	45	60
Bal.	219	42.7	18	32	44	50	80
CeS	95	39.9	20	28	40	50	70
Dau.	14	36.6	26	30	30	43	60
Far.	60	36.7	18	27	35	40	70
Gul.	8	36.3	18	25	37	44	60
His.	63	41.4	18	29	40	50	80
KWF	100	38.8	21	30	37	45	80
S.T.	107	38.0	18	26	35	47	70
She.	11	37.8	24	30	35	43	65
Tot.	719	39.8	18	30	39	50	80

A tabular and graphical summary of the distribution of ages of CDC members, by district, is presented in Table 17 and Figure 32, respectively. There is variation between districts in the median of male CDC members, with members in Adraskan (45 years), Balkh (45 years), and Hisarak (45 years) being, on average, older and members in Daulina (38 years) and Sherzad (38 years) younger than in other districts. The information on the distribution of ages of male CDC members in presented Figure 32, in particular, indicates that the number of CDC members in their 60s (15 percent) and 70s (7 percent) in Hisarak is much higher than in other districts. At the other end of the age spectrum, CDC members in their 20s are most commonly observed in Sang Takht (23 percent) and Sherzad (21 percent).

Table 17: Age of CDC Members

Dist.	Obs.	Avg.	Min.	1 st Q	Med.	3 rd Q	Max.
Adr.	197	40.0	25	35	45	55	80
Bal.	249	45.6	21	36	45	55	85
CeS	197	42.0	20	35	40	50	70
Dau.	237	39.5	20	30	38	46	75
Far.	176	40.8	20	32	40	50	70
Gul.	235	41.9	18	35	40	50	75
His.	267	47.2	19	35	45	58	80
KWF	173	41.6	20	33	40	48	70
S.T.	113	39.5	19	30	40	50	70
She.	197	39.6	18	30	38	50	75
Tot.	2,041	42.7	18	34	40	50	85

Across the full sample, the average ages of CDC members are almost identical to the sample of male head-of-household respondents interviewed during the baseline survey, summarized in Table 18 and Figure 33 below. Within districts, there are some discrepancies, however. In Adraskan, Balkh, and Hisarak, male CDC members are older, on average, than male head-of-household respondents. However, the opposite holds true in Daulina, Farsi, Gulran, Sang Takht, and Sherzad.



Figure 31: Distribution of Ages of Unelected Cand.**Figure 32: Distribution of Ages of CDC Members**

Table 18: Age of Male Head-of-Household Respondents

Dist.	Obs.	Avg.	Min.	1 st Q	Med.	3 rd Q	Max.
Adr.	486	43.5	16	30.0	40.0	54.0	94
Bal.	479	43.4	10	32.0	43.0	54.0	88
CeS	494	42.5	10	30.0	41.0	52.8	90
Dau.	495	41.1	16	36.0	40.0	46.0	71
Far.	490	43.2	11	35.0	43.0	50.0	79
Gul.	494	43.9	10	34.0	42.0	51.0	96
His.	480	41.1	14	33.0	40.0	50.0	85
KWF	493	42.8	16	32.0	40.0	52.0	97
S.T.	490	41.6	14	30.0	40.0	50.0	90
She.	482	42.0	19	35.0	40.0	48.0	85
Tot.	4,883	42.5	10	33.0	40.0	50.0	97

A tabular and graphical summary of the distribution of ages of male members of the CDC executive committee, by district, is presented in Table 19 and Figure 34 respectively. The age patterns of the male executive committee broadly mirror those of the general CDC membership, with a few exceptions. In Sang Takht, in particular, executive committees are, on average, younger than the broader CDC membership, with very few men aged older than 60 awarded positions in the committee.

Table 19: Age of CDC Executive Committee

Dist.	Obs.	Avg.	Min.	1 st Q	Med.	3 rd Q	Max.
Adr.	100	46.5	25	35	48	56	80
Bal.	100	45.0	21	38	45	52	75
CeS	96	42.0	22	35	40	50	70
Dau.	96	38.6	22	30	38	45	65
Far.	98	40.1	20	30	40	48	70
Gul.	95	41.7	23	35	41	50	70
His.	96	46.6	24	35	46	56	80
KWF	81	42.8	22	36	43	49	70
S.T.	44	37.6	20	30	37	45	56
She.	91	40.5	18	30	39	50	75
Tot.	897	42.4	18	34	40	50	80

Information on the ages of male CDC heads is presented in Table 20 and Figure 34 below. As noted above, CDC heads are significantly older, on average, than the executive committee or general CDC membership, with a median age of five years separating CDC heads from the average of either of the two other categories. Variance in the differences do exist between districts, however, with no difference in median ages between CDC heads and the executive committee in Balkh and Farsi, and relatively large differences in Daulina (5 years), Hisarak (9 years), and Sang Takht (8 years).

Figure 33: Distrib. of Ages of Male Head-of-House.




Figure 34: Distribution of Ages of CDC Exec. Comm.




Table 20: Age of CDC Heads

Dist.	Obs.	Avg.	Min.	1 st Q	Med.	3 rd Q	Max.
Adr.	25	51.0	35	48	50	55	60
Bal.	25	43.2	28	37	45	48	60
CeS	24	44.2	26	37	42	51	64
Dau.	25	42.9	24	40	43	50	60
Far.	25	41.4	25	32	40	50	60
Gul.	24	43.3	25	35	43	50	70
His.	24	55.5	25	48	55	65	80
KWF	24	47.0	24	43	47	55	70
S.T.	20	42.1	28	34	45	48	56
She.	23	42.1	18	34	40	50	70
Tot.	239	45.3	18	37	45	54	80

Male members of the CDC and executive committee are significantly younger, on average, than the participants of the male focus group during the baseline survey (ages of which are summarized in Table 21 and Figure 36 below), who had a median age of 45 years. Ages of CDC heads are, however, relatively comparable.

Table 21: Age of Male Focus Group Respondents

Dist.	Obs.	Avg.	Min.	1 st Q	Med.	3 rd Q	Max.
Adr.	418	46.4	19	35.0	45.0	55.0	90
Bal.	378	49.9	20	39.0	50.0	60.0	96
CeS	403	47.0	18	35.0	46.0	56.0	97
Dau.	402	44.2	18	35.0	41.0	50.8	95
Far.	359	44.8	20	35.0	45.0	50.0	95
Gul.	424	47.2	18	35.0	47.0	59.0	92
His.	366	49.4	20	40.0	50.0	60.0	98
KWF	427	47.5	18	36.5	45.0	60.0	85
S.T.	383	44.5	16	32.0	45.0	55.0	85
She.	407	47.8	20	38.0	46.0	57.0	85
Tot.	3,967	46.9	16	36.0	45.0	56.0	98

Female Candidates

Information relating to the age of unelected female candidates, female CDC members, female members of the CDC executive committee, and female CDC heads is presented in Table 22. The age of the median female CDC member, median member of the executive committee, and median female CDC head is 40. Unelected candidates are significantly younger, on average, with a median age of 30, indicating that, as with male voters, female voters have a preference for older candidates.



Figure 35: Distribution of Ages of CDC Heads**Figure 36: Distrib. of Ages of Male Focus Group**

Table 22: Age of Female Unelected Candidates, Female CDC Members, Female CDC Executive Committee Members, and Female CDC Heads, by Election Type

	Unelected Candidates ¹⁸⁹			CDC Members			Executive Committee			Head		
	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.
Observations	52	248	300	1031	984	2015	375	356	731	86	83	169
Mean	32.7	33.6	33.4	39.0	38.7	38.9	38.6	38.3	38.5	40.3	39.1	39.7
Minimum	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	19	19	19
1 st Quartile	24	25	25	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Median	30	32	30	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40
3 rd Quartile	40	40	40	47	45	46	48	47	48	50	50	50
Maximum	70	75	75	235	70	235	75	70	75	70	65	70

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

A graphical display of the distribution of ages between unelected female candidates, female CDC members, female executive committee members, and female CDC heads in cluster villages and those in at-large villages is presented in Figure 37 below. As with men, the type of election has no significant effect on the ages of unelected candidates, CDC members, members of the CDC executive committee, and CDC heads.

Figure 37: Age of Unelected Candidates, Female CDC Members, Female CDC Executive Committee Members, and Female CDC Heads, by Election Type




Table 23 and Figure 38 below present information relating to the ages of unelected candidates. Data on the ages of unelected candidates was unavailable for Adraskan and Sherzad. As displayed, there is some variation between districts in the median ages of male unelected candidates, with candidates in Sang Takht (27 years) and Hisarak (28 years) being, on average, younger and candidates in Daulina (40 years) being older.

¹⁸⁹ Complete data on the occupations of unelected candidates is only available for Adraskan and Sherzad.

Table 23: Age of Unelected Candidates

Dist.	Obs.	Avg.	Min.	1 st Q	Med.	3 rd Q	Max.
Adr.	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bal.	30	33.3	20	23	35	40	55
CeS	40	34.0	18	24	32	44	55
Dau.	13	42.0	25	35	40	50	65
Far.	19	33.4	18	25	30	40	70
Gul.	10	33.5	25	27	30	40	50
His.	70	31.1	18	23	28	35	75
KWF	73	35.1	18	26	35	42	60
S.T.	45	31.4	18	22	27	40	64
She.	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tot.	300	33.4	18	25	30	40	75

Variation between districts in the age of CDC members is more pronounced for women than men. Median ages, for instance, range from a high of 47 years in Farsi to a low of 27 years in Sang Takht, where 23 percent of CDC members are younger than 20 and 33 percent are between 20 and 30 years old. Female CDC members in Chisht-e Sharif and Khost Wa Firing are also, on average, younger than in other districts.

Table 24: Age of CDC Members

Dist.	Obs.	Avg.	Min.	1 st Q	Med.	3 rd Q	Max.
Adr.	197	38.6	22	30	40	40	235
Bal.	248	39.7	20	35	40	45	65
CeS	197	36.1	18	28	35	45	65
Dau.	231	40.2	20	30	40	48	70
Far.	172	46.9	18	40	47	55	70
Gul.	235	38.2	18	28	39	45	70
His.	270	40.0	18	35	40	48	65
KWF	155	35.8	18	24	35	45	70
S.T.	113	29.8	18	20	26	40	62
She.	197	38.9	18	30	40	46	75
Tot.	2,015	38.9	18	30	40	46	235

Notable variation also exists between districts in the ages of female members of the executive committee. Executive committee members in Sang Takht are particularly young, with a median age of only 20, while the median age in Farsi is 46. While many districts appear to have a mix of both young and old female executive committee members, female executive committees in Daulina appear to be exclusively composed of women in their thirties and forties.



Figure 38: Distribution of Ages of Unelected Cand.**Figure 39: Distribution of Ages of CDC Members**

Table 25: Age of CDC Executive Committee

Dist.	Obs.	Avg.	Min.	1 st Q	Med.	3 rd Q	Max.
Adr.	100	37.9	22	30	40	40	60
Bal.	100	40.0	20	35	40	50	60
CeS	96	35.8	19	25	35	45	65
Dau.	3	39.3	33	34	35	43	50
Far.	90	46.1	20	40	46	54	70
Gul.	93	36.0	18	26	35	45	64
His.	96	41.0	18	35	44	50	65
KWF	17	36.2	20	20	30	50	65
S.T.	44	25.9	18	19	20	30	54
She.	92	38.8	18	30	40	47	75
Tot.	731	38.5	18	30	40	48	75

Variation between districts in the ages of female CDC heads mirrors the variation in other categories. Of the two female CDC heads in Sang Takht, one is 19 and the other 32, while female CDC heads in Balkh, Farsi, and Hisarak are much older, with a median age of 45, 47, and 45 respectively. No data is available for the ages of female CDC heads in Daulina and Khost Wa Firing.

Table 26: Age of CDC Heads

Dist.	Obs.	Avg.	Min.	1 st Q	Med.	3 rd Q	Max.
Adr.	25	37.4	22	30	40	45	50
Bal.	26	43.4	23	38	45	50	60
CeS	24	35.6	19	27	35	41	60
Dau.	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Far.	22	46.4	30	40	47	50	70
Gul.	23	34.9	20	25	30	43	60
His.	24	42.0	20	30	45	50	65
KWF	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
S.T.	2	25.5	19	22	26	29	32
She.	23	39.6	24	30	40	45	62
Tot.	169	39.7	19	30	40	50	70

The median female CDC member (40 years) is three years older than the median female (37 years) interviewed during the baseline survey (data for which summarized in Table 27 and Figure 42 below), although the differences in mean ages is only 1.3 years. Female CDC members in Adraskan (40 years versus 32 years), Daulina (40 years versus 37 years), Farsi (47 years versus 32 years) are appreciable older than women interviewed during the baseline survey, with the opposite being true in Khost Wa Firing (35 years versus 38.5 years), and Sang Takht (27 years versus 35 years).

