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## CIS RESPONDS TO IRAQ CRISIS



Fires Burning in Baghdad

photo: courtesy of AP/Wide World Photos

In the months leading up to the U.S. war with Iraq, the Center for International Studies addressed the crisis by conducting a number of well-attended public forums exploring the advisability, feasibility, and likely consequences of such a campaign. On the eve of conflict and continuing throughout the first weeks of military operations, CIS then held several events examining the conduct and probable outcomes of the war. These forums featured a mix of CIS faculty, former CIS

affiliates, and MIT graduates with key positions in government and policy think-tanks, as well as outside experts and former policymakers.

In the fall, two CIS Starr Forums assessed the merits of a U.S.-led military campaign against Iraq. The first featured Security Studies Program Associate Director Owen Coté and CIS Associate Director and MIT Professor of Political Science Stephen Van Evera, both of whom laid out concerns about going to war. The third speaker was MIT political science Ph.D. (and former CIS affiliate) Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy and a former CIA Iraq analyst. Pollack's influential book, *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq*, was widely read in policy circles in the months leading up to the war.

The second fall forum focused on the question of the risks and merits of a post-war occupation of Iraq. The panelists — Hermann Eilts, a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Professor of International Relations at Boston

University; John W. Dower, Elting E. Morison Professor of History at MIT; and Daniel Byman, then serving as Professional Staff Member of the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committee, and, like Pollack, a political science graduate of MIT and CIS — expressed a range of sentiments about a future U.S. occupation, with Professor Dower, author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning book about the U.S. occupation of Japan, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of WWII*, emphatic in his disapproval.

As war in Iraq grew closer and tensions also rose on the Korean peninsula, CIS Starr Forum in early February featured Robert Gallucci, former chief U.S. negotiator of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea, and former Deputy Executive Chairman of UNSCOM (see Gallucci story, page 3). Then, in March, CIS hosted a Starr Forum featuring Rocco Casagrande, an MIT biology Ph.D. and, until a few days prior to his MIT talk, Chief of the Biological Analysis Lab for UNMOVIC, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in Iraq. Casagrande spoke about his experiences as a weapons inspector, and about future attempts by the international community to curb WMD proliferation (see weapons inspector story, page 4).

Once the war with Iraq began, the CIS Starr Forum and the MIT Security Studies Program held several panel discussions about the conduct and consequences of the war. The first of these events, although planned months before as part of SSP's regular Wednesday speaker series, fell on March 19 — just hours before the first U.S. airstrikes against leadership targets in Baghdad that marked the start of the war. Owen Coté


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## IRAQ CRISIS

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and Stephen Van Evera were joined in the CIS conference room by Professor Thomas Christensen, Professor of Political Science, and Professor Harvey Sapolsky, Director of the Security Studies Program. Before an overflow audience, the professors addressed likely war strategies as well as the international political repercussions of the conflict.



*Iraq expert and former CIS grad student, Ken Pollack, making the case for a U.S. invasion of Iraq at a Starr Forum in October.*



*Another CIS-trained Iraq expert, Dan Byman, speaking at a forum on the possible consequences of a U.S. occupation of Iraq.*

On March 21, the second full day of the war, most of the same speakers were joined in MIT lecture hall 10-250 by Daryl Press, Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth, another recent graduate of MIT's Political Science Ph.D. program, to discuss the challenges facing U.S. military planners and post-war policy.

Certain themes recurred throughout the presentations, although individual speakers gave different weight or interpretation to them. The Bush Administration's pre-war diplomacy and priorities were criticized in their outlines for placing additional strain on U.S. efforts to coordinate anti-terrorism efforts and failing to secure Turkish cooperation against Iraq, although Professor Sapolsky dissented by noting that there may be a lasting positive result if other major powers begin to realize that they will have to shoulder more of the global security burden themselves.

Professor Christensen also linked the timing of the Iraq campaign to the need to address North Korean threats to develop a large-scale nuclear capability, arguing that the Bush Administration was legitimately pressed for time.

Most of the speakers said that the process of establishing liberal democratic institutions in post-war Iraq would be an extremely difficult one, and most assessed the war as an enormous gamble in its long-term political dimensions (although far less a challenge in the immediate military sense).

Dr. Coté, however, noted that the "rolling start" of hostilities, before the arrival of additional armored forces, was itself a significant bet on the battlefield efficacy of airpower and maneuver, while Professor Press stressed the multiple competing missions that U.S. armed forces would have to complete if they wished to achieve victory.

Panelists directed much attention to the larger political context in which the U.S. military campaign unfolded and the ways the dynamics of the war could rebound. Professor Van Evera expressed concern about the possibilities of WMD terrorism on the U.S. homeland and argued that events now could substantially shape global approaches to WMD proliferation. Professor Sapolsky argued that concerns that this could lead to a wider American "empire" overlooked the real and continuing domestic political constraints. For his part, Professor Christensen concurred with the notion that the prospect of WMD terror incidents on U.S. soil has transformed American security policy and stakes in otherwise regional crises, arguing that North Korea

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may soon discover this to its dismay. All agreed that, in some sense, the most wrenching changes in U.S. foreign and security policy are yet to come and will be critically shaped by the conduct and especially the aftermath of the war with Iraq.

Given the strong anti-war sentiments of many on the MIT campus, many audience

members at these events directed skeptical questions to panelists about the motivations of U.S. policy-makers and the prospects for successful post-war nation-building in multi-ethnic Iraq. And many questioners expressed concern and uncertainty about post-war U.S. policy and the possibilities for regional backlash in the

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## GALLUCCI WARNS OF NORTH KOREAN "CRISIS"



At a CIS Starr Forum on February 6, Robert Gallucci, Dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Ambassador at Large during the Clinton Administration, told a packed audience at the Wong Auditorium that the current situation in North Korea "is serious enough to rate 'crisis.'"

"More likely than not," Ambassador Gallucci said, "North Korea already has one or two nuclear weapons." With the amount of plutonium that the North Koreans are already known to have extracted from their reactor at Yongbyon, he said, they could build another five or six nuclear weapons within the next

six months. And if they restart reprocessing, he added, the North Koreans could produce enough plutonium for as many as thirty additional nuclear weapons a year.

If the United States does not deal with this crisis soon, Gallucci warned, the North Koreans will be able to separate the plutonium from their spent fuel and move it from the Yongbyon facility. Once this happens, the United States will be unlikely ever to be able to find this material.

