



# THE MEXICO 2006 PANEL STUDY: POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN AN EMERGING DEMOCRACY

BY CHAPPELL LAWSON AND FRANCISCO FLORES-MACIAS



Mexican voters at a polling station in 2003. This year's federal election in Mexico will take place on July 2.

*During the seventy-one years in which Mexico was ruled by the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI), there was no true democracy in Mexico. The Presidential election of 2000, which elected Vicente Fox and the National Action Party, brought real choice to Mexican voters. But Mexican democracy remains nascent. In this article, Associate Professor Chappell Lawson and doctoral student Francisco Flores-Macias of the MIT Political Science Department*

*discuss a study they have undertaken to examine democratization in Mexico and the elections that will be held in July.*

ments becoming solidified? To what extent are mass preferences and priorities reflected in elite discourse and public policy?

These questions go to the heart of Mexico's new political system. Modern democracy consists of a chain of delegations from citizens to leaders, through which popular preferences are theoretically translated into public policy. Although this process of translation involves much more than elections alone, elections do constitute a key mechanism of democratic accountability and representation.<sup>1</sup> If the Mexican people cannot make themselves heard in the 2006 elections, either directly or indirectly, they are unlikely to exercise much control over public policy. How electoral campaigns come to focus on a particular set of issues will thus matter crucially for the operation of democracy. The role of elections may be especially important in new democracies such as Mexico, where democratic norms and institutions outside of the electoral sphere are less developed.

## *Measuring Political Attitudes in an Emerging Democracy*

Building on the success of a major survey research project conducted during Mexico's 2000 presidential race, the Mexico 2006 Panel Study will examine the types of issues that emerge as salient over the course of Mexico's 2006 campaign. We will document how the mass public, candidates, political parties, and the media interact to shape the subjects of electoral contestation—taking into account the possibility that political elites may anticipate the

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
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## *The Uncertain Consolidation of Mexican Democracy*

The election of Vicente Fox in 2000 ended 71 years of dominance by the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI). Despite this change, Mexico's process of democratization is far from complete. Rule of law remains weak, and civil society continues to be less developed than in many established democracies. Perhaps most importantly, the controversy surrounding attempts to prevent leftist former mayor of Mexico City, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, from contesting the presidency in 2006 suggested that some political elites have yet to internalize democratic norms. In this context, the elections this year could shape political developments for years to come.

How have Mexican citizens and politicians adapted to a more competitive political system? Are ideological cleavages and partisan attach-



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preferences of ordinary citizens and of other elites. In particular, we will address the extent to which campaigns remain a “top-down” process in Mexico’s new democracy. Ultimately, we hope to understand why electoral campaigns highlight or downplay certain issues, how the Mexican public responds to them, and what the implications of these dynamics are for democratic governance.

The project consists of several related data collection efforts. The central part of the study is the implementation of a nationally representative three-wave panel survey, designed to measure how political attitudes change throughout the campaign period. Additionally, our team will gather aggregate-level data on the communities in which panel participants live—from crime rates to past voting trends. Third, our project will measure elite discourse through content analysis of party platforms, candidates’ speeches, and televised campaign advertisements. Finally, we will conduct a detailed analysis of television newscasts during the campaign, focusing especially on the attention and spin given to different issues.

Both our surveys and our content analysis will examine several types of issues during the 2006 campaign: positional issues (i.e., those policy debates on which politicians disagree), valence issues (topics like corruption or economic growth, in which politicians generally agree), assessments of incumbent performance,

party reputations, and candidate attributes. Among valence and assessment issues, we will concentrate on economic growth, job creation, inflation, public safety, corruption, and perceptions of President Fox. Among positional issues, we expect to focus on topics like the death penalty, energy sector privatization, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and abortion rights. For each of the positional issues on which we focus, we will measure the positions of the main candidates and parties in the eyes of citizens, as well as the certainty respondents feel about their judgments.

For each of these issues or assessments, we will gauge the emphasis placed on them by political elites, mass media, and ordinary citizens. This information will allow us to discern whether candidates or parties “own” certain issues or attributes and how they attempt to exploit that ownership.<sup>2</sup> In other words, we will be able to analyze how and why certain issues emerge as the focus of political contestation. Does issue emergence follow the same logic identified in established democracies? If not, how might patterns of agenda-setting—and their effects on voters—be different in emerging democracies? And what does all of this mean for representation and accountability?

Information generated in this project should be of special interest to experts on political communication, media influence, and campaign strategy. By providing data from an emerging democracy, the content analysis alone should represent a contribution to a growing body of literature on comparative communication strategies and media biases in campaign cover-

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**précis**

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# FORMER SRI LANKAN PRIME MINISTER, SUDAN EXPERT AND U.S. OFFICIAL IN IRAQ JOIN CIS

Ranil Wickremesinghe, a two-time Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Francis Deng, a former foreign minister and ambassador from Sudan and a leading expert on that country's humanitarian crisis, and Barbara Bodine, former coordinator for post-conflict reconstruction for Baghdad and central Iraq and a former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, join CIS this spring—Mr. Wickremesinghe for a several-week visit, Ambassador Deng as the Center's new Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow, and Ambassador Bodine as a Visiting Scholar.

Mr. Wickremesinghe, a lawyer who was Sri Lanka's Prime Minister from 1993-1994 and 2001-2004—and who was narrowly defeated for the presidency of Sri Lanka in November 2005—in 2002 established a ceasefire between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tiger rebels in which the rebels dropped their demand for independence in favor of regional autonomy. Last December, acting as the country's opposition leader, Mr. Wickremesinghe met with Sri Lanka's president, Mahinda Rajapakse, to set in motion a new peace process—although fighting in the decades-old Sri Lankan civil conflict continues.

Francis Deng, Research Professor of International Politics, Law and Society and Director of the Center for Displacement Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, will join CIS as a Wilhelm Fellow on June 1, 2006. The Robert E. Wilhelm Fellowship is awarded to individuals who have held senior positions in public life.

Ambassador Deng served from 1992-2004 as the Representative of the United Nations

Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons. In addition, he was Sudan's Ambassador to the United States as well as its Minister of State for Foreign Affairs prior to the rise to power of an Islamic fundamentalist government during the early 1980s.

Ambassador Deng is a leading scholar of indigenous cultures and the role of tradition in development, the politics and conflicts of identity in the Sudan, conflict management and the challenges of nation building in Africa, and the global crisis of internal displacement. His presence at MIT will undoubtedly help to raise local awareness about the crisis in Darfur.

Ambassador Bodine, a career diplomat, was serving in Yemen when the U.S.S. Cole was attacked in 2000. She had been Deputy Principal Officer in Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War and Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion and occupation in 1990.

