Whatever one’s views of the war in Iraq, there is no doubt that the reconstruction of that country has profound regional and international implications. For that reason, the Center for International Studies and the Department of Urban Studies and Planning (DUSP) have offered an ambitious and probing semester-long colloquium series this winter and spring on “The Politics of Reconstructing Iraq.”

The seven-event series has addressed the economic, social, and political complexities of reconstruction and has featured a diverse and distinguished group of speakers, including Sami Zubaida of Birkbeck University in London, Hafez Mirazi of Al-Jazeera television, Naseer Aruri of UMass/Dartmouth, and several MIT faculty members, including CIS Director Richard Samuels, Security Studies Program Director Harvey Sapolsky, CIS Associate Director Stephen Van Evera, MIT Program on Human Rights and Justice Director Balakrishnan Rajagopal, and DUSP Head Lawrence Vale.

A description of the series, which will end on May 2 with a session on “Constructing A New Middle East,” is available on-line at http://mit.edu/cis/reconstructing_iraq.html.

Applying “Institutional Grey Matter”

Underpinning the series is the understanding that the regime of Saddam Hussein left a legacy of dictatorship and destruction, forcing Iraq through several wars and more than a decade of international sanctions. Also, that the war in 2003 further damaged the country’s infrastructure and caused thousands of civilian deaths. And finally, that reconstruction promises to be extraordinarily difficult, especially in the midst of an ongoing insurgency.

Professor Vale introduced the series on February 14 by urging MIT to “apply its institutional grey matter to an issue colored with many shades of grey.” He said that the series was designed to bring together competing views in order to stimulate productive debate.

Speakers at the first meeting included Charles Patterson, who led the State Department post-war planning effort during 2002-2003, and Rear Adm. David Nash (ret.), who managed reconstruction funds during a fourteen-month tour in Iraq. Both Mr. Patterson and Admiral Nash sought to challenge conventional wisdom. Mr. Patterson argued that there was extensive planning for the post-war period, and claimed that the problems that developed weren’t due to a lack of foresight but a breakdown in interagency communications. Admiral Nash said that despite ongoing violence in Iraq, Iraqis maintain a “joy of hope” that the transition to democracy is genuine.

A less sanguine view was provided during the March 7 session, when Pulitzer Prize-winning historian and Ford International Professor of History John Dower compared the
reconstruction of Japan after World War II to the present effort in Iraq. Professor Dower argued that American occupation forces in Japan were far more legitimate than the troops currently in Iraq, and urged U.S. leaders not to underestimate the importance of legitimacy.

At the colloquium on April 11, NYU School of Law Professor Noah Feldman addressed the forum on the legal and political hurdles associated with democratization.

Professor Feldman, who consulted with the Iraqi Governing Council on constitutional issues, said that the original goal of writing a constitution prior to having elections ran into the reality that a constitution without a democratically legitimate government would be impossible. This became especially clear when Grand Ayatollah Sistani, a highly influential Shiite cleric, called for elections.

The Coalition Provisional Authority settled on a provisional law, which was satisfying to most parties but left out the Sunnis. The lack of Sunni participation has crippled the reconstruction of an Iraqi national identity, making the nation building project more difficult. Dealing with the Sunnis means dealing with unsavory religious leaders who are tied to the insurgency.

Feldman also noted provocatively that the United States could have preserved the Iraqi government and avoided chaos by invading with as many as 600,000 troops. He also chastised the United States for failing to provide security after the invasion, and called prison abuse at Abu Ghraib a gross violation of the Geneva Conventions. According to Feldman, some of these problems were caused by President Bush’s failure to coordinate the post-war effort with his National Security Advisor. After the State Department was cut out, the reconstruction process was left to the Department of Defense, which did not have the skills to handle it.

Creating a “Third Space”

Dr. Yosef Jabareen, a DUSP scholar currently writing a book on Iraq, organized the colloquium series. He told précis that he wanted the series to provide a comprehensive look at the various issues—and conflicting views—associated with the reconstruction effort.

Up to now, the reconstruction debate has been polarized both in Iraq and in the United States, said Dr. Jabareen, who added that Iraqis are generally friendly to American principals but wary of the American occupation. He added that he hopes to help facilitate a “third space” for discourse that takes these sentiments into account. The current focus on military control is not enough over the long term, he contended.

Dr. Jabareen has been teaching an undergraduate companion course to the Politics of Reconstructing Iraq series this semester, in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning. The course has offered students both theoretical and practical tools for understanding comparative reconstruction projects and various attempts at nation-building.
Millions of people around the world are victims of forced labor, enforced prostitution and human trafficking. Despite the seriousness of this problem, their plight is the focus of insufficient public policy and media attention.

To focus attention on this problem, the Center for International Studies and the MIT Program on Human Rights and Justice (PHRJ) will partner with the British Broadcasting Corporation and WBUR/Boston at MIT’s Kresge Auditorium on Saturday, May 14 for a day-long symposium on the topic.

“Forced Labor in the Global Economy” is timed to coincide with the release by the International Labor Organization (ILO) of its Global Report on Forced Labor. The report will announce the ILO’s estimates of the monetary value of the forced labor economy and the number of people currently working in forced labor situations.

Taping of BBC and WBUR Programs

There will be two public components of the symposium: the taping by BBC Television of its World Debate program, and the taping by WBUR of On Point, the award-winning program distributed nationally by National Public Radio. On Point is hosted by former Boston Globe deputy managing editor Tom Ashbrook.

The BBC’s World Debate will air internationally on May 21, and may be distributed to public television stations in the United States. On Point will air in Boston on 90.9 FM sometime during the week of May 16.

Both tapings will take place on the morning of May 14 and will be open to the public. (Additional information is available on the CIS and PHRJ websites.)

The panelists will include Mary Robinson, the former President of Ireland, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees and director of the New York-based Ethical Globalization Initiative; economist Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University; and Jean-Robert Cadet, a professor of French at the University of Cincinnati and a former child slave in Haiti. Other guests will represent international organizations, business, government, and the anti-forced labor activist community.

An Academic Component

The third component of the day’s events will consist of roundtable discussions chaired by Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Ford International Professor of Law and Development and Director of PHRJ. These discussions at the MIT Faculty Club—which will not be open to the public—will bring together some of the morning’s panelists as well as other leading thinkers on forced labor. CIS Executive Director John Tirman will participate, as will MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning Professor Judith Tendler and other MIT faculty members.

A report on the roundtable discussions will be posted online in June.

The May 14 event, which has been more than a year in the making, is the second CIS collaboration with WBUR, which in May 2002 taped an On Point program on the prospects for democracy in the Islamic world. It is the first Center collaboration with the BBC’s World Service Trust, however. The Trust is an independent charity that promotes development through the innovative use of the media.

