

1 **Uncertainty and Inter-jurisdictional High-speed Rail**
2 **Planning: Insights from Portugal and the United Kingdom**

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40 ABSTRACT

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42 Within public policy and academic discourses, HSR is presented as a way of achieving “smarter”
43 or more sustainable forms of growth. Realizing this promise requires coordinated policy efforts
44 across levels of government and at different moments along a project’s timeline. The research
45 presented here makes use of a systems perspective to study the barriers to- and opportunities of
46 inter-jurisdictional HSR planning. This paper makes use of interview material with officials
47 involved in the Portuguese and United Kingdom HSR planning processes. Case studies of five
48 different proposed HSR stops in two countries—three in Portugal and two in the UK—reveal a
49 number of insights:

50

51 Uncertainty is found to be of significant relevance to the manner in which national and
52 local or regional governments interact. Those interactions in turn affect the realized physical
53 reality of the HSR network and its integration into existing land use and transport systems. In
54 particular, this paper examines two sources of uncertainty—uncertainty of outcomes and the
55 uncertainty of a multi-actor inter-jurisdictional system of control. The case studies explore how
56 existing processes and evaluations mechanisms affect the level to which local knowledge and
57 initiatives are incorporated into HSR system design. They additionally reveal how initial
58 conditions can act as important determinants of HSR success by shaping a system’s ability to
adapt to realizations of currently uncertain futures.

59 INTRODUCTION

60

61 **The spatial and distributional sustainability agenda of HSR**

62

63 Within public policy and academic discourses, HSR is presented as a way of achieving “smarter”
64 or more sustainable forms of growth. Adopting the 3E definition of sustainability, HSR’s
65 potential can be described as follows:

- 66 • Economy: this is most often the starting point for advocates of HSR. The goal is to
67 relieve congestion within larger urban areas, overcome distance, and build
68 competitive networks of cities that act as functional economic units in the global
69 market;
- 70 • Environment: environmental sustainability acts at (at least) two spatial scales. HSR
71 can reintroduce incentives for compact urban growth, locally, which in turn can
72 benefit regional ecosystems by helping to preserve habitats and protect watersheds in
73 the interstitial, less developed, spaces of a region (*1*). In a-spatial terms, HSR can be
74 more energy-efficient than competitive modes.
- 75 • Equity: this may be the most difficult goal to define and achieve. Understood in
76 spatial terms, the ambition is as follows: by connecting central and peripheral areas, a
77 more efficient economic system can be built that will bring benefit to all parts of a
78 region, even including those without direct HSR service.

79 Successful achievement of each aspect listed above requires coordinated policy efforts across
80 levels of government and at different moments along a project’s timeline. For example, station
81 location is largely determined at the national (or sometimes international) level of government
82 and fairly early on in the process of system design. The selected station location—whether
83 external to a city or more centrally accessible—will then be a major driver of subsequent
84 decisions and sustainability outcomes. Land use policies that can be used to support compact
85 station-oriented development or transit access to stations, on the other hand, are primarily under
86 the control of local authorities, and will likely need to evolve over time as local demand responds
87 to the improved accessibility provided by new HSR service. Still, the universe of options
88 available for land use and transportation planning at the local and regional levels is constrained
89 by higher-level decisions regarding the location of a station relative to the urban area being
90 served.

91

92 **HSR as a complex system**

93

94 Because of its multi-scalar and multi-actor nature, HSR is best understood as a complex system
95 that includes both its physical components and the institutional sphere within which it resides
96 (2). The research presented here makes use of a systems perspective to study the barriers to- and
97 opportunities of inter-jurisdictional HSR planning. Working from the understanding that
98 technological change must be coupled with institutional change (2), we investigate multiple
99 scales of both the physical environment and institutional sphere and address the importance of
100 uncertainty as a driver of system behavior. Uncertainty is found to be of significant relevance to
101 the manner in which national and local or regional governments interact. Those interactions in
102 turn affect the realized physical reality of the HSR network and its integration into existing land
103 use and transport systems.

104 **Broad ambition, broad tools**

105 HSR projects are unique in that they pursue socioeconomic objectives that extend beyond the
106 direct transportation investment purpose of reducing travel time to indirect effects often not
107 accounted for in traditional benefit-cost analyses. New mobility patterns and land use changes
108 that are the target of HSR investment are hard or impossible to predict. Moreover, the policies
109 that may be used to influence these outcomes are controlled by a wide variety of government
110 entities, spread across sectors and between national, regional, and local jurisdictions.