While in the foreign service, Ambassador Bodine also received a number of assignments at the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and she served as State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism. She was Dean of the School of Professional Studies at the Foreign Service Institute and was recently a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. In October 2005, Ambassador Bodine participated in a panel discussion on state-building in Iraq during a civil war. The event, which was co-organized by CIS Executive Director John Tirman and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, was part of CIS's ongoing Persian Gulf Initiative. ■



*Ranil Wickremesinghe*



*Francis Deng*



*Barbara Bodine*

# POSEN'S IRAQ WITHDRAWAL PLAN DRAWS RESPONSES FROM TWO U.S. SENATORS

A plan by Ford International Professor of Political Science Barry Posen to pull U.S. forces out of Iraq was published in the January/February 2006 edition of the *Boston Review*, as the lead article in the magazine's Democracy Forum. Most prominent among the published respondents to the plan were Senators Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) and Joseph Biden (D-Del.), and Barbara Bodine, a former ambassador to Yemen and former post-conflict coordinator for Baghdad and Iraq's central region. (For more on Ambassador Bodine, see p. 3.)

In his article (written in late 2005), Professor Posen called for pulling American ground forces out of Iraq in 18 months. He argued that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq fuels the Sunni insurgency, and that the insurgency draws strength from Sunni's anger about their loss of power, Iraqi nationalism, Islamic extremism, and tight kinship ties. Also, he wrote, U.S. troops exacerbate each of these problems: Sunnis see the United States as the agent of their downfall; foreign occupation ignites Iraqi nationalism; and jihadis come to Iraq to fight Americans. When U.S. forces kill insurgents, they inflame their network of kin, he wrote, and as a result, the U.S. effort against the insurgency has produced a stalemate at best.

Professor Posen also argued that the U.S. presence blocks political progress in Iraq, and that the Iraqi military, lacking incentive to lead the fight, is infantilized by the U.S. presence. The United States can protect its interests in Iraq—ensuring oil supply and preventing the rise of a terrorist sponsoring state—without ground troops in Iraq, he wrote; for example, the United States could leave air bases in neighboring states and special operations and intelligence assets to work with Iraqi troops. According to Professor Posen, U.S. forces could

help the Shi'a-dominated government fight insurgents to an impasse conducive to political compromise—likely a highly decentralized state.

## Strategy Disagreements

Many of the respondents to the *Boston Review* article agreed with Professor Posen's call for a withdrawal, but not everyone agreed with his strategy. Senator Biden argued that while U.S. troops should begin a slow withdrawal, U.S. strategy should remain focused on building the Iraqi state, which requires subtle shifts in counter-insurgency strategy and more international help. Senator Feingold argued that the withdrawal should be pegged to progress in fighting the insurgency; also, that U.S. troops and resources tied down in Iraq can be

better deployed against other dangers. Ambassador Bodine argued that a weak central government would institutionalize Iraq's sectarian militias. She wrote that the United States should focus on creating a strong central government and on constitutional reform.

Randall Forsberg, Director of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, called for an immediate U.S. troop withdrawal. Lawrence Korb and Brian Katulis, scholars at the Center for American Progress, argued for a 24-month pullout, with 20,000 of the removed U.S. troops redeployed to Afghanistan. Helena Cobban, a contributing editor of *Boston Review*, called for multilateral, UN-based action, and criticized Professor Posen's plan as one designed to maintain U.S. hegemony.

Professor Posen will become Director of the MIT Security Studies Program in July 2006. His *Boston Review* article and all ten responses to it are online at <http://bostonreview.net/ndf.html> (click on "Exit Strategy"). ■



# DEFEATING TRANSNATIONAL INSURGENCIES

PAUL STANILAND

*Among the vexing challenges the United States faces in Iraq is the transnational nature of the insurgency. While most insurgents are Iraqi, some of the bloodiest bombings are the work of foreigners. In this article, Paul Staniland argues that standard counter-insurgency doctrine fails to account for transnational fighters and proposes policy changes to confront the problem.*



Paul Staniland

One of the most troubling aspects of the current insurgency in Iraq is its transnational nature. Islamic radicals are recruited from far-flung networks across the Middle East and Europe and piped into the country through neighboring states, principally Syria and Jordan. Infiltration by foreign suicide and insurgent fighters across the Syrian border into western Iraq has taken a ghastly military and civilian toll, especially in al-Anbar province.<sup>1</sup> On the other side of the country, the eastern border with Iran is a transport conduit for deadly explosives and could become an even greater liability, should the United States press coercive diplomacy against Iran's nuclear program.<sup>2</sup> Despite the costs and dangers imposed by porous borders, U.S. troops and Iraqi security forces seem unable to halt the flow of men and matériel. This failure is not unprecedented; from Afghanistan to Kosovo to Vietnam, transnational insurgent movements have posed daunting, even insurmountable, challenges to counterinsurgent powers.

The inability to neutralize transnational insurgencies reflects a broader problem. Conventional models that guide policymakers, the military, and academics generally assume that insurgents are drawn solely from the native population. Consequently, conventional counterinsurgency strategy instructs that by instilling loyalty or terror in the populace the uprising can be defeated. In Iraq the pronouncements of U.S. and Iraqi officials clearly indicate that they are operating within this

framework. The flaw in this approach is that the transnational aspect of insurgent conflict introduces actors who are not permanently embedded in the local population. Transnational insurgents can live and organize in external sanctuaries, rely in part on foreign recruits and diaspora fund-raising support, and if desired, only enter the country for a period of hours or days, after which they kill themselves or flee back across the border following an attack. As long as the insurgent group maintains minimal support within the country for logistics, it can undermine conventional domestic counterinsurgency strategies such as "winning hearts and minds" or coercing the population.

## *The Nature of the Problem*

Exploiting transnational opportunities has allowed insurgents throughout the world to survive and grow under otherwise unpromising circumstances. Since World War II, in Algeria, El Salvador, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Sudan, among others, insurgencies facing serious disadvantages have stayed alive and fighting by reaping the benefits of sanctuary, diaspora-based funding and recruiting, and porous borders. Insurgent groups translate transnational campaigns into enhanced staying power, increased political influence, and even ultimate victory in some cases.<sup>3</sup> This is especially true when cross-border ethno-nationalist or religious sentiments can be mobilized in the face of a foreign presence, as transnational insurgency against the Soviets in Afghanistan and against the Americans in Vietnam revealed. Along similar lines, many radical Islamists now view Iraq as a battlefield against the United States and have traveled to the country to join the fight.