Professor Rajagopal is faculty leader for the project, which has been organized by Amy Tarr, CIS’s Director of Public Programs, and Susan Frick, PHRJ’s Program Coordinator.
In the conclusion to her recent book, SSP Senior Fellow Jeanne Guillemin argues that extensive government regulation of biological research in the name of national security is both impractical and potentially counterproductive. This is excerpted from Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism, by Jeanne Guillemin, published by Columbia University Press. Copyright © Jeanne Guillemin. Used by arrangement with Columbia University Press. All rights reserved.

The U.S. government’s quest to incorporate biology and related sciences into its civil defense agenda heralds a significant change for scientists in these areas. As early as March 2002, the Defense Department was circulating proposed restrictions on the aims and conduct of scientific research, as a means of controlling the transfer of biological weapons technology. This reaction, fitting for other types of weapons, could barely begin to address the large, unwieldy field of biotechnology, which is as international as it is American. At one point, the FBI estimated to Congress that 22,000 U.S. laboratories might harbor dangerous pathogens in old, leftover stocks from research on outbreaks and epidemics. In theory, any scientist trained in biological laboratory techniques might undermine national security if determined to do so. The federal requirements for laboratory and personnel registration written into the 2002 Bioterrorism Act were a comprehensive step toward controlling the potential threat.

Few U.S. scientists in infectious disease research have much experience with secret government activities or with restrictions on the choice of substance of their work or the publication of its results. Unlike nuclear physicists and engineers, biologists have intended exclusively beneficent ends to their research, ideally with universal application.

Through peer-review processes, researchers in biology have been in charge of the distribution of generous federal funding since the end of World War II, with few strings attached. Scientific freedom from government intrusion (although not from government regulation) has been much more characteristic. President Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 189 affirmed that the products of fundamental research should remain unrestricted unless they were part of classified projects. This decision guaranteed scientists open review and acknowledgment of their research, while increasing the odds that government funding would go to top-level, creative performers.

New Dilemmas

For biologists and other scientists engaged in biodefense research, decisions about the goals of their research are subject to the national security agenda, which gives priority to the interests of the United States over all other considerations. The protection of American civilians, the stated biodefense goal, limits beneficence to one population and presumably withholds it from enemies, however broadly or narrowly they are defined. People in North Korea and Iran may be on that list. People in mainland China or Pakistan or other countries could be added, as political will determines.

Individual scientists involved in biodefense research may have to wrestle with the elementary problem of retaining authority over the terms for their projects. The policies, laws, and practices regarding classified and sensitive biodefense research can be interpreted in vari-
ous ways and are sure to take years to evolve. A recent report by the National Research Council committee exhorted, “Given the increased investments in biodefense research in the United States, it is imperative that the United States conduct its legitimate defensive activities in an open and transparent manner.”

The two principles on which this call for openness is based are that the larger mission of science is to increase knowledge and that medicine is based on humanitarian principles that stand above nationality or other criteria. A third principle emanates from public health, namely, that the people deserve full, clear, and accurate information on disease risks and their protective options. On the other hand, since the goal of biodefense research is explicitly for national security, U.S. military, intelligence, and homeland security agencies may legitimately impose secrecy on biological research or restrain the publication of its results. This restriction would be analogous to those already imposed on government scientists involved in nuclear and encryption research, which are integral to weapons programs. It is highly inadvisable that biology should become part of the defense industry, that is, have its Los Alamos or other secret government enclave, because its goals are medical.

The international character of American science and medicine also stands in potential conflict with narrowly defined goals of national security. American biologists collaborate with colleagues worldwide and frequently attend and present their research at international meetings. Would this information sharing be curtailed by the U.S. government? Within the United States, the biological sciences are international in their education of and reliance on foreign talent and expertise. A third of all U.S. science degrees and half of the engineering degrees each year are awarded to foreign students, many of whom remain in the U.S. workforce. U.S. academic medicine has for decades been a training ground for graduates of overseas medical schools, who make up a third or more of public health and urban hospital staffs. In 2003, half the technicians at NIH were noncitizens.

In the aftermath of September 11 and the anthrax letters, federal concerns about educating foreigners in the sciences gradually took shape. President Bush’s October 2002 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-2), for example, allows the U.S. government to “prohibit certain international students from receiving education and training in sensitive areas, including areas of study with direct application to the development and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The intent of the directive was the protective restriction of dangerous knowledge, but the determination of which students might be national security threats and the definition of the term “sensitive areas” may take years to clarify.

Unintended Consequences

Biodefense research in general could have an important deterrent effect, in that no adversary would bother with an agency against which Americans might be well protected.

Biodefense research in general could have an important deterrent effect, in that no adversary would bother with an agency against which Americans might be well protected. But there are so many agents that the problem is hydra-headed. Biodefense research unfortunately has the potential for increasing risks of exposure to the public. Therefore, the scale and substance of the entire enterprise needs careful, ongoing assessment. More research on select agents increases the known reserves of dangerous pathogens and therefore amplifies the risks of accidental exposure to laboratory workers as well as the risks of theft or biocrimes.

Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, has advised that a whole new generation of biologists should be engaged in the field of biodefense research. But increased numbers of scientists trained to work specifically with biological agents may in itself pose a threat to civilian safety. As discoveries move from the laboratory to final standardized products, more scientists and technicians will gain experience in animal and human testing of new vaccines and drugs and other products. This experience would presumably include tests and trials that continued on next page
NEW CIS STARR FORUM ON THE RISE OF CHINA

China has emerged as a central piece in the global puzzle, a dynamic actor whose impact is undeniable and whose cooperation in attaining solutions is vital. In short, China’s integration has become a substantial concern, and a major topic of discussion, for virtually everybody working on issues of global sustainability.

A new event series at the Center, the CIS Starr Forum on the Rise of China, addresses the effect of China’s growing economic power and national competitiveness on such topics as global resource consumption, greenhouse gas production and climate change, international public health and disease control, and regional military security.

The forum series on China is organized by Edward S. Steinfeld, MIT Associate Professor of Political Science and a China specialist whose work focuses on the political economy of reform in socialist and post-socialist systems, and Yasheng Huang, China Program Associate Professor in International Management at MIT’s Sloan School of Management. Professors Steinfeld and Huang believe the series will become a hub for discussion at MIT, and that the forums will foster inter-disciplinary networks for coping with the new challenges presented by China’s rise. Their aim is to bring together a broad community of scholars. The two professors welcome all participants who are interested in China’s global impact—even those who do not define their expertise geographically.

