You may outline your answers on these study-question sheets, but will not be permitted to consult other materials.

You will be asked to answer two from a choice of three questions, drawn for the list below, plus some short identifications. Total exam time: 2.5 hours (1 hour each for the essays, .5 hour for the short IDs.)

You are encouraged to study together as you prepare your answers.

1. Please answer one of the following two questions:

a. Could World War II in Europe have been prevented, localized or limited? If so, when and how? By whom? ("Whom" = any individual, group, or institution. "Groups" can include classes, professions, or any other social or political group. "Institutions" can include governments, institutions within governments, and private institutions.)

b. Same as question #la, but addressing the 1941-1945 Pacific War between the United States and Japan.

2. Which previous wars covered in this course should the leaders of the powers engaged in the Korean War have studied most closely to avoid the mistakes they made?

3. Some scholars argue that states usually perceive the world clearly, and analyze it well. In this view war results largely from traps and dilemmas that arise from the anarchic character of the international system, which compels states to struggle and sometimes fight for security. Others believe that states seldom see the world as in fact it is, and that most warfare springs from national misperceptions. What do you think?

a. Is warfare usually rooted in sound or unsound perceptions and analysis? Does war more often represent the effective or ineffective pursuit of national interest?

b. How much warfare would be prevented if national perceptions were always accurate?

Base your answer on historical cases covered in this course. Discuss exceptions to any generalizations you offer. If you argue that misperceptions are important, specify what types of misperceptions matter most: (a) those arising from human cognitive shortcomings (that is, psychological causes); (b) those deliberately purveyed by mendacious individuals or institutions; (c) those arising from the opacity of the international environment (that is, from the inherent difficulty of perceiving international politics correctly.)