The Inter-University Committee on International Migration (IUCIM), which has been a focal point for migration and refugee studies at MIT, Boston University, Tufts University, Wellesley College and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy since 1974, marked its 30th anniversary on October 5th with a celebration at the Wong Auditorium that included a keynote address by Dr. Mamphela Ramphele, Co-Chair of the UN’s Global Commission on International Migration.

IUCIM Steering Committee Chair Dr. Sharon Stanton Russell joined founding members Nazli Choucri, MIT Professor of Political Science, and John Harris, a former MIT professor of economics who now teaches at Boston University, in recalling the formation and achievements of the program, which offers grants to stimulate research and training on policy issues of concern to NGOs working in the field with refugees and the internally displaced and sponsors two seminar series on international migration.

“We are delighted to welcome John to CIS,” said Center Director Richard Samuels, “and look forward to benefiting from his enormous energy and creativity.”

Dr. Tirman has written extensively on foreign policy, politics, and human rights, publishing six books and more than 100 articles in a variety of newspapers and journals. His books include The Fallacy of Star Wars (Vintage Books, 1984), Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America’s Arms Trade (Free Press, 1997), and The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration After 9/11 (The New Press, 2004). He is currently working on another volume as co-editor and co-author, Multilateralism Under Challenge? Power, International Order and Structural Change (U.N. University Press).

From 1999-2000, Dr. Tirman was Fulbright Senior Scholar in Cyprus. Since his return, he has edited an online educational website called continued on page 18...
According to his faculty web page, MIT Professor of Biology Rudolf Jaenisch works on “epigenetic regulation of gene expression in mammalian development and disease.” At first glance, he may not seem to be an ideal speaker for a forum on human rights. But on October 18th, Dr. Jaenisch spoke at a gathering sponsored by the Program on Human Rights and Justice (PHRJ) as part of the program’s ongoing effort to broaden the study of human rights at MIT.

**Science, Technology & Human Rights**

The human rights research agenda has long been dominated by issues of international law and moral philosophy. Some researchers worry that this has isolated the field from multi-disciplinary attention, and PHRJ is spearheading a movement to address this concern. The problem is seen as especially acute at MIT, where students spend the majority of their days thinking about science and engineering.

The study of human rights has much to gain by leveraging MIT’s comparative advantages in science and technology, according to PHRJ Program Assistant Susan Frick. To this end, PHRJ has asked scholars from other fields to consider the effects of emerging technologies on human rights, including the speakers in its fall series on science, technology, and human rights. Enter Dr. Jaenisch, a founding member of the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, who spoke about the relationship between cloning and human rights. Acknowledging the serious ethical questions involved, he stressed the need to first outline the “scientific reality of the field.”

PHRJ Director Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Ford International Professor of Law and Development, says that the speaker series encourages the “community of scientists and engineers at MIT to engage with the doctrine of human rights.” To Professor Rajagopal, this is fully consistent with MIT’s broader mission. Other speakers in the series have included Professor Stephan Chorover of the Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, who discussed ethics and neuroscience.

**Building Student Interest**

These scholars are also changing the language of human rights studies in order to make it more accessible. Because issues are often wrapped in legal jargon, some students believe that the field is restricted to lawyers and activists. For students at MIT, the traditional legal focus has also made it seem disconnected from their other studies. But according to Susan Frick, the new focus on the intersection between human rights, science and technology is welcome, because questions about the implications of technology give students an opportunity to discover how their own work relates to...
broader social issues.

To increase student involvement, PHRJ sponsors a number of undergraduate internships each year. Interns work on human rights issues abroad, the aim being to develop new insights on the relationship between technological development and human rights.

PHRJ intern Valentina Zuin recently returned from Brazil, where she researched urban and environmental renovation. Zuin, who presented her findings during an open forum in October, was interested in how non-governmental organizations have collaborated with local governmental agencies. By combining aspects of engineering and social development, her work illustrates the evolution of human rights studies at MIT.

**SPOTLIGHT: PHRJ FELLOWS**

Each year, the Program on Human Rights and Justice (PHRJ) hosts several visiting academics and activists. The program’s current group of fellows bring with them an eclectic mix of research interests and professional experience.

**Dr. Luise Druke** is Visiting Professor at the New Bulgarian University and representative of the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) in Bulgaria. She has had a longstanding association with Amnesty International, and has headed offices of the UNHCR in three continents. Her current research focus is on refugee protection in post-Communist countries.

**Obiora Chinedu Okafor** is Associate Professor of Law at York University in Toronto and a faculty member at York’s Centre for Refugee Studies. Dr. Okafor has taught at universities throughout Canada and Africa, and served as a Visiting Scholar at Harvard Law School’s Human Rights Program. His research project at PHRJ is entitled “Refugee Rights after 9/11: A Comparative Analysis of the Canadian and U.S. Regimes.”

**Dr. Gary Troeller** is a senior executive with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). He has more than 30 years’ experience in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe and North America, and has held four ambassadorial-rank Chief-of-Mission assignments. Before joining the UNHCR, Dr. Troeller taught international relations in the United States, Japan and Korea. He has published widely on the Middle East, energy policy, international relations, academic affairs and the media, and will focus on migration politics, refugees and international relations in the post-Cold War era while at PHRJ.
In May 2004, the Center for International Studies hosted its fourth Asia-Pacific Crisis Simulation since 1993. This year’s exercise—the culmination of a graduate seminar taught by CIS Director and Ford International Professor of Political Science Richard Samuels—examined what impact China’s rise during the next two decades might have on regional efforts to encourage multilateralism.

The participants included MIT faculty and graduate students, as well as other scholars, journalists, current and former policymakers, and business executives.

