



CIS FOR 2009

A Conversation with Admiral William Fallon

précis: After stepping down from your command of CENTCOM, what made you decide to join the Center for International Studies?



Admiral William J. Fallon, the former commander of U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command, joined the MIT Center for International Studies as its 2008-09 Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow.

WF: Dick Samuels and Barry Posen, whom I met in the past when I spoke up here, contacted me right away and put that oar in the water. CIS has a great reputation, not only for deep thinking, but also for turning those thoughts into action. And that's appealing. I had a technical background to begin with, and I know that there's a good meld of technology with policy here. What I think it will offer is lots of opportunity to engage with people who are thinking seriously about the challenges we face in the world today. The academic arena provides many ideas and good thoughts, but I've spent the last 40 years actually out doing things and I think I have a fair idea of what has worked, certainly, in the past, and what doesn't work too well. And I might be able to offer some of that experience to the ideas around here, and come up with a better product. I really have a very great opportunity here, and I'm happy to be here for the academic year. It certainly hasn't been slow in terms of pace.

précis: How would you characterize your role at CIS?

WF: Well, I'm here for students to have access to me, as well as the faculty. Every Wednesday, I usually have office hours. I've done a seminar; I'll probably look to do a couple more. I know a lot of people in many places in the world outside the academic arena, and I'm helping to line up some speakers. I'm thinking about doing a conference. I'm really interested in getting results, so just having a chat is interest-

continued on page 12

précis Interview: Admiral William J. Fallon	1
Rising Power, Territory, and War M. Taylor Fravel	2
Justice for the West: The Path to Reconciliation in Bosnia Does Not Go Through The Hague Andrew Radin	6
Experts Offer Advice to the Next U.S. President	10
Events	18
End Notes	20
IAP 2009	24

Rising Power, Territory, and War

by M. Taylor Fravel

STRONG BORDERS SECURE NATION

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN
CHINA'S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES



M. TAYLOR FRAVEL

Taylor Fravel is the Cecil and Ida Green Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at MIT. The essay's introduction is an excerpt from his recent book Strong Borders, Secure Nation, and was reprinted with permission from Princeton University Press.

China is the new great power of the twenty-first century. Whether its rise will be peaceful or violent is a fundamental question for the study and practice of international relations. Unlike many past power transitions, China's current economic growth has occurred largely through its acceptance of the prevailing rules, norms, and institutions of the international system. Nevertheless, ambiguity and anxiety persist around how China will employ the military power that its growing wealth creates.

Amid this historical change, one concern is China's potential for violent conflict with other states over territory. The congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, for example, stated in its 2006 annual report that China might "take advantage of a more advanced military to threaten use of force, or actually use force, to facilitate desirable resolutions . . . of territorial claims." Such concerns have merit. Historically, rapid internal economic growth has propelled states to redefine and expand the interests that they pursue abroad. Economic development funds the acquisition of more robust military capabilities to pursue and defend these interests. Often such expansion results in the escalation of territorial disputes with other states. More generally, the disruption in the balance of power generates uncertainty among the leading states in the system about the security of vital interests and the structure of international order.

In its territorial disputes, however, China has been less prone to violence and more cooperative than a singular view of an expansionist state suggests. Since 1949, China has participated in twenty-three unique territorial disputes with its neighbors on land and at sea. Yet it has pursued compromise and offered concessions in seventeen of these conflicts. China's compromises have often been substantial, as it has usually offered to accept less than half of the contested territory in any final settlement. In addition, these compromises have resulted in boundary agreements in which China has abandoned potential irredentist claims to more than 3.4 million square kilometers of land that had been part of the Qing empire at its height in the early nineteenth century. In total, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has contested roughly 238,000 square kilometers or just 7 percent of the territory once part of the Qing.

Although China has pursued compromise frequently, it has nevertheless used force in six of its territorial disputes. Some of these conflicts, especially with India and Vietnam, were notably violent. Others, such as the crises over Taiwan in the 1950s and the clash with the Soviet Union in 1969, were tense moments in the Cold War involving threats to use nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, despite a willingness to use force in certain disputes, China has seized little land that it did not control before the outbreak of hostilities.

Overview of the Book

After outlining my theories of cooperation and escalation, chapter 1 continues with an overview of China's territorial disputes. China's territorial conflicts are intertwined with the varied challenges of maintaining the territorial integrity of a large and multi-ethnic state. Ethnic geography, or the location and distribution of ethnic groups, largely defines the different goals that China's leaders have pursued in their country's territorial disputes. The PRC's ethnic geography consists of a densely populated Han Chinese core, a large but sparsely populated non-Han periphery, and unpopulated offshore islands. In frontier disputes on their country's land border, China's leaders seek to maintain control over vast borderlands populated by ethnic minorities that were never ruled directly by any past Chinese empire. In homeland disputes, China's leaders seek to unify what they view as Han Chinese areas not under their control when the PRC was established in

précis is published twice each academic year in order to familiarize readers with the work of the Center for International studies at MIT. For further information about CIS or précis, please contact:

Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
292 Main Street, E38-200
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307

T: 617-253-8093
cis-info@mit.edu

Richard J. Samuels, Director
Stephen Van Evera, Associate Director
John Tirman, Executive Director
Michelle Nhuch, Senior Editor
Peter Krause, précis Editor
Laurie Scheffler, précis Coordinator

1949, namely Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. In offshore island disputes, China's leaders aim to secure a permanent maritime presence among unpopulated rocks and islands far from the mainland.