111 These two sources of uncertainty—uncertainty of outcomes and the uncertainty of a multi-actor
112 inter-jurisdictional system of control—present challenges to the HSR planning process. The
113 broad scope of HSR’s ambition requires that existing methods of project evaluation and ongoing
114 management at the (usually) national scale be expanded to make use of a diverse set of tools and
115 forms of knowledge from other geographic scales of government. For example, a national
116 infrastructure agency may be the entity with the most knowledge and background on how to
117 deliver a rail system. However, national governments have not traditionally been involved
118 directly in development schemes, and may have few precedents for dealing with the long-term
119 uncertainties characteristic of land use related projects. In this realm, more localized
120 governmental entities (e.g. municipal governments, regional transit agencies) have experience,
121 knowledge, and tools to offer. Specifically, local and regional knowledge are necessary to ensure
122 that a station integrates well with its urban context (e.g. via zoning or development schemes) and
123 is consistent with existing or planned mobility systems. Outcome and institutional uncertainty
124 cannot be eliminated, but they can be better managed through inter-jurisdictional planning and
125 cooperative ongoing system management.

126 The next section introduces the case studies from Portugal and the United Kingdom (UK)
127 examined in this paper. Together these cases provides insight into specific types of uncertainty,
128 the challenges they can presents for effective HSR planning, and potential strategies for
129 managing those challenges.

130

131 **ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

132

133 **Discontinuous regions and a focus on smaller intermediate HSR cities**

134

135 This paper analyzes five different proposed HSR stops in two countries—three in Portugal and
136 two in the UK. We focus on smaller intermediate cities brought within one-hour’s travel time of
137 a larger metropolis (here, Lisbon or London) by planned HSR services. Mid-distance service
138 (<250 km) has particularly strong spatial implications (3) as it can forge commuting relationships
139 between cities and expand labor markets to the scale of new *discontinuous regions*—single labor
140 and commercial markets that spans large distances but do not include all intermediate areas (1).
141 Portugal and the United Kingdom (UK) are planning HSR that will provide this type of service.
142 Évora, Leiria, and Coimbra would each be brought within one hour’s travel time of Lisbon by
143 the proposed HSR network.¹ Similarly, Old Oak Common in the western part of Greater London
144 and Birmingham City Center in central UK would both become part of the easily accessible
145 London labor market should the proposed HS2 network be built.

¹ Implementation of HSR in Portugal is currently postponed for the immediately foreseeable future due to fiscal austerity. Nevertheless, lessons can be drawn from the process up to this point.

146 Both the Portuguese and British projects are aimed at, among other things, using HSR to
147 support network agglomeration at the inter-city scale. The planned Portuguese HSR network
148 aims to create a functionally linked system of cities, each playing their own mutually supportive
149 role, that can better compete in the global market. The UK project is posited as a way of
150 addressing growth constraints in London while simultaneously encouraging growth in the rest of
151 the country.

152 Agglomeration is the benefit that firms and workers gain from being in proximity to other
153 firms and workers. Studies of agglomeration economies traditionally conceived of proximity *in*
154 *space* as the enabling factor for these interactions. However, it may be possible to use HSR to
155 benefit from network-based agglomeration economies (4) at the scale of a discontinuous region.
156 Agglomeration increases with increased human interaction. To fully capitalize on this potential
157 requires a focus on the human aspects of the interface between cities and the HSR network.
158 Making the connection as seamless as possible, from initial origin to final destination, will
159 remove barriers to interaction and maximize the realization of benefits from networked
160 agglomeration. Therefore, benefits at the scale of the HSR network actually depend on *localized*
161 issues of urban form and station accessibility, and therefore on the degree to which local
162 considerations are successfully integrated into a national HSR planning process.

163 Secondary cities are an important subject of study for a number of reasons. In comparison
164 to more dominant metropolises, smaller cities are often disadvantaged in terms of planning
165 resources and advocacy power. They require explicit attention if HSR is to achieve its objective
166 of supporting sustainable forms of future growth. In economic terms, good planning at the local
167 level is necessary to provide seamless accessibility between a large metropolis and newly
168 connected secondary cities, and to thus capitalize on agglomeration benefits. Regarding equity
169 goals, smaller cities play an important distributional role in bringing HSR benefits to a broader
170 area. Finally, in environmental terms, smaller cities are often the most at risk for sprawling forms
171 of growth. Greenfield development is often easier and less costly than reinvestment in existing
172 urban centers. City-center locations need other qualities to be competitive with more suburban
173 locations. In big metropolitan areas like Lisbon, the benefits of agglomeration economies—
174 clustering of important firms, labor pooling, and high quality local transportation and urban
175 quality—can be enough to tip the balance in favor of more urban locations. For smaller cities,
176 these forces alone may not be enough. The increment in accessibility provided by a HSR station
177 can reintroduce incentives for compact centralized growth (5).