Each player was assigned a specific role in the simulation, which was guided by a control team that included Professor Samuels and recent Ph.D. graduates George Gilboy, Eric Heginbotham, and Chris Twomey, as well as graduate students Patrick Boyd, Llewelyn Hughes, and Dan Carter. Michael Desch, Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky played the U.S. President; MIT Security Studies Program Principal Research Scientist Cindy Williams played the Secretary of State; Tsuneo Watanabe of the Center for Strategic and International Studies took the role of the Japanese Prime Minister; Paul Hsu, President of the Epoch Foundation, played the President of Taiwan and John Tkacik of the Heritage Foundation the Taiwanese opposition leader; David Kang of Dartmouth College took the role of Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea; Ann Marie Murphy of Columbia University played the Director General of ASEAN; MIT Political Science Professor Edward Steinfeld played the Chinese premier; and Adam Segal of the Council on Foreign Relations assumed the role of China’s Defense Minister.

MIT political science students acted as “aides-de-camp” to the various delegations, while American journalist Chris Nelson played the role of a fictitious “Pox News” reporter and Masaru Honda of Asahi Shimbun played a Japanese TV corresponds. Nelson’s and Honda’s intermittent television reports were piped into each of the rooms in which the various camps were meeting.

Additional players took the role of the “Japanese public” who “voted” in three national elections during the course of the simulation. These votes were meant to assess the interaction between international strategies and domestic politics.

In the Year 2010

The simulation began with a hypothesized crisis in 2010 in which the United States accuses Iran of developing nuclear weapons with components from Russia, China, and North Korea. Participants simulated plausible state moves and counter-moves up to 2013, using the military, economic, and diplomatic tools at their disposal. The game offered no hard and fast conclusions about the future of Asian politics, but the strategic behavior of the participants suggested several possible trajectories. The Russian team, for example, employed a classic balancing strategy to good effect. Korea, on the other hand, “bandwagoned” with China to increase its wealth and military security.

The current-day U.S.-led war with Iraq influenced the game. In the opening crisis over Iran, for example, the principals, mindful of the difficulties faced by the United States in Iraq, were reluctant to take strong action.

Mixed Results

The results of the simulation were mixed. Paradoxically, the long-simmering dispute over Taiwan lost some of its urgency as China became more powerful; as the regime in Beijing became more self-assured, it felt less need to
In this recent article in Foreign Affairs, CIS Research Affiliate George Gilboy challenges the conventional wisdom on the inevitability of China’s economic rise.

China’s sudden rise as a global trading power has been greeted with a curious mixture of both admiration and fear. Irrational exuberance about the country’s economic future has prompted investors to gobble up shares of Chinese firms with little understanding of how these companies actually operate. Meanwhile, overestimates of China’s achievements and potential are fueling fears that the country will inevitably tilt global trade and technology balances in its favor, ultimately becoming an economic, technological, and military threat to the United States.

These reactions, however, are equally mistaken: they overlook both important weaknesses in China’s economic “miracle” and the strategic benefits the United States is reaping from the particular way in which China has joined the global economy. Such misjudgments could drive Washington to adopt protectionist policies that would reverse recent improvements in U.S.-China relations, further alienate Washington from its allies, and diminish U.S. influence in Asia.

China’s Stake in the System

In fact, the United States and China are developing precisely the type of economic relationship that U.S. strategy has long sought to create. China now has a stake in the liberal, rules-based global economic system that the United States worked to establish over the past half-century. Beijing has opened its economy to foreign direct investment (FDI), welcomed large-scale imports, and joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), spurring prosperity and liberalization within China and across the region.

China’s own choices along the road to global economic integration have reinforced trends that favor the continued industrial and technological preeminence of the United States and other advanced industrialized democracies. In its forced march to the market, Beijing has let political and social reforms lag behind, with at least two critical—and unexpected—consequences.

First, to forestall the rise of a politically independent private sector, the Chinese government has implemented economic reforms that strongly favor state-owned enterprises (SOEs), granting them preferential access to capital, technology, and markets. But reforms have also favored foreign investment, which has allowed foreign firms to claim the lion’s share of China’s industrial exports and secure strong positions in its domestic markets. As a result, Chinese industry is left with inefficient but still-powerful SOEs, increasingly dominant foreign firms, and a private sector as yet unable to compete with either on equal terms. Second, the business risks inherent in China’s unreformed political system have bred a response among many Chinese managers—an “industrial strategic culture”—that encourages them to seek short-term profits, local autonomy, and excessive diversification. With a few exceptions, Chinese firms focus on developing privileged relations with officials in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hierarchy, spurn horizontal association and broad networking with each other, and forgo investment in long-term technology development and diffusion. Chinese firms continue to rely heavily on imported foreign technology and compo-

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nents—severely limiting the country’s ability to wield technological or trading power for unilateral gains.

China, in other words, has joined the global economy on terms that reinforce its dependence on foreign technology and investment and restrict its ability to become an industrial and technological threat to advanced industrialized democracies. China’s best hope for overcoming its technological and economic weaknesses lies in a renewed focus on domestic political reform. Thus, rather than lapse into shortsighted trade protectionism that could undermine current favorable trends, Washington should pursue a policy of “strategic engagement.” Not simply engagement for its own sake, strategic engagement would explicitly acknowledge the advantages of U.S. technological, economic, and military leadership and seek to reinforce them, in exchange for increased prosperity and more security for China—the more so now that China has a compelling economic interest in domestic political reform.

Open and Opening

Recent debates about U.S-China trade overlook the fact that the U.S. economic relationship with China is largely favorable and that it is conducted largely on U.S. terms.

According to Morgan Stanley, low-cost Chinese imports (mainly textiles, shoes, toys, and household goods) have saved U.S. consumers (mostly middle- and low-income families) about $100 billion dollars since China’s reforms began in 1978. And although global sourcing can cause painful employment adjustments, the process can also benefit U.S. workers and companies. A recent independent study sponsored by the Information Technology Association of America found that outsourcing to countries such as China and India created a net 90,000 new U.S. jobs in information technology in 2003 and estimated that outsourcing will create a net 317,000 new U.S. jobs by 2008.

Unlike other U.S. trading partners in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, which spurned U.S. imports and investment for decades, China is also a large, open market for U.S. products. Although total U.S. exports have stagnated in recent years, U.S. exports to China have tripled in the last decade. They increased by 28 percent last year alone (whereas overall U.S. exports went up by only 5 percent). In particular, China has become a staple market for advanced U.S. technology products.

