Category M: Military-strategic
Phase 3 Factors

3M-01  "Status quo" side has the military advantage
3M-02 "Non-status quo" side has the military advantage
3M-03 Military balance remains heavily in favor of one side
3M-04 Military technology of one side significantly superior
3M-05 Militarily the hostilities are inconclusive
3M-06 One side has overwhelming military and logistical preponderance for the terrain
3M-07 One side has very weak military forces
3M-08 The military strength of one side increases
3M-09 "Status quo" side uses superior military power to win military victory
3M-10 One side is ill-informed on size of forces needed to execute its avowed policy
3M-11 Initial hostilities fail to delay change in status quo
3M-12 "Status quo" side's forces are ineffective and unable to stop or deflect attack of "non-status quo" side
3M-13 Only a small proportion of each side's forces are engaged
3M-14 A large proportion of each side's forces are engaged
3M-15 "Non-status quo" side uses superior military power to win military victory
3M-16 The manner in which fighting breaks out suggests that hostilities are largely accidental
3M-17 Hostilities having broken out almost accidentally, neither side can follow up
3M-18 One side resorts to guerrilla warfare
3M-19 The terrain is unsuitable for guerrilla warfare
3M-20 "Non-status quo" side has few, primitive arms, and weak training and organization
3M-21 Armed forces of supporters of both sides become involved
3M-22 Armed forces of supporters of both sides do not become involved
3M-23 Major ally of one side responds to attacks with large reinforcements
3M-24 Military action by one side leads to combat with allies of the other side
3M-25 Larger strategic concerns constrain pressure from states influential with "status quo" side
3M-26 One side's ally's military mission has expanded from logistic support to advice on military operations
3M-27 Prolonged or intensified hostilities may trigger a mutual security agreement to which one side belongs
3M-28 Outside parties halt military aid to both sides
3M-29 One side unable to cut off arms supply to other side
3M-30 External pressures for termination develop
3M-31 One side's move against the other side's supply lines risks retaliation
3M-32 Foreign officers in one side's armed forces threaten withdrawal if that side continues military activities
3M-33 Neither side can obtain a decisive military victory at an acceptable level of commitment and risk
3M-34 Rapid growth of one side's armed forces sacrifices quality of training
3M-35 Force is not used for military victory, but to strengthen diplomacy by threatening a wider war
3M-36 Commander of one side's army advises against more military activity
3M-37 One side failed to move beyond terrorism and isolated guerrilla activity
3M-38 Military and para-military units act on their own initiative
3M-39 New military effectiveness on one side discourages other side from belief in military victory
3M-40 Raids by one side into other's territory inflict no military damage
3M-41 One side must commit more troops than anticipated
3M-42 One side feels that a cease fire in place would leave the other's troops too close
3M-43 Reasons for initial intervention by one side remain, but forces committed are inadequate
3M-44 The strategic interests of the side that intervened in hostilities retain importance
3M-45 Military tactics of "status quo" side restrict scale and scope of hostilities
3M-46 One side possesses significant nuclear technology
3M-47 Both sides possess significant nuclear technology
3M-48 One side believed to be developing nuclear weapons capability
3M-49 Both sides believed to be developing nuclear weapons capability

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Copyright 1999 Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Allen Moulton