Figure 40: Distribution of Ages of CDC Exec. Comm.




Figure 41: Distribution of Ages of CDC Heads





Table 27: Age of Female Respondents

Dist.	Obs.	Avg.	Min.	1 st Q	Med.	3 rd Q	Max.
Adr.	353	35.1	16	25.0	32.0	43.0	85
Bal.	301	38.8	17	30.0	40.0	48.0	80
CeS	392	36.7	16	26.0	35.5	45.0	80
Dau.	337	37.3	18	28.0	37.0	45.0	94
Far.	293	34.6	16	25.0	32.0	43.0	70
Gul.	352	36.9	18	25.8	38.0	45.0	70
His.	313	38.7	17	30.0	40.0	49.0	73
KWF	338	39.6	16	29.3	38.5	48.8	88
S.T.	338	37.5	16	28.0	35.0	45.0	95
She.	326	40.6	17	35.0	40.0	48.0	95
Tot.	3,349	37.5	16	28.0	37.0	45.0	95

Figure 42: Distrib. of Ages of Female Respondents

Occupation

This section presents information pertaining to the occupations of unelected candidates, CDC members, members of the CDC executive council, and CDC heads. Information relating to male candidates is presented first, followed by information relating to female candidates. Among men elected to the CDC, or selected as a part of the CDC executive committee or CDC heads, farming is, by far, the predominant occupation, although this is less likely among members of the executive committee and among CDC heads. Female CDCs, on the other hand, are composed overwhelmingly by women that work only within the home, with just 10 percent involved in income-generating activities, such as teaching or carpet-weaving. At-large elections produce a statistically difference in the composition of male CDCs, with slightly fewer farmers and more laborers, a difference which also holds for members of the executive committee and CDC heads. The two different election types produce no discernable difference in the composition of female CDCs, however. Despite the predominance of farming as an occupation among male CDC members, there is some variation between districts, with livestock keepers and shepherds dominating CDCs in Adraskan and laborers being more commonly represented on CDCs in Balkh, Hisarak, and Sherzad than is to be expected based upon the sample aggregates or from the baseline survey data. The variation is slightly more limited among female CDC members, although female CDCs in Khost Wa Firing Sang Takht feature a relatively large cohort of students, while female CDC members working in carpet-weaving and tailoring are comparatively numerous in Chisht-e Sharif.

Male Candidates

Information relating to the occupation of unelected male candidates, male CDC members, male members of the CDC executive committee, and male CDC heads is presented in Table 28 below. Across the full sample, approximately 54 percent of male CDC members are farmers, 13 percent are laborers, 9 percent are keepers of livestock or shepherds, 8 percent are shopkeepers or traders, 6 percent are teachers, and 3 percent are members of the clergy. On average, the male executive committee has a fewer proportion of farmers (46 percent), a slightly lesser proportion of laborers (12 percent), a higher proportion of shopkeepers and traders (10 percent), a higher proportion of teachers (8 percent), and a higher proportion of clergymen (5 percent). Compared to male members of the executive committee, CDC heads are less likely to be farmers (43

percent) or teachers (5 percent), but are more likely be village heads (5 percent) or tribal elders (6 percent).¹⁹⁰

Table 28: Occupation of Male Unelected Candidates, Male CDC Members, Male CDC Executive Committee Members, and Male CDC Heads, by Election Type

	Unelected Candidates ¹⁹¹			CDC Members			Executive Committee			Head		
	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.
Farmer	<u>68.4%</u>	<u>56.5%</u>	59.9%	<u>60.1%</u>	<u>47.1%</u>	53.8%	<u>51.8%</u>	<u>38.7%</u>	45.3%	47.9%	36.4%	42.3%
Livestock / Sheph.	17.1%	12.9%	14.1%	9.4%	8.8%	9.1%	8.8%	9.4%	9.1%	9.9%	10.2%	10.0%
Laborer	5.3%	2.7%	3.4%	<u>9.2%</u>	<u>15.6%</u>	12.3%	<u>8.6%</u>	<u>13.9%</u>	11.3%	9.1%	11.9%	10.5%
Shopk. / Trader	<u>3.9%</u>	<u>16.1%</u>	12.6%	<u>6.6%</u>	<u>9.0%</u>	7.8%	9.1%	11.5%	10.3%	6.6%	13.6%	10.0%
Craftsman	2.6%	2.2%	2.3%	1.3%	1.8%	1.6%	1.8%	2.2%	2.0%	1.7%	0.8%	1.3%
Medicine	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.9%	0.7%	0.4%	1.6%	1.0%	<u>0.0%</u>	<u>3.4%</u>	1.7%
Teacher	1.3%	0.5%	0.8%	5.1%	6.4%	5.7%	7.5%	7.6%	7.6%	6.6%	5.1%	5.9%
Clergy	0.0%	1.1%	0.8%	3.1%	3.1%	3.1%	5.1%	5.2%	5.1%	5.0%	0.8%	2.9%
Elder	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.7%	1.1%	1.4%	3.1%	1.6%	2.3%	9.1%	3.4%	6.3%
Village Head	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	1.7%	1.5%	2.2%	3.4%	2.8%	2.5%	7.6%	5.0%
Village Nobility	0.0%	0.5%	0.4%	<u>0.1%</u>	<u>0.5%</u>	0.3%	0.0%	0.4%	0.2%	0.0%	0.8%	0.4%
Govt. / NGO	0.0%	1.1%	0.8%	<u>0.4%</u>	<u>1.4%</u>	0.9%	<u>0.4%</u>	<u>2.7%</u>	1.6%	0.0%	2.5%	1.3%
Other	1.3%	6.5%	5.0%	1.3%	2.4%	1.9%	1.1%	1.8%	1.4%	1.7%	3.4%	2.5%
Observations	77	182	259	1,048	988	2,036	451	443	894	121	117	238

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

The differences between the occupations of unelected male candidates, male CDC members, male executive committee members, and male CDC heads involved in cluster and at-large is presented in Figure 43 above. On average, CDCs composed by at-large elections have fewer farmers (difference is 13 percentage points) and more laborers (6 percentage points).¹⁹² Similar differences also exist with respect to male members of the executive committee and male CDC heads. Across the full sample, farmers are also progressively less likely to be members to the executive committee or as CDC heads.

¹⁹⁰ Data on the occupations of unelected candidates is only available for four districts (Adraskan, Chisht-e Sharif, Gulran, and Sherzad) and so is not compared with the other three categories in order to preclude the drawing of erroneous inferences.

¹⁹¹ Complete data on the occupations of unelected candidates is only available for Adraskan, Chisht-e Sharif, Gulran, and Sherzad

¹⁹² Both differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Figure 43: Occupation of Male Unelected Candidates, Male CDC Members, Male CDC Executive Committee Members, and Male CDC Heads, by Election Type




Table 29 provides a district-level breakdown of the occupations of unelected male candidates (“Un.”) and elected male members of the CDC (“El.”), the latter of which is also graphically represented in Figure 44. Information on the occupations of unelected candidates was not provided for Balkh, Daulina, Hisarak, and Sang Takht.

Table 29: Occupations of Unelected Male Candidates and Male CDC Members, by District

	Adraskan		Balkh		CeS		Daulina		Farsi		Gulran		Hisarak		KWF		S.T.		Sherzad	
	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.
Farm.	21%	32%	-	53%	79%	58%	-	84%	-	46%	88%	63%	50%	41%	53%	47%	-	65%	91%	49%
Liv.	76%	64%	-	2%	0%	0%	-	0%	-	0%	0%	23%	0%	1%	5%	0%	-	0%	0%	1%
Lab.	0%	0%	-	22%	3%	2%	-	5%	-	2%	0%	0%	50%	41%	3%	4%	-	6%	0%	25%
Sho.	0%	1%	-	2%	14%	18%	-	0%	-	23%	0%	3%	0%	9%	20%	13%	-	9%	0%	5%
Cra.	0%	0%	-	0%	2%	2%	-	0%	-	3%	0%	1%	0%	1%	3%	5%	-	4%	9%	2%
Med.	0%	0%	-	1%	0%	2%	-	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	-	2%	0%	1%
Tea.	0%	2%	-	7%	2%	7%	-	4%	-	3%	0%	5%	0%	4%	0%	16%	-	4%	0%	7%
Cle.	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	6%	-	3%	-	14%	0%	1%	0%	1%	2%	6%	-	1%	0%	2%
Eld.	0%	0%	-	4%	0%	0%	-	0%	-	3%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	-	0%	0%	6%
Hea.	0%	0%	-	6%	0%	1%	-	0%	-	5%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%
Nob.	0%	0%	-	2%	0%	0%	-	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	-	0%	0%	0%
Gov.	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	1%	-	2%	-	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	2%	-	0%	0%	2%
Oth.	2%	1%	-	0%	0%	5%	-	1%	-	1%	13%	0%	0%	0%	11%	3%	-	10%	0%	3%
Ob.	42	197	0	249	95	197	0	237	0	176	8	235	6	269	100	174	0	113	11	197


Table 30 provides a district-level breakdown of the educational attainment of male members of the CDC executive committee (“E.C.”) and male CDC heads (“He.”), information which is also graphically represented in Figure 46 and Figure 47 respectively.

Table 30: Occupations of Male Executive Committee Members and Male CDC Heads, by District

	Adraskan		Balkh		CeS		Daulina		Farsi		Gulran		Hisarak		KWF		S.T.		Sherzad	
	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.
Farm.	28%	12%	39%	44%	52%	58%	79%	64%	35%	32%	62%	63%	38%	38%	31%	33%	52%	50%	40%	30%
Liv.	65%	80%	2%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	16%	13%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Lab.	0%	0%	23%	8%	1%	0%	6%	8%	3%	0%	0%	0%	41%	54%	4%	4%	7%	15%	25%	17%
Sho.	2%	4%	3%	4%	18%	13%	1%	4%	23%	28%	3%	4%	11%	8%	22%	21%	16%	10%	8%	4%
Cra.	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%	8%	7%	5%	2%	0%
Med.	0%	0%	2%	0%	2%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	5%	10%	1%	0%
Tea.	4%	0%	9%	4%	8%	4%	3%	8%	4%	8%	9%	4%	6%	0%	21%	21%	7%	5%	5%	4%
Cle.	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	0%	7%	8%	18%	12%	2%	0%	2%	0%	7%	4%	0%	0%	3%	4%
Eld.	0%	0%	7%	12%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	8%	1%	4%	0%	0%	1%	4%	0%	0%	11%	35%
Hea.	0%	0%	14%	24%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	12%	5%	13%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Nob.	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Gov.	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	4%	3%	8%	1%	0%	1%	0%	2%	0%	4%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%
Oth.	1%	4%	0%	0%	6%	13%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	7%	5%	1%	4%
Ob.	100	25	100	25	96	24	96	25	98	25	95	24	96	24	81	24	44	20	91	23


As shown in Figure 44 below, there is notable variation between districts in the occupations of CDC members. In Adraskan, keepers of livestock and shepherds predominate, while farming is cited by a majority of CDC members in Balkh, Chisht-e Sharif, Daulina, Gulran, and Sang Takht and by a plurality in Farsi, Khost Wa Firing, and Sherzad. In Hisarak, laboring is the most common occupation for CDC members and is also cited around a quarter of CDC members in Balkh and Sherzad.

Figure 44: Occupation of Male CDC Members, by District




Compared to male head-of-household respondents interviewed for the baseline survey, CDC members across the sample are less likely to be farmers (63 percent of interviewees in baseline were famers), but are more likely to be shopkeepers or traders, or teachers. Differences between the occupations of CDC members and baseline respondents are sizeable. While very few traders or shopkeepers were interviewed during the baseline survey in Chisht-e Sharif, Farsi, or Khost Wa Firing, for example, this was a common occupation for CDC members. The is also the case for laborers in Hisarak and Sherzad, and teachers in Khost Wa Firing.

Figure 45: Occupation of Male Head-of-Household Baseline Survey Respondents, by District




As noted above, the proportion of farmers among the executive committee members is generally less than in the overall CDC membership. This pattern holds true across all districts except Gulran and Hisarak, where the respective proportions are statistically indistinguishable. A notable difference with the general CDC membership is the strong representation of members of the clergy (commonly mullahs) in CDC executive committees in Farsi (18 percent), Chisht-e Sharif (8 percent), Daulina (7 percent), and Khost Wa Firing (7 percent).