Thanks to this appetite for imports, powerful domestic coalitions, particularly China’s growing ranks of urban consumers and its most competitive firms, will continue to favor trade openness. Chinese consumers pride themselves on driving foreign-brand cars and using mobile phones and computers with circuits that were designed and manufactured abroad. Many Chinese firms resist protectionism, because they need to import critical components for their domestic operations and fear retaliation against their exports. For example, in the 1990s, China’s machine tool and aircraft industries failed to secure effective state protection in the face of opposition from domestic firms that preferred imports, and they suffered significant decline as a result.

A Potential Trade Ally

As an open economy and a large importing country, China could be an ally of the United States in many areas of global trade and finance. Already, Beijing has displayed a willingness to play by WTO rules. It has charged Japan and South Korea with unfair trade practices—markets the United States has also long sought to crack open. China initiated 10 antidumping investigations in 2002 on products with import value of more than $7 billion, and another 20 investigations in 2003. China is now a leading promoter of regional trade and investment regimes, including a free trade zone with ASEAN and a bilateral free trade agreement with Australia, one of the United States’ closest allies in the Pacific region. Already, Beijing’s proposals on regional economic cooperation seem far more relevant to most Asian nations than do Washington’s.

The final benefit the United States enjoys from China’s global economic integration is in the long-term, patient battle to promote liberalism in Asia. Foreign trade and development have spurred advancements in Chinese commercial law, greater regulatory consultation
with Chinese consumers, slimmed-down bureaucracies, and adherence to international safety and environmental standards. Although it is still limited, the people’s freedom to debate economic and social issues has increased, especially in the robust financial media. This process of liberalization is incomplete and uneven, but it is in the interest of both China and the United States to see it continue.

**Strategic Engagement**

Given these limits on China’s potential to threaten the global balance of economic power, the United States should resist the false promise of protectionism.

Rather, recognizing both the challenges and the opportunities presented by China’s industrial landscape, Washington should pursue a policy of strategic engagement with Beijing. The purpose of this policy would be to bolster U.S. technological, economic, and political leadership, while helping China become more prosperous, stable, and integrated into global economic networks. Pursuing it will require simultaneously strengthening the basis for U.S. technological and manufacturing mastery in the United States and promoting U.S. exports, investment, and liberal values abroad.

The United States should revitalize manufacturing at home, for example. Tax cuts are no panacea; the United States needs focused policies to strengthen R&D, reduce legal and health care costs, and improve education. Innovation is critical to growth, but R&D spending in the United States has declined in relative terms from 60 percent of world R&D in the 1960s to 30 percent today. Meanwhile, although U.S. manufacturing productivity has risen by 27 percent in the last five years, health care premiums have risen by 34 percent and litigation costs by about 33 percent, according to the National Association of Manufacturers.

Continued engagement of this kind will help the United States consolidate the benefits it already reaps from the current relationship, ensure China’s continued prosperity and stability, and encourage China to play by global rules. Working with its allies to further incorporate China’s economy in international trade and industrial networks, the United States can reinforce the technological leadership of the advanced industrialized democracies, while diminishing the scope for Chinese technological and economic mercantilism.


George J. Gilboy is a senior manager at a multinational firm in Beijing, where he has been working since 1995. He earned his Ph.D. in political science from MIT in 2003.
At the Wong Auditorium on September 29th, Myrtoh Bonhomme, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Haiti and the Dean of the National Diplomatic Academy of Haiti, delivered a CIS Starr Forum lecture on prospects for reconstruction and democracy in Haiti in which he cautioned against a return to power by former president Jean Bertrand Aristide.

Ambassador Bonhomme was invited to MIT by Suzanne Berger, Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science, who praised his work in maintaining the Academy despite the ongoing political turmoil in Haiti.

**Missed Opportunities**

Ambassador Bonhomme laid out a history of “missed opportunities” in Haiti that led a once-prosperous island to become the poorest state in the Western Hemisphere. He noted that after World War II, Haiti began to develop a modern economy by supplying raw materials to war-ravaged Europe. Progress halted, however, after a military coup in the early 1950s. What might have become an “era of prosperity,” he said, led to the rise of two consecutive dictatorships. Instead of economic growth and democracy, Haitians lived under stern rule and spiraled into poverty.

During the 1980s, Ambassador Bonhomme explained, the island attracted U.S. investment by providing a source of cheap labor. But low wages eventually led Haitian workers to protest their living conditions, and the growing political instability caused the U.S. firms to close down entirely. The resulting unemployment further alienated the population, fueling a rise in violence and insecurity.

Ambassador Bonhomme argued that recently deposed President Jean Bertrand Aristide missed the most important opportunity to date. Aristide was elected with broad domestic and international support in 1991. His background as a priest made him credible among many Haitians who expected a leader who would honor his vows of poverty and advocate for the poor, Ambassador Bonhomme said. Instead, Aristide became one of the richest men on the island and “gave up the opportunity to be a great man.”

**A Failed State**

According to Ambassador Bonhomme, it is poor governance that has turned Haiti into a failed state, one that cannot provide basic services or create a friendly environment for economic growth. Haiti’s poor infrastructure burdens the country with extra expenses; these expenses siphon off capital that could be used for productive investment. Such problems are self-reinforcing and not easily fixed, he cautioned.

Ambassador Bonhomme suggested a two-stage process for reconstruction. First, he said, Haiti needs to stabilize the current transition from the Aristide regime to something more responsive. Second, Haiti needs to pursue broad and lasting economic reform. Neither step will be easy, he said, but both are critical.

Political Science Associate Professor Chappell Lawson offered a few comments in response to the ambassador’s talk. He discussed the “substantial tension” between the desire to create a strong state and the desire to create democratic institutions, saying that while the development of a strong state may be able to provide basic services and jump-start the Haitian economy, it may ultimately be seen as illegitimate. This tension is unlikely to subside as Haiti tries to rebuild, he added.
Salvatore Scaturro, Jr. (BS, Civil and Environmental Engineering, ’04) spent the summer with a small team of instructors who introduced the MIT-China OpenCourseWare Initiative at Qinghai University. Based in part of the success of their trip, MIT-China is currently scouting additional host institutions.