All forums are open to the public and meet at the Center for International Studies (MIT Building E38). For more information see: http://web.mit.edu/cis/starr_china.html

BIODEFENSE
Continued from previous page

simulate aerosol exposure during a biological weapons attack. Yet biodefense expansion proceeded with little consideration by scientists of its risks or why, after fifteen years of government warnings of bioterrorist attacks, none had occurred. Apparently, federal funding for technological solutions to bioterrorism largely precluded political analysis and action.

2 NSDD-189: “Where the national security requires control, the mechanism for control of information generated during federally funded fundamental research in science, technology, and engineering…is classification.”
5 NRC, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, p. 14.
Experts Discuss Intelligence Reforms

Two senior intelligence officials—one retired from the CIA and one still employed by the agency—discussed the current reorganization of the intelligence community at MIT on January 20.

On the heels of last year’s 9/11 Commission Report, Congress passed sweeping legislation that will fundamentally change the organization of the American intelligence community. The bill created a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a National Counterterrorism Center, and promised additional resources to the FBI for domestic intelligence gathering.

Discussing these developments were Robert Vickers, CIA Officer-in-Residence at the Center for International Studies, and Arthur Hulnick, a longtime CIA official who left the agency to become a professor of international relations at Boston University.

Too Much Too Quickly?

Although skeptical about some elements of the recent legislation, Mr. Vickers said reform was necessary, including the creation of issue-specific analytic centers like the National Counterterrorism Center, which he said was long overdue. He cautioned that the benefits of reform will only accrue over the long term, however, and that “we may be doing too much too quickly without appropriate measures of effectiveness.”

Mr. Vickers also wondered whether the bill was too focused on counterterrorism at the expense of traditional threats, and he expressed concern that the DNI will be constrained by vague legislative language that mitigates his authority over the overall intelligence budget. The 9/11 Commission stressed the importance of centralizing budgetary control in one office in order to force the various agencies to work together, but he noted that the reform bill appears to leave most of the intelligence budget in the Department of Defense.

This year Mr. Vickers co-taught a graduate seminar on intelligence with Security Studies Professors Harvey Sapolsky and Barry Posen. “Intelligence: Practices, Problems, and Prospects” introduced students to the structure and functions of the U.S. intelligence community. It also examined more broadly the role of intelligence in national security and foreign policy.

Funding and Personnel Issues

During his remarks, Dr. Hulnick argued that the distribution of the intelligence budget is not likely to change soon, notwithstanding the recent reforms. Past efforts to rewrite bureaucratic budgets from scratch have failed, he said, and the DNI will have limited practical power to reallocate resources because existing projects demand continued funding.

Mr. Hulnick also noted that the intelligence community has difficulty hiring imaginative analysts and operators due to its slow and cumbersome security clearance process. It must also be willing to hire creative and knowledgeable professionals, he said, and to find ways to deal with the security roadblocks that also get in the way of hiring analysts with specific language skills.
John Tirman joined the Center for International Studies as Executive Director in 2004. Prior to joining CIS, he directed the Washington, D.C., office of the Social Science Research Council, where he also served as Director of the Program on Global Security and Cooperation. Dr. Tirman has written extensively on foreign policy, politics, and human rights, publishing six books and more than 100 articles in a variety of newspapers and journals. He is currently co-editing and co-authoring a new volume, Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, International Order and Structural Change (U.N. University Press).

précis: What drew you to the Center for International Studies?

John Tirman: I knew that the work I would do here would be similar in many respects to my work at the Social Science Research Council. But the attraction of working in an atmosphere like MIT was the deciding factor. I hadn’t worked at a university since I was a graduate student. My career has come full circle: I have worked in civil society, for advocacy groups, and for independent research organizations. Now I’m back in an academic setting that does the kind of work I’m interested in. And frankly, coming back to Cambridge was an attraction; I was evacuating Washington.

précis: What do you plan on introducing to the Center?

JT: When I came here I knew I’d have a very full plate. There are several interesting ongoing projects like the work that’s being done at the Program on Human Rights and Justice, and in the international migration group. I think these programs have a lot of potential to expand and I hope to help with that.

We are developing new projects like the Persian Gulf Initiative, which is funded by an MIT alumnus. Many issues surrounding the Persian Gulf are underspecified in academia, even though it’s considered such an important part of U.S. foreign policy, international security issues, human rights, and so on. The Initiative will sponsor a series of workshops over the next two years.

We are also continuing to work on a project called the “Audit of the Conventional Wisdom in Foreign Policy,” in which senior faculty and other CIS associates will write short pieces that deconstruct the shibboleths of foreign policy. The project is a way to mobilize the talent we have here to dig more deeply into contemporary foreign policy debates. We plan on publishing them as separate pieces before collecting all of the essays together in a single volume.

There are several advantages in publishing the papers separately at first. They will be timely, and we can get people to discuss them in Washington and New York as well as in Cambridge. The edited volume will include some additional pieces with a large addendum with a lot of foreign policy data, chronologies, and so on.

Eventually we might invite contributions from advanced graduate students and friends of the center who aren’t necessarily affiliated with MIT. We’re just feeling our way through the process, but we’d like to do it every year. I hope the project will inject a very incisive perspective into the foreign policy debate. There is so much that passes without examination and becomes codified in policy and law.

For example, the administration has an idea that “freedom” should be the linchpin of American globalism. Maybe this is the case; maybe not. Freedom is an open-ended idea. There are probably two dozen ideas like this every year in the general public debate that pass unexamined or are only examined superficially. We want to take them on.

précis: Let’s turn to your own work. You recently edited a volume on the subject of “human security,” which is a fairly new concept for international relations scholars. What does it mean?

JT: Human security is simply a shift of focus
from the security of states to the security of individuals and social groups. It began to get traction in the 1990s with the rise in interest in issues like human rights, migration, women’s rights and environmental security. But it had not been examined very rigorously. International relations theorists, especially realists, did not look at it very closely. September 11 made clear that human security was very important for IR scholars as well as NGOs and migration analysts.

My take has been drawn mainly from the human rights discourse. One of my earlier books, Spoils of War, was about the human consequences of the U.S. military relationship with Turkey. My recent volume, The Maze of Fear, is about the security implications of migration. The book came about as a result of 9/11 and the emergence of what I call the national security state. I came to think that this conception of homeland security was not the most judicious response to terrorism.

I’d like to re-engage the human security discourse and bring it to CIS, and subject it to the kind of scrutiny that the scholars here can provide.

précis: How would you evaluate the Bush administration’s policies with respect to human security?