Figure 46: Occupation of Male CDC Executive Committee Members, by District




The occupations of male CDC heads (summarized in Figure 47 below) are not strikingly different than those of the executive committee members, although farmers generally appear with relatively less frequency. In Adraskan, CDC heads are commonly keepers of livestock or shepherds; in Balkh, they are usually either farmers or village heads; in Chisht-e Sharif, Daulina, Gulran, and Sang Takht, farmers compose a majority of the positions; in Farsi, it is usually either farming or shop-keeping / trading; in Hisarak, a majority of the CDC heads are laborers; CDC heads in Khost Wa Firing are drawn from a variety of occupations, with farming, shop-keeping, trading, and teaching / medicine being the most common; while in Sherzad, CDC heads are commonly either farmers or members of village patriarchy or nobility.

Figure 47: Occupation of Male CDC Heads, by District



Compared to participants interviewed for the male focus group sessions during the baseline survey (summarized in Figure 48 below), members of the CDC executive committee and CDC heads are less likely to be farmers, and more likely to be keepers of livestock or shepherds, laborers, or shopkeepers or traders.

Figure 48: Occupation of Male Focus Group Baseline Survey Respondents, by District



Female Candidates

Information relating to the occupation of unelected female candidates, female CDC members, female members of the CDC executive committee, and female CDC heads is presented in Table 31 below. As shown, 92 percent of female CDC members, 88 percent of female executive committee members, and 89 percent of female CDC heads are housewives without an income-generating occupation. The second most commonly cited occupation is crafts, such as carpet-weaving or tailoring, which is mentioned by 3 percent of CDC members, 4 percent of executive committee members, and 3 percent of CDC heads.¹⁹³

¹⁹³ Complete data on the occupations of unelected candidates is only available for three districts (Chisht-e Sharif, Gulran, and Khost Wa Firing) and so is not compared with the other three categories in order to preclude the drawing of erroneous inferences.

Table 31: Occupation of Female Unelected Candidates, Female CDC Members, Female CDC Executive Committee Members, and Female CDC Heads, by Election Type

	Unelected Candidates ¹⁹⁴			CDC Members			Executive Committee			Head		
	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.
Housewife	88.9%	67.9%	71.0%	92.2%	91.3%	91.8%	88.8%	87.1%	88.0%	90.7%	86.7%	88.8%
Farmer	<u>0.0%</u>	<u>14.2%</u>	12.1%	0.3%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Livestock / Shep.	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.5%	0.0%	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Craft	11.1%	5.7%	6.5%	2.8%	4.2%	3.5%	2.9%	4.8%	3.8%	1.2%	4.8%	3.0%
Medicine	0.0%	2.8%	2.4%	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%	1.1%	0.8%	1.0%	2.3%	2.4%	2.4%
Teacher	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	0.9%	1.0%	2.7%	2.2%	2.5%	3.5%	4.8%	4.1%
Govt. / NGO	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.3%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Other	<u>0.0%</u>	<u>9.4%</u>	8.1%	2.7%	3.3%	3.0%	3.7%	5.1%	4.4%	2.3%	1.2%	1.8%
Observations	18	106	124	1,028	982	2,010	374	356	730	86	83	169

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

The differences between the occupations of unelected female candidates, female CDC members, female executive committee members, and female CDC heads involved in cluster and at-large is presented in Figure 49 below. As indicated, there are very few noticeable differences – and only a couple of statistically significant differences - in the occupation of the respective categories between villages that held the two different types of elections.

Figure 49: Occupation of Female Unelected Candidates, Female CDC Members, Female CDC Executive Committee Members, and Female CDC Heads, by Election Type




Table 32 provides a district-level breakdown of the occupations of unelected female candidates (“Un.”) and elected female members of the CDC (“El.”), the latter of which is also graphically represented in Figure 44. Complete information on the occupations of unelected candidates was not provided for Adraskan, Balkh, Daulina, Farsi, Hisarak, Sang Takht, and Sherzad. Curiously, in Khost Wa Firing, the proportion of women working outside the home is much higher among unelected candidates than among CDC members, although the opposite is the case for Chisht-e Sharif.

¹⁹⁴ Complete data on the occupations of unelected candidates is only available for Chisht-e Sharif, Gulran, and Khost Wa Firing.

Table 32: Occupations of Unelected Female Candidates and Female CDC Members, by District

	Adraskan		Balkh		CeS		Daulina		Farsi		Gulran		Hisarak		KWF		S.T.		Sherzad	
	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.	Un.	El.
Hous.	-	99%	100%	83%	93%	78%	-	100%	-	95%	90%	94%	-	100%	56%	86%	-	67%	-	99%
Farm.	-	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	-	0%	-	0%	10%	0%	-	0%	18%	1%	-	1%	-	0%
Live.	-	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	-	0%
Cra.	-	0%	0%	8%	5%	17%	-	0%	-	5%	0%	2%	-	0%	8%	1%	-	2%	-	1%
Med.	-	0%	0%	2%	0%	1%	-	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	4%	1%	-	1%	-	0%
Tea.	-	0%	0%	2%	0%	1%	-	0%	-	0%	0%	3%	-	0%	0%	1%	-	4%	-	0%
Gov.	-	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	-	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	-	0%
Oth.	-	0%	0%	4%	0%	3%	-	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	14%	10%	-	26%	-	0%
Ob.	0	197	1	249	40	197	0	231	0	171	10	235	0	270	73	155	0	113	0	197


Table 33 provides a district-level breakdown of the occupations of female members of the CDC executive committee (“E.C.”) and female CDC heads (He.), information which is also graphically represented in Figure 51 and Figure 52 respectively. Information on the educational attainment of female CDC heads was not provided for Daulina and Khost Wa Firing

Table 33: Occupations of Female Executive Committee Members and Female CDC Heads, by District

	Adraskan		Balkh		CeS		Daulina		Farsi		Gulran		Hisarak		KWF		S.T.		Sherzad	
	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.	E.C.	He.
Hous.	99%	100%	78%	81%	76%	67%	100%	-	96%	95%	91%	83%	100%	100%	59%	-	50%	50%	99%	100%
Farm.	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%
Live.	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%
Cra.	0%	0%	8%	0%	16%	17%	0%	-	4%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	1%	0%
Med.	0%	0%	6%	12%	1%	4%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%
Tea.	0%	0%	5%	8%	2%	4%	0%	-	0%	0%	8%	17%	0%	0%	12%	-	5%	0%	0%	0%
Gov.	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%
Oth.	0%	0%	2%	0%	5%	8%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	29%	-	45%	50%	0%	0%
Ob.	100	25	100	26	96	24	3	0	90	22	93	23	96	24	17	0	44	2	92	23

As demonstrated in Figure 50 below, there is some variation between districts in occupations held by female CDC members, with the share of female CDC members who state their occupation as housewife varying from 100 percent in Daulina and Hisarak to 79 percent in Chisht-e Sharif and Sang Takht. Students constitute a significant fraction of female CDC members in Sang Takht (23 percent) and Khost Wa Firing (10 percent), have some presence in Balkh (4 percent) and Chisht-e Sharif (2 percent), but do not appear among the CDC membership in the other six districts. In Khost Wa Firing, 17 percent of female CDC members draw income from crafts-work, such as carpet-weaving or tailoring.

Figure 50: Occupation of Female CDC Members, by District



As noted above and demonstrated in Figure 51 below, members of the female executive committee are more likely to have work outside the home than general female CDC members. This is particularly true in Khost Wa Firing and Sang Takht districts, where only 59 percent and 48 percent of CDC members work exclusively among the home. In Khost Wa Firing, five of the 17 female executive committee members are students, while another two are students. In Sang Takht, 22 of the 50 female executive committee members are students, 3 are teachers, and 1 is a health worker.

Figure 51: Occupation of Female CDC Executive Committee Members, by District






Figure 52 below displays the district-level breakdown for the occupations of female CDC heads. A noticeable feature of the data is the large number of female CDC heads in Sang Takht which are not housewives, which stands out from the rest of the districts. The result is, however, a product of the fact that there are only two female CDC heads in Sang Takht, one of which is a student and the other of which is a housewife.

Figure 52: Occupation of Female CDC Heads, by District



Interestingly, compared to female participants interviewed during the baseline survey, a fewer proportion of women elected to the CDC, or which were selected as members of the CDC executive committee or as CDC heads, work outside the home. The difference is particularly acute in Adraskan and Chisht-e Sharif, where 65 percent and 38 percent of respondents respectively, reported that they performed some form of crafts-work. In other districts, particularly Chisht-e Sharif and Sang Takht, however, CDC members were much more likely than are baseline respondents to perform some type of work outside the home.

Figure 53: Occupation of Female Baseline Survey Respondents, by District



VII.4. Elite Continuity

A key question of interest in the experiment is the effect of election type on elite continuity, or the probability that existing power-holders are elected to the CDC. As discussed in Section V above, the effect is theoretically ambiguous, as while at-large elections should weaken the efficacy of attempts to coordinate voters and thereby reduce the probability of incumbents being elected, the at-large method's elimination of geographic constraints on voting may increase the probability of existing leaders being elected to the CDC. This theoretical ambiguity makes the empirical exploration of the effect of election type on elite continuity particularly interesting.

This section tests the effect of election type on elite continuity through two inverse mechanisms: the first calculates the probability that a CDC member of executive office holder was previously identified as a village power-holder during the baseline survey, while the second calculates the probability that a person identified as a power-holder was subsequently elected to the CDC or selected for executive office. A variety of different metrics are used to identify village power-

holders, including whether a person was a member of the male or female focus group during the baseline survey or was cited by members of the male focus group as an important person missing from the group,¹⁹⁵ as well as whether a person was cited by male focus group, male head-of-household, or female individual respondents as an important decision-maker in the village.

Overall, the analysis finds that there is not a set of mutually consistent and individually statistically significant differences between the level of elite continuity in villages that held at-large elections, as opposed to cluster elections. In other words, it does not appear that election type has a significant impact on the probability of an existing power-holder winning election to the CDC. One plausible explanation for this finding is that pre-existing village power-holders do not live close to each other, so that restrictions imposed by cluster elections do not curtail their probability of election under this election system.

CDC Members & Office Holders Ex-Ante Identified as Village Leaders

The first mechanism to test elite continuity calculates the probability that a CDC member or executive office holder can be identified by information from the baseline survey as a village power-holder. To identify male village power-holders, nine different measures are used:

1. Proportion of CDC members or executive office-holders which participated in the Male Focus Group (MFG) during the baseline survey;
2. Proportion of CDC members or executive office-holders named by Male Focus Group (MFG) participants as a person important to the village leadership, but who did not participate in the focus group;
3. Proportion of CDC members or executive office-holders which either participated in the Male Focus Group (MFG) or which were identified by Male Focus Group (MFG) participants as an important person missing from the focus group;
4. Proportion of CDC members or executive office-holders named by Male Focus Group (MFG) respondents as one of (at-most) the three most important people in the village;
5. Proportion of CDC members or executive office-holders named by any Male Head-of-Household (MHH) respondents as one of (at-most) the three most important people in the village;
6. Proportion of CDC members or executive office-holders named by any Female Individual (FI) respondents as one of (at-most) the three most important people in the village;
7. Proportion of CDC members or executive office-holders named by at least one of the three groups of respondents (MFG, MHH, or FI) in the baseline survey;
8. Proportion of CDC members or executive office-holders named by all three of the groups of respondents in the baseline survey.
9. Proportion of CDC members or executive office-holders identified by any of the aforementioned metrics.

The instruments employed during the baseline survey did not ask any of the respondent groups about female village power-holders and female focus group participants were not asked whether there were any women instrumental in the village leadership structure that were missing from the focus group. Accordingly, only one measure is available to identify female village power-holders:

¹⁹⁵ During the baseline survey, enumerators were directed to collect important village power-holders for the focus group surveys. Participants in the survey were also given an opportunity at the beginning of the survey to name any persons they considered important in the leadership of the village who were not able to attend the focus group.

10. Proportion of CDC members or executive office-holders which participated in the Female Focus Group (FFG) during the baseline survey.

Detailed analysis of the impact of election type on these measures of elite continuity is presented in the section below, as well as district-level breakdowns. Election type is not found to affect elite continuity in a clear and consistent manner, although interesting differences are observed between elite continuity in districts. Specifically, elite continuity is found to be relatively high in Adraskan and relatively low in Sherzad.

