Given the current state of New Orleans, we have three options in front of us: we can rebuild all of New Orleans to the same/greater level* than it was before (either exactly as it was before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, or to the same level in a slightly different format, or to a “greater” level); we can rebuild New Orleans but not to pre-Katrina levels (that is, build it with the idea that fewer people will be living there than before, and fewer areas will be rebuilt); or we can not rebuild it at all.

Rebuild to Same/Greater than pre-Katrina Level

The first solution involves rebuilding all the city’s area levees “bigger and better” than before Hurricane Katrina and possibly also readjusting the population distribution.

Inherently, a complete improvement of all the New Orleans area levees to standards capable of withstanding category three, four, and even five hurricanes will quite possibly well within the tens of billions of dollars (estimated at $32 billion by USA Today magazine)(USAToday 2005). Nonetheless, the ability for raised, reinforced and improved levees to protect the city from future storms within the near future does seem assured. During Hurricane Katrina, the majority of damaging flooding that occurred within New Orleans was often not the result of overtopped levees, but instead the result of levee failure due to improper and faulty design and construction, such as was the case with the I-walls along 17th St and London Ave and the erosion of the back side of the overtopped levees of the Lower Ninth Ward (New York Times 2005). Hence, an improved levee system, built appropriately for the local geology throughout the area, is more than assured to function properly and keep the city dry within the near foreseeable future.

After we have reconstructed all previously existing levees within the same areas and assured their success in the short run, we have two possible paths for rebuilding the city to the same level: we could either rebuild it exactly as it was before, or we could modify it a bit in an attempt to make it better (including making it safer). If we plan on not changing the zoning laws of New Orleans, the plans for building improved levees would stay the same, with perhaps more levees along the coast with Lake Pontchartrain, since the population of these areas is more vulnerable to damage from hurricanes and floods. In terms of population and demographic distribution, the city would stay almost identical to what it is now, with no use of eminent domain to redevelop land. Within a few years, the city’s population would either return to pre-Katrina levels or stay the same as it is now, should the people who are currently displaced outside of New Orleans wish to stay where they are. However, to encourage the return of the displaced, we could offer economic incentives, such as those already put in place by the Road Home program, which offers more to homeowners who stay within Louisiana (“News”, 1) ¹.

The second possibility would change residential zoning in an effort to adjust population distribution so as to remove as many people as possible from areas of high risk. High-risk areas that would witness a decreed decrease in population density would be along the Lake Pontchartrain shore of northern New Orleans. Residential zoning laws would only need be adjusted to assign those areas as either low-density residential, typified by single family homes, large yards, etc., or as open/park space, completely eliminating permanent human settlement of those areas and therefore being the assuredly safest zoning option to pursue (though not always practical or popular, especially when there already exists a human presence). These people, however, would be encouraged to move to other, safer areas within New Orleans, thus maintaining the pre-Katrina total population. Open/park space along high risk areas could prove valuable not only as mini-buffer zones between bodies of water and low/medium density residential areas, but also could add value to surrounding property as aesthetically appealing, quality-of-life improving features of neighborhoods. Since the goal of this plan is to allow people to return to New Orleans, this open space would be specifically designed for areas that currently contain abandoned homes; by using some abandoned land in this way, we would increase the value of surrounding areas, and overall get a better population recovery.

The Road Home Program, implemented across all of New Orleans, would promote the reconstruction of all neighborhoods very close to their capacity as mandated by zoning laws. All property owners in New Orleans seeking to return would be eligible to apply for the Road Home grant of up to $150,000 for the purpose of repairing and if necessary rebuilding their homes.

With levees bigger and better, with some historically high-risk neighborhoods thinned out through zoning, and with the freedom to apply for financial aid for home reconstruction regardless of location in the city, the plan to have everyone move back to the city could be quite optimistic in the short term. Rebuilding New Orleans to a greater level would happen by a very similar process; the main difference would be that, in order to allow for more people than before, some of the land willingly sold by former residents might be turned into multiple lots, and previously zoned low/medium density residential areas could be zoned as medium/high density residential areas.