JT: What’s striking about homeland security policy is that it’s all about hardening: hardening facilities and systems, but also hardening our social relations. The social organization of the response to 9/11 is about creating wariness and even fear and suspicion within American society. It’s not about cooperation, and it’s not about creating social benefits out of re-ordering society to take into account the possibility of a terrorist attack.

If we are really interested in threats to facilities—for instance, the liquid natural gas tanks around Boston—we should be thinking about why we’re so dependent on petroleum and what might be an alternative. We should also be thinking about how we can rearrange our economy and social infrastructure to reduce our dependency on oil. I don’t just mean the physical infrastructure, because the basic social contract is equally important. People need to see benefits in the way they live for homeland security to succeed. Such benefits would include not only more security, but also less pollution, more reliable supply, and so on.

We’re not getting much in return for the enormous cost of homeland security. This cost is reflected in dollars and in how we view each other; how we look at ourselves and warily on other groups in society like Muslims and Arab-Americans.

I’m interested in how society can reorganize to be more secure, equitable, fair, and sustainable. This is a human security take on homeland security, which is still mostly uncharted territory. Our current one does not look at social restructuring, even though we’re spending hundreds of billions of dollars with vast and lasting implications about how people view their own security.

Moreover, homeland security policies affect people in ways that translate into support for foreign policy. If fear is cultivated, for example, people are much more likely to support foreign adventures like the war in Iraq because political leaders tell them that it is necessary to stop terrorism at its origins.

It could be, however, that the origins of terrorism have to do with our profligate use of oil, and how that wreaks social, political, and environmental havoc in many parts of the world. I know that’s a provocative statement, but it’s meant to get people to start thinking about security in fresh ways in order to get us out of this bind of feeling threatened all the time.

précis: Do you think fresh ideas are forthcoming in the next four years?

JT: No. I don’t have any great expectations. But things can take unexpected turns, and one of the things a place like the Center can do is to reshape debates.

It may be that getting past this last election will help us think creatively. The period between...
September 11 and the November election was characterized by shock, war, and reciprocal anger at Bush. This was a flurry of emotions instead of a rational national discourse on security. Now the political questions have been settled, September 11 is further in the background, and an endgame is possible in Iraq. But a more rational discourse will require leadership from political institutions, the media, and social organizations. It’s a little hard to see where that leadership is going to come from.

précis: Your current work is about multilateralism. What are the origins of the project. What questions are you looking at?

JT: The project sprung from my concern over what was happening to multilateral arms control, heightened specifically by what happened in Iraq. It treats multilateralism as a normative project, not just a series of marriages of convenience. It also looks at several kinds of multilateralism. Not just security, but trade, health, and so on.

Liberal internationalists don’t want to be too critical of existing multilateral institutions because they were the crowning achievements of the 1940s. While it is true that they were tremendous achievements, institutions need to be examined over time. The project examines the U.S. challenge to multilateral institutions, and asks to what extent multilateralism is still viable. It asks, to what extent can you animate the normative values of institutions in a complex world?

Multilateralism means different things in different contexts. Trade multilateralism is very much alive, security multilateralism is in trouble, and there are many areas in between, like multilateral cooperation on HIV/AIDS. We tend to focus on just one aspect of globaliza-

précis: Do you think that multilateralism is at unique risk today, or are we just witnessing part of the normal cycle in which states struggle to cooperate under anarchy?

JT: It is probably part of the normal cycle, but it has been accentuated by rhetoric from the Bush administration. Not the president, oddly enough, but people like John Bolton and a few others. One could even say it’s refreshing to have people actually say what’s been in the back of the minds of policymakers for many years. Such candor stimulates useful discourse.

In some ways since September 11, the Bush administration has tended to operate like a hegemonic power would be expected to act. That is to say, unilaterally. But it has perhaps stimulated more recognition in Europe that they have to get their act together on security because they can’t rely on the United States. Perhaps they need to think seriously about their commitments to each other within the European community and within the United Nations. That’s a healthy debate for Europeans.

It’s healthy for Asians as well. They need to think about what the security architecture should look like for East Asia, especially in having to deal with issues like North Korea. That can be a very productive debate.

précis: So administration rhetoric is driving the consolidation of Europe and Asia. Is this in U.S. national interest?

JT: It is, because the notion of the United States maintaining its hegemonic military power indefinitely—a notion that is held by some in
GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE TAIWAN MIRACLE
BY SUZANNE BERGER AND RICHARD K. LESTER

In the introduction to their new edited volume, Global Taiwan: Building Competitive Strengths in a New International Economy (M.E. Sharpe, 2005), Suzanne Berger and Richard K. Lester describe some of the new problems faced by Taiwan as it struggles to sustain its legendary growth in a profoundly changing global economy. Suzanne Berger is the Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science at MIT. Richard Lester is Professor of Nuclear Engineering and Founding Director of the MIT Industrial Performance Center.

Taiwan’s rise stands as an example for developing countries of the possibilities of moving from authoritarian to democratic rule at the same time as a society pursues rapid economic growth. Scholars and policymakers still debate the “lessons of Taiwan” and search for validation in its experiences for competing theories of state and market in developing countries. Today Taiwan has come to have yet another emblematic significance. It is widely regarded as a critical case of the prospects and dangers of globalization for societies with advanced industries and high wages. Taiwan’s relationship with China shows in microcosm the opportunities and vulnerabilities of all developed countries in a world in which capital, goods, and services flow freely across borders and supply chains stretch seamlessly between high and low-wage economies.

The potential and the threat can be seen clearly in the evolution of Taiwan’s information technology industry—the heart of the Taiwan economic miracle. By 2002, Taiwan investors in the Mainland controlled two-thirds of China’s total IT output, and their share was rapidly increasing. These investments provide an enormous boost to the competitiveness of Taiwanese firms by lowering their costs and by allowing an expansion that would be unimaginable in the limited space of an island with 23 million people. The embedding of Taiwanese firms in the fast-growing China market offers vast prospects for the future. But at the same time, manufacturing in Taiwan proper is at risk of being hollowed out; by 2002 about a half of total IT output of Taiwan firms was produced on the Mainland. And the Taiwanese, like Americans, Europeans, and Japanese, ask what will remain and how in a world of open borders can rewarding jobs, innovative activities, and a good society be created at home.