178

179 **Long timelines and the importance of initial conditions**

180

181 Project design and evaluation are iterative processes. Under the long-term uncertainty
182 characteristic of large infrastructure projects, technical alternatives will necessarily evolve over
183 time as new information and new situations require. The case of Portugal makes it amply clear
184 that exogenous economic and political trends can drastically affect both the timing and design of
185 an infrastructure project. Therefore, taking a robust systems perspective means that we not only
186 design organizations to govern HSR infrastructure and operations, but that we also think
187 carefully about the streams of planning decisions (the processes) into which the project will
188 enter. Effective strategic planning is more than a matter of finding, with some ‘black box,’ the
189 ‘optimal’ design solution and then choosing the best delivery vehicle for that design (although
190 this is undoubtedly close to reality for certain parts of the technical system). Rather, design and
191 implementation will also be an exercise in discovery and continual adaptation. In particular,

192 integrating HSR into local contexts will involve uncovering and responding to local knowledge
193 and needs, taking advantage of available policy instruments at the local level, and continually
194 adapting to the changing development prospects and the realization of actual HSR demand.

195 Whether intentionally or unintentionally, HSR will build on what is already in the areas
196 served (local economy, demographics, local transport). As policy makers and engineers, we are
197 interested in the ‘levers’ that can be intentionally influenced and built upon. Existing processes
198 and evaluations mechanisms affect the level to which diverse channels of knowledge are
199 incorporated into ongoing and iterative system design. Dunn discusses the difference between
200 deliberate and emergent strategies (6, adapted from 7). Deliberate strategy is intentional and
201 *objective-driven*. It can be reflected in both plans and in rules or processes adopted by an
202 organization (8). Over time, as an organization responds to changes in its environment, it will
203 continue to make decisions. Some will be based on the original plans and adopted rules while
204 others are adapted to suit new conditions. The actual trajectory of decisions is what Dunn refers
205 to as emergent strategy.

206 The inevitability of emergent strategy in projects we discuss in this paper does not
207 invalidate or reduce the need for deliberate strategy. Quite the opposite: components of
208 deliberate strategy including initial decisions regarding technical alternatives, the definitions of
209 performance, and decision-making processes can set the stage for better emergent strategy. In the
210 case of HSR, ongoing decision-making will depend, in part, on the networks of communication
211 and control in place between various stakeholders. It will also depend on the degree to which
212 initial decisions anticipate and establish the flexibility to deal with both *known* and *unknown*
213 unknowns. The case studies presented in the following section reveal ways in which initial
214 conditions can act as important determinants of HSR success by shaping system’s ability to adapt
215 to realizations of currently uncertain futures.

216

217 **UNCERTAINTY AND MULTI-SCALAR HSR PLANNING – INSIGHTS FROM** 218 **PORTUGAL AND THE UNITED KINGDOM**

219

220 The following studies are based on meetings with government stakeholders in Portugal and the
221 UK. In Portugal interviews were conducted with representatives from the national rail
222 infrastructure agency and with local officials in Évora, Leiria, and Coimbra in January 2012. A
223 more complete account of material from these interviews can be found in (1). Subsequently in
224 January 2013 additional interviews were conducted with representatives from the UK national
225 HSR planning agency (HS2 Ltd.), Transport for London, the City of Birmingham, and Centro,
226 the regional transit regulator serving the area around Birmingham.

227

228 **Coimbra – cooperative multi-scalar planning and robust system design**

229

230 Coimbra is the third largest metropolitan area in Portugal, located 200 road kilometers (124
231 miles) north of Lisbon and 125 road kilometers (78 miles) south of Porto (the second largest
232 Portuguese city). HSR would bring Coimbra within 56 minutes of Lisbon, although time to
233 connect actual origins and destinations would of course be greater. Coimbra offers an example of
234 formalized multi-scalar planning. The simultaneously local and national/global relevance of HSR
235 creates conditions in which local and national planning entities share interests and therefore have
236 incentives to partner in ongoing planning efforts. Viewing the Coimbra municipal government as
237 an indispensable partner in the development of Portuguese HSR, the national infrastructure

238 agency REFER chose to enter into a formal cooperative protocol with the City of Coimbra.
239 Together they are managing an urbanization plan for the HSR station-area. The plan includes
240 provisions for a multimodal hub and a new area of development (Interview, REFER,
241 unpublished data).