External threats are one mechanism in my theory of cooperation in territorial disputes, but internal threats best explain China's willingness to compromise in its many territorial disputes. China has offered concessions in each and every frontier dispute along its land border but not in any homeland disputes, and in only one offshore island dispute. Ethnic minorities who have maintained strong social and economic ties with neighboring states and harbored aspirations for self-determination live in many of the frontiers near China's borders. When faced with internal threats, especially ethnic unrest in the frontiers, China's leaders have been much more willing to offer concessions in exchange for assistance that strengthens the state's control over these regions, such as denying external support to rebels or affirming Chinese sovereignty over the areas of unrest.

Chapter 2 examines China's efforts to compromise in many frontier disputes in the early 1960s. In 1959, a revolt in Tibet sparked the largest internal threat ever to the PRC's territorial integrity. The outbreak of this revolt dramatically increased the cost of maintaining disputes with Burma, Nepal, and India. China offered concessions in its conflicts with these states in exchange for their cooperation in eliminating external support for the rebels and affirming Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. In the spring of 1962, China faced renewed ethnic unrest in the frontiers, especially Xinjiang, during the economic crisis following the failure of the Great Leap Forward. This combination of internal threats to both territorial integrity and political stability increased the cost of contesting land with its neighbors. China pursued compromise in disputes with North Korea, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union in order to rebuild its economy and consolidate state control by easing external tensions.

“When faced with internal threats, especially ethnic unrest in the frontiers, China’s leaders have been much more willing to offer concessions in exchange for assistance that strengthens the state’s control over these regions, such as denying external support to rebels or affirming Chinese sovereignty over the areas of unrest.”

How similar internal threats explain China's efforts to compromise in frontier disputes in the 1990s is demonstrated in chapter 3. In 1989, the upheaval in Tiananmen Square posed an internal threat to the stability of China's socialist system of government. This legitimacy crisis, which the weakening of other communist parties worldwide exacerbated, increased the cost of maintaining territorial disputes with the Soviet Union, Laos, and Vietnam. China traded concessions in exchange for cooperation to counter its diplomatic isolation and ensure the continuation of economic reforms. Soon after Tiananmen, ethnic unrest in Xinjiang posed a new internal threat to the state's territorial integrity. The armed uprisings and demonstrations increased the price for pressing claims against neighboring Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. China compromised in these disputes in exchange for assistance to limit external support for Uighur separatists.

Although windows of opportunity opened by a rival's temporary weakness offer one mechanism in my theory of escalation in territorial disputes, China's own declining bargaining power best explains its willingness to use force in its territorial disputes. Since 1949, China's leaders have demonstrated a keen sensitivity to negative shifts in the state's ability to control disputed land. In most instances, China's behavior reflects such concerns with its own weakness, as China has used force either in disputes with its militarily most powerful neighbors or in conflicts where it has occupied little or none of the land that it has claimed.

Chapter 4 investigates the use of force in its frontier disputes, where China sought to counter challenges from two militarily powerful neighbors, India and the Soviet Union. Domestic instability sharpened perceptions of decline in these cases, as China's leaders concluded that their adversaries sought to profit from the country's internal difficulties. In October 1962, Chinese forces attacked Indian positions all along the contested border after China failed to persuade India to negotiate. China escalated this conflict to halt India's increased military deployments along the contested frontier and its occupation of land in the disputed western sector, decline in China's position in the dispute

continued on next page

that the economic crisis after the failure of the Great Leap Forward intensified. For similar reasons, in March 1969 elite Chinese troops ambushed a Soviet patrol near the disputed Zhenbao Island in the Ussuri River. Soviet troop deployments along the border, the Brezhnev doctrine to intervene in the affairs of socialist states, and an aggressive pattern of Soviet patrolling weakened China's position in the dispute, decline that the political instability of the Cultural Revolution heightened.

China's management of homeland disputes, its most important territorial conflicts, is explored in chapter 5. Although China settled disputes over Hong Kong and Macao in the 1980s, it never compromised over the sovereignty of these areas, which were transferred by Britain and Portugal to China in 1997 and 1999, respectively. China has never offered to compromise over the sovereignty of Taiwan, but it has used force to demonstrate its resolve to unify the island with the mainland. In 1954 and 1958, China initiated crises over Nationalist-held coastal islands to deter the United States from further increasing its military and diplomatic support for Taiwan, support that threatened to weaken China's already poor position in this dispute. In 1995 and 1996, China launched a series of provocative military exercises and missile tests when democratization on the island increased popular support for formal independence and Beijing viewed Washington as supporting this goal.

