

## PS688

### Institutional Analysis: Parliaments and Beyond

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Tuesday, 10-12

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#### Course description:

This course will discuss institutional mechanisms, their cause, and effect. In particular, we will discuss topics such as presidential and parliamentary democracies, representation, coalitions (formation, bargaining, and duration), bicameralism, veto players, European federalism and European parliament, electoral rules and performance, and institutional reform. Most, though not all, topics will be discussed in the empirical context of OECD countries.

#### Books and reading materials:

The following books are on reserve and available for purchase at Ulrich, Michigan Union Bookstore, and Michigan Book and Supply:

Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle. 1996. *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge University Press.

George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money. 1997. *Bicameralism*. Cambridge University Press.

George Tsebelis. 2002. *Veto Players*. Russell Sage Foundation/Princeton University Press.

#### Assignments:

**Attendance and participation:** attendance, participation, and contribution to the discussions are an important part of the course requirements. You are expected to attend the session having done the reading and reflected upon them and to contribute to the discussion. Please let me know ahead of time if you have to miss a session.

**Discussion leading:** each student will be responsible for one topic. This includes distributing a few questions that will serve as a guide for reading the material, giving a short presentation in class (5-10 minutes) as an introduction to the discussion, and participating in leading the discussion on that week. Questions should be distributed by Friday at 5.

**Research presentation:** in the last few weeks of the semester, students will present their research to the class and receive feedback on their projects.

**Research paper:** an original research paper. By November 7 at 5PM you will have to hand in one page of preliminary research about your topic and the form the paper will take. Papers are due on April 25 at 5PM.

## **Course Plan:**

### **January 10**

#### **Introduction**

### **January 17**

#### **Representation: Parliaments, Governments, and Policy**

- a. Powell. 2004. "Political Representation in Comparative Politics." In *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. (7) pp. 273-296.
- b. Achen. 1977. "Measuring Representation: Perils of the Correlation Coefficient." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21(4), pp. 805-815.
- c. Achen. 1978. "Measuring Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 22(3), pp. 475-510.
- d. Huber and Powell. 1994. "Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracies." *World Politics*, Vol. 46(3), pp. 291-326.

### **January 24**

#### **Presidential and Parliamentary Democracies**

- a. Stephan and Skach. 1993. "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism." *World Politics* Vol. 46, pp.1-22.
- b. Shugart and Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and electoral Assemblies*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3.
- c. Samuels. 2004. "Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review* Vol. 98 (3), pp. 425-436.
- d. Cheibub and Limongi. 2002. "Democratic Institutions and regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered." In *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 5, pp:151-179.

## January 31

### Parliaments

- a. Gamm and Huber. 2002. "Legislatures as Political Institutions: Beyond the Contemporary Congress." In Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. pp. 313-341.
- b. Müller, Bergman, and Strøm. 2003. "Parliamentary Democracy: Promise and Problems. In *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, eds. pp. 3-32.
- c. Lupia. 2003. "Delegation and its Perils." In *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, eds. pp. 33-54.
- d. Strøm. 2003. "Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation." In *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Strøm, Müller, and Bergman, eds. pp. 55-106.

## February 7

### Theories of Coalitions and Bargaining

- a. William Gamson. 1961. "A theory of Coalition Formation." *American Sociological Review* Vol. 26(3), pp. 373-382.
- b. TBA
- c. Druckman and Roberts. 2005. "Context and Coalition-Bargaining: Comparing Portfolio Allocation in Eastern and Western Europe." *Party Politics*, pp. 535-555.
- d. Cox—work in progress about portfolio allocation. To be distributed.
- e. We will also spend some time in class discussing Power Indices.

## February 14

### Theories of Coalitions, Bargaining, and Minority Governments

- a. Laver and Shepsle. *Making and Breaking Governments*. Ch. 1-9.
- b. Strøm and Leipart. 1993. "Policy, Institutions, and Coalition Avoidance: Norwegian Governments, 1945-1990." *American Political Science Review* Vol. 87(4), pp. 870-887.
- c. Strøm. 1994. "The Presthus Debacle: Intraparty Politics and Bargaining Failure in Norway." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88(1), pp. 112-127.
- d. Huber. 1999. "Parliamentary Rules and Party Behavior during Minority Government in France." In *Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*. Müller and Strøm, eds. Pp. 258-278.

## **February 21**

### **Bicameralism**

- a. Tsebelis and Money. *Bicameralism*. 1997. Ch. 1-5.
- b. Druckman and Thies. 2002. "The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 46(4), pp. 760-771.

## **March 7**

### **Veto Players**

- a. Tsebelis. *Veto Players*. Chapters 1-6.
- b. Bawn. 1999. "Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany: Evidence for a Veto Players Model of Government Spending." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 43(3), pp. 707-736
- c. Tsebelis, and Chang. 2004. "Veto Players and the Structure of Budgets in Advanced Industrialized Countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 43. pp. 449-476.

## **March 14**

### **European Federalism**

- a. Garrett and Tsebelis. 1996. "An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism." *International Organization* Vol. 50(2), pp. 269-299.+ erratum.
- b. Tsebelis and Garrett. 2001. "The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union." *International Organization* Vol. 55(2), pp. 357-390.
- c. Hix. 1998. "Elections, Parties, and Institutional Design: A Comparative Perspective on European Union Democracy." *West European Politics* Vol. 21(3), pp. 19-52.

## **March 21**

### **EU Parliament**

- a. Tsebelis. 1994. "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter." *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 88(1), pp. 128-142.
- b. Moser. 1996. "The European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: What Are the Conditions? A Critique of Tsebelis (1994)." *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 90(4), pp. 834-838.
- c. Tsebelis. 1996. "More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: Response to the Moser." *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 90(4), pp. 839-844

- d. Kreppel. TBA

## **March 28**

### **Electoral Rule and Corruption**

- a. Chang, Eric. 2005. "Electoral Incentives for Political Corruption under Open-List Proportional Representation." *Journal of Politics* 67 (3): 716-730.
- b. Chang, Eric, and Miriam Golden. Forthcoming. "Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption." *British Journal of Political Science*.
- c. Kunicova and Ackerman. 2005. "Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structure as Constraints on Corruption." *British Journal of Political Science* Vol. 35, pp. 573-606.

## **April 4**

### **Electoral Rules and Policy**

- a. Cox. 1990. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 34 (4): pp. 903-935.
- b. Iversen and Soskice. "Electoral Institutions, Parties, and the Politics of Class. Why Some Democracies Distribute More Than Others." Forthcoming, *American Political Science Review*.
- c. Bawn and Rosenbluth. 2006. "Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector." *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 50(2). pp: 251-265.

## **April 11**

### **Institutional Reform**

- a. Bawn. 1993. "The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 37(4), pp. 965-989.
- b. Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies. 1999. "Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party." *British Journal of Political Science* Vol. 29(1), pp. 33-56.
- c. Shugart. 2001. "Extreme" Electoral Systems and the Appeal of the Mixed-Member Alternative." In *Mixed-Member Electoral systems: the Best of Both Worlds?* Shugart and Wattenberg, eds. pp. 25-51.

## **April 18**

### **Student Presentations**

Poster session. Time and place TBA.