According to Ambassador Gallucci, the urgency of the situation stems from the fact that North Korea sells its nuclear technologies and ballistic missiles to other countries. If the crisis in North Korea is left unchecked, he said, Pyongyang is likely to sell its nuclear weapons or fissile material to terrorist groups in exchange for much-needed cash.

Gallucci, who led the U.S. negotiations with North Korea that resulted in the 1994 Agreed Framework, also explained how that agreement has fallen apart over time. After confronting North Korea with the fact that it had received uranium enrichment technology from Pakistan, the United States stopped the shipments of fuel oil guaranteed to Pyongyang under the Framework, he said. North Korea responded by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and by throwing out the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors who were monitoring its nuclear facilities. More recently, North Korea threatened to restart reprocessing, which further escalated the conflict.

Ambassador Gallucci said he disagreed with the Bush Administration policy of putting the North Korean crisis on a lower rung than the Iraq problem. Together with the war on terror, he said, the North Korean matter should be at the top of the foreign policy list, since that country presents an imminent threat and Iraq does not. He also said that the president's declaration of North Korea as part of the 'axis of evil' "may have made a negotiated give-and-take politically impossible."

Looking ahead to what in February seemed a likely war ahead with Iraq, Ambassador Gallucci — former Deputy Executive Director of UNSCOM, the first UN inspections agency in Iraq — said the only remaining U.S. option seemed to be to "accept, isolate, and contain" North Korea until the war was over.

## IRAQ CRISIS

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*Owen Coté speaking about possible U.S. military strategies for the Iraq war and its aftermath.*

form of increased terrorism and anti-American public sentiment. The moral and humanitarian aspects of the war, both as rationale for invasion and consequence of victory, drew lively debate, as did the stance of various domestic political groups and institutions. Some raised the possibility of fueling a larger “clash of civilizations” while others favored the idea of changing the political dynamics of the Middle East. In this, attendees seemed equally unsure of the

future and divided on the merits of alternative U.S. strategies as the wider American public.

At the final forum of the spring semester, held soon after the fall of Baghdad, Professors Richard Samuels, Suzanne Berger and Stephen Van Evera cautioned about the effect of the Iraq

war on U.S. alliances and on international institutions like the U.N. and NATO.

“We are losing the set of rules that ordered our world,” Professor Samuels said. “What will replace them seems right now to be only dimly conceived.” Professor Berger echoed that sentiment. “We’re in the worst crisis with our European allies since the Second World War.” ■

## UN WEAPONS INSPECTOR RECOUNTS IRAQ EXPERIENCE

On March 14, less than a week after his return from Baghdad and only days before the start of the U.S. war with Iraq, Rocco Casagrande, a biologist who received his Ph.D. from MIT in 2001, spoke about his three-month tour as chief of the biological analysis lab for UNMOVIC, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.

During his talk, part of CIS’s Starr Forum series, Casagrande described the day-to-day life of weapons inspectors in Iraq during the fall and winter of 2002-2003. Strict security precautions were taken during the inspectors’ daily briefings, he said. Information of any significance was written out rather than spoken by his team during these meetings, and they kept the location of each day’s inspection sites secret from their Iraqi escorts.



*Casagrande taking a sample from a conical separator at an Iraqi brewery.*

photo: courtesy of Rocco Casagrande

Although “access for UNMOVIC was almost immediate to all areas inspectors desired to go,” Casagrande added that the Iraqis held back pertinent information. For example, he said, Iraq claimed it had dismantled its biological weapons program but could not offer evidence that it had done so. “In a country where there’s documentation for a broken centrifuge, this is strange.”

Although he and other inspectors found no smoking gun proving that Iraq was still pursuing a biological weapons program, Casagrande said that this did not prove that Iraq did not possess one. He suggested that inspections of the kind and scale that were conducted by his team probably could never fully answer a host of questions about Iraq’s biological program, such as what happened to growth media capable of producing hundreds of thousands of pathogens.

# THE RECONSOLIDATION OF IDENTITY IN POSTWAR JAPAN AND ITALY

*In his new book, Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan, CIS Director Richard J. Samuels analyzes leaders through a close comparison of Italian and Japanese history. In this excerpt, he examines the ways in which leaders in both countries reconsolidated identity after the Second World War.*



*Richard J. Samuels*

In the anarchic world of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Italian and Japanese leaders deployed a formidable range of resources in their pursuit of prestige. Leaders used what was at hand, sometimes in novel ways, to win acceptance in the world's councils. It seemed for a time that acceptance was in the offing, but ultimately, of course, Italian and Japanese leaders failed terribly. With the end of the

Second World War, new leaders, and some more experienced politicians appropriately reinvented, would have to rebuild national power and re-configure national identity in exhausted nations. There was still no "natural" course leading inexorably to status as a great power. Complicating matters was subordination to the United States, which expected them to establish democracy under its global — anti-communist — leadership. It was a tall order, especially since few of those chasing democracy had ever been democrats.

Leaders, as we have seen repeatedly, are not granted the luxury of starting with a blank slate. Nor, since the past can be useful, do many wish to do so. This is true even when there appears to be sharp historical discontinuity. Organization theorists understand that "when an old regime collapses and a new one needs to be established, institution building is constrained by the existing repertoires of competencies and resources...What can realistically be accomplished in a transitional, 'building' phase is thus dependent on the skills and competencies of the people which were most closely

aligned with the old institutions. This compelling irony captures the "transwar" histories of Italy and Japan. The interaction among existing institutions, the experience of the war, and the shifting interests of the victor became dominant facts in the regeneration of Japan and Italy. The first dismantling of some institutions pointed toward a democratic future, but the preservation of others and the growing indifference of the victors gestured at an authoritarian past.

## *A Chase After Parity*

Importantly, the chase after parity with the other great powers was never diminished. Prime Minister Yoshida's goal after the war was to "return Japan to its place in international society." He reflected on "setbacks and miscalculations in the recent past" and pledged his determination that "Japan would become the acknowledged financial and economic equal of the industrially advanced West" thanks to the "inherent qualities of the Yamato race." To do so, he would have to search for, elaborate on, and sometimes even invent democratic elements of Japanese political culture. Italian leaders made similar calculations. Communist Party (PCI) leader Palmiro Togliatti was quick to reach for what was left of Italy's democratic mantle. He proclaimed the PCI a "partito nuovo" but also insisted it was the "inheritor of the Liberal tradition." Alcide De Gasperi, leader of the Christian Democrats (DC), also used the old to accommodate to the new. He sought to reinvent Christian democracy as a broad movement led by a mass-based "national party." He would combine what was once Mussolini's with what was once [five-time Italian premier] Giolitti's, binding these two failures with democratic norms, anticommunism, and Catholic morality. The Italians, however, as weary of war and authoritarianism as the Japanese, were less sure just what they were now pursuing. They were not even sure whether they had lost or won the war. The debate about the war was

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central to the rebuilding of national identity in both countries.