“Fears that China will pursue broad territorial changes or fight frequently over its territorial claims are overstated.”

Chapter 6 examines China's offshore island disputes. Although China compromised in one such dispute in 1957, it has never offered territorial concessions in its other island conflicts, owing to their potential economic and strategic value. Moreover, it used force to occupy islands in the Paracels and features such as coral reefs in the Spratlys when its relative position in offshore island disputes began to decline. In the early 1970s, the first wave of offshore petroleum exploration and other claimants' occupation of features in the South China Sea highlighted China's vulnerability in offshore island disputes as control of these islands grew in importance. China used force to strengthen its position in the one area where it could project limited naval power, occupying the Crescent Group in the Paracels. In the late 1980s, China seized features in the Spratlys after Malaysia began to occupy vacant reefs and Vietnam enlarged its presence in the area, further weakening China's position in a dispute where China was the only claimant that did not occupy any disputed land.

In the conclusion, I assess the implications for China's territorial future. Fears that China will pursue broad territorial changes or fight frequently over its territorial claims are overstated. China's rise may still be violent, but territory is not likely to be the leading source of conflict. Overall, then, this book offers relatively good news. If states fight over territory more than any other issue, then China's resolution of seventeen disputes has eliminated many future opportunities for conflict. In addition, in the agreements settling these disputes, China has signaled its acceptance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors and dropped potential irredentist claims to territory that had been part of the Qing empire in the early nineteenth century. As these documents are public, China has “tied its hands” to prevent violations of these settlements in the future.

Nevertheless, China has demonstrated a willingness to fight over territory, both to secure its current boundaries and to regain homeland areas. When vital interests are at stake, China will use force. As it continues to enhance its military capabilities, China will be able to fight more effectively than ever before. In this context, the potential for conflict over Taiwan should not be understated. Yet so long as China's leaders believe that the prospects for unification are not declining over the long term, the odds of violence are low. In its other territorial disputes, China has been much more willing to use force when its bargaining power has declined, not strengthened. ■

MIT Announces New “Global Council”



*Richard Samuels named co-chair of
MIT Global Council*

President Hockfield and Provost L. Rafael Rief have asked Richard J. Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of CIS, and Dick K. P. Yue, Philip J. Solondz Professor of Engineering, to co-chair an “MIT Global Council” charged with planning and, subsequently, implementing initiatives to more fully incorporate international perspectives and engagement in MIT’s education and research.

The Council will serve as part of a larger infrastructure designed to increase the opportunities for MIT students to engage effectively in the global economy and marketplace of ideas, and for MIT faculty to expand their international impact. The work of this Council will build upon and coordinate closely with the many international activities already underway, including The International Advisory Committee, co-chaired by Associate Provost Philip Khoury and Vice President for Research and Associate Provost Claude Canizares, The Global Education Office, established by Dean for Undergraduate Education Daniel Hastings, MISTI and other programs for sending students abroad, and The Global MIT website, now managed by Associate Provost Philip Khoury’s office.

The Global Council will examine and assess existing efforts in international education, and develop a long-range plan for the creation of a robust and ambitious, globally-active undergraduate educational program, and for a global educational and research program that will be distinctive and game-changing. The Council will produce a report that lays out an action plan to achieve these ambitious goals within a year. ■

New Audits of the Conventional Wisdom

Among the topics addressed in the Center’s *Audit of the Conventional Wisdom* publication in the summer and fall were the global financial crisis, the impact of the “surge” on Iraqi security, the future of Turkish politics, the U.S. and Iran’s struggles in Afghanistan and the path to a new relationship, Russian leadership “after” Putin, and the American empire and the developing world. All of the essays are available at: http://web.mit.edu/CIS/acw_h.html. To subscribe, send your email address to acw@mit.edu.

Recently published:

“U.S. and Colombia: A Growing Military Intervention?” (Jenny Manrique Cortés); “State-Building and U.S. Foreign Policy” (Jeremy Allouche); “Recovering the Liberal Foreign Policy Tradition” (Nick Bromell and John Tirman); “The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry” (Barnett Rubin with Sara Batmanglich); “The Global Finance Crisis and Obstacles to U.S. Leadership” (David Singer); “Does the ‘Surge’ Explain Iraq’s Improved Security?” (Jon Lindsay); “Iran-U.S.: The Case for Transformation” (Sanam Anderlini and John Tirman); “Turkey’s Crisis and Future” (Dogu Ergil); “Who Leads Russia?” (Elizabeth Wood); “Insights into Two American Empires” (Alice Amsden).