Taiwan’s Development

In the 1950s, Taiwan was a poor society living on foreign aid and agriculture with a per capita income of $200 a year. From the 1960s on, an export boom based on labor-intensive consumer goods like clothing, toys, lighters, and plastic products helped raise annual growth rates to 10 percent. The first overseas contracts to source electronic components made in Taiwan came in the late sixties. At the end of the 1980s, Taiwan was emerging as a major player in electronics manufacturing. By 2001, Taiwanese companies manufactured 70 percent of all personal computer motherboards, 55 percent of all laptops, 56 percent of LCD monitors, 51 percent of all color display tube monitors. More than half the world’s silicon chips are now fabricated in Taiwan and Taiwan earns over 70 percent of the world’s semiconductor foundry revenues. The sales of the Taiwanese electrical and electronics industry in 2002 totaled almost $88 billion with the semiconductor industry adding another $21.4 billion. Taiwan’s per capita GDP in 2003 was $12,465.

How Taiwan achieved this is a story that has been told many times and in many different and contradictory ways. Explaining Taiwanese success has come to be a major battlefield in the
struggle between neo-classical market-based theories of economic development and revisionist theories that attribute the lion’s share of credit to state interventions. Virtually every explanation of Taiwanese growth experience is contested by another account, and these academic controversies continue to rage.

In our book, we do not join these battles, but we do recognize the critical importance of the legacy of the first thirty postwar years in Taiwan, when problems of economic reconstruction and development were inextricably tied up with political legitimation and the survival of the regime. At that time, the Taiwanese government had to control and pacify its own hostile population even as it poured the lion’s share of state resources into military preparations for war with an unyielding adversary across the straits. As in many developing countries today, the Taiwanese rulers had to consider economic policies mainly in function of their potential for exacerbating or mitigating domestic and foreign security problems. The policies of those years have left deep traces in Taiwanese social and economic institutions. Most important, they consolidated an industrial structure in which the main players have been small- and medium-sized companies and even the larger firms are distinctly smaller than foreign counterparts.

State Intervention

In Taiwan, as in South Korea, Singapore, and Japan, the state bureaucracy did play a major role in identifying, encouraging, protecting, and financing leading sectors of the economy. The principal difference between Taiwan and the others is that elsewhere the main actors in the state-industry dialogue were very large companies (domestic, in the case of South Korea and Japan; foreign, in the case of Singapore) and they received the lion’s share of funding and protection. In Taiwan, large firms controlled a significant part of the economy, but they were not to be engines of its transformation.

Through the first three decades of Kuomintang governments, for fear of seeing powerful groups emerging in civil society that might contest the central power, the regime kept large firms, public and private, on a tight leash. It ruled out industrial policies, which, like the Koreans’ or the Japanese, would have made large firms the privileged agents of the state’s push towards modernity. The large state-owned enterprises and private companies in Taiwan were mainly confined to the domestic market and rewarded with monopoly rents. Policies about banking and credit that were originally determined for political reasons set the economy moving along a trajectory with considerable momentum, so that even when political anxieties about building power centers in society eased, the dynamic of industrial transformation did not reverse. It was the small and medium companies that continued to drive economic modernization and export-led growth.

Because of its pursuit of a model of growth based on small and medium companies, Taiwan faced from the beginning the dual problems of competing in world markets with much larger rivals and of dealing with customers whose scale dwarfed the Taiwanese. Taiwan’s experiences in positioning itself in global production systems in ways that attenuated these weaknesses and dependencies offer perhaps the most valuable of its lessons for other developing countries. The emergent industries of developing countries do in fact have more opportunities to enter global production systems today because the modularization of production creates the possibility of focusing on a single competence and linking up with other companies in value chains to produce final goods. If in the
past a company had to master a broad range of the activities involved in the overall process from product design to sale to final customer, today it is possible, even optimal, to narrow the range of functions carried out within the walls of the firm. This makes it easier for new firms—from developing or developed countries—to enter the market.

But the other side of the coin of the new opportunities for entry into an international economy built on networked production are new dependencies and an immediate confrontation with the best-in-class producers from around the world. With the liberalization of trade, the new entrants of developing countries are projected into a world in which they face much larger and more powerful customers, suppliers, and competitors. These are challenges Taiwanese firms have had to master all along and today, the lessons of the past in building strength in the face of scale provide the Taiwanese with capabilities that can be mobilized in an international economy very different from that of economic take-off in the seventies.

As a massive relocation of manufacturing and services moves plants and jobs to low-wage countries like China and India, what will remain at home in societies like Taiwan?

New Competitors, New Terms

Our own research starts from the fact of Taiwanese success in the 1990s. We ask whether in the new global economy the performance of Taiwanese companies can be maintained and expanded with the same business strategies and public policies as in the past. Can they still work today for Taiwan? Can they work for other countries seeking to move up the ladder? If changes are required to sustain economic performance in an open international economy, what resources are available to be mobilized in the private and public sectors in Taiwan? As digitization and modularization make it possible to reorganize production that once took place in vertically-integrated firms into value chains linking independent players, how are Taiwanese firms adjusting in order to thrive in the new environment? As a massive relocation of manufacturing and services moves plants and jobs to low-wage countries like China and India, what will remain at home in societies like Taiwan? As trade liberalization confronts Taiwanese firms with larger and more powerful customers, suppliers, and competitors, how can they cope? How can Taiwanese firms defend and expand the positions they have captured in international production networks in the face, on one side, of rapid innovative advances by powerful lead firms and brands; and on the other side, of the rising capabilities of firms in emerging economies?

6 EIU, Taiwan: Country Profile 2003.
In their contribution to Global Taiwan: Building Competitive Strengths in a New International Economy, Cunningham, Lynch, and Thun explore possible strategies for “traditional industries in a mature economy.” The authors researched this project in Taiwan and China as part of the Global Taiwan group. Edward Cunningham and Teresa Lynch are Ph.D. Candidates at MIT. Eric Thun is Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School and Department of Politics at Princeton University.

We have examined three different segments of the automotive sector — automotive assembly, original equipment manufacturing (OEM) parts, and aftermarket parts — to analyze how mature industries in Taiwan face the pressures of adjustment. Taiwanese OEM firms, on the one hand, confront great difficulties at home. In the early years of growth, firms in this segment of the auto sector benefited from strong government support and extensive technical linkages with Japanese firms. OEM firms remained reliant on foreign partners for advanced technology, however, and the small market constrained growth. In the past decade, rising labor costs and World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, combined with the difficulty of achieving economies of scale, have forced Taiwanese auto assembly firms to begin searching for new survival strategies. As in advanced industrial nations, moving offshore is one of the most popular strategies for promoting sustained growth. Taiwanese aftermarket parts firms, on the other hand, are increasingly thriving at home. They are migrating up the global value chain by acquiring logistical, quality-control-related, and design work, and they are consolidating their control over the parts of the value chain that they occupy. The largest of these firms are dominating the U.S. market for their particular product, and are establishing service offices and even final assembly sites in the United States.