Male CDC Members & Executive Office Holders

Table 34 below presents information relating to the proportion of male CDC members, male heads, male deputy heads, male treasurers, and male secretaries which participated in the male focus group or which were otherwise identified as village leaders during the baseline survey. Among the general CDC membership, 26 percent had previously participated in the male focus group, while another 9 percent were absent from the focus group, but were cited by participants as a person important to the village leadership who was missing from the focus group. The corresponding statistics were higher for CDC heads, at 42 percent and 12 percent, deputy heads (31 percent and 12 percent), treasurers (30 percent and 10 percent), and secretaries (27 percent and 9 percent). Across the full sample, 29 percent of general CDC members were named by either the male focus group (MFG), male head-of-household (MHH), or female individual (FI) respondents as a village leader. Unsurprisingly, the corresponding figure was much higher for CDC heads, with 59 percent being so named, while 32 percent of deputy heads were so named, 38 percent of treasurers, and 29 percent of secretaries.

A key point of interest is the difference in the respective metrics between members and office-holders elected by cluster elections vis-à-vis at-large elections. A few differences are identifiable, although they collectively fail to paint a clear and consistent picture of the effect of election type on elite continuity. General CDC members elected by an at-large election, for instance, are slightly more likely to have participated in the male focus group or to be cited as an important person missing from the focus group, although the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Similarly, CDC members elected by an at-large election are more likely to have been named as a village leader by MHH respondents, but slightly less likely to be named by either of the other two groups of baseline respondents. Among office-holders, the differences between the two election types in the frequency by which the respective people were named by baseline survey participants are negligible, although there are numerically large differences in the prior participation of CDC heads and deputy-heads in the male focus group. Interestingly, though, the differences go in different directions, with CDC heads elected through cluster elections being 12 percentage points more likely to have participated in the focus group, while deputy heads are 9 percent less likely. Accordingly, the statistics assembled in Table 34 present no clear argument as to the impact of election type on elite continuity.

Table 34: Male CDC Members & Office Holders Identified Ex-Ante As Village Leaders, by Type of Election

	CDC Member			CDC Head			CDC Deputy Head			CDC Treasurer			CDC Secretary		
	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.
1. MFG Member	24%	27%	26%	48%	37%	42%	26%	35%	31%	32%	28%	30%	25%	28%	27%
2. MFG Missing	9%	8%	9%	11%	13%	12%	12%	13%	12%	11%	9%	10%	10%	8%	9%
3. Either of Above	32%	34%	33%	57%	48%	52%	37%	46%	41%	41%	35%	38%	32%	36%	34%
4. Cited by MFG	13%	12%	13%	35%	39%	37%	20%	13%	16%	17%	13%	15%	13%	8%	10%
5. Cited by MHH	21%	24%	22%	49%	51%	50%	21%	22%	22%	25%	34%	30%	24%	23%	24%
6. Cited by FI	15%	14%	14%	42%	41%	41%	16%	13%	14%	22%	20%	21%	14%	15%	15%
7. Cited by One	28%	29%	29%	59%	60%	59%	33%	31%	32%	37%	38%	38%	30%	29%	29%
8. Cited by All	6%	6%	6%	25%	26%	25%	6%	4%	5%	9%	8%	9%	4%	3%	3%
9. Any of Above	39%	42%	40%	68%	66%	67%	42%	50%	46%	49%	44%	46%	37%	44%	40%
Total	1,055	1,003	2,058	118	111	229	95	94	189	107	111	218	112	99	211

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

Table 35 below presents information at the district-level relating to the proportion of CDC members which participated in the MFG or were otherwise identified as village leaders. Adraskan has the highest level of elite continuity, both as measured by the proportion of members who attended the male focus group or were identified as being an important person missing from the male focus group (52 percent of CDC members were so identified) or as measured by the proportion of members identified by village leaders by one or all of the three baseline survey respondent groups (46 percent and 12 percent).¹⁹⁶ At the other end of the spectrum, elite continuity was lowest in Sherzad, where just 19 percent of CDC members either participated or were mentioned as missing from the male focus group and only 12 percent were cited by one of the three respondents groups as village leaders.

Table 35: CDC Members Identified Ex-Ante As Village Leaders, by District

	Adr.	Bal.	CeS	Dau.	Far.	Gul.	His.	KWF	S.T.	She.
1. MFG Member	44.7%	22.4%	28.0%	15.6%	32.6%	23.8%	25.7%	22.4%	26.9%	16.8%
2. MFG Missing	9.7%	9.2%	16.6%	3.8%	7.4%	16.5%	6.3%	5.8%	6.5%	2.5%
3. Either of Above	51.9%	31.6%	41.5%	19.3%	38.9%	37.9%	31.2%	27.0%	32.4%	19.3%
4. Cited by MFG	22.8%	13.6%	13.0%	6.7%	11.4%	13.7%	11.2%	15.5%	14.8%	5.6%
5. Cited by MHH	38.4%	24.0%	30.6%	10.5%	22.3%	18.2%	17.5%	28.7%	24.1%	11.7%
6. Cited by FI	23.3%	16.4%	16.1%	9.7%	18.9%	12.1%	9.3%	16.1%	19.4%	7.1%
7. Cited by One	46.1%	30.4%	36.8%	15.6%	33.7%	25.8%	26.8%	33.3%	30.6%	12.2%
8. Cited by All	12.1%	6.8%	6.2%	3.8%	3.4%	4.0%	2.6%	9.8%	9.3%	4.6%
9. Any of Above	61.2%	43.0%	48.7%	24.4%	46.3%	42.3%	36.8%	37.9%	42.6%	22.3%
Total	206	250	193	238	175	248	269	174	108	197

¹⁹⁶ In addition to Adraskan, the other three districts in Heart – Chisht-e Sharif, Farsi, and Gulran – also had relatively high levels of elite continuity.

Female CDC Members & Executive Office Holders

Table 36 below presents information relating to the proportion of female CDC members, female heads, female deputy heads, female treasurers, and female secretaries which participated in the female focus group during the baseline survey. Approximately, 13 percent of female CDC members did so, while the corresponding proportions for CDC heads, deputy heads, treasurers, and secretaries was 25 percent, 14 percent, 16 percent, and 16 percent respectively.¹⁹⁷

The difference between the proportion of female CDC members elected by at-large elections and those elected by cluster elections who participated in the female focus is negligible. While there are noticeable differences between the respective proportions for CDC heads and deputy heads, as with the male office-holders, these go in conflicting directions and so obscure the identification of an effect. Accordingly, it is concluded that the election type has no impact on elite continuity in the female village leadership, at least as measured in this manner.

Table 36: Female CDC Members & Office-Holders Who Participated in Female Focus Group, by Type of Election

	CDC Member			CDC Head			CDC Deputy Head			CDC Treasurer			CDC Secretary		
	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.
10. FFG Member	12%	13%	13%	27%	23%	25%	<u>9%</u>	<u>18%</u>	14%	17%	16%	16%	15%	17%	16%
Total	1,024	999	2,023	83	80	163	102	98	200	91	83	174	91	89	180

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

Table 37 below presents the proportion of CDC members in each district who previously participated in the female focus group. Wide variation between districts is observed, although the pattern is similar to that observed for male CDC members. Of the ten districts, Adraskan (25 percent), Chisht-e Sharif (26 percent), and Gulran (25 percent) have the highest proportion of CDC members who participated in the female focus group, while Daulina (7 percent) and Sherzad (5 percent) have the lowest.

Table 37: Female CDC Members & Office-Holders Who Participated in Female Focus Group, by District

	Adr.	Bal.	CeS	Dau.	Far.	Gul.	His.	KWF	S.T.	She.
10. FFG Member	24.9%	20.5%	26.3%	7.0%	10.6%	25.0%	10.4%	11.1%	14.5%	4.7%
Total	196	249	198	230	171	247	270	156	109	197

Identified Village Leaders Elected to CDC and Holding Office

An alternative means of assessing elite continuity is to analyze the inverse of what was analyzed above: that is, the proportion of focus group participants or persons otherwise identified as a village leaders which are elected to the CDC or selected for executive positions. Under this approach, the nine measures are defined as follows:

1. Proportion of Male Focus Group (MFG) participants elected to the CDC or selected for executive office;
2. Proportion of persons who did not participate in the Male Focus Group (MFG), but who were named by Male Focus Group (MFG) participants as a person important to the village leadership, and were elected to the CDC or selected for executive office;

¹⁹⁷ These relatively low proportions, as compared to those of the male focus group, in part no doubt reflect the difficulty experienced by the baseline survey enumerators in identifying important women to participate in the female focus group in each village.

3. Proportion of Male Focus Group (MFG) participants or persons identified as missing from Male Focus Group (MFG) who were elected to the CDC or selected for executive office;
4. Proportion of persons named by Male Focus Group (MFG) respondents as one of (at-most) the three most important people in the village who were elected to the CDC or selected for executive office;
5. Proportion of persons named by any Male Head-of-Household (MHH) respondents as one of (at-most) the three most important people in the village who were elected to the CDC or selected for executive office;
6. Proportion of persons named by any Female Individual (FI) respondents as one of (at-most) the three most important people in the village who were elected to the CDC or selected for executive office;
7. Proportion of persons named by at least one of the three groups of respondents (MFG, MHH, or FI) in the baseline survey who were elected to the CDC or selected for executive office;
8. Proportion of persons named by all three of the groups of respondents in the baseline survey who were elected to the CDC or selected for executive office.
9. Proportion of persons named by any of the aforementioned metrics who were elected to the CDC or selected for executive office.

The measure of identifying female village power-holders described above does not change between the two mechanisms and, accordingly, the analysis below is presented only for male candidates. The results of this mechanism are found to be broadly comparable with the first mechanism, with few clear and consistent impacts of election type found on elite continuity.

Male Village Power-Holders

Table 38 below presents information relating to the proportion of persons which participated in the MFG or were otherwise identified as village leaders during the baseline survey who subsequently were elected to the male CDC or were selected as male CDC heads, male deputy heads, male treasurers, and male secretaries. Across the full sample, approximately 27 percent of MFG participants and 24 percent of those missing from the MFG were elected to the CDC. As is to be expected, the proportions were much lower for the executive office positions, with 5 percent of MFG participants and 4 percent of persons missing from the MFG being selected as CDC heads, 3 percent of MFG participants and 3 percent of MFG “missings” being selected for deputy head of the CDC, 3 percent of MFG participants and 3 percent of MFG “missings” being selected for treasurer, and a further 3 percent of MFG participants and 3 percent of MFG “missings” being selected for the secretary position. 42 percent of persons identified as village leaders by MFG participants, 28 percent of persons identified by MHH respondents, and 25 percent of persons identified by FI participants were elected to the CDC. For CDC heads, the corresponding figures are 13 percent, 7 percent, and 9 percent; for deputy head, they are 5 percent, 3 percent, and 3 percent; for treasurer, 5 percent, 4 percent, and 4 percent; and for secretary, 4 percent, 3 percent, and 3 percent. Persons identified as village leaders by all three groups of respondents faced a 48 percent chance of being elected the CDC, a 23 percent chance of being selected as a CDC head, a 4 percent chance of being selected as a deputy head, a 7 percent chance as a treasurer, and a 3 percent chance as a secretary. The corresponding statistics for persons cited by just one of the three groups are 25 percent, 6 percent, 3 percent, 4 percent, and 3 percent.

As with the previous analysis, a few differences between election types are identifiable, although they again collectively fail to paint a clear and consistent picture of the effect of election type on

elite continuity. MFG participants are slightly more likely to be elected to the CDC under at-large elections, but MFG “missings” are slightly more likely to be elected under cluster elections. Likewise, village leaders identified by MFG participants are more likely to be elected by cluster elections, while those identified by FI respondents are less likely. Overall, persons cited by either one or by all of the three respondent groups are more likely to be elected to the CDC under cluster elections, indicating that elite continuity is more significant under cluster elections. However, for executive offices, differences between the two election types in the respective proportions of MFG participants, MFG “missings”, or identified village leaders selected for office are small and statistically insignificant. Accordingly, as with Table 34, the statistics assembled in Table 38 present no clear argument as to the impact of election type on elite continuity.