242 Interesting in its own right as a form of inter-jurisdictional collaboration, the Coimbra
243 Urbanization Plan is also attractive as a potential solution to the problem: how can local and
244 national plans regarding HSR and station-areas be coordinated in a manner that effectively deals
245 with long-term uncertainty? A formalized relationship between the City of Coimbra and REFER
246 enables coordination of both initial design decisions and ongoing management. Bi-directional
247 communication helped support a station design that can work in multiple future scenarios—
248 including the suspension of the HSR project itself. The future of HSR in Portugal and the
249 Coimbra Urbanization Plan remains uncertain due to fiscal constraints. Nevertheless, the joint
250 planning process did yield a more flexible design approach: if the more general Coimbra station
251 plan goes ahead without HSR, it will be designed so as to not preclude future expansion to
252 accommodate HSR passengers (Interview, REFER, unpublished data).

253 Thus, collaboration between a national HSR planning entity and local governments is
254 likely to not only improve the integration of HSR into local land use and mobility systems but
255 also to produce more robust station and station-area designs that can perform under multiple
256 future scenarios.

257

258 **Évora and Leiria – external station locations as a constraint on future benefits**

259

260 Évora and Leiria are located on two separate proposed HSR axes. Évora is approximately
261 135 road kilometers (84 miles) east of Lisbon, on the Lisbon-Madrid axis. A smaller city of
262 around 50,000 residents, Évora is known for its historic center, university, and scenic agricultural
263 setting. Leiria is located just south of Coimbra, in the polycentric Centro Region of Portugal,
264 about the same distance from Lisbon. Évora and Leiria would each brought within a 30 and a 36-
265 minute trip (station-to-station) of downtown Lisbon by HSR, respectively. For both cities, this
266 would be a considerable increment in accessibility. Évora is at present served by only four trains
267 per weekday in each direction with a travel time of 1 hour and 58 minutes to Lisbon (9). The
268 planned frequency for HSR would be 12 trains per day and 30-minute travel times (Interview,
269 Lopes, unpublished data). Leiria similarly has low rail accessibility. The primary conventional
270 rail Norte line does not serve the city. With five trains per day from Lisbon, only two of which
271 do not require transfers, and all of which are slowed by the frequency of intermediate stops, rail
272 is not currently competitive with automobile and bus for access to Lisbon.

273 Despite the promising increment in accessibility offered by HSR, Évora and Leiria
274 present interesting cases of the “last mile” problem and the effect that station placement can have
275 both on development prospects and on the potential involvement of local governments in HSR-
276 supportive planning. Unlike Coimbra, both are slated to have external – outside the urban core—
277 HSR stations. In interviews, local planning officials in Évora expressed concern about the impact
278 of a station located 9 km outside the city. The city feels that it should maintain the strength of its
279 core and for this reason has already turned down one proposal for a new service-industry
280 development in the vicinity of the station. They believed that external development would not
281 deliver benefits to the established urban core (Interview, Évora, unpublished data). Station
282 location can be a powerful determinant of not only local land-use impacts, but also of the level of
283 interest and attention that local governments pay to HSR-supportive initiatives. Partially due to

284 the planned non-central location of their stations, both Évora and Leiria have favored a ‘wait-
285 and-see’ planning approach to HSR. With less obvious development potential, an external station
286 creates fewer incentives for local involvement, thus causing a loss of specialized knowledge—as
287 well as lost levers of influence (zoning, local transport or public realm investments, etc.) for the
288 overall HSR planning and implementation process.

289 Thus, decisions that occur fairly early on in an HSR planning process regarding the siting
290 of station have long-term implications for development outcomes and for the ways in which local
291 or regional stakeholders are likely to be integrated into a national planning and implementation
292 process. This influential decision stems from an evaluation process that struggles to assess
293 uncertain but significant future benefits, relative to more certain and more immediate costs. In
294 particular, the decision gives disproportionate weight to current rather than targeted future
295 conditions. Stations in places like Évora and Leiria are sited outside the city to a) reduce HSR
296 travel times between dominant O-D pairs, b) provide easy auto access to a region as a whole, and
297 c) avoid localized monetary and environmental costs associated with construction in an already
298 built up area.