In the face of these challenges, how can counterinsurgents win the transnational dimension of a conflict? Specifically, how can the United States and its allies neutralize the transnational insurgent challenge in Iraq? The

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key to clamping down on a cross-border insurgency is recognizing that it dramatically complicates domestic counterinsurgency policy. Outside sanctuary and support give insurgents three advantages. First, manpower can be recruited and trained in foreign countries, as opposed to a reliance on recruiting directly from the contested area. Safe havens make the basic task of organizing military power much easier. Second, matériel can be gathered and organized away from the military pressure of a counterinsurgency. Finally, transnational insurgents can ride out and respond to counterinsurgent initiatives—they can take a punch domestically but stay standing because of their external sanctuaries and diaspora networks. This provides improved influence over momentum, halting or slowing downturns in their fortune while also allowing counteroffensives and rebuilding. As a result, the standard “hearts and minds” and “coercion” counterinsurgency approaches simply do not work very well; as long as insurgents can maintain a small domestic base of support, their external advantages can allow them to survive even intense counterinsurgent pressure.<sup>4</sup>

### *Strategies With Limited Success*

Recognizing the limits of conventional domestic counterinsurgency strategies, other approaches are often proposed and tried. There are three common strategies, each of which holds a certain intuitive appeal but is significantly flawed in practice. The strategies outlined below can succeed, but each relies on a specific, restrictive set of circumstances. Otherwise, counterinsurgent governments risk a widened war, insurgency-bolstering backlash, or simply wasted time, hope, and resources.

First, offensive military action is usually counterproductive; limited incursions produce ill will without eliminating sanctuaries, while full occupations tend to spark new insurgencies or the military involvement of other states. Israel in Lebanon and Austria-Hungary in Serbia both found out the hard

way that going after cross-border insurgents in their sanctuaries can end up being a messy and complicated business, while South Africa’s clashes with the “frontline state” backers of the ANC show the limits of cross-border incursion and subversion. Airpower is a less problematic tool but is only effective when insurgents are massing like conventional ground forces, the counterinsurgent has excellent intelligence, or the insurgent organization is led hierarchically by a single, charismatic leader. Interdiction and decapitation are difficult against insurgent forces with low logistical needs and an adaptable command structure.<sup>5</sup>

Second, population resettlement is incredibly difficult and, as with invasions, tends to backfire.<sup>6</sup> Moving groups away from vulnerable border areas is tempting as a solution to cutting the Gordian knot, but is rarely done without generating new grievances and consequently further instability.

Finally, using threats and incentives with sanctuary states has limited success. States intentionally supporting insurgents are not easily intimidated or bribed. States unintentionally supporting insurgents are incapable of cracking down on them effectively. Strong state sponsors are difficult to coerce—they have already decided to run the risks of backing the insurgency, and so only unexpectedly generous concessions can end their support. Weak or failed states pose a very different problem. The countries most desperate to be bribed are also those least likely to be able or willing to turn the money into success against transnational insurgents.<sup>7</sup>

### *Containment: A Better Route*

History indicates that the best policy combination for neutralizing the transnational component of an insurgency is containment. A mixture of border defenses, marginalization campaigns promoting nationalist propaganda, and law enforcement/intelligence initiatives that undercut diaspora networks is the most likely to succeed at the lowest cost. Such containment policies are not as sexy as bold offensives, telegenic aerial bombing, or high-profile crisis diplomacy, but they are extremely effective at precisely slicing the

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sinews of transnational insurgent power. By sealing off border infiltration routes, using nationalism to de-legitimize foes based abroad, and reducing the ability of insurgents to collect men and money abroad, external sanctuaries can be turned into isolated and impotent enclaves. These containment strategies hold the key to overcoming the challenge of transnational insurgency. Obviously, broad-

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*One of the most troubling aspects of the insurgency in Iraq is its transnational nature. Radicals are recruited from far-flung networks across the Middle East and Europe and piped into the country through neighboring states.*

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er counterinsurgent success requires many other initiatives, but none are likely to succeed as long as insurgents can replace losses and bolster forces from across the border.

The first step in this strategy is to build and maintain defensive barriers. The basic aim is to make infiltration difficult, raising the costs of external sanctuary until they outweigh the advantages. If forced to navigate minefields, breach electrified fences, and evade air-mobile assault forces, an insurgency's combat power can no longer flow freely across borders, impeding its ability to withstand the impact of domestic counterinsurgency offensives. Isolating the insurgents' men and matériel from the primary arena of warfare reduces their ability to make military and political gains, cutting off insurgents' contact with and assistance from external sanctuaries and diasporas. France in Algeria, India in Kashmir, Turkey along its southern border, Morocco in Western Sahara, and Israel on all of its borders have successfully held transnational insurgents at bay by sealing key border areas. Good fences may not quite make for good neighbors, but they can certainly make them less dangerous.

An effective barrier-and-pursuit defense opens the door for sustained law enforcement, intelligence efforts, and propaganda aimed at

undercutting both the ideological appeal as well as the recruiting and fund-raising capability of the insurgents. This type of marginalization campaign has two primary components: nationalist propaganda and network-eliminating cooperation. When they are effectively combined, transnational insurgents simultaneously lose political support and material resources.

First, as insurgents are being isolated in external sanctuaries, the counterinsurgent government can employ a propaganda campaign to paint the infiltrators as tools of foreign power and influence who are disconnected from the population, unrepresentative of the country as a whole, and hopelessly weak. The counterinsurgent uses its control over the media and state educational apparatus to push nationalist propaganda targeting foreign-based insurgent groups relentlessly. Sparking nationalist reactions against groups based abroad can blunt the ability of the insurgents to capitalize on grievances among the population.

The second prong of a political marginalization strategy focuses on attacking global recruiting and fund-raising networks with a concentrated intelligence and law enforcement campaign. States friendly to the counterinsurgent government may be used as "feeders" for transnational insurgent movements. Feeder networks provide men and material to the insurgency, which can effectively organize these resources in its host-state sanctuaries. Cutting off the supply of cash and fighters holds promise for starving out transnational insurgents. This can involve attempts to bribe, threaten, or compromise with the sanctuary state, but it is often less costly and more effective to try to go further afield into the feeder states' diaspora networks. The counterinsurgent must work with the law enforcement and intelligence services of these friendly states to eliminate or at least reduce recruiting and fund-raising.

#### *Iraq and Beyond*

Counterinsurgency is a difficult business, especially in the face of domestic and transnational challenges. Neither challenge can be overcome without at least neutralizing the

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other, and often failure in one leads to failure in both. The most successful policy against a transnational insurgency is to embrace a containment strategy, combining border defenses with aggressive propaganda as well as international intelligence and law enforcement efforts.