Rebuild to a Lesser Level

The second option would be to downsize New Orleans – that is, rebuild but to a lesser level. From the governmental perspective, there are a number of ways in which we could go about this. The classic method by which the government takes privately owned land and changes its use is eminent domain. However, due to the recent Amendment No. 5 to the Louisiana State Constitution, eminent domain can no longer be used if the land in question is going to be turned over to a private owner. Therefore, we cannot plan development projects that would simply take land that was formerly residential and turn it into a different sort of privately owned land, with the intention of decreasing residential space. Eminent domain may still be used, though, if the land will be used for some public function and remain in the hands of the government; in terms of downsizing, we could use the method of eminent domain to convert some of the land in New Orleans into, say, parks, wetlands, federal research areas, or other publicly-owned spaces.

A second method by which the government may control the extent to which an area is rebuilt is through zoning. If we wanted to downsize New Orleans through zoning, we could, for example, zone a formerly high-density residential area as a low-density residential area. Any new homes rebuilt in that area would have to follow the new zoning laws, and any homes already rebuilt or still remaining in that area would be grandfathered in. If we were to decide that there was an area we didn’t want to rebuild at all, we could change its zoning to no longer be residential at all. (An area may only have the types of buildings it is zoned to have – see zoning.)

In all cases, former residents would be compensated for land taken. Compensation for damaged/destroyed homes would be determined by the same method that is currently used by the Road Home Program. Compensation for any homes that have already been fixed/rebuilt or that were not damaged would be determined by standard eminent domain compensation procedures – that is, “full compensation” for the value of the loss.

In the downsizing plan, the areas that are rebuilt would be rebuilt by the same procedure as given in the plan for rebuilding the entire city: money for individual homes would come from the Road Home Program and FEMA, the levees necessary to protect these areas would be rebuilt to protect against Category 5 hurricanes, and the infrastructure of these areas would be fully restored.

But what, then, happens to residents who don’t get to move back? Here again we encounter to options: we could simply let people move wherever they want and take care of themselves, or we could provide an alternative location for people to live.

The option of letting people move wherever they want (with their compensatory money) is based on the fact that it’s already been a year since the storm, and many people who have not yet returned have probably established lives for themselves in some other region. For those who haven’t, we could establish a nation-wide network that assists people in finding a new home in a different city where they believe they would be the most content. This network would be available, free of charge, funded by federal hurricane relief money, to all former residents of New Orleans. It would consist of social workers, career counselors, and real estate specialists, and would help families and individuals re-establish their lives as best they could in another city, whether they simply don’t want to return to New Orleans or whether they have been forced out due to eminent domain or new zoning laws.

The concern with letting people move where they want to, though, is that it excludes the option of letting certain people move back to New Orleans, should that be where they want to go. Therefore, we have considered the possibility of setting up an alternative location, close to New Orleans, to which people could return. One option we considered was the North Shore of Lake Pontchartrain, in St. Tammany Parish. A second option is various locations along the Mississippi River, up to and including Baton Rouge. For the Baton Rouge/other Mississippi areas option, we wouldn’t explicitly create an area for people to move to, but rather make it easier for them to move by creating housing plans, encouraging New Orleans companies to shift north so that jobs would move, etc.

Not Rebuild at All

Finally, our overall plan could be to not rebuild New Orleans at all – and even, in the most extreme case, tear down what is already there and simply allow the Mississippi to flood the area. Due to the great amount of history in the area, the economic impact of shipping and tourism in New Orleans, and the number of residents who have already returned, this was not an option that we considered for very long. The monetary losses of industries based in the area and the priceless losses of culture seemed to far outweigh the costs of rebuilding, whether rebuilding all or part of the city.

From a purely political perspective, the first option (rebuild New Orleans in its entirety) is the most attractive because it is the most likely to please people. However, based on the research of other members of the class (see websites for teams 1, 2, 3, 4, and 9 in particular), the scientific outlook for New Orleans is not favorable in the long run. Therefore, our plans tend towards the second option, to account for long-term hazards while still taking care of the existing population. In this sense, our immediate solutions need to be integrated with our long-term vision for the area.

One possible solution for the long term is to keep the city of New Orleans where it is, at its current population level and with the same amount of economic activity, making allowances for a natural increase or decrease in each of these.