Justice for the West: The Path to Reconciliation in Bosnia Does Not Go Through The Hague

by Andrew Radin

Radovan Karadžić, the notorious wartime leader of the Bosnian Serbs, was arrested in Belgrade on July 18, 2008, after disguising himself as an alternative medicine practitioner. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) issued their first indictment of Karadžić in July 1995, before the war in Bosnia had even ended. Though many in Bosnia and elsewhere applauded his arrest, the long freedom of the indicted Serb leaders, and the continued political strife in Bosnia bring to the fore questions about the logic and effectiveness of the ICTY. Ostensibly, reconciliation in Bosnia is a key goal for the tribunal, but the longer the exercise continues the weaker the hope for its success. The delay of justice for Karadžić is but one example of a larger problem—the ICTY means well, but it is hard to see how its work benefits the people it is meant to help.



Andrew Radin is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at MIT and a member of the Center's Security Studies Program.

The UN created the ICTY in 1993, in the middle of the Bosnian civil war. The United States and its largest allies preferred a weak tribunal—one that would serve as a reprimand to the belligerents without committing resources or risking soldiers.¹ The staff of the tribunal began prosecutions early to increase the tribunal's visibility, resources, and legitimacy. Although the ICTY started with lower ranks, they eventually indicted the most notorious Serb leaders—Ratko Mladić, Karadžić, and Slobodan Milošević. NATO and the EU made Bosnia's membership conditional on compliance with the ICTY, and by 2004 the ICTY had a budget comparable to the West's development projects.²

Judging the Tribunal

I focus on the ICTY's efforts to create reconciliation in Bosnia after the civil war.³ Reconciliation here means the idea that the parties of the war, civilian and soldier, victim and criminal, should live in peace together afterwards. This is a high standard—getting people to tolerate one another after a war. I evaluate the success of reconciliation based on whether the ICTY follows a reasonable causal logic leading to reconciliation, since without this logic the tribunal can have no influence. Public acceptance and support for the tribunal is another metric of success,⁴ but the expected impact of the tribunal is delayed and difficult to measure directly.

The ICTY may have other goals: deterring future crimes, the pursuit of a normatively-grounded sense of justice or impunity, assuaging the guilt of Western leaders, building a system of international law, or subsidizing the international legal trade.⁵ Others may disagree, but I believe that even if the ICTY were to fulfill these goals—a highly questionable proposition—their efforts would be a failure without some reconciliation in Bosnia.

Approaches to Reconciliation

There are three possible ways the ICTY could benefit reconciliation. Each of these approaches is related to each other: while each is unique, they are complementary rather than competing. All of these approaches appear in the ideas of the ICTY, and are necessary to understanding the theorized impact of war-crimes tribunals, even though it is probable only the third approach can help a deeply divided society like Bosnia. All approaches aspire to create an end to the discourse of the war. If the war remains politically relevant indefinitely, the political future of the society will remain stunted.

First, and most abstractly, prosecution of war criminals tries to create a universal legal framework undergirding the society after the war. By one account, “the principal goal of prosecutions in international criminal tribunals has been to challenge impunity by bringing victims within the protection of the law and perpetrators under the scrutiny of the law. The aim is to recover the universality of law, its equal application to all, by re-establishing individual rights.”⁶ In other words, if I believed that you harmed me during the war, I am more likely to be willing to tolerate you if I believe that you have been punished for your crimes. The tribunal needs to identify individual culpability for this to work. The difficulty for Bosnia is that it is unclear what is a “war crime” and what is legitimate war-time violence, and it is logistically impossible to put everyone who committed a war crime on trial.

The flaws of the first approach lead us to a second approach. By establishing the truth of the war, war-crimes prosecution reconstructs the collective memory of the society. There are two ways that a trial can help. First, like any highly publicized event, the trial can emphasize a shared set of understandings about historical events. For example, the trials in Argentina in the 1980s included a sense of victimhood and outrage at the junta’s “disappearances.”⁷ However, the range of agreement within a society, especially a divided society, is likely to be small, and, like the Dreyfus trial in 19th century France, the proceedings may instill conflicting feelings in the differing groups. Second, the trial, through its adversarial but civil proceedings, can simultaneously recognize the differences of the parts of society and the common ground they share. A common belief in the benefits of the trial and some desire for continued citizenship are critical.⁸ This is very difficult in a divided society like Bosnia where there is not consensus about the membership of the state.

A third approach, the most compelling for Bosnia, hopes to repudiate the political leadership and ideology of the war-time period. This approach follows the tribunals against the leaders of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. It separates the leadership of the war-time society from the rest of its citizens. Regardless of their participation, the rest of the citizens are assumed to be not guilty; they too are the victims of the old political ideology. This approach relies on identifying and arresting the key leaders and creating a narrative that separates them from the rest of society, and explains their perversion of the society’s ideology during the war. This approach fails if the leaders remain free or the society continues to identify with them. It may also be morally problematic for some—the desire to move beyond the war becomes prior to justice for all of the victims and criminals.