299 What such a decision does not acknowledge is the longer-term growth impacts of HSR
300 service, as opposed to the demands coming from existing categories of users who may prefer
301 easy regional automobile access. Central stations have been shown to be better for destination
302 users (as opposed to outbound users who originate in these small cities) and in Spain have also
303 proven better for building up business in smaller cities (10). A city is most likely to benefit from
304 new HSR if its connectivity enables two-way interactions with other cities—particularly with a
305 major metropolis located less than one hour away. Based on evidence from China, Zheng and
306 Kahn argue that secondary cities stand to gain much from participation in a two-fold improved
307 matching process: first, a matching between residential locations in less expensive and less
308 congested cities and jobs in larger metropolis labor markets and second, a matching between
309 various firm functions and the different forms of accessibility and proximity offered across a
310 region integrated by HSR. HSR, they claim, can “encourage firm fragmentation and firm sorting
311 depending on their idiosyncratic demand for megacity access” (11).

312 It is easier to attract new businesses to areas that already have some critical mass of
313 activity, because developers see this as less risky. As that prior concentration tends to be in more
314 central locations, a centrally located HSR station has more to build on to attract investment than
315 the accessibility increment from HSR alone. While entirely new developments are not
316 impossible, they depend to a much more significant degree on securing anchor tenants that
317 inspire enough confidence for other developers to invest. Therefore, while more short-term
318 objectives can be met with an external station placement, longer-term land use and growth
319 objectives point towards choosing a more central location.

320 It is common in project evaluation to grapple with costs that have greater certainty and
321 predictability than do benefits. This difficulty, we find, is only magnified by the fact that HSR is
322 aimed far beyond the needs of current long distance travelers, to future regional and economic
323 opportunities connections that have yet to be realized or perhaps even fully imagined. The
324 solution is not obvious. If the scope for a cost-benefit analysis is drawn too narrowly, longer term
325 economic and development impacts in station-areas may be neglected. On the other hand, if the
326 scope is too broad, the national planning agency will be faced with intractable uncertainties in
327 predicting land use changes and resulting value added.

328 The following section of this paper investigates a case from the UK in which local
329 governmental entities and a national HSR planning agency are at odds over the appropriate scope

330 of a cost-benefit analysis and whether or not to consider a more optimistic but also more
331 uncertain set of planned future developments around a proposed HSR station. After that, another
332 UK case study, this time from London, begins to offer suggestions for how to manage this type
333 of conflict and—more broadly—how to use intelligent inter-jurisdictional planning to manage
334 uncertainty of outcomes.

335

336 **Birmingham – uncertainty and the challenge of integrating local station-area plans**

337

338 Birmingham is located 110 miles (180 km) from London. The second most populous area (with
339 just over 1 million people) in the UK, Birmingham sits atop the regional hierarchy of the West
340 Midlands. HS2, the UK’s HSR project, offers the chance to enhance this position while also
341 bringing Birmingham within easy commuting distance of central London (12).

342 Two interrelated local Birmingham projects predate the HS2 planning process: the
343 Midland Metro extension and a new economic development initiative on the east side of
344 downtown Birmingham (Figure 1). Phase 2 of the Midland Metro extension is intended to link
345 New Street Station, another key rail interchange in Birmingham, with the HS2 station and
346 beyond (13). In the same area is the City Centre Enterprise Zone, set up by the Greater
347 Birmingham and Solihull LEP (a local development body) in April 2011 prior to approval of the
348 HS2 preferred route in 2012. It covers twenty-six sites including three that are adjacent to the
349 HS2 station and collectively referred to as “Eastside” (14, 15). Creation of an Enterprise Zone
350 allows the local government to offer incentives for development. Eastside will take advantage of
351 funding for site development, access, and infrastructure; a simplified planning process;
352 broadband Internet service; reduced business taxes; and business development support (15).
353 Located in precisely the same geography as the proposed HSR station, these two projects will be
354 affected by the manner in which HS2 is implemented. Moreover, the projects—aimed (partially)
355 at providing an accessible and immediate urban experience for HSR users—are the ideal types of
356 HSR-supportive initiatives and therefore likely to affect the overall success of the HS2 project.


357 We present this case to highlight challenges and risks associated with integrating local
358 initiatives into a national HSR planning process. In particular, the Birmingham station
359 demonstrates how uncertainty may block easy integration of local proposals into HSR project
360 evaluation. Birmingham’s ongoing metro efforts and development planning in the station-area
361 are examples of the types of local initiatives that could be included into a project’s formal
362 evaluation. These complementary efforts hold the promise of increasing the ‘upsides’ of an HSR
363 project. They possess, however, both outcome-uncertainty—because real estate development is
364 inherently an uncertain endeavor—and stakeholder-related uncertainty from the perspective of
365 the national government—because future actions and investments by local governments may not
366 be guaranteed or fully committed at the time of HSR assessment.