Currently New Orleans functions as a very large port, second largest in the state after the Port of South Louisiana (Port of New Orleans 2003). It is quite feasible to keep this economic activity as is. Private companies will continue to function in the port, as long as this port is advantageous to them. If the city of New Orleans is rebuilt to its pre-Katrina state, the port will indeed continue to be used by companies, as it is located in a large city and is close to the mouth of the Mississippi. Furthermore, these ports are sustainable because they are mostly right along the river, and these areas are located further above sea level than the rest of New Orleans (GNOCDC 2005). These areas also do not suffer as much from subsidence (BBC 2006).

In order to sustain the rest of the city, which is essentially in a bowl next to Lake Pontchartrain, it would be necessary to combat the subsidence and the sea level rise. One possibility is to build the levees higher and higher to protect the low-lying areas of the city, such as New Orleans East, Gentilly, and Lakeview. It is important to note that much of the flooding in New Orleans was not just caused by the overtopping of the levees, but also by the breaching of levees and canals. If the levees are built to a Category 5 storm standard, the city would be well protected. The role of the government here is being in charge of building up the levees. Much of the government’s involvement here would be through the Army Corps of Engineers, which has been in charge of rebuilding the levees and would be in charge of making the levees better. The problem with this plan, however, is that the maintenance of these levees and the continual raising of these levees would become very expensive.

Another way to combat the rise of subsidence is to make an effort to fill in with soil the areas of New Orleans that are sinking. The role of the government here is in using eminent domain to take control of land that will be filled in with soil. This would require demolishing property, or at least not rebuilding many of the areas that have been damaged severely by Katrina for some time. The fact is that some of the low-lying, quickly sinking parts of New Orleans are already being rebuilt, so it would be necessary to demolish these homes (Cotton 2006). This brings up an issue with eminent domain, because the government would have to take control of the land in order to fill it in with soil. A recent law passed concerning eminent domain prevents the government from transferring ownership of the land to a private company to develop or, in this case, fill in with soil, so the government would have to keep control of the land. After this lengthy, expensive project has been finished, the government would have to help rebuild entire neighborhoods, including homes that had not suffered much damage from the hurricane. This would help combat the problem of subsidence, but the subsidence will still occur, meaning that eventually, this process would have to be repeated.

Building the levees higher and filling in the land with soil would together be a way to sustain the city for years. This would lower the rate of subsidence of the city, and it would also keep the city from being flooded by water from Lake Pontchartrain. However, the cost associated with this plan is astounding. There are immense costs associated with filling in the city with soil and demolishing and rebuilding entire neighborhoods. Furthermore, there are costs associated with building better levees to meet the Category 5 storm standard and maintaining them throughout hurricanes, which make this solution possible, but not economically feasible.

Rather than continue to build the city up, at higher and high costs, as time goes by, it might be more practical to move residents to a place that would not require such extensive maintenance, protection, and rebuilding after every hurricane. Though not a popular choice, we believe the government must make the best decision based on all factors, including costs and scientific outlook. This leads us back to downsizing New Orleans – not just in the short-run rebuilding plans, but also in our long-term vision for the city. Downsizing, as detailed in the short-term plans, would make it easier to protect the residents remaining by restricting the areas they can live in (through eminent domain and zoning) and focusing time and funds on protecting those areas, rather than the entire city.

As with any plan that changes the nature of an area, there would of course be widespread repercussions. To begin with, the Port of New Orleans: the long-term plan envisions the Port of South Louisiana and Baton Rouge absorbing many of the current functions of the Port of New Orleans. The government could help with this transition by subsidizing the development of railways, highways, and other transportation mechanisms that go to ports further north along the Mississippi, as an alternative to the Port of Louisiana. Subsidence would slow with a decreased population density, and the people staying could be concentrated in areas of higher elevation and lower subsidence. It would be much more economically feasible to protect fewer people in a smaller area, and therefore the government could actually provide better protection, rather than using its limited budget to build sub-standard levees all over New Orleans.

Though this long-term solution is not perfect, we believe that, given the real restrictions of limited budget and incomplete technological solutions to environmental problems, it is the best and most foresighted decision the government can make.