Barriers to Reconciliation

How do the ICTY’s actions accord with these approaches? Six characteristics of the ICTY and post-war Bosnian society together make clear why the first two approaches are impossible and emphasize how the ICTY’s tactics have weakened the possibility of the third approach.

First, the war led to the radical segregation of Bosnian society. The goal of the Serb forces was to establish a homogeneous Serb enclave, which was largely successful. To end the war, the Dayton Agreement recognized the autonomy of this entity, called the Republika Srpska (RS).⁹ While Dayton also insisted on the right of refugees to return to the home of origin, the economic and political reality of post-war Bosnia made full return and desegregation of society highly

continued on next page

unlikely.¹⁰ Segregation impedes all three approaches since the Serb community believes they have the right to autonomy. While the tribunal has nominally focused on the means of segregation (i.e. rapes, murders, etc.), the rhetoric of the justices and international community's representatives condemn segregation itself, which makes it very difficult to ideologically separate the Serb leaders from their people.¹¹

Second, unlike in Germany or Japan, the victory in Bosnia was incomplete. The war was settled rather than won and, unlike in World War II, neither the Bosnian Serbs nor the Serbs in Serbia proper were defeated in a war of attrition. Indeed, the war-time agenda of their leaders to establish the homogeneous Republika Srpska was largely successful, and the reach of NATO over the RS and Serbia was incomplete.¹² As a consequence, it was difficult to arrest the leaders and harder to convince the people of the leaders' malfeasance. Incomplete victory thereby imperiled the approach of separating the people from their leaders.

Third, the tribunal works incredibly slowly. The Nuremberg trials of the key criminals lasted one year, while the ICTY has been in place for thirteen years and shows little sign of completing its work.¹³ The slow progress of the tribunal stems from two elements: the failure to arrest its indicted and the long trials. The first stems from the reluctance of the US and its allies to risk their soldiers or the peace, and the second from the particular legal framework. The longer the process goes on, the worse it is for reconciliation. Justice remains undone, new narratives compete with the tribunal's version of truth, and the ideal of delegitimizing an ideology becomes all but impossible.

Fourth, the tribunal has pursued a variable indictment policy, prosecuting both lower level foot soldiers and high-level politicians. This policy reflects changes in leadership, but was largely the product of the initial weakness and poverty of the tribunal. Trying as many war criminals as possible might reduce impunity, but it makes delegitimizing the leadership more difficult. Their prosecution makes their co-ethnics believe the international community is out to get them.

Fifth, the international community has been unable to appear neutral. To the Serbs, the tribunal is victors' justice against them. Few Croats and even fewer Bosniaks have been indicted, and they often receive minimal sentences. A narrative that the international community consistently works against the Serbian people has emerged. To the Bosniaks, the international community has been complacent and weak. They allow a political entity based on genocide to persist, have exerted little effort to arrest the Serb leaders, and let many who committed crimes to walk free. The Bosniaks feel they are the victims of the war, and they feel the criminals have been allowed to walk free.¹⁴

Sixth, the tribunal is housed in The Hague. Its distance from Bosnia, and the unfamiliarity of the procedures make positive local outcomes much more difficult. Even if the tribunal established justice, truth, and the delegitimation of an ideology of ethnic cleansing, these accomplishments are still a thousand miles and a great cultural divide away from the people hurt by the war.

Conclusions

In sum, the establishment of universal law is all but impossible given the scope of the tribunal, the revealed truth cannot permeate Bosnia's political divisions, and the tribunal has not changed Mladić, Karadžić, and Milošević from Serb heroes to traitors. Karadžić and his compatriots do not deserve to go free, and abandoning the trials this late hurts Bosnia more than continuing them does. Future indictments at The Hague, especially for lower level criminals, are counterproductive for Bosnia. The tribunal must end the criminal claims from the war rather than dragging them on indefinitely. The above analysis also refocuses the purpose of the tribunal: more for the victors than the victims. In the next war, the international community should insist that its war-crimes tribunal pursue an approach with a reasonable hope of helping the victims of the war, or not pursue any tribunal. ■