Having been in China for a total of 12 months over the past four years on various MIT-China program internships, and having spent time in both large cities and small towns throughout the country, I honestly thought that I would not learn too much more about Chinese education and culture on this, my fourth trip to China.

I have never made such a foolish and naïve assumption in my life.

The unique experiences I have had this summer as part of the MIT-China OpenCourseWare Initiative at Qinghai University have been among my most meaningful, thought-provoking, and—at the risk of being cliché—life-changing.

During my internship with the Environmental Education Media Project for China (EEMPC) in Beijing during the summer and fall of 2001, I first became exposed to issues facing the developing world. I was so deeply influenced by working with my dedicated colleagues at that organization that I decided to shift my academic focus from structural engineering to environmental engineering upon returning to my undergraduate studies at MIT in the spring of 2002. I felt that this change would allow me to get closer to my newfound interest in understanding—and helping—those in the developing world who lack the opportunities and infrastructure to improve their lives.

Now, three years later, with a bachelor’s degree in Civil and Environmental Engineering and a much clearer understanding of what ‘development’ implies, I am in Qinghai province, at the heart of China’s developing west. Like my internship at EEMPC, this project at Qinghai University has deeply influenced my academic interests and personal growth.

Pilot Project

The purpose of this summer’s pilot project was to provide a basis for cultural exchange by introducing the concept and benefits of MIT OpenCourseWare to the students and faculty at Qinghai University. From late June until the end of July, my four teammates (Yiqun Bai ’06, Siqi Chen ’02, Peter Jeziorek MS ’05, Michelle Tiu ’05) and I taught biology, computer science and environmental engineering to approximately 100 students.

We modeled our teaching schedule after the MIT system by making use of lectures, recitations, and lab sessions. This type of schedule—and our Western style of teaching—was a new experience for our students, who were accustomed to the more traditional style of Chinese education. There was a definite period of adjustment for them at the beginning of the summer, as they became comfortable asking questions and actively participating in class activities.

Similarly, there was an adjustment period for us as we tried to figure out ways to increase participation. The most effective way was simply by becoming their friends and interacting with them outside the classroom. Our students frequently visited our apartment, and we often cooked and ate with them. They accompanied us on our half-day trips into the city of Xining, approximately 30 minutes away by the number 15 bus. Several of our students even came with us when we took a weekend trip to Mengda Nature Preserve, home to some of Qinghai’s most beautiful scenery.

It was during these out-of-class interactions with our students that I experienced the most cultural exchange. The students were especially interested in the details of my family life, American food, and the American education system. It was during these interactions that I realized how fortunate I am to have the opportunities that I do, and how much I can learn from others. I am grateful for this opportunity to share my experiences with others and to help them understand the world in a new way.

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University to begin teaching my fall semester Fluid Mechanics class. The arrangements for this class are a bit different than those for our summer classes; the students are taking my class in place of the class they would normally take within their major. Qinghai University has continued to be extremely accommodating, allowing me full freedom of teaching style.

I am responsible for every aspect of my class: preparing lecture notes, assigning homework, administering tests, and giving a final grade. None of my students has taken a Fluid Mechanics class before, so nearly all of the material I present to them is new. To help them learn the material, I have developed a class website. They download my notes, Chinese translations of the important technical words, homework problem sets, and practice example problems. Online course content is a new concept at Qinghai University (and most other Chinese universities), and the students are still getting comfortable using it as an integrated part of my class.

Changing the Face of Education

I also learned an important thing about myself: I thoroughly enjoy and get much satisfaction from teaching. No matter where my life’s path takes me, I am certain that it will involve teaching. I feel that this is an extremely lucky time for me—or anyone else—to begin a career as an educator, due to the presence of open-content educational materials and the free sharing of knowledge across cultures. Though open-content materials are only starting to become omnipresent in the educational world, they will always be available to me during my career as an educator. This is why I consider myself lucky. It’s similar to how my generation has grown up with computers as a part of everyday life, but my parents’ generation did not.

The concept behind OpenCourseWare is revolutionary, and I am certain that it will change the face of education around the world. It already has begun to do so—I’ve seen it here at Qinghai.

Enjoying Nanshan Park with students in downtown Xining

Teaching Fluid Mechanics

As the summer drew to a close, my teammates went back to the States to continue their studies at MIT and I came back to Qinghai University to begin teaching my fall semester Fluid Mechanics class. The arrangements for this class are a bit different than those for our summer classes; the students are taking my class in place of the class they would normally take within their major. Qinghai University has continued to be extremely accommodating, allowing me full freedom of teaching style.

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Précis Interview Series

TAYLOR FRAVEL

Assistant Professor of Political Science Taylor Fravel joined the MIT faculty this fall, as well as the faculty of the Security Studies Program. Professor Fravel completed a postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies after receiving his Ph.D. from Stanford University. A specialist in international relations theory and Chinese foreign policy, he also writes about the nature of territorial disputes.

Précis: In your work, you describe how China has become more enthusiastic about participating in international institutions. What has motivated this change?

Taylor Fravel: There are a couple of factors. One was the recognition among Chinese leaders that growing power created a security dilemma for other states in the region. Participation in multilateral institutions would help to ameliorate this fear as China’s economy continued to expand. The second motivating factor was that participation in these institutions would strengthen China vis-à-vis the United States. In the early 1990s, China worried that it would be constrained by such participation. By the mid-1990s, Chinese leaders realized that these institutions presented an opportunity to advance their interests and partly shield China from U.S. pressure.

Précis: China’s position on North Korea has also changed. Why?

TF: It’s partly a reflection of this new thinking in Chinese foreign policy. China had never tried to promote or negotiate a multilateral solution before. In this case it seized the initiative.

Given the regional consequences of nuclearization, North Korea is one of China’s most important security concerns. Chinese leaders feared U.S. military action against North Korea, especially in the immediate aftermath of the war in Iraq in April 2003. Some have argued that China’s multilateral activism was in response to this fear. But China remains involved in the North Korean situation, even though the threat of an American military strike has become less likely. This suggests that China’s policy reflects a broader strategic shift.

