Category M: Military-strategic
Phase 3 Factors
| 3M-01 | "Status quo" side has the military advantage |
| 3M-02 | "Non-status quo" side has the military advantage |
| 3M-03 | Military balance remains heavily in favor of one side |
| 3M-04 | Military technology of one side significantly superior |
| 3M-05 | Militarily the hostilities are inconclusive |
| 3M-06 | One side has overwhelming military and logistical preponderance for the terrain |
| 3M-07 | One side has very weak military forces |
| 3M-08 | The military strength of one side increases |
| 3M-09 | "Status quo" side uses superior military power to win military victory |
| 3M-10 | One side is ill-informed on size of forces needed to execute its avowed policy |
| 3M-11 | Initial hostilities fail to delay change in status quo |
| 3M-12 | "Status quo" side's forces are ineffective and unable to stop or deflect attack of "non-status quo" side |
| 3M-13 | Only a small proportion of each side's forces are engaged |
| 3M-14 | A large proportion of each side's forces are engaged |
| 3M-15 | "Non-status quo" side uses superior military power to win military victory |
| 3M-16 | The manner in which fighting breaks out suggests that hostilities are largely accidental |
| 3M-17 | Hostilities having broken out almost accidentally, neither side can follow up |
| 3M-18 | One side resorts to guerrilla warfare |
| 3M-19 | The terrain is unsuitable for guerrilla warfare |
| 3M-20 | "Non-status quo" side has few, primitive arms, and weak training and organization |
| 3M-21 | Armed forces of supporters of both sides become involved |
| 3M-22 | Armed forces of supporters of both sides do not become involved |
| 3M-23 | Major ally of one side responds to attacks with large reinforcements |
| 3M-24 | Military action by one side leads to combat with allies of the other side |
| 3M-25 | Larger strategic concerns constrain pressure from states influential with "status quo" side |
| 3M-26 | One side's ally's military mission has expanded from logistic support to advice on military operations |
| 3M-27 | Prolonged or intensified hostilities may trigger a mutual security agreement to which one side belongs |
| 3M-28 | Outside parties halt military aid to both sides |
| 3M-29 | One side unable to cut off arms supply to other side |
| 3M-30 | External pressures for termination develop |
| 3M-31 | One side's move against the other side's supply lines risks retaliation |
| 3M-32 | Foreign officers in one side's armed forces threaten withdrawal if that side continues military activities |
| 3M-33 | Neither side can obtain a decisive military victory at an acceptable level of commitment and risk |
| 3M-34 | Rapid growth of one side's armed forces sacrifices quality of training |
| 3M-35 | Force is not used for military victory, but to strengthen diplomacy by threatening a wider war |
| 3M-36 | Commander of one side's army advises against more military activity |
| 3M-37 | One side failed to move beyond terrorism and isolated guerrilla activity |
| 3M-38 | Military and para-military units act on their own initiative |
| 3M-39 | New military effectiveness on one side discourages other side from belief in military victory |
| 3M-40 | Raids by one side into other's territory inflict no military damage |
| 3M-41 | One side must commit more troops than anticipated |
| 3M-42 | One side feels that a cease fire in place would leave the other's troops too close |
| 3M-43 | Reasons for initial intervention by one side remain, but forces committed are inadequate |
| 3M-44 | The strategic interests of the side that intervened in hostilities retain importance |
| 3M-45 | Military tactics of "status quo" side restrict scale and scope of hostilities |
| 3M-46 | One side possesses significant nuclear technology |
| 3M-47 | Both sides possess significant nuclear technology |
| 3M-48 | One side believed to be developing nuclear weapons capability |
| 3M-49 | Both sides believed to be developing nuclear weapons capability |
Copyright © 1999 Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Allen Moulton