Bibliography

- 1 Gary Jonathan Bass, *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), Chapter 6.
- 2 John Hagan, *Justice in the Balkans: Prosecuting War Crimes in the Hague Tribunal* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), Robert M. Hayden, "Justice Presumed and Assistance Denied: The Yugoslav Tribunal as Obstruction to Economic Recovery," *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law* 19, no. 4 (2006): 400-404.
- 3 The mandate of the tribunal extends to all of the former Yugoslavia, but the prosecution appears to focus on Bosnia. Bosnia is also the critical case for reconciliation, since unlike Kosovo or Croatia it retains substantial numbers of groups in conflict. Hagan, *Justice in the Balkans: Prosecuting War Crimes in the Hague Tribunal*.
- 4 John Hagan and Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, "War Crimes, Democracy, and the Rule of Law in Belgrade, the Former Yugoslavia, and Beyond," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 605, no. 1 (2006), Hayden, "Justice Presumed and Assistance Denied: The Yugoslav Tribunal as Obstruction to Economic Recovery," Dan Saxon, "Exporting Justice: Perceptions of the ICTY among the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim Communities in the Former Yugoslavia," *Journal of Human Rights* 4, no. 4 (2005).
- 5 Some of these goals are specified in the official literature of the ICTY. See the ICTY's website <http://www.un.org/icty/>, especially the section on general information.
- 6 Michael Humphrey, "International Intervention, Justice and National Reconciliation: The Role of the ICTY and ICTR in Bosnia and Rwanda," *Journal of Human Rights* 2, no. 4 (2003): 498.
- 7 Mark Osiel, *Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 28-31.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 22-55.
- 9 Derek H. Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
- 10 Florian Bieber, *Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance, Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance* (Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 108-121. Author's interviews with various international officials in Bosnia, Summer 2008.
- 11 Saxon, "Exporting Justice: Perceptions of the ICTY among the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim Communities in the Former Yugoslavia," 566-567.
- 12 Bass, *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals*, 246-271.
- 13 "Assessment and report of Judge Fausto Pocar, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534," UN Security Council S/2008/326, (2004).
- 14 Saxon, "Exporting Justice: Perceptions of the ICTY among the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim Communities in the Former Yugoslavia"; Gerard Toal, John O'Loughlin, and Dino Djipa, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton: Constitutional Change and Public Opinion," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 47, no. 1 (2006).

Experts Offer Advice to the Next U.S. President



Barry Posen

Ford Int'l Professor of Political Science
Director, Security Studies Program



Taylor Fravel

Cecil and Ida Green Career Development
Associate Professor of Political Science
Member, Security Studies Program



Carol Saivetz

CIS Visiting Scholar
Research Assoc, Davis Center for Russian
and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

Professors Barry Posen and Taylor Fravel and CIS Visiting Scholar Carol Saivetz held a roundtable discussion on foreign policy and the next U.S. administration. The September talk launched a series of CIS Starr Forums on policy advice to the next president.

Posen began the pre-election foreign policy discussion by declaring that Barack Obama and John McCain support quite similar American grand strategies, despite media reports that say otherwise. Both candidates share a view on “ends”—expand American efforts in Afghanistan, reconstruct failed states, take an activist stance on Darfur, contain rogue states like North Korea and Iran, actively work to spread democracy, retain NATO and other Cold War alliances, and support nuclear non-proliferation—as well as “means”—maintain by far the biggest military force in the world, expand the current number of troops, and forward deploy U.S. forces around the world. What is missing from the discussion, Posen remarked, is a deeper examination of resource constraints, the difficulties of armed forces specialization amidst preparation for both counterinsurgencies and conventional war, and the nationalist response that often greets Americans deployed overseas regardless of their intentions. America’s current policy of borrowing money to maintain its power position is not tenable in the long run, and difficult trade-offs are going to need to be made since the U.S. simply cannot accomplish all of the candidates’ foreign policy goals and maintain its current position of strength, he concluded.

Saivetz focused on the U.S.-Russia relationship, and noted that there was not a great deal of attention paid to it before the crisis in Georgia in August. To craft the best policy toward Russia, Americans have to understand the forces driving Russian policy, she said. Russia’s actions were largely designed to restore its great power status by trying to change the rules of the game established when Russia was much weaker. She further explained that the Kremlin doesn’t want to restore the Soviet Union, but it is responding to real and perceived humiliations with attempts to restore its sphere of influence as a regional hegemon. Saivetz supports selective engagement with Russia—meaning that the U.S. should not throw Russia out of international institutions like the G-8 but rather pull them in more to institutions like the WTO to give them more of a stake in the system. She argued that the EU-Russia partnership agreement should go forward, the U.S. should give Russians access to missile sites in Eastern Europe to demonstrate that the system is not directed against them, and the U.S. should delink the Georgian crisis from its overall Russian policy to allow the two countries to work together on areas of common interest like anti-terrorism.

Fravel discussed East Asia, noting that the Bush administration improved relations with Japan and China due both to circumstance and its own strategy. Nonetheless, he claimed that the rest of region feels a bit neglected, which is unwise for the U.S. given that the countries in the region hold \$4 trillion dollars in foreign currency reserves. The five key challenges in the region facing the next U.S. administration are North Korea, Taiwan, climate change, multilateral Asian institutions, and China’s rise, he said. The U.S. should stick to the roadmap with North Korea laid out by negotiator Christopher Hill, maintain stability in Taiwan by stressing America’s One China policy and supporting ongoing talks between China and Taiwan, work

towards a grand bargain with China on climate change (the two countries combined account for over 40% of CO2 emissions), avoid relying solely on bilateral alliances, and accommodate China's rise as long as it continues to join the international system and not challenge it, he remarked.