Précis: Do you think that China has the leverage to engineer a more comprehensive settlement on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program?

TF: Nobody knows, and the Chinese are very cagey about how much leverage they have. They provide most of the fuel oil and food aid, so that would make it appear that they do have sources of leverage. They also maintain regular channels of communication with the North Koreans, but what is said or heard in those channels is unknown.

On the other hand, North Korea has been perfectly willing to starve its people to achieve its goals. Suppose China cut its fuel oil deliveries in half. Would that cause the regime to collapse, or would North Korean leaders make sure to deliver the remaining resources to those who support the regime’s power? This is unknown, so it’s hard to say if China could bring about the kind of changes that some in the U.S. government desire.

Précis: Part of China’s transformation into a “less confrontational, more constructive” state involves tacit acceptance of U.S. military preponderance. Will China revert to more confrontational behavior if it narrows the military gap in 25 or 50 years?

TF: It’s hard to look that far down the road. If we assume that the same basic regime stays in place as the state becomes stronger, then it is fair to assume that it might try to use its power to change the rules of international institutions.
But you can’t hold the current regime constant.

One reason for optimism is the observable change in the past decade in how China perceives its interest abroad. This suggests that increased participation in international institutions may have a pacific effect in the long term. This makes people more optimistic about the effects of China’s rise.

précis: Some scholars have argued that the Chinese Communist Party maintains its legitimacy on the pillars of nationalism and economic growth. Yet both are somewhat tenuous. Suppose Taiwan leans toward declaring independence, or the economy suffers a hard landing after years of expansion. Do these scenarios threaten China’s emergence as a responsible global power?

TF: If economic growth declines or the government faces new legitimacy crises, it may become more inward looking and decrease its level of participation in international institutions. But it is almost inconceivable to see China completely walking away from global responsibilities. At the same time, various international bodies will offer aid to the Chinese economy, which has driven the world economy over the last several years.

Nationalism is a double-edged sword for Chinese leaders. The government uses nationalism to deflect attention from its current problems, but it doesn’t want to set expectations too high. After the embassy bombing in 1999, for example, the government stopped the protests after about four days. This was not because the emotions died away. Rather, the government decided that the protests could easily spin out of control, and people would start questioning why the government wasn’t doing more to protect Chinese people from American bombs.

More worrying is the collapse of the authority structure of the regime itself. In this scenario, you might see the rise of an opportunist who would use irredentist claims or outstanding territorial disputes to motivate supporters. It is impossible, however, to accurately make such pointed predictions about the future of China’s domestic problems.

précis: Broadly speaking, how should the United States deal with China’s new internationalization?

TF: The irony is that the United States encouraged it all through the 1990s. Now we’re wondering whether we really want China to be more active. China’s new thinking is both a challenge and an opportunity. To some extent it reinforces the existing order, because China has accepted the rules of existing international institutions. At the same time, China is becoming a more able diplomatic player with increased diplomatic influence, in these institutions and elsewhere.

This is especially the case since September 11th. In the region, the United States has focused heavily on counterterrorism. Asian states, however, remain equally concerned about economic modernization, development and trade. China has addressed these concerns through the pursuit of free trade agreements with ASEAN, for example. This has raised China’s profile in the region at the expense of the United States. In this case, U.S. policy created a vacuum that China easily filled.

Over the long term, China will use the very institutions that the Bush administration disregards to accumulate respect and diplomatic capital from its neighbors. The danger is that the United States will be left behind in the region.

précis: Much of your work focused on territorial disputes. When are states most likely to offer territorial concessions?

TF: Compromises over disputed territory are almost always a bargain. Leaders will trade territorial concessions for some good or some form of cooperation. China, for example, has
been more willing to cooperate when it has faced domestic threats to regime stability and regime security. Specifically, Chinese leaders have compromised during periods of ethnic unrest in frontier regions or crises of regime legitimacy. At these moments they have placed high value on cooperation with neighboring states.

The more generic point is that states are most likely to make territorial concessions when they desire international cooperation for other reasons. For example, the existence of an external threat may be reason enough to offer concessions to a would-be ally. Loosely speaking, leaders weigh the value of the disputed territory against the value of the cooperation needed to address the external threat.

In some cases, territorial disputes are so important that they take on properties of indivisibility. Under these conditions it is extremely hard to reach an agreement. In China, for example, leaders have not compromised on areas that are linked to the ethnic Han identity, such as Hong Kong or Taiwan. On the other hand, they have made significant concessions in disputes with every other neighboring state.

précis: When are territorial disputes particularly dangerous?

TF: In Chinese history, periods of internal weakness combined with external pressure have been extremely dangerous. At these moments China has tried to avoid the perception that domestic unrest was a sign of weakness. China has used force to signal strength and resolve.

More generally, shifts in the balances of power can lead to dangerous disputes. The process of de-colonialization is particularly dangerous because departing colonial powers leave a power vacuum.

précis: The emergence of non-state and transnational enemies pervades public discourse on national security affairs. How is territorial conflict relevant to U.S. foreign policy and homeland security?

TF: September 11th didn’t crowd out all existing forms of conflict; it just created a new one. For example, it wouldn’t make much sense to claim that rising powers are no longer worrisome because of increased concerns about terrorism. The rise of China today is just as important as it was before 9/11, but we have to focus on a whole new basket of security problems, as well.

In terms of relevance, the birth of new states in the modern era will probably produce new territorial disputes. In addition, the war on terrorism involves states as actors. We have already invaded two states on the grounds that they provide safe harbor or supported terrorists. And terrorists take advantage of borders that are easy to traverse. Existing territorial disputes may become more relevant to U.S. national security, as contested borders are difficult to secure.
In the introduction to her recent edited volume, Filling the Ranks: Transforming the U.S. Military Personnel System (MIT Press, 2004), Security Studies Program Principal Research Scientist Cindy Williams argues that current military personnel policies have not adjusted to new strategic and social realities. Outmoded policies will make it difficult to recruit soldiers with the technical skills necessary to run a modern military. And because taxpayers spend over $100 billion each year on military pay and benefits, reform is “critically important from a fiscal point of view.”