367 In its consultation response to the Appraisal of Sustainability, which forms the basis of
368 the HSR Environmental Impact Assessment, the regional transit regulator Centro, urges HS2 Ltd
369 (the national body charged with planning HS2 is under the control of DfT, the national
370 Department for Transport) and to incorporate local land use and accessibility changes related to
371 local regeneration proposals. Centro claims that the wider benefits included in the HSR
372 assessment are conservatively low because land use is assumed not to change:

373

373 The DfT have assumed no changes to land use will occur as a result of HSR
 374 which is not consistent with regeneration proposals associated with the High
 375 Speed Rail stations in the West Midlands, e.g. Eastside in Birmingham city centre
 376 (16).

377 As part of this research a number of meetings were conducted with representatives from Centro
 378 and the Birmingham City Council in January of 2013 that offer further insight (Interview,
 379 Birmingham, unpublished data). According to these officials, there are aspects of the Eastside
 380 and Birmingham metro plans that are highly dependent on the manner in which the HS2 station
 381 is built. The outer boundary of the HSR station determines the precise alignment for Centro's
 382 planned metro extension. Centro is advocating for the safeguarding of joint work sites for HS2
 383 and the metro, as the projects are likely to occur in close sequence if not simultaneously. Design
 384 of the HS2 station will also affect other longer-term growth plans in Birmingham. The Eastside
 385 Masterplan includes proposals for an additional entrance on the south side of the HSR station
 386 and for improved pedestrian connectivity to Digbeth, a neighborhood where two more Enterprise
 387 Zone sites are (15, 17). Permeability of the station for pedestrians affects the attractiveness of
 388 those sites for future development.



389

390 **FIGURE 1 Birmingham HS2 station area with Eastside development zone and metro**
 391 **extension (Source: Author, using Centro base-map, 18)**
 392

393 The case of Birmingham highlights the importance of considering existing planning
394 streams (at multiple scales) when developing and HSR system design. It also points to the
395 challenges of planning in multi-actor environment. Local initiatives are not within the control of
396 the national government (at least not directly—they are influenced by national funding).
397 Therefore, projects at the local level that do not have fully committed designs and allocated
398 resources carry with them a certain uncertainty. Because of this, the national government of the
399 UK has been reluctant to include Birmingham’s plans. However, not considering local initiatives
400 in this case may constrain future development and actually blocks what would generally be
401 considered “good” HSR planning.

402 There are, of course, challenges to pursuing a broadened approach that takes into account
403 local initiatives. National planning authorities like HS2 Ltd have a real and legitimate need to
404 narrow the scope of assessments to keep them tractable and on-target. The next case discusses
405 one possible approach to managing the uncertainty of outcomes through inter-jurisdictional
406 scenario planning. Additionally, Old Oak Common provides another example of how outcomes
407 can be dependent to a considerable degree on initial conditions.

408

409 **Old Oak Common – managing uncertainty of outcomes in project evaluation**

410 Old Oak Common (OOC) is located on the western side of the area governed by the
411 Greater London Authority (GLA), on the boundary between what is considered outer and inner
412 London. It is in one of the poorest areas in London (19). The site includes a unique convergence
413 of transport infrastructure and a significant amount of industrial land. The proposed HSR station
414 at OOC is viewed by Transport for London (TfL) and the London mayor’s office as an
415 opportunity to create a strategic interchange for west London and to achieve considerable area
416 regeneration (Interview, TfL, unpublished data). To further this end, London (a powerful but
417 nevertheless non-national government agency) is advocating for an adjustment of the HS2 plans
418 to include London Overground connections.

419 From a local authority’s perspective the exclusion of HSR-supportive initiatives is
420 undoubtedly frustrating, but there are legitimate barriers to their inclusion. The UK national
421 government is reluctant to include projects like the Midlands metro extension that have not yet
422 been full committed because of the uncertainty of their realization. Similarly, proposals for land
423 use changes carry with them a significant amount of uncertainty and are dependent on the real
424 estate market. Nevertheless, our study of London reveals ways in which the national-level
425 environmental process can include acknowledgment of local development and connectivity
426 efforts. It is, however, important to keep in mind that applying these approaches beyond London
427 will require concerted effort as smaller cities have less leverage and direct access to the national
428 government than London.