Table 38: Ex-Ante Village Leaders Elected to Male CDC & Office, by Type of Election

	General Member			Head			Deputy Head			Treasurer			Secretary		
	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.	Cl.	A-L	Tot.
1. MFG Member	26.6%	28.3%	27.4%	5.8%	4.3%	5.0%	2.5%	3.4%	3.0%	3.3%	3.0%	3.2%	2.9%	2.9%	2.9%
2. MFG Missing	24.7%	22.6%	23.7%	3.4%	3.8%	3.6%	2.9%	3.3%	3.1%	3.5%	3.2%	3.4%	2.9%	2.2%	2.5%
3. Either	25.6%	26.5%	26.0%	5.1%	4.1%	4.6%	2.6%	3.3%	3.0%	3.2%	2.7%	3.0%	2.8%	2.8%	2.8%
4. Cited by MFG	43.6%	39.5%	41.6%	12.9%	13.9%	13.4%	6.0%	3.9%	4.9%	5.6%	4.5%	5.1%	4.4%	2.6%	3.5%
5. Cited by MHH	27.8%	27.3%	27.5%	7.4%	6.6%	7.0%	2.5%	2.4%	2.5%	3.4%	4.4%	3.9%	3.4%	2.6%	3.0%
6. Cited by FI	30.3%	27.3%	28.8%	9.3%	9.0%	9.2%	2.9%	2.4%	2.6%	4.4%	4.4%	4.4%	3.2%	3.0%	3.1%
7. Cited by One	26.1%	24.3%	25.2%	6.1%	5.6%	5.8%	2.7%	2.4%	2.5%	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%	2.9%	2.4%	2.6%
8. Cited by All	49.3%	47.5%	48.4%	21.6%	23.8%	22.7%	4.5%	3.3%	3.9%	7.5%	7.4%	7.4%	3.7%	2.5%	3.1%
9. Any of Above	19.2%	20.0%	19.6%	3.7%	3.3%	3.5%	1.8%	2.3%	2.0%	2.4%	2.2%	2.3%	2.0%	2.1%	2.1%

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

Table 39 below presents information at the district-level relating to the proportion of MFG participants or persons that were otherwise identified as village leaders who were elected to the CDC. As in the inverse analysis, Adraskan has the highest level of elite continuity as measured by the proportion of MFG participants or “missings” elected to the CDC, as well as by the proportion of persons named as a village leader by at least one of the three groups of respondents and who were elected to the CDC. In Adraskan, Balkh, and Hisarak, persons identified by all three respondent groups as village leaders faced a two-thirds or higher percentage of election to the CDC. The aforementioned measures proved to be relatively poor predictors of election to the CDC in Daulina, Khost Wa Firing, Sang Takht and Sherzad, however, with just 19 percent, 19 percent, 16 percent, and 17 percent of persons who either participated in or were missing from the MFG being elected. In Daulina, Sang Takht, and Sherzad, a person named as a village leader by all three groups of respondents had less than a one-third chance of being elected.

Table 39: Ex-Ante Village Leaders Elected to CDC, by District

	Adr.	Bal.	CeS	Dau.	Far.	Gul.	His.	KWF	S.T.	She.
1. MFG Member	42.8%	29.8%	26.7%	19.5%	32.8%	28.4%	40.2%	19.2%	17.4%	16.9%
2. MFG Missing	41.7%	24.2%	26.9%	13.9%	22.8%	41.4%	23.3%	9.5%	12.3%	17.2%
3. Either	41.8%	27.9%	25.4%	18.9%	29.7%	31.9%	34.9%	15.6%	16.2%	17.0%
4. Cited by MFG	63.5%	52.3%	37.9%	24.2%	39.6%	45.3%	50.0%	38.0%	29.1%	25.0%
5. Cited by MHH	43.0%	35.9%	28.6%	18.8%	34.2%	34.6%	15.5%	28.4%	20.0%	21.1%
6. Cited by FI	48.0%	33.3%	35.6%	13.9%	32.7%	40.0%	32.9%	20.7%	21.2%	24.1%
7. Cited by One	41.0%	31.0%	27.3%	13.7%	29.9%	32.7%	18.8%	22.3%	18.5%	18.5%
8. Cited by All	67.6%	68.0%	54.6%	32.1%	46.7%	55.6%	66.7%	43.9%	31.3%	32.1%

Power of Baseline Respondent Groups in Influencing CDC Election

To conclude the analysis on elite continuity, we examine the relationship between the probability of a person which is both identified as a village leader and which is elected to the CDC and the category of respondents which identified the person. As such, the analysis considers whether a person identified as a village leader by MFG participants is more likely to be elected to the CDC than a person identified as such by MHH or FI respondents. In order to perform the analysis, identified village leaders are categorized by the respondent group(s) by which they were identified. The probability that a person identified by each combination of respondents is elected to the CDC is then calculated.

Table 40 presents the probabilities of persons identified *ex-ante* as village leaders being elected to the CDC, by the category of respondents which identified the person. As is to be expected, persons identified as village leaders by all three respondent groups (bottom line) have the highest probability of being selected (48 percent). Persons identified by two of the three respondent categories have between a 30 percent and 42 percent chance of being selected, depending on the combinations of categories. Persons identified by both male focus group and male heads-of-household respondents, but not by female individual respondents, fare best at 42 percent, followed by persons identified by male heads-of-household and female individuals, at 38 percent, with persons identified only by male focus group participants and female individuals faring worst at 30 percent. Interestingly, persons identified just by male focus group participants have a relatively high chance of being elected, at 32 percent, while persons identified just by male head-of-household respondents (17 percent) or by female individual respondents (15 percent) have a relatively low chance of being elected.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁸ Statistical comparison of probabilities indicates that there is no difference across election methods, be it cluster or at large.

Table 40: Probability of Persons Ex-Ante Village Leaders Being Elected to CDC, by Respondent Category

Identified As Decision-Maker			Cluster Election		At- Large Election		Total	
MFG	MHH	FI	Proportion	Number	Proportion	Number	Proportion	Number
No	No	Yes	17%	264	12%	244	15%	507
No	Yes	No	16%	462	18%	540	17%	1,002
No	Yes	Yes	37%	107	39%	114	38%	221
Yes	No	No	35%	80	29%	68	32%	148
Yes	No	Yes	33%	21	27%	22	30%	43
Yes	Yes	No	45%	84	39%	97	42%	181
Yes	Yes	Yes	49%	134	48%	122	48%	256

Note: Differences between paired observations for cluster- and at-large elections are significant at the 10 percent level if italicized; significant at the 5 percent level if underlined and italicized; and significant at the 1 percent level if bolded, underlined, and italicized. Differences for all other pairs are statistically insignificant.

The conclusion to be drawn from the analysis is that the support of the pre-existing elite (as proxied by the preferences of the male focus group) is important for the success of a candidate. However, even without this support, a person has a good chance of election if male and female villagers identify him as a village leader. Identification by female villagers alone does not increase the chances of election, unless male villagers also identify the person, but once that is forthcoming, support by female villagers plays an important role, especially if the pre-existing elite do not recognize the candidate.

VIII. Conclusion

This paper provides results of the comparison of two different election types – cluster and at-large – used to select CDC members in 250 villages mobilized under NSP. Villages were randomly assigned to one of the election types and, accordingly, the results identify the causal effect of the election procedures without selection bias.

The analysis finds that at-large elections increase the competitiveness of both male and female CDC elections as measured both by differences in the vote share and the number of unelected candidates. Although no significant differences are identified between election types in the mean level of geographic dispersion of male or female CDC members, significant differences are observed between election types with respect to the dispersion of male CDC members in smaller villages. With respect to the effect of electoral methods on the human capital of CDC member, the analysis indicates that male CDC members elected by at-large elections have significantly higher level of educational attainment and are less likely to be farmers compared to those elected by cluster elections. No differences are observed between the mean ages of male CDC members elected under the two procedures, however, and no differences are observed between the educational attainment, occupation or age of female CDC members. Limited differences are observed between election types in the level of elite continuity.

Because of data availability, the analysis is limited to the effect of electoral methods on the electoral outcomes and does not provide information on the comparison of the results of the work of the CDCs. Such analysis will be conducted in the future based on the information collected during the follow up surveys and monitoring of the projects implementation.

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Annex I: Potential Violations in Treatment Assignment

Table 41: Villages Assigned Cluster Election

District	Village
Daulina	Haidaran
Daulina	Saliman Sufla
Farsi	Jar Ango
Farsi	Tatron
Gulran	Ahmad Kal
Khost Wa Firing	Katagi
Sang Takht	Shina

Table 42: Villages Assigned At-Large Election

District	Village
Adraskan	Poul Besh
Daulina	Gala Baid
Daulina	Gardan Toop
Gulran	Nahmat
Hisarak	Do Ab
Hisarak	Kablo Kas
Hisarak	Par Jena
Hisarak	Shen Pani
Hisarak	Tomani
Sherzad	Banda
Sherzad	Gardi Mela

Annex II: STI-1 Guide for Social Organizers

ELECTION PROCEDURES IN EVALUATION VILLAGES: A GUIDE FOR SOCIAL ORGANIZERS WORKING IN EVALUATION DISTRICTS

SECTION 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON ELECTION PROCEDURES IN EVALUATION DISTRICTS

A. Introduction

This manual provides instructions on how elections should be administered in the 25 villages in this district which are included in the evaluation of the NSP program. The purpose of the evaluation is to learn about how the NSP program affects the quality of life of villagers and to test some new policies which might improve the impact of the NSP program on the lives of villagers. The results of the evaluation will provide important information to the government of Afghanistan and to the Facilitating Partners (FPs) and will influence decisions made by the government of Afghanistan as to whether to expand the NSP program and/or to modify the way in which the program is implemented.

In order for the evaluation to succeed, it is very important that Social Organizers follow the guidelines outlined below when conducting elections to select the members of the Community Development Council (CDC). In the 25 villages in this district which are included in the evaluation of the NSP program, two different procedures will be implemented. The purpose of making this change is to determine the form of election procedure that is most appropriate for electing the CDC in villages receiving the NSP program.

In the district, twelve (or thirteen) of the villages will elect their CDC using a “cluster-based election”, where each villager can only vote for those people who live in the part of the village in which they also live. The other thirteen (or twelve) villages will elect their CDC using an “at-large election”, where each villager can vote for any person in the village, regardless of whether that person lives in their part of the village or not. Although these two different procedures appear somewhat confusing at first, we hope that you will work hard to learn the two election procedures and to implement them correctly in each of the 25 villages included in the evaluation. This will be the only way that the team conducting the evaluation will be able to learn about which procedure is most appropriate for the NSP program.

The team that is conducting the evaluation of the NSP program has decided which twelve (or thirteen) villages in the district will elect the representatives of the CDC using the cluster-based election procedure and which thirteen (or twelve) villages in the district will elect the representatives of the CDC using the at-large election procedure. The names of the 25 villages and type of election procedure they will receive are listed in Section H below. During the day that elections are held in each village, the Evaluation Team and the NSP Head Office will send a monitor to the village to ensure that the correct type of election procedure is held and that the procedure is implemented properly.

This manual aims to provide clear guidelines on how the two election procedures should be implemented. However, you are likely to have questions about the details of each procedure and may encounter situations which are not covered in the guidelines below. In this case, please be sure to ask the FP staff any questions you may have and please feel free to ask them for additional guidance or advice in the event that you come across a situation that is not explained in the guidelines below.

B. Elections: A General Introduction

One of the most important aspects of the NSP program is the holding of a democratic, secret-ballot election to select the members of the Community Development Council (CDC). There are a few key points about elections about which you should be aware:

- Elections are a process where all members of the village community express their choice as to who in the village should be given the power to make important decisions for the village community;
- Elections are conducted done by “secret ballot”. This means that when villagers make their vote, they do so in private so that no one can see which person they voted for. Privacy for voters is usually achieved by allowing voters to make their selection in a closed area where no one else can see the choice they make on their ballot paper;
- Elections have been used over recent years in Afghanistan to allow the people of Afghanistan to make their choice as to who should represent at them at the village, provincial and national level. For example, nation-wide elections were held in 2004 to decide the President of Afghanistan, and in 2005 to select the members of the *Wolesi Jirga* and Provincial Councils. Elections have also been held in villages across Afghanistan to select members of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) as a part of the National Solidarity Program;
- Everyone who is above 18 years of age and is a resident of the village community is usually allowed to vote in an election. Both men and women have the freedom to vote in the election for whoever they would most like to represent them;
- A number of different election procedures exist, each of which has its own advantages and disadvantages. In “cluster-based” elections, for example, people vote only for candidates from their area or “cluster”. The candidate who receives the most votes in each cluster and who lives in that cluster is elected the representative of that cluster. The “cluster-based” election method is a good way to ensure that each area has a dedicated representative. Another type of election is the “at-large” election, in which people vote for all candidates, regardless of whether they live in their cluster or not. Those candidates who receive the most votes, regardless of where they live, are elected to the council. The “at-large” election method is a good way to ensure the most popular people are elected to the council. The “at-large” election method was used to elect candidates from each province to the *Wolesi Jirga* in 2005. Both “cluster-based” and “at-large” election procedures are considered democratic and one is not necessarily better than the other.

C. Cluster-Based Elections vs. At-Large Elections: An Overview

In the 25 villages in the district which are included in the evaluation, one of two different election procedures is to be implemented. In 12 (or 13) of the 25 villages, a cluster-based election procedure will be implemented. In the remaining 13 (or 12) villages, an at-large election procedure is to be implemented.