The American way of war relies heavily on technology. Media coverage of recent wars has focused national attention on the machines of modern combat: precision-guided weapons, stealth airplanes, un-manned aerial vehicles, satellites, computers, and other high-tech systems. But focusing attention on the tools of war makes it easy to lose sight of the fact that the key to military success is the nation’s men and women in uniform. Without dedicated, motivated, able, and well-trained troops, U.S. investments in military hardware are wasted.

Since the elimination of the draft in 1973, every person who serves in the U.S. military is a volunteer. Military pay and benefits and the personnel policies that underpin them are crucial to the Defense Department’s ability to fill the ranks with the qualified volunteers it needs; they lie at the heart of America’s combat power. Yet the nation inherited most of today’s policies from an earlier era: before conscription ended, before the vast social changes of the past three decades, before the fundamental restructuring of American business of the past two decades, and before the information age, the end of the Cold War, and the war on terrorism ushered in a new set of challenges and technological opportunities for the U.S. military.

Especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the future the U.S. military faces has become more complicated and uncertain. Fundamental changes in the national security environment have profoundly altered the landscape of military operations. The way the nation thinks about and uses its Guard and Reserve has changed dramatically. But the military’s pay and personnel policies are still largely geared toward a force to fight a repetition of World War II.

Policies inherited from the past are also out of step with the modern marketplace and society in which the military must seek its volunteer members. Inflexible pay scales blunt the services’ capacity to compete for people who have attractive alternatives in the private sector. Increasing numbers of young people choose to go to college or technical school after graduating from high school, yet current pay policies make it hard to attract and reward recruits who already have a two-year technical degree or other valuable training and experience. More than half the spouses of military members are employed in the labor force, yet crucial systems for supporting military families still take their volunteer efforts as a given.

The Post-9/11 Landscape

The end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, transformed the strategic landscape. The Department of Defense and all four services now embrace ambitious plans to revolutionize the way wars are fought and reinvent their organizational structures. All seek to transform themselves to take more advantage of modern information systems and to rely less on the slow and heavy units and systems they have today.

In addition, since the 1940s, vast demographic, social, and economic changes in America mean that the supply side of the military personnel equation has become far different. America’s youth are much more likely to
enter college right after high school than the previous generation, and the earnings gap between those who go to college and those who do not has widened dramatically. The generation that fought in World War II is passing away, and growing numbers of young people thus have no close connection to people who have served in the military. A growing share of the U.S. population was born abroad, and English is the second language for increasing numbers of Americans. Women participate in the workforce in far greater numbers, and military spouses are substantially more likely to work outside the home than they were. Individuals’ expectations about careers and professions have also changed with growing labor mobility and corporate restructuring.2

Despite these enormous changes in the military setting, there has been virtually no change in the system of tangible rewards for military service.

**Wars of the Future**

Images of future transformation have profound implications for the people of tomorrow’s military. On the battlefield, the wars of the future will require that lower-ranking officers and enlisted personnel have greater technological expertise, and will place far greater responsibility on their shoulders. Future fights will also require experienced, technically savvy people to maintain high-tech equipment, manage computer networks, and troubleshoot command and control systems. Bringing to fruition the technological innovations that enable the new ways of fighting will also mean devolving and distributing authority across a cadre of acquisition personnel who must be highly innovative and adaptive, able to see problems coming, explore new technologies, and develop creative solutions. At the same time, however, the services are still likely to need people in a host of relatively unskilled occupations.

It has never been easy to attract and keep a force of great occupational diversity and to shape careers in a way that benefits the individual member and at the same time serves the interests of the military as an institution. Doing so with today’s inflexible pay and personnel systems, in the strategic, demographic, labor, and economic context of tomorrow, will be all but impossible. ■


In his contribution to Cindy Williams’s edited volume, Security Studies Program Associate Director Owen Coté explains why the evolving battlefield demands new military personnel policies.

Beginning with the first Gulf War in 1990-91, the United States has fought five wars of choice against much weaker powers. The interests at stake in these wars have varied, but none were truly vital in the traditional sense of the term, which implies a threat either to national survival or to the global balance of power. Because these wars were fought against much weaker powers, the United States was able to marshal military forces enjoying a vast qualitative and, in some cases, quantitative superiority compared to its foes. One result of this disparity in power is that U.S. forces have entered combat with unprecedented levels of control of the sea and of the air, and have been able to defeat opposing ground forces with both historically low losses to U.S. forces and low levels of collateral damage to the opponents’ civilian population and infrastructure.

All of this is fortunate, because no modern great power could afford to fight a war roughly every two years over less than vital interests against much weaker powers if those wars cause both significant military casualties to itself and extensive loss of civilian life. The jury remains out as to whether the military successes heretofore achieved are the result of a revolution in military affairs that only the United States has experienced, or rather of the fact that all of its opponents have been much less powerful in material and also in moral terms. What is clear is that the U.S. military is likely to be asked again, perhaps repeatedly, to achieve the battlefield results of the recent past. This will require it to deepen and accelerate innovative changes in its doctrine that have already begun.

A New Kind of Opponent

Achieving success on modern battlefields requires that the U.S. military be able to quickly defeat adversaries who understand that it is foolish to challenge U.S. forces directly. Instead, these adversaries will try to use deception, dispersal, and mobility to protect their forces, exposing them only when they sense a tactical advantage. This means that an opponent’s forces will generally not present large, fixed targets to U.S. forces, but rather a series of fleeting mobile or relocatable ones.

Because U.S. forces are so superior to their opponents, those opponents scale back their battlefield goals, making it harder for U.S. forces to find and destroy them without exposing themselves.

The Cold War Environment

One common theme of the Cold War legacy was a doctrinal proclivity toward large forces and the elaborate higher command headquarters needed to organize, direct, and sustain such forces efficiently.