The discussion concluded with a question-and-answer session and is available in video format on MIT World at <http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/605>. ■

The foreign policy event was part of a Starr Forum series on pressing policy issues that President-elect Barack Obama will be forced to address. Other topics included health care policy with MIT professor of economics Jonathan Gruber, and science policy with Marc Kastner, dean of science at MIT. Eugene Skolnikoff, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at MIT, chaired the science policy discussion.

On February 11, 2009, Martin Feldstein, Harvard University, will discuss America's role in shaping the global economy. Simon Johnson, MIT, will serve as the discussant. These events are available in video format at <http://web.mit.edu/cis/starr.html>. To subscribe to CIS event announcements, please visit <http://web.mit.edu/cis/joel.html>.

Colombian Journalist Named Neuffer Fellow

Jenny Manrique, a Colombian freelance journalist, joined CIS as its 2008-09 Elizabeth Neuffer Fellow. Manrique is the fourth recipient of the International Women's Media Foundation (IWMF) fellowship. The award gives a woman journalist working in print, broadcast or online media the opportunity to focus exclusively on human rights journalism and social justice issues.

The fellowship is named for Elizabeth Neuffer, a *Boston Globe* reporter who was killed while on assignment in Iraq in 2003. Neuffer's life mission was to promote international understanding of human rights and social justice.

Manrique, 27, writes for *Comunicaciones Aliadas*, a non-govern-

mental online magazine based in Peru that focuses on Latin American news, particularly human rights. A reporter for seven years, Manrique has covered subjects such as kidnapping, drug trafficking and refugees.



In the course of her journalistic work, Manrique has received multiple death threats and was forced into exile in Peru for eight months. The threats, which began in 2005, were from paramilitaries, who wanted to silence her because

of articles she wrote in the Colombian newspaper *Vanguardia Liberal* about how the paramilitaries infiltrated the civil population.

Manrique's reporting experiences, especially the articles for which she was threatened, have led to her interest in investigating Colombian paramilitaries and their ties with multinational corporations during her IWMF Elizabeth Neuffer Fellowship. She hopes to use the results of her studies to deepen her coverage of people who have been displaced by violence in Colombia.

Admiral William J. Fallon

Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow



Admiral Fallon led U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) from March 2007 to March 2008. During his tenure as CENTCOM commander, he was responsible for U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and directed all U.S. military activities in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa.

Prior to heading CENTCOM, Admiral Fallon served with distinction as the commander of U.S. Pacific Command from February 2005 to March 2007 with responsibility for U.S. military engagement and operations in the Asia-Pacific region of the world. He had previously served as commander for U.S. Fleet Forces Command and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet from September 2003 to February 2005. He was the 31st Vice Chief of Naval Operations, serving as the number two officer in the Navy, from October 2000 through August 2003. Admiral Fallon recently retired from the military after 41 years of distinguished service to the nation.

A generous gift from Robert E. Wilhelm supports the Center's Wilhelm fellowship, which is awarded to individuals who have held senior positions in public life.

continued from page 1

ing, but I'd like to deliver more, and I am working to do that.

précis: As a former commander of CENTCOM and now a fellow in academia, do you see a gap between policymakers and academics?

WF: Maybe not so much a gap as just a reality that people get busy in our own activities. Folks up here tend to work on things close to home. When I look around, I see academics working with their students, and it seems that the priority is inspiring or passing on knowledge or ideas. And then they have their writing and other engagements. We all get pretty busy. I found myself in the Middle East or Central Asia 70 percent of the time last year. I was away from my own headquarters so often that many of my people didn't see much of me. So I certainly didn't have much time to engage outside of my assignment. It was a pleasure to come up here a couple of times in the past, but I certainly haven't had that opportunity in the last year or so. Another observation is that folks in academia may have good ideas, but sometimes struggle making decisions and getting things done. Within the Defense Department, Department of State, and so forth, there are a lot of people who have come from the academic world and they have some really good ideas. That's terrific, because we get new talent and inspiration. The down side is that many of these folks do not know how to operationalize these things. Within the bureaucracy of the Department of Defense, there are quite a number of senior positions that are filled by political appointees who come from academia and other places outside of government. Some are absolutely terrific, because they have the experience and know-how and savvy

to take their ideas and formulate a plan of action, and get it done. Others don't have that ability. We need to recognize that every peg doesn't fit every hole.

précis: Some academics and civilians question the utility of having U.S. troops deployed in so many countries. They claim that having troops in places like Europe and East Asia allows allies in those regions a free ride off of American blood and treasure. They further claim that having U.S. troops stationed in regions like the Middle East is a major cause of animosity toward the United States. What are your thoughts?