Other transnational counterinsurgency strategies, including military strikes, population resettlement, and diplomacy, can some-

Stabilizing Iraq requires a variety of successful policies, of which dealing with the transnational problem is but one. Nevertheless, stopping Iraq from becoming a version of Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s must be a pressing national priority.

*Paul Staniland is a PhD student in the MIT Political Science Department and a member of the MIT Security Studies Program. His research focuses on international security and civil war.*

*Adapted from "Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense Is a Good Fence," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 21-40. © 2005, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

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### *History indicates that the best policy combination for neutralizing the transnational component of an insurgency is containment.*

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times succeed but are narrower and riskier.

What does this imply for counterinsurgency in Iraq? The ineffectiveness of coercive diplomacy against Syria has already been witnessed, and an invasion of either Syria or Iran would stretch U.S. military power to or even beyond its limits. The most cost-effective way to cauterize the transnational component of the insurgency is to seal off key vulnerable areas of Iraq's border, leverage Iraqi nationalism against foreign fighters through the media and state apparatus, and focus intensely on disrupting diaspora recruiting from the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.

1. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, "Outside Iraq but Deep in the Fight: A Smuggler of Insurgents Reveals Syria's Changing, Influential Role," *Washington Post*, June 8, 2005, p. A1.
2. Eric Schmitt, "Some Bombs Used in Iraq Are Made in Iran," *New York Times*, August 6, 2005, p. A1.
3. See Daniel Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2001).
4. A review of these approaches can be found in Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 1989).
5. On the low levels of supplies needed to sustain insurgencies, see Robert Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Autumn 1990), pp. 126-129.
6. Kelly M. Greenhill, "Draining the Sea, or Feeding the Fire? Evaluating the Role of Population Relocation in Counterinsurgency Operations" (unpublished manuscript, Wesleyan University, 2005).
7. Robert Rotberg, ed., *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). ■

## JIM WALSH

*Jim Walsh joined the MIT Security Studies Program as a Research Associate in February 2006. After getting his doctorate from MIT's Political Science Department, Walsh served as Director of the Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School. Walsh, a leading expert on proliferation issues, is writing a book on Iran's nuclear weapons program.*

**précis:** *What are the odds of nuclear terrorism?*

**Jim Walsh:** The probability for the use of nuclear weapons in the near term by a non-state actor is low. But the consequences are so huge that we should be doing everything we can to reduce that probability to near zero. On the other hand, the technological and organizational challenges involved in staging a radiological attack—a dirty bomb—are sufficiently modest that a non-state actor could do it. Al Qaeda is not very technologically sophisticated. Because they work in cells and are on the run, their organizational structure is not conducive to complex scientific projects. To build a nuclear weapon requires group problem solving; you need the metallurgist talking to the physicist talking to the engineer. It is preferable to have stationary facilities. That is not what Al Qaeda has.



*Jim Walsh*

My concern is that unless we address the issue of securing nuclear material and reducing the total number of nuclear weapons and establishments, Al Qaeda 'the second iteration' will be more dangerous. Al Qaeda is a social movement. Some social movements succeed and consolidate, and others fail. If Al Qaeda persists over the long term, its next generation may go to school in Germany or France and be more technologically sophisticated. Given sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium, it is not impossible that they could craft an improvised nuclear device.

**précis:** *Is the threat exaggerated to provoke a response?*

**JW:** There is a lot of difference of opinion about terrorist capabilities. It is good to draw attention to the problem, but if we mischaracterize the adversary, if we make them more technologically savvy than they really are, if we make them the perfect enemy, then we will miss opportunities to reduce their capability. You want to understand your adversary's capabilities and exploit them. So a cold-hearted assessment of what they are good at and what they are bad at is useful

**précis:** *The funding and support for Nunn-Lugar, the U.S. programs that help to secure nuclear weapons materials in the Soviet Union, seems to have faded as an issue since the 2004 Presidential debate, when both John Kerry and George Bush said the issue of terrorists getting nuclear weapons was their number-one priority. Is the issue getting enough attention?*

**JW:** The president says terrorism is his number-one priority. He says all the right things about securing nuclear material, but as my mother used to say, you can only have one number-one priority. As long as there are Americans on the ground in Iraq, that will be the President's number-one priority. The most precious commodity, which cannot be created, is Presidential attention. When we talk about the cost of the Iraq war, it is not only the resource cost and the cost in diplomatic capital, it is the hours each day that the President focuses on that and not something else. We have not acted as if this is our number-one priority. We have a business-as-usual model that has us getting things modestly secure in another five or seven years.

Money is less an issue than political priority. If this were the top priority, then when we have summits with Russia, it would be the main issue we bargain around. Since it is not the main focus for either country's president, the thing gets caught up in the weeds. So issues like tax liability and, understandably, Russian sensitivity about Americans visiting their sites, hold up

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## JIM WALSH

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progress. There is a lost opportunity here: we let it sit rather than acting early and locking things in. The attitude in Russia has begun to change. Now there are more issues in the bilateral relationship, more suspicion. That makes it hard to get the sort of political agreements that can clear the bureaucratic logjam.

*précis:* You traveled to North Korea last summer and recently returned from Iran. What were you doing?

**JW:** Two things. One, I'm doing data collection, meeting people and conducting interviews to learn how nuclear decision-making

there is no one in their country who is interested in building nuclear weapons, and we should realize that there are indigenous constituencies who think that is not a terrific idea. We need to be attentive to that internal dynamic if we hope to be successful in our non-proliferation policy.

One of the great myths in international politics is that nuclear proliferation is inevitable. That is just empirically and demonstrably wrong, but it is a seductive notion that will not die. The idea that there is nothing we can do to stop proliferation leads us toward policy prescriptions that can actually push countries to acquire nuclear weapons.

*précis:* How does the proliferation issue fit into international relations theory?

**JW:** I consider myself a realist, but realists have gotten nuclear weapons wrong. They keep predicting that nuclear weapons will spread, and they have not spread much. What has happened with the study of proliferation is that there is not much politics in it. It is thought of very mechanistically, as being based on security and technical capability. Human beings are ignored. But proliferation is like other policy issues: there are interested parties. It is all about who has the votes in the room, what organizations see as their interest, and agenda-setting moments. Take Iran. My concern is that we are forcing a decision on them at a time where they are in a period of nationalism. That is a very permissive environment for pro-nuclear weapons decisions. You have to be able to count the votes. It would better to ice the thing—delay it, have a moratorium. Let's not force an issue when the votes are against us, especially when that decision can get locked in.