One consequence of the fact that the basic units of action were set so high was an accompanying de-emphasis on combined arms within squadrons and battalions. Small unit commanders therefore could expect a relatively predictable and simple tactical environment. Their opponents were assumed to be known and the equipment fielded by those potential opponents was known.

Furthermore, because the stakes in the out-
come of the contemplated battles were high for both sides, and because they were relatively evenly matched in terms of capabilities, neither side would have faced any incentives to avoid close combat.

Finally, because of the relatively unlimited nature of the combat expected, collateral damage would not have been a major concern, and decisions to fire or not would be determined by military necessity.

Under these circumstances, tactics are dominated by relatively constant factors having to do with weapon capabilities and terrain and could be developed to a high degree of specificity during peacetime.

New Demands

Today’s battlefield demands on small unit leaders are quite different. In the air, the emphasis is now on mobile or time-critical targets, and this will impose significant new demands on pilots and weapon system officers.

The new battlefield has also led to new demands on ground forces. Brigade-sized and smaller units are being given independent operational assignments. Often these smaller units operate along multiple non-contiguous and non-linear fronts. In some cases, units must be deployed or sustained by air. Under such circumstances, the capability and responsibility for combining arms and linking to higher headquarters must occur at lower levels than was the norm during the Cold War.

In the ground forces, this devolution of responsibility will need to be met by an equally significant devolution of skills. And there, unlike the air forces, these skills will need to be developed in both the junior officer corps and the enlisted ranks.

Both in the air and on the ground, the biggest personnel obstacle to decentralized operations on distributed battlefields is the relatively short time that small units stay together and that small-unit leaders stay in command. In the ground forces at platoon, company, and battalion-level commands, for example, officers are cycled quickly through command, and the up-or-out system prevents even those who have demonstrated great aptitude for it from staying or returning to command. This system assures that the Army and the Marines have many command-qualified captains and lieutenant colonels in the unlikely event that there is a major world-war style mobilization, but if left unchanged, it will prevent the development of small units capable of combining all arms on distributed battlefields.


1 Few would dispute the material inferiority of our recent opponents. In arguing that they were morally inferior as well I am referring to their relative lack of fighting spirit and determination compared to, for example, the North Vietnamese army. On the latter’s determination, see Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore USA (Ret.) and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once…and Young (New York: Random House, 1992), especially pp. 65-132.

ous academic research and education in this field.”

Ramphele Keynote

In her keynote address, Dr. Ramphele—a former South African civil rights leader and public health expert who is currently special advisor to the president of the World Bank—emphasized that migration is a key concern “in every part of the world” and is “neither good nor bad.” Globalization, economic inequality, and human rights abuses contribute to increased migration, she said. Because this growth affects domestic economies and social hierarchies, she noted, political leaders cannot ignore the substantial costs and benefits associated with migration.

According to Dr. Ramphele, lower-skilled migrants are often “exploited in the workplace and marginalized in society.” Although the international community has not been able to create a coherent common policy toward immigration, she said, the UN Global Commission on International Migration is laying the foundation for such a policy. The Commission will report to the UN Secretary General in July 2005 on three general topics: the effects of migrants in local economies, linkages between migration and international security, and the interaction between human rights and migration patterns. Despite the academic nature of the research, Dr. Ramphele stressed, the report will put a “human face” on migration.

Dr. Ramphele was until recently one of the four managing directors of the World Bank, responsible for managing the Bank’s human development activities with regard to education, health, nutrition, population and social protection. A medical doctor who also holds degrees in social anthropology and public health, she started her career as a student activist in South Africa’s Black Consciousness Movement. After being banished to the Northern Province of Lenyenye in 1977, she established a community health program and then worked as a doctor, a community development activist, and an academic researcher. She was the first black woman to serve as Vice-Chancellor at a South African university, the University of Cape Town.

The Inter-University Committee on International Migration, which is chaired at MIT as a program of CIS, recently added Brandeis University to its list of university partners. Brandeis Professor Mari Fitzduff thought that the master’s students in her new Program on Coexistence and Conflict would benefit from collaboration with the IUCIM.

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use anti-Taiwanese nationalism to bolster its legitimacy. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was resolved late in the course of the exercise, when it was suggested that the decline of U.S. power might chip away at the Israeli bargaining position and cause it to make new concessions.

One graduate student who acted as an observer, Austin Long, said he was “amazed to see how the same set of events could be interpreted so differently by the various country teams. It was also interesting to contrast the continuous, long-term strategy of China, whose leaders faced no electoral pressure, with the more haphazard approach of the democracies such as Japan and the U.S. This inclusion of domestic politics made the simulation more realistic than others I’ve participated in.”

**Influence of 9/11**

This was the first simulation organized by CIS since 9/11, and observers noted some dramatic differences in the course of play. “The principals had adjusted their expectations for violence upward,” said Professor Samuels. “Higher levels of violence had become a more normal part of world affairs, and this sense was factored into the foreign policy calculations of all actors, from large to small.”

The simulation’s adjudication report, drafted by CIS Associate Director Stephen Van Evera in conjunction with Professor Samuels and several CIS-affiliated graduate students, concludes: “The extent to which global leaders accepted widespread chaos and the use of weapons of mass destruction was unprecedented in our experience and, we fear, closely models the greatest dangers of the post-9/11 world.”

Center Administrator Laurie Scheffler organized the event, which was conducted at the MIT Faculty Club and funded by the Starr Foundation. For a full summary of the exercise, see the Final Adjudication and Analysis at the CIS website: [http://web.mit.edu/cis/sim.html](http://web.mit.edu/cis/sim.html). The adjudications of the 1993, 1995 and 1997 simulations are also available at that URL.
In September, Ph.D. Candidate Boaz Atzili presented his paper, “Complex Spiral of Escalation: the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association (APSA). Ph.D. Candidate Vanda Felbab-Brown also presented at APSA. Her paper was on “The Coca Connection.”

On October 6th, CIS alumnus and Political Science Ph.D. Daniel Byman gave a talk on states’ passive support of terrorism, as part of the Security Studies Program’s Wednesday seminar series. Byman, an assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown, worked on CIA issues as a consultant to the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committee. His book, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorist Groups, will be published next year.