### *Rebuilding Identity*

By the end of World War II, Italians were more than ready to shed the baggage of imperial Rome. They were eager to be part of Europe rather than to help dominate it. The idea of an Italian nation was widely rejected as so much patriotic swill. In postwar Japan, likewise, a gentler, pacifist self-image had to be crafted. Bushido, the moral code of the samurai class, had to be transferred from military to commercial associations. Again, Japanese history and traditions were pressed into service and were flexible enough to support a new national story. There was no “stubborn reality” of Japanese identity, only determined reinterpretations — many of which were made under the close supervision of Americans who intended to “redefine the Japanese nation away from ethnic and toward civic models.”

Italy, the nation that had had a lust for historical glorification, now harbored a palpable disgust for what that lust had wrought. The very core of Italy's majesty was also her greatest disappointment. [The prominent Italian historian] Gaetano Salvemini called it “the Roman-Imperial cancer,” filled with “dreams of impossible primacies,” and it was for him a history that had crushed Italy. After the war, many shared Salvemini's self-abasing, masochistic national image. Italians were fit to do great things but became convinced they would not. Their hopes were denied by great forces from the outside (Italy ever the victim of cunning, malicious foreign powers) and by inadequacies from within (localism, familism, egoism, incompetence). Both the Japanese and the Italians felt vulnerable and victimized. But the Japanese saw in themselves special competencies the Italians did not. The Renaissance had happened in Italy, but Italy did not become a nation-state. Machiavelli taught princes how to rule, but Italian princes were too

incompetent to do it well or too stupid to learn. Italy produced great bankers and traders, and political analysts, but could not gain advantages over other nations. It was a nation of heroes, of stars: it produced great generals but poor armies; great scholars but poor universities; great jurists but poor administrations. Japan, by contrast, told itself that its leaders were weak or wrongheaded but that its institutions were strong and worth preserving. Individuals could be subsumed in groups, and creativity could be collective. The stars might be small, but the constellations could be stunning.

In both countries national identity had been invented and affirmed through mobilization, sacrifice, and foreign wars. The Japanese had contrived an identity as a great and special family, the “golden people” of Yamato damashi, and reinvoked it after the war for commercial rather than military conquest. The Italians seemed less sure how to proceed. They proclaimed themselves poets, saints, and scientists, but for centuries they had asked what united them. They embraced a pastiche and they resorted to self-vilification. An established Italian national image remained elusive. That their leaders failed to seize upon a legitimating symbol would have costs.

### *The Issue of Militarism*

While patriotism became suspect in both countries after the war, the Italians held one advantage over the Japanese as each tried to reconstruct itself as a peaceful and democratic people. The Italians could point to growing popular disaffection with fascism, even before Mussolini's decision to enter the war, and they could remind themselves of armed resistance even before his demise. Then, too, they could speak of valiant Italians who fought side by side with the Allies against the Germans. Never mind that there were fewer than four thousand men under arms before Mussolini's fall; never mind that many of those who joined them subsequently, swelling their ranks to some sixty-five thousand, were opportunists or turncoats. The central point of the comparison to Japan is that in Italy “every citizen was faced with crucial moral and political choices.” Many (especially in the reconstruction) made the right one.

The Japanese had generated no mass movement to oppose their militarists. There had been



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no early defiance of the regime, as there had been in the June 1924 Aventine Secession, no community of exiles to needle the regime and await their postwar turn at power. Indeed, beyond a few doubts expressed by intellectuals who were quickly silenced and forced to recant and by conspirators who found themselves cornered late in the game, there had been virtually no elite opposition to the regime. The Japanese had no obvious heroes to invoke as they rebuilt their polity. They were perforce freed of some of the postwar violence that wracked Italy, but were burdened with finding other ways to legitimate a democratic politics. Given how dispirited the people were, leaders had to be particularly inventive in reasserting the superiority of the Japanese spirit. It was not easy to recover

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*A constitution written by U.S. officials was imposed upon the Japanese people with little more than pro forma review and approval.*

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their confidence, but they did. They discovered or created “traditional” elements to justify the wholesale shift from the Meiji to the U.S.-imposed constitution, claiming continuity from the welfare policies of the home ministry to the progressive programs of General MacArthur’s Occupation, from Taishō liberalism to U.S.-style democracy and state-led economic growth. They even found a history of Japanese pacifism, with the emperor merely a symbol of the state, to justify the view that nothing was changing.

*Different Approaches*

So the two nations proceeded to reconstruct their postwar identities in different ways. Italians across the political spectrum gathered openly to design a new political order. Their 1947 Costituente continued the broad collaboration of the Resistance. The process was hardly uncontentious, but compromise dominated the proceedings. The Left and the Church would soon return to their posture as the most implacable foes in Italian politics, but for a crucial moment the Communists approved reaffirmation of the Lateran Pacts, recognizing

Catholicism as the official religion of the Italian state and accepting religious education in the public schools. For its part, the Church was convinced to confront modernity and accept democracy. Church and party would agree on important issues of local autonomy, land reform, and the fundamental values of the new Italian state. When they could not settle matters by logrolling, they put the issue to the people. The most important referendum, in June 1946, concerned “the institutional question”: a republic or a monarchy? Italians had seen Victor Emmanuel III lift Mussolini to power in 1922 and fourteen years later they heard him proclaim the Kingdom of Italy as the “fascist fatherland.” They also saw him abandon Rome to the Germans, fleeing the country in 1943. The republican idea prevailed, constitutional monarchy was rejected, and the royal family was expelled. The central cleavage in Italian politics thereupon shifted, from Republicanism versus Catholicism to Christianity versus Communism.