*précis:* What will you be doing at the Security Studies Program?

**JW:** I'm really happy to be back here—this is a scholarly environment that really suits me. I'm looking forward to working with colleagues here and in other parts of MIT and building a robust, scholarly effort on issues relating to weapons of mass destruction. I'm going to continue to work on various projects on Iran and North Korea that I started at Harvard. I also want to make progress on my book on Iran. My particular interest is the role of civilian nuclear bureaucracies in nuclear weapons decision-making. ■

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*I assume that Iran is a normal country. And if it is a normal country, then there are people in Iran who want to build nuclear weapons and other elements of the government who do not.*

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works in those countries. Second, there is a unique role for academics in dealing with countries like Iran and North Korea, where we do not have diplomatic relations. I have spent more time with Kim Kye-Gwan, the Vice Foreign Minister who heads the North Korean delegation to the six-party talks, than most people in the U.S. government. The danger with a country like North Korea is less outright aggression than misperception and miscalculation. We do not understand each other. So if I can go there and give them a chance to ask questions about how the U.S. system works and ask them questions and report to colleagues and government officials when I return, then I can play a small but useful role.

*précis:* What do you think are Iran's intentions for its nuclear program?

**JW:** I assume that Iran is a normal country. And if it is a normal country, then there are people in Iran who want to build nuclear weapons and other elements of the government who do not. This is about the internal organizational struggle and about which policy position prevails. Iranians should not kid themselves in thinking

# MIT-JAPAN CO-HOSTS GLOBALIZATION SYMPOSIUM

*President Hockfield Toasts Event and MIT Study*



*MIT President Susan Hockfield and CIS Director Richard Samuels toast the globalization symposium.*

On January 18, 2006, the MIT-Japan Program (MISTI Japan) and the Keizai Koho Center, a nonprofit organization that brings international scholars to Japan, hosted a symposium in Tokyo to discuss a five-year study on globalization and competitiveness undertaken by MIT's Industrial Performance Center (IPC). Among the speakers was the study's leader, Suzanne Berger, Director of MISTI (The MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives) and Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science. MIT President Susan Hockfield attended the event and toasted the discussion participants and the IPC study.

Following an introduction by Yoshio Nakamura, Director of the Keizai Koho Center, and opening remarks by Richard Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies, Professor Berger outlined the conclusions of the IPC study, which relied on more than 500 interviews at companies around the world to determine which corporate practices work for a range of companies and countries in the global economy.

"The first and strongest conclusion that we've drawn from our research is that, for every product that we look at—whether it's personal computers or clothing—we see equally successful models that are extremely different," Professor Berger said. The IPC study, she added, uncovered a diversity of viable corporate responses to the pressures of globalization—in other words, there is no single recipe for success. (Details of the study and its conclusions are found in Professor Berger's most recent book, *How We Compete: What Companies Around the World Are Doing to Make it in Today's Global Economy*, Doubleday 2005.)

## **Other Perspectives**

Also on the Tokyo panel was Dr. Teruaki Aoki, advisor to the Sony Corporation. He out-

lined Sony's operations in China in the context of its global production strategy. Professor Robert Madsen, a senior fellow at CIS, spoke about changes in the global finance system. Haruo Kawahara, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Kenwood Corporation, discussed his experiences reforming companies in mature product markets under global pressures. And Professor Hugh Whittaker of Doshisha University presented the results of his study on Hitachi's recent reform efforts, focusing on the electronic giant's technology management strategy. The panelists then fielded questions from an audience of nearly 200 Japanese corporate executives, journalists, and researchers.

While all of the panelists used the IPC study's economic definition of globalization—the process of moving toward a single world market for the factors of production—they also addressed globalization's political underpinnings. In discussing the outsourcing of components of production systems, they agreed that production has fragmented over the last twenty years, both organizationally and geographically. They also agreed that the causes of this change are liberalization in advanced industrial economies, the opening of socialist countries to the global economy, increased volatility in global financial markets, and the development of digital communication technologies that allow the rapid transmission of production techniques.

The speakers were less unified, however, on what these changes portend for firms. Although they agreed that companies should avoid building a future competitor by transferring too much of their technological know-how to suppliers or surrender functions that might produce future businesses, they disagreed over whether industries dependent on labor-intensive operations are likely to disappear in high-wage countries.

Consensus returned when the discussion turned to what national governments should do

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# JERUSALEM 2050 GEARING UP FOR DESIGN COMPETITION

Jerusalem 2050, an interdisciplinary effort to re-imagine Jerusalem as a peaceful city shared by all its residents, is set to launch its 'Visions Competition' in August 2006. The program, which is jointly sponsored by CIS and MIT's Department of Urban Studies & Planning (DUSP), is directed by DUSP Professor of Political Sociology Diane Davis and Leila Farsakh, Assistant Professor in Political Science at UMass/Boston.

Jerusalem 2050 will solicit plans from multidisciplinary teams for its competition. These teams will be encouraged to draw their participants from diverse academic, professional, ethnic, national and religious backgrounds. Their designs will deal with physical spaces and infrastructure, but must also demonstrate social value. Those who participate will be asked to describe what it would take to create a peaceful, humanist city and how their entries address that objective.

The aim of the Visions Competition is to challenge conventional thinking, and in so doing, to produce constructive ideas about Jerusalem as a physical place as well as workable notions about cooperating in it.

According to Jennifer Klein, Jerusalem 2050's Project Coordinator, "the project turns problem solving for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on its head. Instead of trying to solve the problem of nation-states at the beginning, we ask how we can make the city just and livable for all its residents. We believe that this will eventually help to answer the questions of nationality and sovereignty."

In January 2006, Professor Davis and Ms. Klein traveled to Israel and Palestine to meet with potential participants and sponsors. In May 2006, MIT will host a workshop for the competition's judges, to finalize criteria for judging entries. Then a booklet to guide those submitting designs will be issued. The competition is scheduled to launch near the start of the Fall 2006 semester.

A year ago, Jerusalem 2050 organized a conference that brought together more than thirty researchers from American, European, Israeli, and Palestinian universities. The 2005 conference laid the groundwork for the forthcoming competition. It also led to an effort to develop tools to allow Palestinian participants a chance to compete on equal technical footing; urban planning and related programs in Palestine are nowhere near as developed as they are in Israel and elsewhere. Jerusalem

2050 hopes to help develop capacity-building programs for Palestinian faculty and graduate students. The project also intends to serve as a hub for mapping software as well as other data and materials on the topic.