The sectoral contrast evident in Taiwan’s automotive industry results from at least two factors. First, initial ties of dependence are difficult to sever. In particular, capacity for innovation and degree of technological independence are critical because they constitute the key determinants of Taiwanese firms’ comparative advantage over the low-cost competitors in the regions to which they are relocating. Perhaps more importantly, competency in these two areas will determine Taiwanese industry’s capacity for transforming what is left at home to include more value-added activities. Innovative capacity and technological independence, however, depend in part on how the Taiwanese firms originally acquired technology (e.g. licensing, joint ventures), and from whom such technology was acquired. Thus, for Taiwanese auto assembly firms and OEM parts producers, long-standing dependence on Japanese technology has limited firms’ presence in regional and international markets by constraining product and investment strategies available to firms.

The island’s growing aftermarket auto parts firms, on the other hand, are technologically “independent” because of the use of “reverse engineering,” the prevalence of generic parts, and the generally slower pace of technological change in the aftermarket sector. They are also able to transform their cost advantage into service, quality, and managerial advantages that enable them to increase control over larger segments of the value chain. In contrast, continued dependence on Japanese technology hinders the relocation efforts of Taiwanese auto assembly firms, while offshore relocation efforts replicate rather than compensate for these weaknesses.

Second, relocation strategies reflect both the nature of the global production networks that organize a sector, and the place (both current and potential) of Taiwanese firms in them. In particular, opportunities are shaped by the
degree to which production within a sector can be divided both geographically and between firms into distinct, or modular, activities, and how these activities are then coordinated. In other words, it is important to understand the linkages that hold the chain together. The “buyer-driven chains” that characterize the aftermarket sector are dominated by retailers, brand-name marketers, and trading companies that command a decentralized production network. Success in such an environment depends upon a firm’s ability to create brand equity, establish exclusive distribution channels, create a niche demand, maintain competitive service levels, and minimize the leverage of the firms higher in the value chain. Niche approaches offer prospects for growth and profitability in such an environment. In contrast, the “producer-driven chains” that characterize automotive assembly and OEM parts manufacture are dominated by highly integrated producers who control the forward and backward linkages in manufacturing. Success in this form of network depends on the ability of a firm to produce at high volume and efficiently integrate all functions of production. Niche approaches are rarely profitable in such an environment.

**The “China Effect”**

The most important influence on the future direction of the Taiwanese auto industry is likely to be the development of the auto industry on the Mainland, and the challenges and opportunities this will create. Crucial questions for Taiwanese auto assemblers and parts suppliers are whether and how China’s automobile capabilities will be integrated into the existing East Asian production network. The most likely possibility is that Japanese assemblers will continue to pursue regional complementarity schemes in East Asia, and American and European assemblers will use Mainland plants only to serve the China market. In such a case, Mainland production capacity would be used to serve only the local market and production capabilities currently being developed in China would be only marginally integrated into existing regional arrangements.

But achieving the potential of relocating to Mainland China will not be without its challenges. Although the Mainland market was initially attractive because it had many similarities to the Taiwanese market of the past — it was protected by high tariffs and firms operated at relatively low volumes — it is changing rapidly, and the trend is toward a convergence with international standards, both in terms of quality and price, to an extent that was not possible in a closed system.

Second, the Chinese government has continued to leverage market access in exchange for increasingly sophisticated technology, and the number of foreign players has increased dramatically since the first Taiwanese investment in 1996. After a decade of leisurely development, investment in the market began to explode at the end of the 1990s. The increase in the number of joint ventures has been matched at the lower end of the market, by an increase in the number of wholly owned Chinese firms offering less expensive models for the growing number of individuals purchasing cars. The result of both of these trends has been more advanced models in the market and severe price competition.

**Niche Markets in a Modular Industry**

Rather than attempting to compete head-to-head with the major global suppliers, an alternative strategy for Taiwanese firms would be to integrate selectively into the global production networks. The Taiwanese textile/apparel and electronics sectors provide evidence that a certain degree of dependence does not necessarily preclude successful relocation. Firms in these sectors are not competitive in all aspects of the value chain. Western firms dominate the retail business, and continue to exert strong leverage as buyers. Given the inherent modularity of the value chains in these sectors, however, Taiwanese auto parts firms have been able to pick the activities in which they have a comparative advantage (while avoiding those in which they do not) and ruthlessly exploit these advantages. When firms in these sectors relocate, they do so as part of a global logic. They may only do a few activities, but what they do is done well. The challenge continued on next page
for these firms is to increase the integral links that connect them to buyers so as to avoid being cut out of the supply chain.

A second approach would be to tie into the lower tiers of supply networks. While a Taiwanese firm would rarely have the design capability to be a first-tier supplier, many could become important players in lower tiers. Indeed, this is an alternative relocation strategy that many Taiwanese auto firms are employing with some success. In China, local protectionism led to closed supply networks in the past, but increasing competitive pressure is beginning to force these networks open. The strategy of several Taiwanese firms has been to establish competitive manufacturing operations in China based initially on exports, and to position themselves to acquire new business as first-tier suppliers are forced to lower their costs. Alliances with foreign firms are sometimes utilized as well.

The third strategy is to seek to dominate the rapidly expanding auto parts aftermarket in the largest markets of the developed and developing world. Taiwanese auto parts suppliers have proven that these strategies are not mutually exclusive, and synergies may develop if a combination of approaches is adopted. Taiwanese collision parts manufacturers successfully created and dominate the U.S. collision aftermarket. These firms have complemented their domestic activities by tapping into foreign markets and several are attempting to utilize a niche strategy to link with OEM assemblers and further migrate up the value chain. Serving the aftermarket has integrated these firms into a supply chain that has allowed them to control increasing sets of value-added activities within the aftermarket that will further support their growth.

Traditional industries in a mature economy are not destined to decline. Global patterns of consolidation and the modularization of automotive parts production offer distinct opportunities for value chain upgrading and expansion into additional markets, particularly for firms willing to pursue a niche export strategy. The Taiwanese auto parts sector therefore illustrates the potential importance of government policies that could stimulate productivity and growth even in later stages of development, as maturing firms seek to expand beyond domestic market constraints. This case of Taiwanese auto assemblers and auto parts manufacturers industries illuminates a wide set of possibilities for firms competing in a global market. In particular, firms that are able to identify particular segments of the manufacturing value chain and successfully dominate such segments will create critical avenues of upgrading that in turn will better inoculate them to cost-based threats from below.