The assignments of which of the 25 villages will hold an at-large election and which of the 25 villages will hold a cluster-based election has been made by the Evaluation Team. These assignments are listed in Section D below. To ensure that the evaluation is successful and that the Evaluation Team is able to find out which procedure is most appropriate for the NSP program, it is very important that these assignments are adhered to and that the two procedures are implemented correctly as described below.

A description of the Cluster-Based Election is provided below:

Cluster-Based Election

In a cluster-based election, villagers are only allowed to vote for people that live in the part of the village (or “cluster”) in which they themselves live. Each cluster elects two representatives – one male and one female – to the CDC. The male and female that receive the highest number of votes in each cluster are to become members of the CDC, but only if they also live in that cluster. This procedure ensures that each part of the village (or cluster) has its own male and female representatives on the CDC (but does not necessarily ensure that the people that receive the highest number of votes across the whole village become members of the CDC).

In the event that the individual(s) who receives the most votes in a cluster does not live in that cluster, they cannot be elected as the CDC representative from that cluster (they may, however, be elected as the CDC representative from another cluster, but only if they receive the highest number of votes in that cluster **and** live in that cluster). In this case, the individual with the most votes **and** who lives in that cluster should be elected to the CDC.

In order to distinguish the cluster-based election from the at-large election described below, it is very important that each cluster only elect CDC representatives who live in the cluster. You must ensure that this condition is adhered when collating the results of the election and composing the CDCs.

The male and female CDC representatives elected by each cluster are to meet with and seek feedback from their cluster before making decisions on priorities, subprojects, and community contributions. In this sense, each member of the CDC ‘represents’ a particular cluster, to which they are required to report to, and whose interests they should seek to represent on the CDC.

A description of the At-Large Election is provided below:

At-Large Election

In an at-large election, villagers are allowed to vote for any person in the village, regardless of where they live. Those candidates that receive the highest number of votes in the election are to be selected to become members of the CDC, even if all of the people that receive the highest number of votes in the election live in the same part of the village. This procedure ensures that the people that receive the highest number of votes across the whole village become members of the CDC (but does not necessarily ensure that each part of the village (or cluster) has its own male and female representatives on the CDC).

In the at-large election, each villager has three votes. When voting, villagers should use these three votes to indicate which people from the village who they would most like to become members of the CDC. The three votes are not to be ranked, although community members may opt not to use all of their three votes. When describing the election procedure, you must ensure that all villagers understand that they may use their three votes to vote for anyone in their village they think should become a member of the CDC, regardless of whether the people they wish to vote for live in their assigned cluster or in another cluster.

Those males and females which get the most votes in the election across the whole village are to be selected to become members of the CDC. This should be completed without consideration of the clusters those people receiving votes belong to. Thus, if the size of the CDC is 16 members, the eight males and eight females which received the highest number of votes should be elected to the CDC (even if they all live in the same part of the village). The size of the CDC and the balance between male and female representatives to the CDC should be determined in the same manner as for a cluster-based election. That is, the CDC is to consist of an equal number of men and women and the total number of representatives in the CDC will be twice the number of clusters.

Once the results of the election have been counted and the members of the CDC have been selected, it is your duty to assign one male and one female CDC representative to a cluster to which they are to report and to seek feedback from before making decisions on priorities, subprojects, and community contributions. This should be done in with reference to appropriate factors, such as the number of votes the elected CDC members received in each cluster and the location of residence of the CDC members. Sometimes it will not be possible to allocate a CDC member to a cluster in which they live (as will be the case, for instance, if all the elected CDC members come from one part of the village), so you may need to ask the CDC members about which cluster they would prefer to represent. Further directions on this procedure are provided below.

D. Village Election Assignments

The assignments of which of the 25 villages will hold an at-large election and which of the 25 villages will hold a cluster-based election has been made by the Evaluation Team. To ensure that the evaluation is successful and that the Evaluation Team is able to find out which procedure is most appropriate for the NSP program, it is very important that these assignments are adhered to.

The villages in this district which are to use a cluster-based election to select the CDC are listed in the table below:

Cluster-Based Election	
District Name	Village Name
1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	
6.	
7.	
8.	
9.	
10.	
11.	
12.	
13.	

The villages in this district which are to use an at-large election to select the CDC are listed in the table below:

At-Large Election	
District Name	Village Name
1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	
6.	
7.	
8.	
9.	
10.	
11.	
12.	
13.	

E. Election Rules

When administering cluster-based or at-large elections in villages surveyed by the evaluation, there are a set of common rules that Social Organizers must be sure to uphold during the administration of the election. These rules are provided by the NSP Operational Manual. The rules are as follows:

- Every resident of the community, male and female, aged eighteen years or above who has lived for at least one year in the community, has the right to vote in the CDC election;
- Every resident of the community, male and female, aged eighteen years or above who has lived for at least one year in the community; has no record of criminal conduct or human rights violations; has sufficient time available for work on the CDC; and is not a member of the National Assembly or Provincial Council is eligible to be elected a member of the CDC;
- Information and documents concerning the CDC election procedure, including an explanation of the election procedures and the registration of voters, should occur at least 30 days prior to the date of the election;
- Voting is conducted through a secret ballot. Each person should be allowed to cast his or her vote in private without interference;
- Separate polling stations should exist for male and female voters;
- Predefined candidate lists and electioneering are prohibited. All community members who are eligible to be a CDC member are a candidate unless they withdraw their candidacy. To avoid the problem of electing the candidates that would be unwilling to serve as CDC members, prior to the election community members will have an opportunity to declare that they will not accept the position if elected.
- FP staff should be present to assist illiterate voters in filling out their ballots, but should in no way provide any advice or information that may be perceived as influencing the choice of the voters.
- At least 60% of eligible voters must vote for the election to be valid. If the turnout is less than 60%, new elections should be organized;
- Only one CDC is to be elected per village. Separate CDCs cannot be established for sub-groups of an existing village (such as political, ethnic, or family groups);
- The counting of votes and announcement of results shall take place immediately and openly following the conclusion of the voting process;
- Convening of the election, announcement of the results, and registration of the CDC shall be carried out under the supervision of the MRRD representatives of the respective district and also potentially under the supervision of a monitor assigned by the Evaluation Team;
- The names of persons elected to the CDC should be posted in at least three public places accessible to the residents of the community.

In both at-large and cluster-based elections, election results must first be counted separately in each cluster. In the case of an at-large election, it will also be necessary to combine the vote counts at the cluster-level into a village-wide count in order to determine the results of the election and determine the CDC representatives.

In both at-large and cluster-based elections, a record of the vote counts in each cluster must be retained by the FP staff and reported to the NSP office and the Evaluation Team. In the case of at-large elections, a record of the vote counts for the whole village should also be retained by the Social Organizer and the FP staff and reported to the NSP office and the Evaluation Team (in addition to the vote counts at the village-level).

F. Monitoring

In order to ensure that election procedures are conducted according to the manner prescribed in the above sections, the Evaluation Team, support staff, and representatives of the NSP office will conduct regular and consistent monitoring of election procedures in the 25 villages which have been surveyed by the Evaluation team.

This monitoring will include the observance of CDC elections and vote-counting procedures; interviews with community members, election candidates, and elected CDC representatives; inspection of cluster and village-wide vote counts; and election audits to ensure that the results of vote counts coincide with ballots cast by community members.

Following the completion of each election observation, the election monitors will provide a report to the FP staff, to the NSP office, and to the Evaluation Team about whether the election procedures described in this document were adhered to correctly.

SECTION 2: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO ADMINISTERING ELECTIONS IN EVALUATION DISTRICTS

The following section provides a step-by-step guide to how you should administer cluster-based or at-large elections in the 25 villages in the district which are surveyed by the Evaluation Team. The section is divided up into 6 sub-sections in the order by which they should be carried out in each village: Sub-Section A concerns the manner in which the CDC election should be introduced to the community; Sub-Section B concerns the division of the village into separate clusters; Sub-Section C details the voter registration process; Sub-Section D concerns the procedures to be followed on the day of the election; Sub-Section E concerns the way in which votes should be counted and the CDC members determined in both cluster-based and at-large elections; and Sub-Section F details the various forms that the Election Team asks that you complete to supply necessary information for the evaluation.

A. Introduction of CDC Election Process to Community

The first step upon is to introduce the NSP and the CDC election process and the rules of the CDC election to the village community. In order to do this, you should a meeting with the whole community to explain the election process. This meeting should always be called with the assistance of village elders and/or leaders.

During this meeting, you should emphasize the following points:

- **Responsibilities of the CDC:** The CDC is to be democratically elected by the residents of the village (and only the residents of the village) and is given the responsibility to design the Community Development Plan and to implement and manage sub-projects financed through block grants provided by the NSP program. Elected CDC members will be involved in activities such as purchasing materials and equipment in the district or provincial centers. They should thus be trustworthy individuals who will act with the best interests of the village community at heart;
- **Composition of CDC:** The CDC is to be made up of an equal number of female and male representatives selected by the villagers through a select ballot election. The size of the CDC will be determined by the number of families in the village;
- **Purpose of the CDC Election:** The purpose of the election is to select the members of the CDC. The wishes of the people, as expressed in the election, will decide which villagers become members of the CDC;
- **Who Can Vote:** Every resident of the community, male and female, aged eighteen years or above who has lived for at least one year in the community, has the right to vote in the CDC election;
- **Who to Vote For:** Villagers should vote for whoever they feel will be best able to serve the needs of the village on the CDC. A vote is a personal and private choice and no one should attempt to influence anyone else's vote. Villagers may vote for men or for women;
- **How to Vote:** Villagers should write the name (or, in the case of an at-large election, names) of the people they wish to be elected to the CDC on the ballot paper that is provided;
- **Illiterate Voters:** Villagers that are illiterate or unable to cast their vote may ask an FP representative or close family member to assist them. If assisted by an FP representative, this representative will not attempt to affect or influence the voter's choice in any way and will not reveal your vote choice to anyone else;
- **Voter Registration Process:** In order to vote, eligible voters must first be registered. FP representatives will be visiting all dwellings in the village to record the names and register eligible voters in the next week(s);

- **Eligibility for CDC Membership:** Every resident of the community, male and female, aged eighteen years or above who has lived for at least one year in the community; has no record of criminal conduct or human rights violations; has sufficient time available for work on the CDC; and is not a member of the National Assembly or Provincial Council is eligible to be elected a member of the CDC;
- **Candidacy for CDC Membership:** In the CDC election process, electioneering and other forms of campaigning are prohibited. All community members who are eligible to be a CDC member are a candidate unless they withdraw their candidacy. To avoid the problem of electing the candidates that would be unwilling to serve as CDC members, prior to the election community members will have an opportunity to declare that they will not accept the position if elected;
- **Secret Ballot:** Everyone in the village is to cast their vote in secret. When they enter the polling station to cast their vote, no one will be able to find out who you vote for. In fact, there will be way for anyone else to know who you voted for. Only the aggregate results will be known;
- **Clusters:** The village is to be divided up into clusters, which are groups of between 5 and 20 families. Each cluster is to have a male and female representative on the CDC.
- **Polling Station:** In each cluster, there will be a “polling station” where villagers will go on the day of the election to cast their ballot. There will be separate polling stations in each cluster for men and women;
- **Type of Election:** In villages assigned to administer a cluster-based election (see table below), explain that villagers are only allowed to vote for people who live in their assigned cluster. In villages assigned to administer an at-large election (see table below), explain that villagers should vote for the three people in the village they would like to be members of the CDC, regardless of where in the village they live;
- **Number of Votes:** In villages assigned to administer a cluster-based election, each villager will have one vote. In villages assigned to administer a cluster-based election, villagers will have three votes (with these three votes, they must select three different people, however. Votes that mention the same name more than once will be discarded);
- **Turnout:** In order for an election to be valid and for the village to select a CDC and receive an NSP block-grant, 60 percent of eligible voters must participate in the election. For this reason, it is important that all eligible voters, and especially women, participate in the election;
- **Date of Election:** Please announce the date of the election. This should occur one month following the public gathering to explain the election procedures;
- **Publication of Election Results:** Following the election, FP representatives will count and tally the election results. Those persons who receive the most votes will be elected to the CDC. The names of the persons elected to the CDC will be posted in at least three public places accessible to villagers.

Election Assignments for 25 Villages Surveyed by Evaluation Team

Cluster-Based Election		At-Large Election

B. Division of Village into Clusters

Following the community gathering to explain the election process, the next step is to divide the village into a number of “clusters”. The division of the community into clusters should be done in all villages receiving the NSP program, regardless of whether the village is to conduct a cluster-based or at-large election.