Detailed information on Jerusalem 2050 and its competition is available on the CIS website, at <http://web.mit.edu/cis/jerusalem2050/>. For information on donating to the project, see <http://web.mit.edu/cis/jerusalem2050/donations.html>. ■



*Jerusalem 2050 Project Director Diane Davis in Bethlehem.*

# MIGRATION CONFERENCE BRINGS NGOs AND ECONOMISTS TOGETHER

On December 9-10, 2005, the Inter-University Committee on International Migration held a three-day conference, “Workshop on the Economics of Forced Migration,” at MIT’s Faculty Club. The inter-disciplinary gathering drew an international group of participants from dozens of universities, think tanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governmental organizations, including the World Bank and the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.



Photo: Helen Young

Darfur refugee camp in Kufra, Libya.

Sessions dealt with the distinction between forced and economic migration, the question of who migrates, host-country policies, refugee employment and remittances, and migrants’ economic integration in host countries.

According to the conference’s organizer, Dr. Anna Hardman, a Lecturer in Economics at Tufts University and a 2005-2006 Visiting Scholar at CIS, the conference bridged a gap between NGOs and economists. The study of forced migration has largely been the province of policy analysts in the NGO community and of political scientists, who tend to employ case studies, she said; economists have only recently

begun to apply formal modeling methodology to forced migration. The December conference was a rare opportunity for these lines of inquiry to come together and one of the first occasions where scholars discussed the application of quantitative methods to this set of issues, she added.

“It has long seemed as if the NGO community spoke one language and the academic community, especially economists, spoke another. We were trying to address that, and I think the event helped get people on the same page,” said Dr. Hardman, a member of the Inter-University Committee’s Steering Group.

The Inter-University Committee is the focal point for migration and refugee studies at several Boston-area colleges and universities, and is hosted by MIT and CIS. Longtime Program Chair Sharon Stanton Russell turned over the reins at the end of 2005 to Dr. Gary Troeller, a CIS Research Associate, and Boston University Professor of Economics Robert E.B. Lucas.

The Inter-University Committee sponsors the Myron Weiner Seminar Series on International Migration and organizes workshops and seminars. See <http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/migration/> or email [cis-migration@mit.edu](mailto:cis-migration@mit.edu) for details. ■

## Security Studies Program Launches Revamped Website



The Security Studies Program launched a sleek new website at the start of the 2006 spring semester. It provides easier access to information on SSP’s courses, events, and publications. The URL is the same as before: <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/index.html>.

Magdalena Rieb, Assistant Director of SSP, said that with the new site, visitors will be better able to keep track of the myriad activities and accomplishments of SSP’s nine full-time faculty members, four military fellows, thirteen outside fellows, ten research affiliates, and more than thirty graduate students.

The new site features updated biographies, news items and spotlights on its homepage. Descriptions of the nineteen courses taught by SSP faculty are now a click away, as are links to MIT’s OpenCourseWare system. The site also archives sixteen years of SSP’s annual reports, as well as its working papers, research journal, newsletter and conference reports.

# MISTI TESTS PROJECTS IN AFRICA AND SPAIN

The MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives Program (MISTI)—MIT's cornerstone international education program—has been busy on a host of fronts. It has been working closely with OpenCourseWare and with iLabs, a program that shares MIT laboratories with universities around the world, using the Internet. MISTI has also been testing the waters in Africa and in Spain. With funding from the Carnegie Foundation, the program is participating in a collaborative effort to launch iLabs in Africa. Two MIT students traveled to Nigeria during IAP 2006, and several more will go to Nigeria and Tanzania this summer. And, in a pilot effort, MISTI students will work as interns this summer at companies in Madrid and Barcelona.

## *Other developments:*

- **China:** MISTI China has been out front in helping MIT to bring iLabs, OpenCourseWare and other educational technologies to Chinese universities. A series of MIT teams have traveled to China for this purpose, and one will seek new Chinese partners while helping to organize the First Asian MIT-iCampus Conference at Tsinghua University in Beijing in June 2006.
- **France:** This spring, MISTI France and Alcatel, the French communications company, held a workshop in Paris on location-based services. Media Lab and Sloan School students presented their work and participated in a brainstorming session about Alcatel products. Also, the MIT-France seed fund project received 74 applications in the fall of 2005, double the previous year's total. Grants, which range from \$5,000 to \$15,000, encourage MIT collaboration with French researchers and support projects that will draw additional funding.



*MISTI-China's OpenCourseWare team being interviewed by a Chinese television crew in Xining, Qinghai Province.*

- **Germany:** 'High Tech in Munich,' a summer German language and culture program for engineering students, will bring MIT students to the Technical University of Munich this June. During IAP 2006, MIT Germany organized a workshop in Berlin, "Technology for the Silver Generation," with the MIT Age Lab. The focus was on designing cars for the growing number of elderly drivers. Executives from DaimlerChrysler and Siemens participated.
- **India:** OpenCourseWare and iLabs projects will soon be introduced in India. MIT-India has also launched the MIT-India/Raj Foundation lecture series, here at MIT as well as in India. Speakers come from various academic disciplines, industry, the arts, and politics.
- **Italy:** The Progetto Roberto Rocca—a collaboration between MIT, the Fondazione Fratelli Agostino ed Enrico Rocca, and the Milan Politecnico—has begun to bring graduate students and postdoctoral fellows from the Politecnico to MIT and to send MIT undergraduate and graduate students to Milan. The project also provides seed funds for collaborative MIT/Politecnico projects.
- **Japan:** The MIT Japan Program has instituted a weekend trip to Kyoto for its interns. Students kick off the weekend with a bath at the Kyoto station, visit temples and a Shinto priest, and take walks through the Gion District. The Japan Program also continues to support talks at MIT on pertinent topics, a weekly lunch language table, and IAP cultural programs on a variety of topics.
- **Mexico:** MISTI Mexico is working with NGOs to create internship positions for students interested in working in public policy and healthcare. The program has also begun creating opportunities for recent MIT graduates to teach math and science in Mexico. ■

## MEXICO

*Continued from page 2*

age.<sup>3</sup> When combined with the panel survey, it should allow researchers to weigh in convincingly on debates about media effects and campaign influence.<sup>4</sup>

Combined with past research, this project will help to shed light on other key issues in Mexico's democratic consolidation. For instance, scholars have amply documented the fact that Mexican voters are typically more susceptible to short-term campaign influences than are most citizens in established democracies.<sup>5</sup> In particular, the combination of weak partisan attachments and pervasive media penetration leaves a larger number of citizens available for persuasion during a given campaign. We expect the 2006 election to offer further evidence for these claims, underscoring the potential magnitude of campaign effects in new democracies.