2 In 2002 alone, three foreign automakers invested over US$1 billion each in new 50-50 JVs: in August, Toyota committed to US$1.3 billion to a JV with First Auto Works; in September, Hyundai committed US$1.1 billion to a JV with Beijing Auto Industry Corp; in October, Nissan announced plans to invest US$1 billion in a JV with Dongfeng.
3 Evidence is mounting that Mainland Chinese auto parts manufacturers, for example, are entering developed markets, despite technological dependence: “In October 2002, at an Economist conference in China, [one component manufacturer] dared to suggest that, within a few years, the Chinese parts-makers might start buying up their weaker European and US counterparts. Most of the audience was aghast. Then one delegate put up his hand. ‘It’s already started,’ he said nervously. ‘SAIC [one of the biggest Chinese firms] has set up an office in Detroit just for that purpose.’ It was like listening to an axe drop.” Economist Intelligence Unit, Automotive Forecast: Western Europe (London, 2003).
How should the United States conduct itself in an era of unprecedented power? How can it remain dominant without causing perpetual fear and suspicions of its motives? Those questions were the focus of a February 10 discussion at the Wong Auditorium, “Debating the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy,” co-sponsored by the Center for International Studies’ Starr Forum and the Boston Review.

Stephen Walt, Academic Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard, offered a provocative answer. He argued that the United States should act to preserve its position of global primacy while working to dampen the resistance to American efforts abroad.

Professor Walt’s talk summarized part of the argument in his book, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, which will be published by W.W. Norton & Co. later this year, as well as an edited excerpt that appeared in the February/March 2005 issue of the Boston Review, where his analysis served as the centerpiece of a New Democracy Forum on U.S. foreign policy.

Other Points of View

Other members of the panel at the joint CIS-Boston Review event offered various critiques of Professor Walt’s argument. CIS Executive Director John Tirman, who has written widely on U.S. foreign policy, argued that the offshore-balancing strategy depends critically on allies whose support is not guaranteed. Turkey, for example, has proven willing to buck U.S. interests in response to domestic opposition, he noted.

Robert Vickers, a former member of the National Intelligence Council and the 2004-2005 CIA Officer-In-Residence at CIS, spoke directly to the issue of WMD proliferation and Professor Walt’s call for a more active stance by the United States. Mr. Vickers expressed skepticism that the United States can force either North Korea or Iran to give up weapons of mass destruction that they believe are vital for deterrence. He said military options would be costly, and that efforts at regime change, even if successful, would not guarantee more cooperative future leaders. We might have to live with the reality of some WMD proliferation, he concluded.

A “Condescending” Approach?

Naomi Chazan, who in February completed her tenure as the first CIS Robert Wilhelm Fellow in International Studies, offered the

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most direct criticism of Professor Walt’s case for U.S. primacy. “The world has grown up,” she said, and the United States should refrain from seeing itself as the “parent” in international relations. Although she said she agreed with many of Professor Walt’s specific recommendations (and his criticisms of the Bush administration), she took issue with his overall framework.

Professor Chazan, a political scientist and former Deputy Speaker of the Israeli Knesset, cautioned that resistance to U.S. primacy will be inevitable because primacy will “institutionalize inequality on a global scale.” In addition, she said, offshore balancing is both isolationist and condescending because it essentially co-opts other states to work toward American interests. Offshore balancing is also morally problematic, she argued, because it removes the responsibility for the United States to conduct humanitarian interventions.

Professor Walt’s Boston Review essay and the responses to it — including those responses written by John Tirman, Robert Vickers and Naomi Chazan — are available at: http://bostonreview.net/.

the Bush administration—doesn’t seem very realistic.

One could encourage a responsible evolution of a multi-polar world. And the poles are somewhat obvious. Asia is complicated, but clearly in size and economic power India and China are forces to reckon with, and Russia is not going to be denied its place at the table. We should be fostering some kind of non-competitive security architecture for these states. The global south is different, but one could see countries like Brazil or some of the larger African nations playing a regional role or even something more significant in terms of peacekeeping.

In short, there is a period of time in which American power will remain dominant. This gives us the chance to segue into something other than U.S. hegemony or weak multilateral institutionalism. What that is I’m not prepared to say, but it seems fairly obvious that it’s something we should be thinking about and acting on in the next decade.
Planning. On the agenda were aspects of law, sociology, the arts, and urban planning and design, as well as politics, religion and economics—all as they might relate to a shared Jerusalem in 2050. Distinguished speakers from around the world joined members of the MIT faculty for this event, which will culminate with an international design competition in 2007.

On January 12, Ph.D. candidate Peter C. Evans spoke on the value of trade commitments in a world of growing energy interdependence in Washington, D.C. The conference “Services Liberalization in the Doha Round: U.S. Industry Priorities,” was jointly sponsored by the U.S. Department of Commerce and Coalition of Service Industries. On February 4, Evans gave a presentation on “Meeting the Efficiency and Equity Imperatives of the Electricity Sector,” at the Fifth OECD-World Bank Services Experts Meeting in Paris. On March 15, he spoke at a seminar at Energy Services Week organized to support WTO’s ongoing service trade negotiations. His presentation there focused on the complementarity between domestic energy sector reform and multilateral trade commitments.

On March 2, Ph.D. candidate Vanda Felbab-Brown gave a talk on “Drugs and Conflict: Lessons from Asia and Latin America” at the International Studies Association Annual Conference in Honolulu.

At the end of February, Naomi Chazan, the Center’s first Robert Wilhelm Visiting Fellow in International Studies, departed just as she arrived a year earlier: with thoughtful and provocative comments on the prospects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians. “A Palestinian state is Israel’s only guarantee of survival,” she said during one of several talks she gave toward the end of her tenure at CIS. “The costs of failure are immense.” Professor Chazan is now Head of the School of Politics and Society at Tel Aviv College, and Chair of the Platform Committee of the new Yahad (Social-Democratic Israel) party.

On April 8-9, CIS affiliate and Professor of Political Sociology Diane Davis led a “Visionaries Conference” for the Jerusalem 2050 initiative, which is co-sponsored by CIS and the Department of Urban Studies and Planning. On the agenda were aspects of law, sociology, the arts, and urban planning and design, as well as politics, religion and economics—all as they might relate to a shared Jerusalem in 2050. Distinguished speakers from around the world joined members of the MIT faculty for this event, which will culminate with an international design competition in 2007.

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Ph.D. candidate Llewelyn Hughes gave a talk last December 14 to academics and policymakers from the Australian government at the Australian Defense Forces Academy (ADFA) on “Why Japan Won’t Go Nuclear (yet): An Examination of the International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearisation of Japan.”