SSP Senior Advisor Jeanne Guillemin delivered a lecture in August at the Society for the Social Study of Science in Paris. Her topic was “Allegations, Evil, and the Problem of Biological Weapons.”

Also in August, SSP Research Associate Allison Macfarlane attended the 16th Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs in China. She gave a talk entitled “Weapons of Mass Destruction: False Grouping or Useful Category?” Dr. Macfarlane also traveled to France to attend a conference at the Society for the Social Study of Science, where she spoke about the “Social Construction of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” In September, she announced the creation of a working group on disarmament which will sponsor talks and undertake studies on American nuclear policy and various arms control and proliferation issues.

On October 19th, Emeritus Professor of Political Science Lucian Pye spoke to several hundred European Union officials via teleconference. His talk was entitled “Asia’s Rise and Its Consequences for the International System.”

Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders & Their Legacies in Italy & Japan (Cornell University Press, 2003), the latest book from CIS Director and Ford International Professor of Political Science Richard Samuels, won the American Political Science Association’s 2004 Jervis-Schroeder Prize for the best book in International History and Politics. The award committee chose Samuels’s study because of its “major impact across a wide variety of subfields in political science and history.” Machiavelli’s Children previously garnered the 2003 Marraro Prize from the Society for Italian Historical Studies.

This fall, SSP’s Christopher Twomey successfully defended his doctoral dissertation, “The Military Lens: Theories of Military Victory, Misperception, and Sino-American Statecraft.” In November, Dr. Twomey began teaching in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Last summer, CIS Affiliate Jing Wang presented her work on tribal discourses in marketing at an international conference in Beijing on “The Urban Imaginaries.” In July, Professor Wang spoke on “Academia as a Medium” at IBM in Beijing. She was also appointed as an “Expert Assessor of International Standing” for the Australian Research Council (ARC), and has been asked to serve on the International Editorial Advisory Board for a new journal, Global Media and Communication (Sage).

SSP Principal Research Scientist Cindy Williams has given a number of talks in recent months. She spoke about military family poli-
Michael Doran, Assistant Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, has joined CIS as a Senior Advisor to the Security Studies Program. Professor Doran teaches and researches Middle Eastern nationalism, politics and Islam, U.S.-Middle East relations, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He is the author of Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question (Oxford University Press, 1999), and is currently writing a book entitled The Trump Card: Israel in the Arab Civil War.

Taylor Fravel, Assistant Professor of Political Science, joined the MIT and Security Studies Program faculties this fall. His research focuses on the international relations of East Asia, Chinese foreign policy and military doctrine, and international relations theory. (See this month’s précis Interview, p. 11.)

Lt. Col. Scott Henderson is the SSP Air Force Fellow for 2004-2005. Lt. Col. Henderson is the commander of the 2d Space Operations Squadron, where he manages the military and civilian personnel operating the Global Positioning System (GPS), the Department of Defense’s largest military satellite constellation. Lt. Col. Henderson oversees the operation and maintenance of the GPS satellite constellation and worldwide command and control resources.


New Faces

Arundhati Banerjee recently joined CIS as the co-Director of the MIT-India program. Professor Banerjee teaches South Asian literature in the Department of Foreign Languages & Literature. She is also a Fellow of the Center for Bilingual and Bicultural Studies.

Bernd Widdig, Director of the MIT-Germany Program and Associate MISTI Director, received a 2004 School of Humanities and Social Sciences Infinite Mile Award for outstanding educational contributions to the School and the Institute. Dr. Widdig played a central role in obtaining MIT approval for the new undergraduate minor in applied international studies.
Lt. Col. Michael Miklos is the SSP Army Fellow for 2004-2005. He has served in several cannon and rocket artillery units, and commanded a cannon battery in Germany and an infantry training company in South Carolina. He has also served as a planner at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Upon departure from the Pentagon, where he served on the Army Staff during the last Quadrennial Defense Review, he commanded a Multiple Launch Rocket System battalion in the First Infantry Division. Most recently, Lt. Col. Miklos served as the Secretary of the Combined and Joint Staff for CJTF-7 in Iraq.

Lt. Cdr. Dominick Strada is the SSP Navy Fellow for 2004-2005. He served as an H-46D helicopter pilot aboard ammunition and supply ships and was later assigned to the Naval Rotary Wing Aircraft Test Squadron, where he acted as Project Officer and Test Pilot. In 2001, Lt. Cdr. Strada reported to HC-3 in San Diego as the Operations Officer and the first MH-60S Instructor Pilot. In 2002, he was transferred back to HC-5 in Guam, where he deployed as the Officer-in-Charge of a two-helicopter, 30-person detachment aboard the ammunition ship USNS Kiska in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.


Robert D. Vickers recently began a two-year tour at CIS as the CIA Officer in Residence. Between 1996 and 2003, Mr. Vickers served as National Intelligence Officer for Warning in the National Intelligence Council. Before joining the NIC, he was Head of Analysis at the National Photographic Interpretation Center and at the CIA’s Office of Imagery Analysis. During the 1980s, Mr. Vickers was a senior editor of the President’s Daily Brief. He has also worked in military intelligence, serving in the U.S. Army from 1965-1967.

**Owen R. Coté, Jr., SSP Associate Director**


**George J. Gilboy, CIS Research Affiliate**

“The Myth Behind China’s Economic Miracle,” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2004), pp. 33-47. (Excerpted in this issue of précis, p. 5)

**Michael A. Glosny, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science**


**Lisbeth Gronlund, SSP Research Fellow, George N. Lewis, SSP Associate Director and Principal Research Scientist, David C. Wright, SSP Research Fellow, and Philip E. Coyle**


**Annette M. Kim, CIS Affiliate and Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning**


**Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science**


**Richard Samuels, CIS Director and Ford International Professor of Political Science, and Llewelyn Hughes, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science**


**Harvey Sapolsky, SSP Director, Eugene Gholz, and Daryl Press**


**Jing Wang, CIS Affiliate and Professor of Chinese Language and Cultural Studies**


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