Jean Li . Team 7: Insurance . Mission 2010

Topic: Insurance with focus on building codes and regulations in New Orleans

Annotated Bibliography

1) ENR (2006). New Orleans Flood Base Elevation To Count on Levees Again. Engineering News Record, 256(16), 14.

The article discusses FEMA’s decision to keep the same base flood elevations that were last updated in 1984. The new and rebuilt houses have to be only three above ground to protect them against minor flooding. FEMA is relying almost completely on the new stronger levees to keep prevent any Hurricane Katrina scale disasters. If the levees do fail again during a disaster like Katrina, the residents have no protection against flooding. There needs to more ways to minimize damage during large storms either through updating building codes or another method.

2) Butler, E. (2002). Building code revisions bogged down to local builders' chagrin. Orleans CityBusienss, 23(4), 13.

Butler portrays the complex bureaucracy around the building does in Louisiana. The State had originally followed codes set by the SBCCI which recently consolidated with two other companies. the complicated management system that creates the codes or possibly the complexity of the codes for different areas may be part of the cause for the loosely enforced building codes in New Orleans. Butler mentions that the general public was not given access to the codes it was until in the late 90s. The article begins to discuss is a need for not only a more streamlined system and policy, but also more public awareness about the codes that are meant to protect them.

3) Reichard, P. (2000). Tenants stuck with shoddy housing have few options under Louisiana laws. Orleans CityBusiness, 20(34), 17.

Reichard describes the poor state of a New Orleans woman’s building apartment. The residents living in apartment buildings have little control over their living conditions and have little protections when it comes to disaster. While there is a Renter’s Insurance, few people actually own this insurance. Their losses financially are certainly not as large those of homeowners, but many of them also lost their homes and belonging to Katrina. There is a need for a policy which will protect renter’s as well, so they can have some sort of safety net after a disaster like Katrina.

4) Roberts, D. (2004). Terrible Traces: Strength of Ivan shows signs of weakness in building codes. Orleans CityBusiness, pg 17.

Roberts discusses the inconsistency of Louisiana building codes that were brought to public attention by Hurricane Ivan. Ivan destroyed the town in Alabama, but was far enough away from New Orleans to do no damage. However, Roberts predicts that had the hurricane passed over New Orleans many home would have been damaged as well. Many parishes around New Orleans have loosely enforced building codes, or some like St. Charles Parish have no codes at all. The article portrays the gap the policy and reality. After Katrina, building codes will certainly be taken more seriously than they were before, but insurance companies and government companies will all have to take a hand in enforcing these codes.

5) Eosco, G. M., Hooke, W. H. (2006). Coping With Hurricanes. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society,87(6) pg 751-3.

Eosco presents a new way of dealing with post-hurricane rebuilding and relief through a system based more on private sectors. She sets the collaboration between the National Transportation Safety Board and private airline companies after a plane crash as an example of a good partnership between public and private groups. Since private groups already control so much of the public spaces throughout the country, a new strategy could force private groups to work with government groups for relief and perhaps putting pressure on private groups to help minimize damages of disasters by constructing better buildings etc.

6) Opdyke, J. D. (2005). Louisiana Toughens Building Codes; New Rules Aim to Limit Storm Property Damage And to Reassure Insurers. Wall Street Journal, pg A. 2.

Opdyke describes the contradictory interests between more hurricane and storm surge proof building codes and drawing new businesses to the state. New statewide building codes in Louisiana that are meant to minimize future damages to the state due to hurricanes and storm surges could add on tens of thousands of dollars of cost for business buildings. Building codes, while they are meant to sustain the city, may actually keep business away and prevent the city from being revitalized. Extrapolating from Opdyke’s article, we can forsee the similar problems arising with building codes with residential buildings. These shifting cost associated with building codes will change the people who move back to New Orleans and the culture of the city.

7) US Congress. (2000). Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. Public Law106-390.

The DMA of 2000 continues the assistance from the Federal Government for pre disaster planning and programs and the actual post disaster relief for public and private losses. At the same time, the act encourages people to protect themselves in through private insurance companies. While the DMA helps provide relief after the disaster, it takes pressure of local government to make pre-disaster adjustments to minimize damages (for example reinforcing building codes).

8) Burby, R. J. (2006). Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy:

Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas. The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604(1), 171-191.

Burby discusses how the oftentimes well-intentioned government policies actually encourage bad construction. Many unsafe areas of New Orleans were developed as a result of government building codes that led people to believe that their homes were safe. Burby believes the key is to have more local government involvement in the building process to enforce the building codes and prevent builders from taking advantage of certain ambiguities in policies

9) NIST. (2006). Performance of Physical Structure in Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita: A Reconnaissance Report. NIST Technical Note 1476.

The report provides detailed descriptions of the damages done to different types of buildings in different and recommendation for rebuilding. For each recommendation, the NIST report lists the policies and acts that have to be reevaluated.

10) Kingsbury, K. (2006) High-Water Marks. Time Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/insidebiz/article/0,9171,1531321,00.html

In this article, Kingsbury interview’s All State Insurance Company’s CEO Edward Liddy about insurance a year after Hurricane Katrina. Insurance company received all-around criticism for not providing enough money quickly after the hurricane and more recently for pulling much of its coverage from hurricane-prone areas like Florida.

11) 108th Congress. (2004). National Flood Insurance Reform Act. S-2238.

This act was meant to provide relief people who were have applied for flood claims multiple times. Since regular private insurance does not cover floods, the federal government’s policy is the only flood insurance homeowners can buy.

12) Barry, J.M. (1997). Rising Tide. New York: Touchsone Books.

Rising Tide is a novel about the great Hurricane in the early part of the 20^th century. It tells the story of the flood, and the also the politicized rebuilding process. It also describes how the flood changed much of the social dynamics of the city. The book gives a sense of changes, especially social ones that may take place post-Katrina.