Japan, where the Showa emperor had been a tool of, and possibly even an active participant in, militarist decision making, saw no eruption of republican sentiment. Although there was considerable debate, the Japanese people ultimately accepted a version of war responsibility that placed blame on the military rather than on the emperor, whom they continued to embrace even while “embracing defeat.” Where [the Italian philosopher] Croce famously viewed fascism as a “parenthesis,” the Japanese public accepted a view of the recent past as a “dark valley” (kurai tanima). Postwar Japan would be like Meiji Japan before it, “restored” rather than “new.” Elites that had used the emperor now gambled that the imperial presence was too deep a part of the national identity to be abandoned. Concerned that the U.S. Occupation would impose an end to the imperial house — or, worse, that it would try the emperor as a war criminal — they pressed vigorously and successfully for at least a constitutional monarchy. None of this was put to an open test of popular will. A constitution written by U.S. officials was imposed upon the Japanese people with little more than pro forma review and approval. To be sure, Japanese identity was

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being transformed, but even so a mortal emperor would remain a touchstone for the nation.

In these ways, an official morality repudiating militarism and embracing democracy was carefully constructed in both countries. In Japan the new “democratic” self-image remained largely untested, and delicately balanced against an inheritance of conservatism if not authoritarianism. It was as if the Japanese did not trust themselves with democracy. (Certainly their U.S. overlords did not.) When the new image was tested, it was tested by the Right, which vowed to revise the Constitution. There was never an open test of popular support for the document. Instead, the Left used the military alliance with the United States as a surrogate. After massive, generation-defining protests, the Japanese Left lost its effort to prevent a strengthening of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (Ampō). The Liberal Democratic Party emerged from the 1960 demonstrations shaken but in better control of national identity

and power than ever. The Italian dynamics were uncannily similar. A parallel antifascism dominated postwar Italy’s national formula; any open effort to return to authoritarianism met with immediate protest. The crucial moment was also in mid-1960. The Italian Left attacked the government for having accepted neofascist support in Parliament and, after street battles broke out, forced the postponement of the neofascists’ Missini Congress in Genoa. Neofascists in Italy, who over time fashioned a less nostalgic position, would continue to enjoy significant electoral support and representation in Parliament, whereas the Japanese Right would be incorporated as an anti-mainstream minority inside the LDP itself. Neither would disappear, but it is important to note that anti-authoritarian official moralities held in both countries. ■

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## CIS REVAMPING WEBSITE

CIS has launched an effort to update and improve the Center’s website. “We are doing this with a view to making the website central to the way we do business, both internally and in our communications with the rest of the world,” said Carolyn Makinson, CIS Executive Director.

“As part of the review process, we have surfed the websites of our peer institutions to see what information they provide and how it is structured. We’re hoping to borrow many of the good ideas we found and avoid some of the pitfalls,” she added. “One area where we hope to make progress is in providing information on funding sources to students and, eventually, to faculty. We are working with existing funding databases by the Department of Urban Studies and Planning and the Department of Political Science to produce an on-line funding database that could be searched on various parameters (e.g., type of fellowship, substantive topic, deadline for application).”

The project, which will continue in the summer and fall, will also bring about a new look for the site’s homepage, a search function, and a separate log-in for staff members. The latter will provide access to shared calendars and other information geared toward simplifying the event-planning process.

In addition to Dr. Makinson, CIS’s working group on the website includes Dee Siddalls, Amy Tarr, Bernd Widdig and Sean Gilbert. The group welcomes suggestions from all CIS affiliates; please contact Dee Siddalls at [deesid@mit.edu](mailto:deesid@mit.edu).

## SSP SENIOR FELLOW GEOFF FORDEN

*Security Studies Program Senior Fellow Geoff Forden has been on leave this academic year while serving as Chief of the Multidisciplinary Analysis Section of UNMOVIC, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, in New York. He is one of two CIS affiliates involved in the Iraq weapons inspections this year; the other, Jörn Siljeholm, went to Iraq as part of the UN's chemical weapons inspection team.*



*Geoff Forden*

**précis:** What is your job as the Chief of the Multidisciplinary Analysis Section for UNMOVIC?

**GF:** The multidisciplinary sections (there is also an Operations section) were set up on the recommendation of the Amorim panel (a panel created by the UN Security Council in 1999 to review the status of Iraqi disarmament) because of the worry that specialists were missing Iraqi programs or evidence that crossed the boundaries between chemical, biological, or missile programs. It was also clear that there were connections between Iraq's biological and nuclear programs that had not been fully explored. At the same time, it was not obvious how the Multidisciplinary Analysis Section should investigate those interactions. As the first Chief of Multidisciplinary Analysis, I tried to systematically study those overlaps as well as cover other important issues that seemed to fall through the cracks. These latter ranged from open source information exploitation to import/export issues to analyzing the Security Council Resolution 1441 mandated lists of Iraqi scientists.

**précis:** What attracted you to this position?

**GF:** At the time when Dr. Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, approached me about this position it was becoming increasingly clear that the United States and the rest of the

international community would be turning their attention to Iraq. Because of this, it seemed likely that the UN would be going back into Iraq to resume the inspections that had ended in 1998. I believed in UNMOVIC's mission to disarm Iraq and felt that this would be a way of making a positive contribution to world peace. Of course, if it hadn't been for 9/11 and a desire to contribute to making the world a safer place to live, there is no way I would have left my family for such an extended period.

**précis:** What has been the most rewarding part of the job?

**GF:** During my time at UNMOVIC, I have been fortunate enough to work on most of the important issues that have come up. These ranged from leading the analysis on the so-called "Air Force Document" — an important document that showed the Iraqis had understated how much chemical agent they used during the Iraq-Iran War and hence had 1,000 tons more unaccounted for — to the conference of international experts considering the Al Samoud 2, to certain analyses of Iraq's UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] program. Just contributing to these efforts has been the most rewarding part of my job.

**précis:** What triggered your interest in UNMOVIC and active participation in the inspections regime?

**GF:** When I was working for Congress, my job included analyzing a number of non-proliferation treaties and initiatives. That involved meeting a number of former inspectors and others, such as members of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, who convinced me that inspections could work and that to really understand such regimes you had to participate somehow. When I came to MIT, I sent my CV to UNMOVIC and was invited to participate in the first training course for inspectors

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**GEOFF FORDEN**  
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during the summer of 2000. Since then, I have been on the roster of inspectors. In May of last year, Dr. Blix suggested I apply for my current position.