429 The Old Oak Common approach to managing uncertainty, this time for station-area
430 redevelopment, is via an inter-jurisdictional body called the Opportunity Area Planning
431 Framework (OAPF). An OAPF was created to guide the redevelopment efforts surrounding Old
432 Oak Common station. Local authorities (municipalities), HS2 Ltd., and Transport for London
433 (which operates at the scale of the Greater London Area, above the municipalities) are all
434 members of the framework. As part of the OAPF process, growth scenarios are produced. These
435 then feed back into analysis performed by HS2 Ltd. as a sensitivity test for their proposals—to
436 determine how the system design performs under different scenarios of future development. The
437 tests identify the scale of the environmental and transport impacts and are published as part of
438 the Environmental Impact Assessment. Now on record, these results can hopefully influence the

439 design of HS2 to include future proofing and scalability in anticipation of future growth in the
440 area (Colella, unpublished data). The use of growth and land use change scenarios produced by
441 an inter-jurisdictional planning framework is a promising technique for incorporating local land
442 use proposals into HSR assessment, despite the proposals' uncertainty. By developing solutions
443 amongst multiple stakeholders, the OAPF hopefully produces a more robust set of development
444 scenarios than might be created by a single dominant stakeholder.

445 Beyond the decision of whether or not to invest in additional regional connectivity, there
446 are other initial decisions that will impact the long-term development potential of Old Oak
447 Common and the success of the HSR project. At OOC planners are faced with determining the
448 most productive use of the land around the station. Judgments from the Opportunity Area
449 Planning Framework process will influence both local zoning designations and infrastructure
450 decisions that affect what can and cannot be built. Residential development is the safest bet in
451 current market conditions and therefore the most attractive with a short-term cost recovery goal.
452 Taking a longer view might result in a decision to pursue more mixed-use development with
453 both residential and commercial (and possibly even some remaining industrial) uses.
454 Commercial development tends to be more speculative and have a longer timeline for returns. It
455 is therefore riskier but also likely more strategic (Interview, TfL, unpublished data).

456 There is a case to be made for phased implementation, starting with less risky residential
457 developments adjacent to existing neighborhoods, rather than in the more industrial core of
458 OOC. In that way, uses can gradually build on one another. Still, some immediate infrastructure
459 decisions do have implications for even a more incremental development strategy. For OOC,
460 designers must choose whether and how much decking to build above the rail yards that
461 comprise a large percentage of the land closest to the station. Decking is expensive and is not
462 justified by lower density development scenarios. Compared to housing, commercial uses will
463 benefit more from immediate station proximity. Decking is less costly to construct initially
464 during overall station construction than later once demand for higher density development has
465 materialized. The decision to build decking in effect would purchase a real option (20) to at a
466 later point build commercial real estate immediately adjacent to the station. This is just one
467 example of how initial flexibility can be a powerful tool in enabling decision-makers to respond
468 to future changes, thus improving overall HSR system performance (Peña-Alcaraz et al. provide
469 others, 20).

470 CONCLUSIONS

471
472 This paper made use of case studies from Portugal and the United Kingdom to examine the role
473 that uncertainty can play in inter-jurisdictional high-speed rail planning. Smaller cities to be
474 brought within one hour's travel of a larger metropolitan area by HSR were the particular subject
475 of this analysis because of their relative disadvantage in terms of resources and influence in the
476 national political arena, and because such intermediate cities have a unique role to play in
477 achieving the sustainability objectives of high-speed rail.

478 From interviews in Coimba, Évora, and Leiria in Portugal and London and Birmingham
479 in the UK, we find that existing processes and evaluations mechanisms affect the level to which
480 local knowledge can be incorporated into HSR design. We also find that certain initial decisions
481 and cooperative inter-jurisdictional planning can help manage the long-term uncertainty of HSR
482 planning and implementation.

483 Coimbra offers an example of how national-local collaborative planning can produce
484 station-designs that are more robust and able to perform under multiple future scenarios. Évora

485 and Leiria demonstrate how an evaluation mechanism that values more certain current costs over
 486 potential future benefits can result in a station-placement decision that constrains the economic
 487 development and environmental sustainability benefits of HSR. Next, an examination of
 488 complementary local efforts in Birmingham offers another case in which an insufficiently broad
 489 project assessment can block potential long-term benefits from HSR. In that case the uncertainty
 490 of local initiatives that are not yet fully committed hinders the projects' inclusion into a national
 491 assessment of HS2. Lastly, the Old Oak Common case from London recognizes that there are
 492 real barriers to accounting for uncertain future benefits. The Opportunity Area Planning
 493 Framework's approach to scenario planning suggests an approach to incorporating uncertainty
 494 into a project evaluation. Undoubtedly there will need to be additional creative solutions.