13) Hearn, P. D. (2004). Hurricane Camille: Monster Storm of the Gulf Coast. Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi.

The book is about the Category 5 hurricane, Hurricane Camille. The pictures included in the book of the damages done to New Orleans mirrored the post-Katrina pictures. At that time, no communities followed the building codes, but little much has changed; building codes were still loosely enforced pre-Katrina. Even though there was so much damage done then, there was been a relative lack of action since then to prevent a Camille from ever happening again.

14) Brown, G. F., Fasler, V. M., Adams, R. W., Reed, E. W., Padgett, H. D. (1944). Mississippi State Geological Survey. Mississippi: University.

The Geological survey gives statistics on different kinds of soil and sediment in the Gulf Coast Area. The data can help analyze the relative safeties of different areas and relative safeties of different structures built in those area.

15) Steinberg, T. (2006). Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disasters In America. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.

Ted Steinberg gives an overview of the history of the surprisingly commonplace natural disasters in America. In a chapter about insurance policy, he illustrates the conflicts between the government and insurance companies. Because insurance companies are a money making industry, the government needs to provide incentives for insurance companies to approve and follow their policies.

16) Roberts, D. (2006). Parishes in New Orleans area slow to adopt elevation standards. New Orleans CityBusiness, pg 1.

Roberts brings up the problem between the government policy and local building. While FEMA has required new height for new buildings in New Orleans, no parish in New Orleans has adopted this standard. To local residents, the new requirement makes no sense since none of the old buildings will have the three feet elevation. The article shows that the federal government, once again, cannot control what happens on the local level.

17) Kunreuther, H. (2006). Disaster Mitigation and Insurance: Learning from Katrina. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604(1), 208-277.

Kunreuther gives a hypothesis as to why so few people had flood insurance pre-Katrina and recommends ways to keep the same from happening by the next large storm. The pre-Katrina population had generally been lulled into the “not me” concept and downplayed the risk of disaster in their mind. By streamlining the insurance policy and system and informing citizens about their needs, he believes that there could be much fewer unprotected citizens post-disasters.

18) Kopp, G. A., Bartlett, F M. (2005). Huffing and Puffing and Blowing It Down: How To Make Houses That Will Survive Katrina. Policy Options-Montreal, Dec 05 – Jan 06. 57-59.

Kopp and Bartlett consider a new approach to creating building codes in New Orleans. Government agencies, like FEMA, have looked very narrowly at possible changes in building codes like height elevation requirements. Kopp and Barlett consider large scale changes mainly in the type of building material. They propose doing controlled experiment to test new building models. However, in the article, they never consider the high costs for running these experiments and the actual building materials.

19) Glaeser, E. L., Gyourko, J. (2003)The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing Affordability. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, Jun 03. 21-39

Glaeser and Gyourko discuss the direct correlation between the amount of building restrictions and the rise of the building costs. While the article is not a study of New Orleans, it shows the building codes may be meant to make areas more habitable and safer, the codes may actually marginalize certain demographics.

20) Sherman, A., Shapiro, I. (2005). Essential Facts about the Victims of Hurricane Katrina. Center of Budget and Policy Priorities, 1-3.

Sherman and Shapiro report the racial and socioeconomic breakdown of the victims of New Orleans. The statistics shows that most of the people affected by Hurricane Katrina were African-American; many of whom also lived below the poverty line. The rebuilding of Hurricane Katrina will have to take into account the plight of these people who may do not have the resources to simply move away or afford even moderately priced housing.

21) McCulloh, R. P., Heinrich, P. V., Good, B. (2006). Geology and Hurricane-Protectection Strategies in the Greater New Orleans Area. Public Information Series, No. 11

MuCulloh, Heinrich, and Good explore the geological history of the area and the effects of man made structures on the geology of New Orleans and surrounding Parishes. While the article is not directly related to insurance, it explains why New Orleans need to protected. They supply a useful chart describing the elevation of different parishes within New Orleans which could be used to establish building codes and referenced to adjust insurance rates.

22) Konigsmark, A. R. (Oct. 19, 2006). Flood Risk Doesn’t Stop Builders. USA Today

Konigsmark article reflects how much the culture of New Orleans has not changed since Hurricane Katrina. A St. Bernard’s Parish Councilman is quoted saying that the Parish’s goal is not adopt to the new building codes even though all but 50 homes were flooded. Creating building codes for New Orleans is much more than passing the law; it will take time and energy to convince homeowners that building codes help them and to enforce them throughout the various Parishes.

23) FEMA. (August 2005). Converting A Standard Rated Policy to PRP. National Flood Insurance Policy.

FEMA allows homeowners to switch to a lower level of insurance if their homes are rezoned to a low or moderate risk area. Insurance in low – moderate risk zones are not mandatory, so FEMA must make it cheaper to encourage people to buy their insurance. FEMA also guarantees returning insurance money when the zoning is adjusted even if it the home had not been switched to the lower cost insurance immediately. The government since it is not a completely profit-driven industries is more homeowner friendly. A private insurance would probably not have as flexible of a policy. We could create more gradations of insurance plans than currently sold by FEMA which encourages the adaptation of new building codes.

24) FEMA (No Date Found). NFIP Summary of Converage. National Flood Insurance Policy. This document was created by FEMA to help its costumers understand the insurance details. It provides descriptions of different ways to purchase National Flood Insurance and what kinds of properties are included in the coverage. It also describes the different kinds of reimbursements it provides for different kinds of property and different kinds of damages. The document reflects how confusing the national flood insurance policy actually is. There is an obvious need to make the policy a more integral part of people’s lives and clarifying different points of the policy.

Last Updated: 10/22/06