Each cluster in the village is to have its own polling station where villagers place their vote in the ballot box. In addition, each cluster is to have its own male and female representative on the CDC. Each member of the CDC is to report back to assigned cluster about their work on the CDC. The division of each village into clusters is thus an important process and should be done carefully to ensure that the clusters are a logical representation of the geographic, ethnic, or religious diversity of the village.

How to Make the Clusters


Before beginning the process of dividing the village into clusters, please find out about the number of families in the village. This information should be provided to you by the village leaders and/or village elders, but please check this information with other villagers. In addition, the Evaluation Team can assist in providing information about the number of families in the village.

The village is to be divided into clusters in a manner that is logical and which groups together families that are in regular contact with each other. There are a number of important considerations when dividing the community into clusters:

- Each cluster should contain no less than 5 families and no more than 20 families;
- The total number of clusters in the village will depend on the size of the village. Large villagers will have more clusters than smaller villages;
- The number of families in each cluster in a village should be more or less the same. Within a single village, no cluster should have more than two families more or less than any other cluster;
- Clusters should be group together families that are in regular contact with each other or which have something else in common. For example, the families in a cluster may attend the same mosque or share a well or electrical generator;
- Clusters should geographically contiguous. That is, neighboring dwellings should be grouped together so that each cluster represents a particular area of the village and not an assortment of dwellings spread across the village. To demonstrate this, the two illustrations below show two sets of clusters, one correct and one incorrect. In the illustration on the right, the village is drawn with non-contiguous set of clusters – neighboring dwellings are not grouped together. This is an incorrect procedure for composing clusters. The illustration on the left represents a correct means of composing village clusters – neighboring dwellings are grouped together in clusters.


Correct Village Clusters

(Groups are Contiguous)



Incorrect Village Clusters

(Groups are Not Contiguous)




Drawing the Village Map

Once you have divided the village into clusters, you should assign a unique number or name to each cluster in the village. You should then draw a map of the village showing the location of the houses in the village and the borders of each cluster with their number or name. In addition, the map should show the location of major landmarks in the village (if they exist), such as a river, bridge, agricultural fields, mosque, well, bazaar, electrical generator, school, bridge etc.

To draw this map, please use the template that is provided to you by the FP staff. On this template are listed a number of village landmarks that should be drawn on the map (if they exist in the village), in addition to the location of the dwellings of the village and the clusters.

An example of a map of a village is shown below. You will notice that each cluster in the village has between seven and eight dwellings. There are 6 clusters in the village and these are numbered 1 – 6, with the houses that belong to each cluster clearly displayed. The location of the river and bridge are clearly shown. The location of mosques in the village is shown by the symbol: . The locations of wells are shown by the words “Water Well”, the location of schools by the words “School”, and the house of the Malik by the arrow pointing out from the words “House of Malik”. Using this map, it is easy for villagers to find out which cluster they belong to.



When drawing the village map, please be careful to make sure it is accurate as possible and displays all information necessary for villagers to find out which cluster they belong to. Members of the Evaluation Team and/or NSP Monitoring Team will visit the village and check to ensure the map is accurate.

Location of Polling Stations

Each cluster is to have a separate male and female polling station, with an individual male and female ballot box for each cluster. Thus, if the community is divided into six clusters, there should be six male and six female polling stations, located within each of the six clusters.

Polling stations should be located near the geographical centre of each cluster so that they are easily accessible by families living in that cluster. Where clusters are organized around a mosque or other communal building or resource, you should place the polling stations next to the mosque or communal building or resource in order to make the polling station easy to find.

As described further below, regardless of whether a cluster-based or at-large election is held, the number of votes that each candidate received in each cluster must be counted and recorded. That is, even when an at-large election is held, you must first count the number of votes received by each candidate in each cluster and record this number of votes on the sheet entitled “Election Results - Cluster”.

Information about Cluster Assignments

Once the community has been divided into clusters, all villagers should be informed of which cluster they belong to. This is important so that villagers know the location of their assigned polling station where they will place their vote in the ballot box. In the case of villages

assigned to hold cluster-based elections, villagers must also know their assigned clusters in order to know who they will be allowed to vote for in the election (since each villager is allowed to vote only for those people who live in their assigned cluster).

In order to ensure that all villagers know which cluster they belong to, please make sure you do two things:

- Visit each dwelling in the village to inform each family of the name or number of the cluster that the dwelling has been assigned to.
- Inform each family which other dwellings have been assigned to their cluster as well (this is especially important in the case of cluster-based elections, so that villagers know who they are allowed to vote for)
- Inform each family of the location of the polling station in the cluster where they will cast their vote;
- In small villages, please post a copy of the Village Map you have drawn in a central location in the village that villagers commonly visit (such as the mosque or village bazaar).
- In larger villages, please post copies of the Village Map in a central location in each cluster. This will allow villagers to examine the map and learn about the locations of the clusters on their own.

C. Voter Registration

Once the village has been divided into clusters, the next step is to undertake the registration of eligible voters in the village. This is a very important process as voters must be registered on the Eligible Voter Registration List (see below) in order to vote. On the day of the election, FP staff will use the Eligible Voter Registration List to ensure that no person votes more than once and to ensure that a turnout of at least 60 percent of eligible voters is achieved.

In order to conduct the voter registration, you are to visit each dwelling in the village and locate the persons in each dwelling that are eligible to vote in the CDC election. As noted above, all men and women in the village are eligible to vote provided that they meet the following two conditions:

- 18 years of age or older
- Lived in the village for at least one year

For villagers that meet these two conditions, please record the following information on the Eligible Voter Registration List (see below):

- For Men: Name, Name of Father, Name of Head of Family, Age
- For Women: Name, Husband or Father, Name of Head of Family, Age (Note that if families do not want to give the specific names of women, they can list women by stating “*Wife of...*”)

An example of the “Eligible Voter Registration List” that should be used to record the names of eligible voters is provided below. Please note that the column entitled “Signature of Voters” is not to be filled during the voter registration process. When eligible voters come to the polling station to make their vote, they are to sign their name in the cell that is adjacent to their name. This is to show that they have voted.

When meeting with families to do the voter registration, please discuss with them the voting procedure and the voting rules. You should inform each eligible voter the name or number of the cluster that he or she has been assigned to, the location of the polling station for that cluster at which they should vote on the day of the election, and the date of the election.

If the village is to administer a cluster-based election procedure, please inform eligible voters that they may only vote for people that live within the cluster in which they themselves live and that they only have one vote. If the village is to administer an at-large election, please remind eligible voters that they have three votes and that they may vote for three people who live anywhere in the village (they cannot vote for the same person more than once, however).

When conducting the voter registration, please also remind people that their vote is secret and that they should use their vote to select the person (or persons, in the case of an at-large election) which they feel will act honestly and in the best interests of the village community.

Eligible Voter Registration List

	District		Village		Cluster	
Signature of Voter	Gender	Age	Name of Head of Family	Name of Father (or Husband)	Name	
						1
						2
						3
						4
						5
						6
						7
						8
						9
						10
						11
						12
						13
						14
						15
						. . .

D. Administration of Election

In order to conduct the election in accordance with the guidelines of the NSP Operational Manual, it is important that two separate polling stations be established in each cluster – one for male voters and one for female voters. The polling station should allow each person to make their selection in private, so that no one else can see the name(s) they write on their ballot paper. The polling stations should be located in a central location in each cluster.

On the day of the election, at least one male and one female Social Organizer and/or FP Staff should be present at each polling station from the time the polling stations open in the morning until the time they close in the afternoon. Social Organizers and/or FP staff-members present at the polling station must have the Eligible Voter Registration List for that cluster so that they can allow voters to sign next to their name on the list to indicate that they have been given the opportunity to make their vote.

Members of the village community should make their vote in the following manner:

- Upon arrival at the polling station, voters should approach the Social Organizer and/or FP staff-member present and tell them their name, age, and name of father (or husband);
- The Social Organizer and/or FP staff-member should check the thumb of the person to ensure that he or she hasn't already voted;

- The Social Organizer and/or FP staff-member should find the person on the Eligible Voter Registration List and ask them to sign (or, if illiterate, make a thumbprint) next to their name on the list;
- In the event that the person's name is not on the list, the person must not be allowed to vote. It is possible, for instance, that the person has gone to the wrong polling station. In this case, please direct the person to the polling station of the cluster that they are assigned to;
- Once the eligible voter's name has been found and their signature or thumbprint recorded, they should be given a pen and ballot paper and asked to step inside the polling station;
- Once inside the polling station, the voter is to write the name of the person (or 3 persons, if the village has been assigned an at-large election) that they would like to become members of the CDC on the ballot paper;
- If an eligible voter is illiterate and unable to write the name of their choice on the ballot paper, they may ask for assistance from a family member, one of the Social Organizers and/or FP staff-members, or one of the respected people in the village. When providing assistance, such persons must be careful not to influence the choice of the voter and to represent the voter's choice accurately on the ballot paper;
- Once the voter has written their choice on the ballot paper, they should fold the ballot paper over so that no one can see the writing on it, step outside the polling station, and place the ballot paper in the ballot box;
- Once a person has voted, his thumb should be coloured with a marker pen to show that he/she has already voted;
- Inform voters that votes will be counted immediately after the casting of ballots has been completed. Results will be communicated via public notice boards and, if applicable, via the speakers of local Mosques.

Please note that the ballot box should be kept with the Social Organizer and/or FP staff-member at all times in order to prevent mischief. The ballot box is to be locked and should only be opened at the end of the day for the counting of the election results.

In the event that women are unable to walk to the polling station to make their votes, it may be necessary to take the ballot box to the dwelling in which they live to collect their votes. This should be done at the end of the day, after the men living in the cluster have made their votes at the polling station, but before the ballot boxes have been opened and the counting of votes has started.

E. Counting of Votes and Selection of CDC Members

Once all of the eligible voters in the village have been given the opportunity to cast their votes, the Social Organizers and FP staff-members (and any village elders or other village members who have assisted the election process as part of the Election Team) should carry the locked ballot boxes to a central location in the village where the villagers can gather to observe the counting of the election results. The ballot boxes from each cluster should be counted separately. The counting of the votes should proceed with one Social Organizer and/or FP staff-member removing the votes from the ballot box and announcing the name and another Social Organizer and/or FP staff-member recording the name(s) listed on each vote on a piece of paper.

The procedures for counting votes, selecting CDC members, and announcing results will differ depending on whether the village is assigned a cluster-based election or at-large election. The specific procedures for each of the two elections are outlined below:

Cluster-Based Election: In a cluster-based election, the male and female that receive the highest number of votes in each cluster are to become members of the CDC, provided that they live in that cluster. In the event that the individual(s) who receives the most votes in a cluster does not live in that cluster, they should not be elected to the CDC. In this case, the individual with the most votes and who lives in that cluster should be elected to the CDC.

The following example demonstrates how Social Organizers and FP staff-members should determine the winners of the cluster-based election:

Example: In order to demonstrate how a CDC should be selected based on the results of a cluster-based election, please examine the hypothetical election results presented in the table below. This village was divided into three clusters by the Social Organizer, meaning that the CDC will have six representatives, three male and three female. The results from the ballot box in Cluster 1 are presented in the left column, the results from the ballot box in Cluster 2 are presented in the middle column, and the results from the ballot box in Cluster 3 are presented in the right column. In each of the three columns are four pieces of information: (1) the number of votes each candidate received in that cluster; (2) the name of the candidate; (3) the gender of the candidate; and (4) the cluster where the candidate is from. For example, Ajmal Ahmady, a male who lives in Cluster 1, received 39 votes in Cluster 2, 8 votes in Cluster 1, and 6 votes in Cluster 3.

CDC Composition for Cluster-Based Elections

Cluster 1 Ballot Box Results				Cluster 2 Ballot Box Results				Cluster 3 Ballot Box Results			
Votes	Name		Cl.	Votes	Name		Cl.	Votes	Name		Cl.
30	Eng. Shahim	M	2	47	Nadima Wardak	F	2	24	Eng. Noorzad	M	3
18	Fatima Laghmani	F	3	39	Ajmal Ahmady	M	1	16	Massouda Sultan	F	3
17	Aman Ahrary	M	1	35	Aman Ahrary	M	1	12	Fatima Laghmani	F	3
12	Zabi Assil	M	1	21	Eng. Shahim	M	2	9	Ahmad Wali	M	3
10	Arezu Ghani	F	1	14	Sherzad Arary	M	1	6	Ajmal Ahmady	M	1
8	Ajmal Ahmady	M	1	7	Eng. Noorzad	M	3	5	Eng. Shahim	M	2
7	Nadima Wardak	F	2	1	Abdul Stanikzai	M	2	2	Abdul Stanizkai	M	2
102	Total Votes			164	Total Votes			74	Total Votes		

In this particular cluster-based election, due to a mistake by the Community Organizers, the community members did not understand that they should only vote for people who live in their cluster. As a result, community members voted for both people who in their cluster and other parts of the village. Nonetheless, in order to determine which candidates should become members of the CDC, the Social Organizer must select the male and female candidates that received the most votes from each cluster and who also live in that cluster.