495 The case studies also focus to a significant degree on establishing flexible initial
 496 conditions: The Coimbra collaboration between REFER and the City creates a institutional setup
 497 that can more flexibility handle changing designs needs. HSR-supportive local planning in Évora
 498 and Leiria is at risk because of the decision earlier in the HSR planning process to locate stations
 499 external to the cities. In Birmingham initial decisions about station design may constrain or
 500 enable future station-area growth. And finally at Old Oak Common, the initial decision to
 501 purchase a "real option" by building decking over the rail yards would provide flexibility to the
 502 scope of higher-density commercial development as future market conditions allow.

503 While these types of initial decisions are undoubtedly important to the long-term
 504 performance of an HSR system, there are other factors that enable successful emergent strategies
 505 in the implementation of a large-scale infrastructure project such as HSR. With a scope as large
 506 as it is, any HSR project is subject to long timelines and high stakes. There will be many phases
 507 of design and redesign. Large sums of money, not to mention political and institutional capital,
 508 will be committed. And as with all large projects, HSR will be subject to extensive vetting and
 509 challenge. With that challenge comes the risk that local input will receive acknowledgment but
 510 not follow-through in the actual HSR designs. True HSR-supportive local and regional policies
 511 (accessibility or development related) will in most cases require the commitment of additional
 512 resources, across scales of government. This extra spending is subject to political challenge, as it
 513 can seem secondary to the principal functionality of a HSR system—even though in reality such
 514 efforts are integral to the system's performance. Therefore, we will end this paper with a brief
 515 discussion of two approaches to ensuring long-term follow through.

516 The first approach is a formalization of commitments, along a spectrum from making
 517 decisions a matter of public record (without necessarily committing resources) to complete
 518 commitment of funding to certain aspects of a project. National entities will inevitably be
 519 somewhat reluctant to increase the cost (or complexity) of an overall HSR project—particularly
 520 given how difficult it is to quantify the benefit of local HSR-supportive initiatives. Some
 521 possibilities for ensuring follow-through include:²

- 522 • Local representation in decision making groups
- 523 • Specific contractual agreements that require the HSR promoter to follow local plans
 524 when siting stations, etc.
- 525 • Designation of a certain percentage of HSR funds for complementary schemes
- 526 • Clear inclusion of local accessibility requirements in HSR authorizing documents

527 Moreover, even modifying a project evaluation approach to acknowledge the importance of
 528 connecting HSR into local contexts can be important. A formal evaluation document such as an
 529 Environmental Impact Statement is a form of on-the-record support from the national

² Special thanks to Michael Colella of TfL for providing detailed feedback and input regarding these approaches.

530 government. Inclusion makes the case, publicly, that the project's success depends partly on
531 complementary efforts and thus increases the likelihood of allocating necessary resources in the
532 eventual authorization and budget allocation process.

533 The second approach is more informal and depends on building broader coalitions to
534 support HSR-related initiatives. Earlier research has indicated that HSR is a unique opportunity
535 in that it has the potential to shake up a prior competitive landscape enough to incentivize
536 reconsideration of inter-jurisdictional relationships, both local-local and local-national (*1*). For
537 example: regional stakeholders in the West Midlands of the UK are pushing for a more strategic
538 view of intermodal HSR planning, extending beyond access modes, to consider the effects of
539 released capacity on the conventional rail network. The question of what to do with released rail
540 capacity may be a higher priority in the UK than in Portugal, because of faster overall growth
541 and greater congestion in the UK. However, it raises a more general point about HSR: its
542 implementation is an opportunity to take a step back and evaluate the state of a region's transport
543 (or planning) system, in general.

544 By leveraging the incentives for cooperation provided by HSR to work on wider regional
545 issues, a broader and stronger coalition for change can be created. With more than HSR on the
546 table, the HSR system has a better chance of achieving its potential—while at the same time the
547 inter-jurisdictional partnerships needed to support HSR will gain durability from stakeholders
548 interested in the broader vision of equitable, economically viable, and environmentally
549 supportive regional growth. This approach to HSR development will undoubtedly require
550 additional resources, beyond a bare-bones approach. Still, given the scope of the professed
551 agenda for HSR, it would be inconsistent not to pursue the full extent of benefits that are the
552 claimed target of such a large investment program. As Ureña put it so eloquently in a recent
553 twenty year retrospective on Spanish HSR: “High-speed rail infrastructure should not be
554 considered the end objective, but rather the initiation of a long process of developing actions and
555 strategies to enhance its effects” (*21*). This paper has sought to translate lessons from two
556 specific contexts—Portugal and the UK—into broader lessons on how to do just that.
557

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