The information we collect in 2006 will also allow us to gauge the degree to which intermediary organizations have adjusted to Mexico's new political context. Over the last two decades, partisan dealignment from the long-ruling Revolutionary Institutional Party has exceeded reattachment to its main rivals, the center-right National Action Party and the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution. Mexico's three main parties are still struggling to broaden their constituencies and to construct meaningful links with voters.<sup>6</sup> Other organizations that might provide citizens with credible cues about politics are also new or, in the case of most unions, seriously weakened,<sup>7</sup> and mass media remain dominated by two family-owned television networks often suspected of collusive relationships with politicians.<sup>8</sup> Our study of the 2006 campaign should shed light on the elite-mass linkages that presumably help to orient average voters.

Ultimately, our project aims to assess how faithfully Mexico's new political system can be expected to respond to the desires and beliefs of ordinary citizens. Is the mass public equipped to communicate their policy preferences to prospective leaders and to make intel-

ligent choices between those leaders? Do these leaders in turn respond to what voters seek, at least in terms of their campaign discourse and strategy? Or do candidates, votes, and mass media talk past each other, impeding the sort of representation and accountability commonly associated with democratic governance? The answers to these questions should not only shed light on how Mexican democracy works, but also on broader issues of democratic consolidation in countries that have recently emerged from autocratic rule.

*The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SES 0517971), Reforma newspaper, MIT, and the intellectual support of their colleagues on the Mexico 2006 Panel Study. For more information on the project see: <http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/mexico06/index.htm>.*

1. Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).
2. John R. Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 825-50 (August 1996); Thomas E. Nelson, "Policy Goals, Public Rhetoric, and Political Attitudes," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May 2004), pp. 581-605.
3. Maxwell McCombs, Donald L. Shaw, and David Weaver, *Communication and Democracy: Exploring the Intellectual Frontiers in Agenda-Setting Theory* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997).
4. Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson, eds., *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Candidates, Voters and the Presidential Campaign of 2000* (Stanford and La Jolla, CA: Stanford University Press and the Center for U.S. Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 2003).
5. James A. McCann and Chappell Lawson, "An Electorate Adrift? Public Opinion and the Quality of Democracy in Mexico," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Fall 2003), pp. 60-68.
6. José Antonio Crespo, *The Party System and Democratic Governance in Mexico* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004).
7. Roderic Ai Camp, *Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Transformation*, 4th Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
8. Sallie Hughes and Chappell Lawson, "Propaganda and Crony Capitalism: Partisan Bias in Mexican Television News," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 81-105. ■

Following is a selected review of Spring 2006 events at the Center. To learn about upcoming CIS events, click on “Calendar” at <http://web.mit.edu/cis/>.

## Prince Turki on Saudi Reform



Saudi Ambassador Prince Turki Al-Faisal greeting a student at his February 16 talk.

Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, packed Bartos Auditorium for a **CIS Starr Forum** on February 16. The head of Saudi intelligence from 1977-2001, Prince Turki was introduced by MIT Institute Professor and former U.S. Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch. Prince Turki described Saudi efforts to enhance opportunities for higher education, for both men and women, and highlighted Saudi Arabia’s recent municipal elections—although he said that reform will be gradual. Regarding the 9/11 Saudi hijackers he said, “We intend to take back our religion, which has been maimed by these malevolent cults.”

## Kaplan on Bush Policy

Fred Kaplan, an alumnus of the Security Studies Program, visited SSP on March 1 as part of the **SSP Wednesday Seminar Series**. Kaplan, who writes the “War Stories” column for *Slate*, attacked the Bush Administration’s foreign policy and its assumptions in going to war in Iraq. Kaplan argued that democracy is not easy to create and that new democracies are often warlike. Other Wednesday Seminar speakers this semester included Dartmouth Professor Benjamin Valentino, University of Texas Professor Alan Kuperman, and Professor Sharon Weiner, a fellow at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

## McKiernan on the Kurds

Kevin McKiernan, a journalist who spent 15 years in Kurdistan, visited CIS on March 6 to talk about his book, *The Kurds: A People in Search of Their Homeland*. The event was taped and broadcast by C-SPAN’s “**Book Talk**.” McKiernan argued that Americans are culpable for much of the hardship the Kurds have experienced in recent decades.

## CIS in Washington: Turkey and the E.U.

CIS Executive Director John Tirman organized and moderated a March 13 panel on Turkey’s turbulent road to the E.U., in collaboration with the **Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars**. The event, at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., included remarks from scholars Zehra Arat, Lenore Martin, John Sitalides, and Mario Zucconi.

## Fulbright Scholar on Kazakhstan

On March 16, Didar Kassymova, a Fulbright Scholar from Kazakhstan who is in residence this year at the University of Washington, spoke about the ways in which Kazakhstan navigates its national security, with both China and Russia as neighbors. The talk was arranged by SSP Principal Research Scientist Cindy Williams and SSP, on behalf of **Women in International Security**.

## SSP Hosts Service Heads

The heads of two military services recently spoke at SSP: General Peter Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, and General T. Michael Moseley, Air Force Chief of Staff. General Schoomaker visited on April 7 for a luncheon with graduate students and faculty. On April 13, General Moseley delivered SSP’s annual Doolittle Award lecture. SSP also recently hosted Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command. ■

## People

**Robert J. Art**, Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and Director of CIS's Seminar XXI executive education program, has won the distinguished scholar award from the International Studies Association for his exceptional contributions in scholarship through research and mentorship. The award, which was made at the ISA's convention in March, cites Professor Art's lifetime achievement in international security studies.

Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science **Suzanne Berger** appeared on NPR's *Marketplace* on January 23, 2006, to discuss her new book *How We Compete: What Countries Around the World are Doing it to Make It In Today's Global Economy*. On March 13, she appeared on WGBH-TV's *Greater Boston*.

In November, 2005, graduate student **Vanda Felbab-Brown** gave a guest lecture on Colombia's insurgency at Wellesley College. Vanda spoke about the fallacies of "narcoterrorism" to Seminar XXI in January and at the Harvard's Belfer Center in February. On March 20, 2006, she appeared on local cable TV to discuss Afghanistan.

Graduate student **Benjamin Friedman** spoke about overreacting to terrorism at Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs in November, 2005, and as part of a February, 2006, Tufts University conference called, "The Politics of Fear," organized by the Institute for Global Leadership. SSP Research Affiliate **Sandy Weiner** spoke about avian flu on the same panel.

Associate Professor of Anthropology **Hugh Gusterson** recently gave talks at Pomona College, Notre Dame, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy.