On March 18, Associate Professor of Political Science Melissa Nobles spoke on “Official Apologies and the Meanings of Reconciliation” at Brown University. On March 31, she gave a talk on “Official Apologies and Multicultural Citizenship” at Brandeis University.
On March 16, Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, spoke with a group of CIS graduate students, affiliates and faculty members about pressing humanitarian issues and the need to draw on multi-disciplinary scholarship in the study of human security. Dr. Ogata—who delivered the keynote address at the Center’s 50th anniversary celebration in May 2002—was invited by CIS Director Richard Samuels and PHRJ fellow Gary Troeller, a long-time executive with the UNHCR. Dr. Ogata’s most recent book is The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s.

MIT-Mexico Director and Professor of Political Science Michael J. Pioré will speak at the MIT-Mexico First Anniversary Gala Event in Mexico City on July 19th. More than a hundred guests from Mexico and MIT are expected to attend the event, which will be held at the Palace Conde del Valparaiso.

Professor Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Director of the MIT Program on Human Rights and Justice, has recently given talks on his book, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance (Cambridge University Press, 2003), at law schools in Boston, New York and Washington. He also presented papers at the International Law Association’s annual meeting, Harvard University, Harvard Law School, the International Peace Academy, and the Indian Institute of Management. Professor Rajagopal was invited to speak at the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labor, on current human rights challenges, and was invited to provide input for the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

During January, Professor Rajagopal was a visiting professor at the UN University for Peace in Costa Rica.

The MIT Security Studies Program is co-sponsoring a new faculty seminar series on biosecurity with the Committee on International Security Studies of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and Alice P. Gast, the Vice President for Research at MIT. The purpose of this invitation-only series, funded by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation, is to bring together international security specialists and the life sciences research community to examine the potential threat and research policy implications of biological weapons and bioterrorism. SSP Director Harvey Sapolsky is the principal investigator and SSP Affiliate Gregory Koblentz co-investigator on the grant. The inaugural session on March 7 featured Dr. Lawrence D. Kerr, Assistant Director for Homeland Security, Office of Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President.

In late 2004, PHRJ Research Fellow Gary Troeller was appointed Advisor to the Geneva-based Global Commission on International Migration.

On January 11, Professor of Political Science and CIS Associate Director Stephen Van Evera led an Independent Activities Period discussion about “The Future of Terror.” On January 12, Professor Van Evera served on a panel at the National Press Club on possible solutions to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. On February 18, he spoke about “Evaluating American Strategy in the War on Terror” at Lincoln Labs, and he appeared on NPR’s On Point on March 1, assessing the prospects for democracy in the Middle East.

CIS Affiliate Jing Wang recently joined the CMS Convergence Culture Brand Consortium. She was also asked to serve on the International Editorial Advisory Board of the journal, Global Media and Communication.
On February 18, SSP Principal Research Scientist Cindy Williams participated in a panel discussion at a Capital Hill briefing for media and congressional staff. Her talk was entitled “How to Improve the U.S. Military Compensation System.” On February 23, she delivered a paper, “From Conscripts to Volunteers: NATO’s Transitions to All-Volunteer Forces,” at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.

New Faces

This winter, Casey Johnson-Houlihan joined CIS as Assistant to the Executive Director, John Tirman. Casey joins the Center from MIT’s Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, where she worked for the past three years.

Amy Kirkcaldy joined MISTI as the MIT-Mexico Program Coordinator in August 2004. Previously, she was an English teacher at the Tec de Monterrey in Monterrey, Mexico. She earned her A.B. in history from Harvard University.

In March, Heidi Knuff became the Administrative Assistant for CIS Public Programs and the Political Economy and Technology Policy Program. Heidi comes to MIT from the parent relations office at the University of San Diego.

Deepti Nijhawan recently joined CIS as the Program Coordinator for MIT-India. An architect by training, Deepti ran her own design studio before coming to the Center. Prior to that she worked in the public housing field for several years. She is currently Chairperson of MITHAS, an MIT-based arts organization that presents world class South Asian classical artists to the Greater Boston area.

April Julich Perez recently became the MIT France program coordinator after working for the Museum Loan Network in MIT’s Office of the Arts. Before coming to MIT, Perez worked in publishing in France for Beaux-Arts Magazine, the International Herald Tribune and Le Figaro, and in Boston as Assistant Cultural Attaché for the French Consulate.

Publications

Marcos Ancelovici, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, and Sara Jane McCaffrey, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science


Dan Breznitz, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science


Diane E. Davis, CIS Affiliate and Professor of Political Sociology

Discipline and Development: Middle Classes and Prosperity in East Asia and Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Leila Farsakh, CIS Affiliate and UMass Boston Professor of Political Science


Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ph.D Candidate in Political Science

Vanda Felbab-Brown and Roger Petersen, Professor of Political Science
"United States Social Science and the Counter-Insurgency Policy in Colombia,” in Freddy Cante, ed., Is it Possible? Nonviolent Political Action in Colombia (forthcoming).

Benjamin Friedman, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science
“Department of Threatening the Homeland?” TechCentralStation.com, February 1, 2005.

Jeanne Guillemin, SSP Affiliate and Professor of Sociology at Boston College

Hugh Gusterson, CIS Affiliate and Associate Professor of Anthropology and Science Studies
Why America’s Top Pundits Are Wrong, co-edited with Catherine Besteman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).


Richard Samuels, CIS Director and Ford International Professor of Political Science

Melissa Nobles, Associate Professor of Political Science

Balakrishnan Rajagopal, PHRJ Director and Ford Assistant Professor of Law and Development


Melissa Nobles, Associate Professor of Political Science
Harvey M. Sapolsky, SSP Director and Professor of Political Science

Michael Schrage, SSP Senior Advisor

Todd Stiefler, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science

Edward S. Steinfeld, Associate Professor of Political Science
“Cross-Straits Integration and Industrial Catch-up: How Vulnerable is the Taiwan Miracle to an Ascendant Mainland,” in Berger and Lester, eds., Global Taiwan: Building Strength in the New International Economy (M.E. Sharpe, 2005).

John Tirman, CIS Executive Director
“Can we demonstrate a seriousness about sustaining the environment, alleviating poverty, or eradicating disease?” (reply to Stephen Walt), Boston Review (February/March 2005), pp. 19-20.

Stephen Van Evera, CIS Associate Director and Professor of Political Science

Robert Vickers, Jr. CIA Officer-In-Residence, Security Studies Program
“Can we really be confident that rogue states will be unwilling to risk giving WMDs to terrorists?” (reply to Stephen Walt), Boston Review (February/March 2005), pp. 17-18.

Jing Wang, CIS Affiliate and Professor of Chinese Language and Culture


Cindy Williams, SSP Senior Research Fellow


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