**précis:** What was the biggest limitation on the inspections?

**GF:** The inspections were limited most by Iraqi cooperation. While the Iraqis cooperated in procedure, allowing UNMOVIC access to all sites as requested, they failed to cooperate in substance. As Dr. Blix has said, it is hard for Iraq to prove the negative — i.e., to prove they do not have proscribed weapons. However, it is possible to determine if they are trying to address the outstanding issues in a proactive fashion. We were barraged by letters from the Iraqis in the last days of the inspection regime but few, if any, made substantive contributions to resolving the remaining disarmament issues and none actually resolved any. It has to be said that their efforts could best be described as “too little, too late.”

**précis:** Do you feel that inspections could have yielded evidence of WMD programs given more time?

**GF:** Although the inspections regime would have continued if more time were available, the primary determinant of their success was likely to be Iraq’s substantive cooperation. Without such cooperation, the international community could not have had confidence in Iraq’s WMD disarmament.

**précis:** What is left to be done for the purposes of your job, now that the inspectors have left Iraq?

**GF:** We are completing our analysis of the information that came in from Iraq during the last few weeks of inspections to see if it contains anything that might help us make progress. We are completing the files and thinking about what will happen in the future if inspectors are allowed back into Iraq. UNMOVIC still has a UN mandate to go back into Iraq and finish its inspections to ensure that Iraq has been disarmed. Of course, as servants of the Security Council, we await their orders.

**précis:** What’s next for you? What are your plans?

**GF:** I am really looking forward to returning to MIT and living full-time with my family, not just on weekends. Professionally speaking, WMD proliferation is a fascinating subject. I’m considering writing a book about it. There is an interesting story to tell that combines my previous research on the US biological weapons program, the chemical warfare during the First World War, missile development in various countries, and, of course, what is already publicly available about Iraq’s programs. It seems to me that understanding how countries acquire the WMD know-how and the industrial infrastructure it requires is the key to any future non-proliferation regime. And I am convinced that future such regimes will have to be better thought out and require better coordination than the ones we have today. ■

# REFUGEES AS INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION

BY KELLY M. GREENHILL

Following the 1999 conflict in Kosovo, there was much discussion in academic and policy circles about the “unprecedented” use of refugees by former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic as a weapon in the war against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the exploitation of refugee flows is neither a new nor a particularly unusual phenomenon. In fact, it has a long and influential history, arguably going back as far as the wars between Ptolemy I and the successors of Alexander the Great in the third century BC.



Kelly M. Greenhill

Moreover, there are myriad ways to use refugees as instruments of statecraft. In the last decade alone, we have witnessed their use in wartime in multiple locations and in numerous ways. They have been pressed into service as soldiers (in the African Great Lakes region, for example), deployed as human shields (such as in Afghanistan and Iraq), and used to create logistical logjams (in Kosovo and Sudan, for instance). They have likewise been employed as propaganda tools to elicit international sympathy and support (including by all parties to the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo). Historically, they have also been used with some regularity in peacetime, most frequently as bargaining chips/coercive instruments by actors like Cuban President Fidel Castro and former Haitian and Ugandan Presidents Baby Doc Duvalier and Idi Amin.

As the above examples might suggest — and, in large part, because there are usually significant reputational costs associated with generating outflows — the manipulation of refugee streams as a policy tool is generally favored by weak, illegitimate or semi-legitimate actors who lack effective recourse to more conventional methods of influence. Nevertheless, such manipulation has been rather more effective than one would probably predict, given the vast power asymmetries that regularly exist between perpetrators (refugee generators) and their targets (receiving states). This is because perpetrators have been remarkably adept at exploiting

the fundamental contradictions that often exist between international normative commitments and domestic political imperatives. They have done so via a strategy that I call “extortive engineered migration,” which refers to the subset of forced migrations whereby (real or threatened) outflows are used to induce changes in political behavior and/or to extract economic side-payments from a target state or states. It may be thought of as a kind of asymmetric warfare or coercive bargaining game, since it is usually “played” out between actors who possess significantly different levels of power (as it is traditionally understood).

Asymmetric warfare generally refers to a strategy that seeks to avoid an opponent’s strengths and to pit one’s own comparative advantages against an enemy’s relative weaknesses. Given the West’s disproportionate and overwhelming power relative to that of most other countries and non-state actors, it makes sense that many potential adversaries will perceive their comparative advantage against the West not in technological terms, but in relation to “the collective psyche and will of [their] people.” Thus, as Charles Dunlap argues, the potential asymmetrical vulnerabilities about which the West should be most concerned are not technological, “but rather are those that turn the fundamentals of the West’s culture and political system against itself.” In short, current and potential adversaries (as well as disgruntled allies) may derive powerful bargaining leverage via exploitation of what the West views as its virtues — its moral strengths and ethical standards. Therefore, while norms — defined as “collective understandings of the proper behavior of actors” — do “provide incentives and disincentives for different kinds of actions” for those who embrace them, they also provide incentives and disincentives for different kinds of exploitation of these self-same standards. Furthermore, those who look to exploit these norms will increasingly seek to present Western leaders with moral and ethical conundrums, against which their superior power is of little

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## REFUGEES

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use. The employment of refugees as coercive bargaining tools is a key example of this phenomenon in action.

### *Source of Vulnerability: Hypocrisy Costs*

Advanced industrial democracies are particularly — but not exclusively — vulnerable to exploitation. Although they have made international commitments to human rights and refugee protection — via, for instance, the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees — at least a segment of their populations is usually unwilling to bear the (real or perceived) domestic costs of fulfilling these obligations (including unemployment, crime and cultural and/or ethnic fragmentation). This conflict between international and domestic obligations has given rise to a new class of symbolic political costs, what I call “hypocrisy costs.”

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## *Advanced industrial democracies are particularly — but not exclusively — vulnerable to exploitation.*

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These “symbolic political costs ... arise when there exists a real (or perceived) disparity between a professed commitment to international norms and agreements, and demonstrated actions that contravene such a commitment.” As was noted during the August 1994 Cuban refugee crisis in the US, for example, Castro was “well aware that the United States, given its values and domestic political pressures, [could] not afford to send back the ‘anti-social elements’ he [was] encouraging to leave.” At the same time, the vast majority of the US public was fervently opposed to letting Castro once more turn Florida “into a gigantic refugee camp,” particularly one that might again house a variety of “undesirables.” Consequently, the leaders of target states may find themselves trapped between conflicting international normative obligations and domestic imperatives.

And when the options available to targets in the face of massive refugee outflows have negative (and visible) side effects, both with respect to national interests and normative commitments, targets may become vulnerable to coercion and ripe for extortion.