**Fatemeh Haghighatjoo**, a Visiting Fellow and former reform member of Iran's parliament, was interviewed for "Nuclear Nerves: Iran on Edge," a radio documentary aired in March by the Mainstream Media Project. In addition, she will speak at the World Economic Forum on the Middle East, in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, on May 20-22, 2006.

In February, 2006, Associate Professor of Political Science **Chappell Lawson** spoke at the University of Texas and Harvard's Weatherhead Center, presenting preliminary results of his National Science Foundation-funded research on the upcoming Mexican Presidential election.

Fifteen graduate students will receive summer research support from the **MIT-Japan International Studies Fund** (formerly known as ETIA): **Matthew Amengual, Catherine Ashcraft, Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch, Michael Glosny, Llewelyn Hughes, Rajendra Kumar, Xin Li, Nora Libertun de Duren, Akshay Mangla, Reo Matsuzaki, Apiwat Ratanawaraha, Robert Reardon, Neil Ruiz, Peter Shulman, and Jessica Wattman.**



Roger Petersen

Associate Professor of Political Science **Roger Petersen** received a grant from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation to study the strategic use of emotion in violent conflict.

Ford Professor of Political Science **Barry Posen**, CIS Executive Director **John Tirman**, and Security Studies Program Associate **Robert Vickers** all recently gave talks as part of a series organized by MIT undergraduates on Iran's nuclear program.

CIS Director **Richard Samuels**, after a year on sabbatical in Japan and Italy, will return as the Center's director in the fall.

CIS Executive Director **John Tirman** recently gave a number of talks on the Iranian nuclear program, and on proliferation issues.

Security Studies Research Associate **Jim Walsh** has had a busy media schedule, discussing Iran's nuclear program on NPR's *Morning Edition*, and on CNN, BBC Radio and KPCC (Los Angeles public radio). He has also done media interviews on the India-United States nuclear deal and the failed Dubai ports deal.

In November, 2005, SSP Principal Research Scientist **Cindy Williams** led a discussion on U.S. military compensation at the Heritage Foundation, spoke on the national security budget at Georgetown University as part of a "Security Boot Camp" for women running for Congress, and talked about benefits for military reserves at a Department of Defense conference. In January, 2006, Cindy spoke at a Peace and Security Legislative Strategy Meeting in Virginia. In February, 2006, she gave two talks at the Japan Defense Agency in Tokyo.

## Published

### **Owen R. Cote, Jr., Associate Director of the Security Studies Program**

*The Future of Naval Aviation*, MIT Security Studies Program (January 2006).

### **Vanda Felbab-Brown, PhD Candidate in Political Science**

"The Coca Connection: Conflict and Drugs in Colombia and Peru," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. XXV, No. 2 (Winter 2005), forthcoming.

"Trouble Ahead: The Cocaleros of Peru," *Current History*, Vol. 105, No. 688 (February 2006), pp. 79-83.

"Afghanistan and Opium," *Boston Globe*, December 18, 2005.

### **Benjamin Friedman, PhD Candidate in Political Science**

"Risk to U.S. of Withering Terrorist Hit is Overblown," *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 19, 2006.

### **Benjamin Friedman and Caitlin Talmadge, PhD Candidates in Political Science**

"Pentagon Should Put Money Where Its Mouth Is," *Baltimore Sun*, February 10, 2006.

### **Taylor Fravel, Assistant Professor of Political Science**

"The Evolution of China's Military Strategy," in David Finkelstein and James C. Mulvenon, eds., *China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs*, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 2005).

### **Hugh Gusterson, Associate Professor of Anthropology**

"Decoding the Debate on Frankenfood," in Banu Subramaniam, Elizabeth Hartmann, and Charles Zerner, eds., *Making Threats: Biofears and Environmental Anxieties*, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).

"The Auditors," *Boston Review*, (November/December 2005).

### **Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science**

"Exit Strategy: How to Disengage from Iraq in 18 Months," *Boston Review* (January/February 2006).

"We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran," *The New York Times*, February 26, 2006.

### **Richard Samuels, CIS Director and Ford International Professor of Political Science**

Editor, *Encyclopedia of United States National Security* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005).

**Paul Staniland, PhD Candidate in Political Science**

“Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense Is a Good Fence,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 21-40.

**Paul Staniland, PhD Candidate in Political Science and Roger Petersen, Associate Professor of Political Science**

“Diversify Iraqi Security Forces,” *Christian Science Monitor*, March 10, 2006.

**Cindy Williams, Security Studies Program Principal Research Scientist**

“Beyond Preemption and Preventive War: Increasing U.S. Policy Emphasis on Conflict Prevention,” Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief (February 2006).



Cindy Williams

“Weighing the Costs of Today’s Defense Strategy,” *Boston Globe*, March 21, 2006.

CIS **Audits of the Conventional Wisdom** are now available on AlterNet ([www.alternet.org](http://www.alternet.org)), a nonprofit dedicated to supporting independent and alternative journalism, as well as on the Center’s website (<http://web.mit.edu/cis/acw.html>). Recent Audits include:

“The Hidden Cost of Homeland Defense” (**Benjamin Friedman**, November 2005); “Why Intelligence Isn’t to Blame for 9/11” (**Joshua Rovner**, November 2005); “Is Iran’s Reform Movement Dead?” (**Fatemeh Haghightajoo**, January 2006); “A Better Strategy Against Narcoterrorism” (**Vanda Felbab-Brown**, January 2006); “Japan-China Relations: Four Fallacies Masquerading as Common Sense” (**Kazuo Ogoura**, March 2006); and “Remittances: Latin America’s Faulty Lifeline” (**Catherine Elton**, March 2006).

## GLOBALIZATION

*Continued from page 11*

to maximize the benefits of globalization for their citizens. Dr. Madsen and Professor Berger encouraged governments to sustain support for economic openness by compensating losers with increased access to healthcare, pensions, and education. Noting that technological innovation is one way to keep industries home, Professor Berger stressed the need for governments to support basic research with universities and public laboratories.

### **Globalization Past and Present**

Participants at the Japan symposium also compared the current period of globalization

with an earlier time of openness, that from 1870 to 1914. Noting that the earlier globalization ended abruptly, Professor Berger argued that globalization is not irreversible. Rather, she said, it amounts to a set of policies that require constant attention from national governments. Challenges like terrorism or viral outbreaks will test the political will supporting globalization, she said.

Overall, the panelists agreed that international markets are more volatile today than in the past, with the volume and rapidity of capital flows representing unprecedented challenges to the global economy. Several of them argued that without policies that cushion these shocks, support for globalization could continue to diminish. ■



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