In Cluster 1, Eng. Shahim received more votes than any other male, but does not live in Cluster 1 and so is ineligible to be elected to the CDC as the representative for Cluster 1. Of the male candidates who live in Cluster 1, Aman Ahrary received the most votes and so is the male CDC representative for Cluster 1. Of the female candidates who live in Cluster 1, Arezu Ghani received the most votes and so is the female CDC representative for that cluster. For Cluster 2, the female CDC representative is Nadima Wardak and the male CDC representative is Eng. Shahim, who are the top female and male candidates who live in that cluster. For Cluster 3, the female and male CDC representatives are Massouda Sultan and Eng. Noorzad, respectively.

Social Organizers and/or FP staff-members should use the procedures described in the above example to determine the male and female CDC representatives of each cluster immediately following the end of the counting of the votes in the ballot boxes of each cluster. The male and female with the most votes from each cluster should be announced as the elected representatives of that cluster (provided, of course, the top vote-getters also live in that cluster). Please be sure to record the number of votes received by each candidate in each cluster on the Cluster Vote Count form.

At-Large Election: In an at-large election, villagers are free to vote for any person in the community, regardless of where they live. Another difference is that in the at-large election, each eligible voter is to have three votes (which they must use to choose three different people they would like to be members of the CDC). Only the male and the female members of the community who get the most votes in the community election are to become members of the CDC. The determination of which candidates become members of the CDC should be completed without consideration of where those candidates live in the village and which clusters they belong to.

The size of the CDC and the balance between male and female representatives to the CDC should be determined in the same manner as for a cluster-based election. That is, the CDC will eventually consist of an equal number of men and women and the total number of representatives in the CDC will be twice the number of clusters.

Even when an at-large election is held, it is necessary to assign one male and one female CDC representative to a cluster to which they are to report and to seek feedback from before making decisions on priorities, subprojects, and community contributions. Social Organizers should seek take the preferences of each cluster into account by assigning CDC members to clusters where they received the most votes. However, in the event that a single individual receives a large share of the votes across a number of different clusters, Social Organizers should exercise discretion and take appropriate factors (such as the location of residence of the CDC representative(s) and the distribution of votes across the clusters) into account when making the assignments. Social Organizers should pay special attention to assignment of female member of the CDC to clusters to ensure that all the female members of the CDC can freely visit the cluster that they are assign to.

The following example demonstrates how Social Organizers and FP staff-members should determine the winners of the at-large election and make cluster reporting assignments for the elected members:

Example: In order to demonstrate how a CDC should be selected based on the results of an at-large election, please examine the hypothetical election results presented in the table below. As in the earlier example, the community was divided into three clusters by the Social Organizer, meaning that the CDC will have six representatives, three male and three female. In an at-large election, the candidates elected to the CDC are those which receive the highest number of votes, regardless of the cluster in which the candidate resides. Thus, in order to determine which community members are elected to the CDC, the number of votes obtained by each candidate in each cluster should be combined to get the total number of votes obtained by each candidate across the whole community. When the votes in each of the three clusters are combined into a single tally for the whole community, we obtain the results displayed in Table 3 below.

CDC Composition for At-Large Elections

Election Results			
Votes	Name	Cl.	
56	Eng. Shahim	M	2
53	Ajmal Ahmady	M	1
52	Aman Ahrary	M	1
54	Nadima Wardak	F	2
31	Eng. Noorzad	M	3
30	Fatima Laghmani	F	3
16	Sultan Massouda	F	3
14	Sherzad Arary	M	1
12	Zabi Assil	M	1
10	Arezu Ghani	F	1
9	Ahmad Wali	M	3
3	Abdul Stanikzai	M	2
302	Total Votes		

Given that there are three clusters in this community, the CDC is to comprise six representatives – three males and three females. Thus, in this case, the CDC will be comprised of the three males and three females with the highest number of votes. According to the vote tally displayed in Table 3 above, the male CDC representatives are Eng. Shahim (56 votes), Ajmal Ahmady (53 votes), and Aman Ahrary (52 votes). The female CDC representatives are Nadima Wardak (54 votes), Fatima Laghmani (30 votes), and Sultan Massouda (16 votes). Note that the change in the type of election procedure from a cluster-based to an at-large election has resulted in a change in the composition of the CDC, even though the pattern of voting remains identical.

With an at-large election, an extra step is required in order to determine the cluster reporting assignments for the six CDC representatives. In order to do this, it is necessary for social organizers to examine the results of the election on a cluster-by-cluster basis. The results of the election by cluster are given in Table 4 below. As with the cluster-based election, each cluster should have two reporting representatives – one male and one female. In contrast to the reporting structure with the cluster-based election, however, it is not necessary for representatives to live in the cluster that they are reporting to. Rather, the reporting assignments should be determined by the pattern of voting in the different clusters. Where possible, CDC representatives should be assigned to the clusters where they received the most votes. Thus, in the example, Eng. Shahim and Fatima Laghmani should be assigned to report

to Cluster 1, since this is the cluster where they received the most votes. For cluster 2, Nadima Wardak is the female representative and Aman Ahrary is the male representative. Although Ajmal Ahmady received more votes than Aman Ahrary in Cluster 2, Aman Ahrary did not receive any votes in Cluster 3 and so should not be assigned to report to that cluster. Instead, Ajmal Ahmady becomes the male representative for Cluster 3, with Massouda Sultan taking the female representative position for the cluster. The cluster reporting assignments for the example are summarized in Table 4 below:

Table 4: Determination of Cluster Reporting Assignments for At-Large Elections

Cluster 1 Ballot Box Results				Cluster 2 Ballot Box Results				Cluster 3 Ballot Box Results			
Votes	Name	Cl.		Votes	Name	Cl.		Votes	Name	Cl.	
30	Eng. Shahim	M	2	47	Nadima Wardak	F	2	24	Eng. Noorzad	M	3
18	Fatima Laghmani	F	3	39	Ajmal Ahmady	M	1	16	Massouda Sultan	F	3
17	Aman Ahrary	M	1	35	Aman Ahrary	M	1	12	Fatima Laghmani	F	3
12	Zabi Assil	M	1	21	Eng. Shahim	M	2	9	Ahmad Wali	M	3
10	Arezu Ghani	F	1	14	Sherzad Arary	M	1	6	Ajmal Ahmady	M	1
8	Ajmal Ahmady	M	1	7	Eng. Noorzad	M	3	5	Eng. Shahim	M	2
7	Nadima Wardak	F	2	1	Abdul Stanikzai	M	2	2	Abdul Stanizkai	M	2
102	Total Votes			164	Total Votes			74	Total Votes		

Social Organizers and/or FP staff-members should use the procedures described in the above example to determine the men and women that have been elected to the CDC and the cluster reporting assignments for the elected CDC members. Please be sure to record the number of votes received by each candidate in each cluster on the Cluster Vote Count form.

Before the results of the CDC election can be determined, the cluster vote counts must be combined into a village-wide vote count. For this reason, and for the reason that Social Organizers and FP staff-members will have three times the number of votes to count as they would have had to in a cluster-based election, the counting process for the at-large election is expected to take longer than the counting process for the cluster-based election. In order to save time, all Social Organizers and FP staff-members should assist in counting the votes at the cluster-level and in adding the vote counts of each cluster together to provide the village-wide vote count. Once the village-wide vote count has been completed, please record and report the results on the Village Vote Count form.

The village-wide vote count should be announced to the group that is assembled for the counting of the votes. Social Organizers and FP staff-members should then announce that the persons who got the highest number of votes in the village-wide count will be the members of the CDC. As noted above, the number of members of the CDC will depend on the number of clusters in the village.

F. Reporting

For each of the 25 communities included in the evaluation, you should complete a number of forms following the election process. These are described below:

1. Village Map – As noted above in Section 2.B, this map should be drawn to show the location of the clusters in the election and the number of dwellings or families in each cluster. The unique numbers that have been assigned to clusters should be clearly marked on the map. In addition, the map should indicate the major landmarks in the village, such as schools, rivers, bridges, mosques, wells for drinking water, and electrical generators. Please refer to Section 2.B above for an example of what the Village Map should look like. A template for the village map and a list of landmarks that might be included on the map is shown below:

VILLAGE MAP

District:		Village Name:		Number of Clusters in Village:		
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- Please draw and number the following features on the map (if applicable):
- 1

Dwellings

2

Clusters (with Names or Numbers)

3

Market / Bazaar

4

Health Center / Clinic

5

School(s)

6

Mosque(s)

7

Bridge(s)

8

Road(s)

9

Electricity Generator(s)

10

Well(s)

11

River(s)

12

Hill(s) / Mountain(s)

13

Agricultural Field(s)

2. Eligible Voter Registration List – This is a list of all persons in the community that are eligible to vote in the CDC election and have to be registered to vote. When voters come to the polling station to vote in the CDC election, they will sign their name on the Eligible Voter Registration List to indicate that they have voted in the election (for further information, please see Section 2.C above). For this reason, it is important the Eligible Voter Registration Lists are prepared for each cluster of the village. All of the voter registration lists, complete with the signatures of those that participated in the election, should be given to the FP staff-member (who will give it to the Evaluation Team) following the completion of the CDC election. An example of the Eligible Voter Registration List is provided below:

Eligible Voter Registration List

	District		Village		Cluster
Signature of Voter	Gender	Age	Name of Head of Family	Name of Father (or Husband)	Name
					1
					2
					3
					4
					5
					6
					7
					8
					9
					10
					11
					12
					13
					14
					15
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					17
					18
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					27
					28
					29
					30
					...

3. Cluster Vote Count Form – All the information presented in the tables in Section 2.E should be clearly recorded in a Cluster Vote Count Form. The name, name of head of family (father or husband), gender, cluster of residence, and number of votes received by each person who received at least one vote in the CDC election in that cluster should be listed. Regardless of whether an at-large or cluster-based election is held, this information should be recorded for each cluster in the village. That is, different forms must be made for each cluster in the village. In villages where a cluster-based election is held, the Cluster Vote Count Forms will be used to determine which people are elected members of the CDC (the man and the woman with the most votes in each cluster are elected to the CDC). An example of the Cluster Vote Count Form is provided below:

Cluster Vote Count Form

	District		Village		Cluster	
sNumber of Vote Received in Cluster	Gender	Age	Cluster of Residence of Vote-Getter	Name of Head of Family	Name of Candidate or Vote-Getter	
						1
						2
						3
						4
						5
						6
						7
						8
						9
						10
						11
						12
						13
						14
						15
						16
						17
						18
						19
						20
						21
						22
						23
						24
						25
						26
						27
						28
						29
						...

4. Village Vote Count Form (At-Large Elections ONLY) – In villages where an at-large election is held, you must also prepare a vote count form which lists all the information (and number of votes received) for all persons who received at least one vote in the CDC election in at least one of the clusters of the village. In this form, the sum of the number of votes received in all of the clusters in the village will be recorded. In villages where an at-large election is held, this form will be used to determine which people are elected members of the CDC (the men and women with the most votes across the whole village are elected to the CDC). An example of the Village Vote Count Form is provided below:

Village Vote Count Form

	District		Village		Cluster
--	----------	--	---------	--	---------

Number of Votes Received in Village	Gender	Age	Cluster of Residence of Vote-Getter	Name of Head of Family	Name of Candidate or Vote-Getter	
						1
						2
						3
						4
						5
						6
						7
						8
						9
						10
						11
						12
						13
						14
						15
						16
						17
						18
						19
						20
						21
						22
						23
						24
						25
						26
						27
						28
						29
						...

5. CDC Member Form – Once you have determined the men and women that have been elected to the CDC, please record the names of these people, along with their title (if applicable), occupation or profession, highest level of education, age, and cluster of

residence on the CDC Member Form. An example of the CDC Member Form is provided below:

CDC Member Form

	District		Village		Cluster
--	-----------------	--	----------------	--	----------------

Highest Level of Education	Gender	Age	Cluster of Residence	Occupation	Title	Name of CDC Member

In the event that any elected CDC members decline to take their position on the Council, please prepare a report on the reason why this person or persons refused to join the CDC.

6. Election Log or Diary – If possible, please keep a diary to document the reaction of the villagers to the election procedure. This diary may include any incidents that occur during the election process, notes about the general feeling among villagers about the election, as well as comments and suggestions you hear from villagers, vote-getters, shura members, village leaders, and district authorities.