While pressure to adhere to norms can and frequently does come from external sources, such as foreign governments and international and non-governmental organisations, the most potent sources of pressure tend to be domestic — at least in liberal democratic states — as they generally have the capacity to inflict the greatest and most tangible political costs on leaders. Such sources of pressure include academia, ethnic and public interest lobbies, Congress, the media and the military. These political and social actors/groups rely on two factors, in particular, to exercise domestic influence over leaders in support of international norms. The first is the need for what Alexander George has called “policy legitimacy.” Policies that prescribe strategies or tactics that violate norms can threaten policy legitimacy and thereby severely limit support for those policies in a country’s legislature, media, or within the public at large. Yet the opposite is also true: policies that pose a threat to specific groups or constituencies — while upholding the norm — may receive very limited backing. The second factor that “provides a special avenue for international norms to influence policy” is a leader’s desire to remain popular, either due to short-term electoral considerations or because of longer-term concerns about how he/she will appear in the context of history. The need for legitimacy and the wish to remain popular and get re-elected, therefore, create a conduit from norms to norms-adherent state behavior — or, to be more accurate, at least the appearance of norms adherence.

In contrast to scholarship that suggests that leaders adhere to norms because they have internalised them, this author has found little systematic proof to support such a proposition. Instead, available evidence indicates that, ultimately, leaders tend to yield to normative pressure not out of a sense of moral conviction, but, rather, only when failure to do so will result intangible (and lasting) domestic political costs. Hence, while norms play a critical role in setting the terms of the debate and framing

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possible policy options, they do not appear to drive decision-making by state leaders directly. Instead, they influence how some observers think leaders should behave, and how leaders themselves believe that they should appear to behave when norms are being violated. This is not to suggest that leaders will opt to flout the norm when given a choice. Rather, if there are no appreciable political costs associated with adhering to the norm, decision-makers will choose to comply. More concretely, if there is no domestic hew and cry against acceptance/

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### *Refugee flows present a real ethical conundrum for Western liberal democratic regimes.*

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assimilation of a group of refugees, leaders will prefer to accept (as opposed to exclude) them.

If the threat of domestic backlash exists, however, evidence suggests that decision-makers will seek to shirk their normative obligations, whenever possible. This makes sense in light of recent research, which proposes that, while states easily develop reputations for lying, they have a harder time developing a reputation for honesty. Thus, there appears to be little to be gained by conforming to norms for norms' sake, but myriad material reasons to avoid appearing to violate them. As a result, the interesting dynamics lie in those instances where leaders can expect to incur substantial domestic costs for adhering to the norm and to invite hypocrisy costs for shirking it. In the majority of these cases, evidence suggests that, ultimately, the target does concede to at least some of the perpetrator's demands. This is an example of the law of unintended consequences in action, whereby the growing strength of humanitarian norms (and the human-rights regime, more generally) since the end of the Second World War has invested power in the hands of weak actors who would otherwise have little. The irony is that, as pressure to adhere to these norms has grown, so, too, has the leverage of those who look to exploit them.

Moreover, the monetary, political and reputational costs paid in the "end game" are usually higher than they would have been if the target had pursued a more conciliatory tack and/or

agreed to negotiate with the perpetrator earlier in the crisis. This is likely because powerful targets (confident of their superior strength and position) fail to recognize until late in the day that they might lose. As in more conventional settings, both parties to a conflict frequently have inflated expectations of victory, although history suggests that more powerful actors in asymmetric conflicts tend to be particularly susceptible to such hubris. As conflicts between strong states and "Lilliputian opponent[s] drag on ... dramatic overestimates of success force political and military élites in the strong state to escalate [the situation] ... or risk looking increasingly incompetent."

As has been argued elsewhere, though, if escalation fails to achieve the desired outcome, domestic pressure to end asymmetric conflicts is likely to result, particularly as the costs to the target state's population rise. Furthermore, the longer a "war" drags on, the greater the chance that the strong actor will simply abandon the war effort, regardless of events on the ground. Of course, one must be wary of overdrawing the parallels between asymmetric warfare and coercive refugee-driven bargaining. But this author contends that the results are frequently much the same. The prospect of future unbounded political — if not material — losses is a powerful motivator for a besieged leader. Despite superior strength and influence — their Achilles' heel exposed — targets are frequently forced to concede, at least in part, to the demands of a weaker perpetrator in order to bring a crisis to an end.

#### *Conclusion*

Refugee flows present a real ethical conundrum for Western liberal democratic regimes. As a rule, such regimes are reluctant to insist that governments restrain the exit of their citizens simply because they or others are disinclined to accept them. They likewise believe in the right of emigration, yet simultaneously embrace the principle that states retain the right to determine whom and how many shall be permitted to enter their countries. Western liberal democracies have accepted the principle of non-refoulement — that is, they agree not to return forcibly asylum seekers to their countries of origin, as long as their "life or freedom"

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## REFUGEES

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remain threatened — enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Yet, at the same time, they have not adopted a universal right to asylum: the granting of asylum is at the discretion of the receiving state. When push comes to shove, liberal democracies wish neither to be in the position of having to force people to return home against their will nor of having to press governments to prevent their people from leaving. Rather, they want regimes to stop repressing political dissidents and persecuting minorities, for example, so that people do not want to leave in the first place. However, this state of affairs may be further complicated by groups that see no better way to promote their own agenda than by provoking attacks on themselves by their own governments. It has been suggested, for instance, that Kosovar Albanians behaved in a manner calculated to bring the wrath of the Serbian government down on them, because they had credible reason to believe that the West would intervene on their behalf.

What does all of this portend for the future? It is not wholly clear, but evidence indicates that, as long as nascent and actual refugee flows pose a threat (intentional or otherwise) to target states, they will be driven to take broader and more proactive steps to decrease their vulnerability to outflows. Thus, the current Western trend towards ever-tighter immigration restrictions — despite declining birth rates in many countries — will likely continue, further weakening the framework that underscores the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. At the same time, however, non-governmental organisations and other norm-promoting actors will surely continue to push for the expansion of “morally-appropriate” behavior, which will serve to expose further the contradictions between domestic imperatives and international commitments. To some targets — especially the US — it may appear that the only way to combat this ever-increasing contradiction is to do more to keep refugees in their countries of origin. As a result, the desire to keep things

“uneventful” at home may well lead to more “adventurism” abroad.

*This excerpt is taken from “Extortive Engineered Migration: Asymmetric Weapon of the Weak,” Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 2, no. 3 (Winter 2002): 105-116. It is reprinted with permission of the journal, which is accessible at <http://www.tandf.co.uk>. The argument is presented more fully in Ms. Greenhill’s forthcoming dissertation, which examines engineered migration in a variety of regions across the globe. Kelly M. Greenhill is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at MIT and is currently a Research Fellow at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. ■*

# MACFARLANE AN AUTHOR OF STUDY ON NUCLEAR PLANT VULNERABILITY

Allison Macfarlane, Senior Research Associate in the Security Studies Program, was part of a team of eight scientists and scholars who in January released a study warning of a threat to U.S. nuclear power plants from terrorist attack.



Allison Macfarlane

“Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, high risk technologies, like nuclear power, have been considered sites for terrorist attack,” according to Macfarlane. “In a perplexing response to this situation, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has ruled that terrorist attacks should not be considered in granting or extending licenses for nuclear facilities, because the risks are not well

known,” she said.

The report outlines the seriousness of the threat posed by a successful terrorist attack against the spent fuel storage pools at U.S. nuclear power plants. Such an attack, it said, could cause consequences “significantly worse than those from Chernobyl.”

Due to few other options for long-term

storage of nuclear fuel rods, most spent fuel pools in the United States pack the rods into the water-cooled storage tank at a density 4-5 times greater than the tanks were designed for. This means that drainage of the water due to an attack could lead to a rapid overheating of the spent fuel rods. It would also likely cause a fire, which would release radioactivity into the air and disperse it over the surrounding area. According to the report, the cleanup effort required after such an event would be massive, perhaps rising into the hundreds of billions of dollars.

“The group strongly recommends that the U.S. Congress cover the costs of moving spent fuel from pools into dry cask storage at reactor sites to reduce the risks of catastrophic radioactivity releases,” said Macfarlane. A project to construct safer storage facilities would likely cost between \$3.5 and \$7 billion, in comparison to the astronomical costs that might have to be paid if no changes are made to storage procedures.

The report will be released shortly in the Princeton journal, *Science and Global Security*. ■



Cindy Williams

## WILLIAMS GROUP COLLABORATES ON MILITARY PAY PROJECT

In November, SSP Senior Fellow Cindy Williams invited more than 20 authors and reviewers to Cambridge to do the groundwork for a book on “Transforming the Rewards for Military Service.”

Over two days at the Hyatt Regency, the group discussed the pros and cons of a variety of potential changes to the military pay and benefits system, as well as the institutional barriers to implementing these changes in the United States. The book that will result from the meeting will also draw lessons from the ways in which other countries’ militaries reward their soldiers and from the benefits provided by some private sector companies.

Dr. Williams worked on these issues as Assistant Director for National Security at the Congressional Budget Office. The editor of *Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives for the 21st Century*, she has been a German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Fellow in Brussels, Belgium, during the 2002-2003 academic year.

# end notes

**Thomas J. Christensen**, Professor of Political Science, gave a talk in October entitled “Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait” at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, and returned in November to present a paper on “Windows and War: Chinese Use of Force.” In December, he presented a paper titled “Zhanyixue and Taiwan Scenarios: Contradictory Messages on Deterrence” at a RAND-CAN conference. He also attended a Chinese Military Power Task Force meeting at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. In February, he spoke about the North Korea crisis on WBUR radio’s “The Connection” and attended the National Intelligence Council study group on “Strategic Responses to American Preeminence” at Georgetown University.

SSP Associate Director **Owen Coté, Jr.** and Political Science graduate student **Daniel Landau** have been providing regular commentary on local television of the war with Iraq on New England Cable News (NECN).

In February, **Eugene Gholz**, SSP Research Affiliate, and **Daryl G. Press**, Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College — both graduates of the Ph.D. Program in Political Science — presented their paper, “Why America Shouldn’t Provide Global Stability: Economic Adaptability, Oil, and the ‘Insurance Analogy,’” at the International Studies Association annual conference in Portland, Oregon, and at the Olin Institute of Strategic Studies at Harvard.



*Kenneth Keniston*

**Kenneth Keniston**, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Human Development and Director of the MIT India Program, was elected a Foreign Member of the India International Centre in New Delhi, a small elective member organization. In addition, he was asked to chair the Ten-

year Review Committee of the National Institute of Advanced Studies at the Indian Institute of Science. Professor Keniston co-edited and co-wrote the forward for a special issue on “IT Policies” of the *Journal of Management* of the Administrative Staff College of India, and gave the annual M.N. Srinivas Lecture at the Indian Institute of Science. In January, Keniston lectured at Delhi’s Indian International Centre and at the Administrative Staff College of India in Hyderabad.

**Gregory Koblenz**, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, presented his paper, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Weapons,” at the National Security Seminar at Harvard’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies in November. In March, he gave a presentation in the series on “Bioterrorism and Biosecurity: Science and Policy,” co-sponsored by the MIT Security Studies Program and the Harvard-MIT Division of Health Sciences and Technology. His presentation was entitled “Strategic Theory and Biological Warfare: The Political Science Perspective.”

**George Lewis**, Associate Director of the Security Studies Program, and **David Wright**, Senior Research Associate at SSP, were elected Fellows of the American Physical Society. They were recognized for their “outstanding analysis of arms control issues” and their work on ballistic missile defense. **Lisbeth Gronlund**, also a Senior Research Associate at SSP, was named a Fellow last year.

**Michael Lynch**, Visiting Scholar at CIS, presented his article, “Drivers of Oil Price Volatility,” to the 8th International Energy Forum in Osaka, Japan, a ministerial-level meeting.

**Karen R. Polenske**, Professor of Urban Studies and Planning, recently returned from a working trip to Iran, where she gave a keynote address at the second Iranian input-output conference in Tehran on “Environmental Impacts of Energy-Efficient Technologies: Potential for Input-Output and Supply-Chain Analyses in Iran.” In addition, she gave a presentation entitled “Agglomeration Versus Dispersal Economies” to the secretary-general of the Central Bank of Iran. She also met with members of the staff of the Planning and Management Organization to discuss their work on regional planning at the local and international levels for the fourth five-year plan for Iran.

macroeconomic indicators for state and provincial governments in federations around the world.

**Sharon Stanton Russell**, a CIS Research Affiliate, took part in the panel on “Conflicts, Crisis and Refugees” sponsored by the student-organized group United Trauma Relief and MIT’s Public Service Center. She also served as Peer Reviewer for “Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance,” at the Bank-Wide Review Meeting at The World Bank in Washington, D.C. (published as Chapter 7 of *Global Development Finance 2003*).



*Barry R. Posen*

**Barry R. Posen**, Professor of Political Science, recently gave a presentation entitled “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony” at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) in Paris and at King’s College at the Center for Defence Studies in London. Professor Posen, who has been a German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Fellow in Brussels, Belgium while on sabbatical in 2002–2003, also gave a talk on “The

New Grand Strategy of the Bush Administration” at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin.

**Balakrishnan Rajagopal**, Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning and Director of CIS’s Program in Human Rights and Justice, has been awarded a Ford International Career Development Professorship.

**Jonathan Rodden**, Assistant Professor of Political Science, was awarded a \$100,000 grant from the National Science Foundation to put together a data set of political, fiscal, and

In January, **Stephen Van Evera**, Professor of Political Science, gave a presentation to the MIT Club of New York entitled “Assessing the War on Terror.” He has also appeared regularly on television and radio as a commentator on the war with Iraq.

*Erratum: The last issue of précis inaccurately listed Professor Diane Davis’s title. She is an Associate Professor of Sociology in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning.*

## Publications by CIS Authors

### Thomas J. Christensen, Professor of Political Science

“Optimistic Trends and Near-term Challenges: Sino-American Security Relations in Early 2003,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 6 (Spring 2003).

“The Party Transition: Will It Bring a New Maturity in Chinese Security Policy?” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 5 (Winter 2003).

“A Smooth Ride Despite Many Potholes: The Road to Crawford,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 4 (Fall 2002).

### Peter C. Evans, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science

“The Financing Factor in Arms Sales: The Role of Official Export Credits and Guarantees,” in *SIPRI Yearbook 2003 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), forthcoming.

### Eugene Gholz, SSP Research Affiliate

“National Security Space Policy in the U.S. and Europe: Trends and Choices,” MIT Security Studies Program Conference Report, January 2003, available at [http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/con-series/Space&SecuritREPORT\\_English.pdf](http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/con-series/Space&SecuritREPORT_English.pdf).

(with Peter Dombrowski and Andrew Ross), “Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: Defense Industrial Implications of Network-Centric Warfare,” U.S. Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies Report, September 2002.

(with Daryl G. Press) “Paying to Keep the Peace,” *Regulation* (Spring 2003).

### Kelly M. Greenhill, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science

“Extortive Engineered Migration: Asymmetric Weapon of the Weak,” *Conflict, Security and*

*Development*, vol. 2, no. 3 (Winter 2002): 105-116.

“The Use of Refugees as Political and Military Weapons in the Kosovo Conflict,” in *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Intervention*, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003).

### Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, SSP Senior Research Associates

“Estimating China’s Production of Plutonium for Weapons,” *Science and Global Security* (Spring 2003).

### Carl Kaysen, Professor Emeritus of Science, Technology, and Society

(with John D. Steinbruner and Martin B. Malin), “U.S. National Security Policy: In Search of Balance,” in *War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences and Alternatives*, (Cambridge, MA: Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2002), available at [http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA\\_content/documents/war\\_wit\\_h\\_iraq.pdf](http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/war_wit_h_iraq.pdf).

### William W. Keller, former Executive Director of CIS, and Professor Richard J. Samuels, Director of CIS

*Crisis and Innovation in Asian Technology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

### Gregory Koblentz, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science

“Biological Terrorism: Understanding the Threat and America’s Response,” in *Countering Terrorism: Dimensions of Preparedness*, eds. Arnold Howitt and Robyn Pangi (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).



Lisbeth Gronlund

**George N. Lewis, Associate Director of the Security Studies Program, and Lisbeth Gronlund, SSP Senior Research Associate**

“Debunking the Missile Defense Agency’s ‘Endgame Success’ Argument,” *Arms Control Today* (December 2002): 16-18.

**Michael Lynch, Visiting Scholar**

“Forecasting Oil Supply: Theory and Practice,” *Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, July 2002.

“Drivers of Oil Price Volatility,” *Journal of Energy and Development*, December 2002.

“The Invasion of Iraq: Impact on Oil Markets,” *Geopolitics of Energy*, September 2002.

**Joyce Malcolm, Visiting Scholar**

“Why Britain Needs More Guns,” BBC News Online, 14-15 January 2003.

“Disarming History: How an award-winning scholar twisted the truth about America’s gun culture—and almost got away with it,” *Reason Magazine* (March 2003): 22-29.

**Barry R. Posen, Professor of Political Science**

“Foreseeing a Bloody Siege in Baghdad,” *New York Times*, 13 October 2002.

**Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Assistant Professor in Urban Studies and Planning**

“From Modernization to Democratization: The Political Economy of the ‘New’ International Law” in *Reframing International Law for the 21st Century*, eds. Richard Falk and R.B.J. Walker (New York: Routledge, 2002).

“International law and Social Movements: Challenges of Theorizing Resistance,” *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, vol. 42 (2003).

**Jonathan Rodden, Assistant Professor of Political Science**

(with Erik Wibbels), “Beyond the Fiction of

Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multi-tiered Systems,” *World Politics*, vol. 54, no. 4 (July 2002).

**Sharon Stanton Russell, Research Affiliate**

“Refugees: Risks and Challenges Worldwide,” *The Migration Information Source*, 1 November 2002, published online at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/print.cfm?ID=64>.

**Richard J. Samuels, Director of CIS and Ford International Professor of Political Science**

*Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).

**Serenella Sferza, Program Coordinator, MIT-Italy Program**

“The Third Way in France: Tertium Non Datur?” in *The Third Way Transformation of Social Democracy*, ed. Oliver Schmidtke (Ashgate Publishers, 2002).

**Christopher P. Twomey, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science**

“Avoiding Tragedy in Sino-American Relations,” book review of John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), in *Issues and Studies* 38, no. 4 (December 2002).

**David Wright, Senior Research Associate at the Security Studies Program**

(with other Task Force members), “Turning Point in Korea: New Dangers and New Opportunities for the US,” Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy Report, February 2003, available at <http://www.ciponline.org/asia/>.

“The North Korean Missile Program,” Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy Working Papers, Center for International Policy Online, February 2003, available at <http://www.ciponline.org/asia/wright.htm>.