WF: I feel very strongly that we need to be engaged in countries around the world. Now, by whom, what numbers, and what circumstances, is wide open for discussion. And our presence needs to be mutually agreed upon between the U.S. and the respective country. In virtually every nation in the world, we have a diplomatic presence. There is also almost always a military presence of some number of folk, ranging from two or three to a very significant presence. In Japan, for example, we have 35,000 people on the ground. In Korea, we've got about 23,000. There are all kinds of histories and circumstances with those. In Korea, we've been coming down steadily from about 50,000 a decade ago to less than half that number now and remember, there has yet to be a formal end to the Korean War. In other places, we have increased that presence. At the invitation of the government of Qatar, we have two new facilities there, an air base and a headquarters, my former forward headquarters of Central Command. That facility at Qatar is very important to us, the air base particularly so, because it's centrally located and from that base we provide a tremendous amount of support for our forces

in Iraq and Afghanistan and the whole region. The Qataris have been very good to us in making that facility available. They came to us several years ago and asked if we could move the headquarters from As Sayliyah to a new location near the airfield. We said that we could, and they said they'd pay for the new headquarters. And so they're spending probably \$160 million plus to build a completely new facility. My experience as the commander was that I couldn't have had a better relationship. The head of the Qatari military and I became very close. He was a phone call away and could get anything done. That government took abuse, took grief, from the Iranians, among others. The key point is that this country welcomed us and it's very important, particularly for current operations. I would expect that as operations continue to draw down in Iraq that the footprint there will come down as well, part of a natural expansion and contraction.

Another country in the Middle East: Bahrain. The U.S. Navy has had a presence in Bahrain for 60 some years, completely at the invitation of the ruling leadership. I know the king very well, King Hamad, the crown prince, and other leaders. They reiterate at every opportunity how much they want us there. We've actually contracted the size of our forces but the remaining presence is very important to the Navy. It's our only maritime footprint ashore in the entire Middle East region, and historically has been very helpful. What do these countries get out of that? They get an engagement with us. They get a relationship. They have an opportunity to be influential in things that they need. Each of these countries is very small and is looking for a little outside help.

There are other places in which we don't actually have operating forces. In fact, the vast majority of our presence in other countries does not include operating forces or "facilities" as I call them, or "bases" as people tend to say. There's nothing permanent about this and it depends on the interests of the

countries. So, we run a variety of arrangements and these things change all the time.

A primary goal of our presence in any region of the world is to provide training, example, mentoring, and assistance; enable the security forces in these countries to take care of their own people. I'd love it if we didn't have to worry about this. We do security patrols all over the world with our naval and air units. In some cases, we're the only people that provide that kind of security. The Persian Gulf would be an interesting place, I think, without us. Now, the Iranians would love to see us gone, because they want to be the influential power in the area. We've told them it's an interesting proposition, but we don't see things that way. We're there at the invitation of the neighborhood and we have vital interests there.

Some commentators in this country and in other places around the world say that people really don't want us in the region. Well if you were to speak with leaders in the region, I think you'll hear a very different story. There are always going to be some outliers, but usually they have other agendas. Look at history. It will show that we send people overseas, and we have fought in wars, engaged in operations, but we're not really interested in staying there if we can help it. We've been in a few places like Korea for a long time. We've been working hard trying to get ourselves out of there. It's been difficult to balance the desire to bring down the numbers of our forces with ongoing security concerns. I found myself advocating a smaller footprint, and the Koreans often telling me "No, no, don't do that!"

précis: Should we be concerned that civilians or non-state groups accuse us, for example, of occupying the Middle East and not wanting to leave? Or should the main criterion be whether the government desires our presence?

WF: Well, a lot of what you hear is just not true. Take Saudi Arabia, for

example. Back in 1990 and 1991 we had a huge physical military footprint there. Today, it's almost nothing. We have a handful of people in Saudi Arabia in connection with our embassy, and that's it. The government said, "You're outsiders. Most of you are a different religion. We have cultural sensitivities, religious sensitivities, and we'd like you to go away." So over the years, we drew it down until we were basically gone.

There are those who criticize our presence in Egypt. We don't have much of a presence in Egypt, in truth. We have a few people at the embassy. We have no facilities, enduring facilities, whatsoever. The criticisms are that we help and support a repressive regime in Egypt. There are some parts of that story that resonate, and have some factual basis, because the Egyptian leadership doesn't tolerate much dissent in the country. And people will make an issue of that. On the other hand, Egypt is the largest country, population-wise, in the region. It has a very long history, and in my opinion, despite some shortcomings, is a major instrument of stability. It's the only country that has a formal peace treaty with Israel. Again, given all the other problems I had in the region, I was pretty happy to be able to work with the Egyptians, and to call on them for help. For example, when I went to Iraq the first time and saw what we had to deal with, I came back and asked to see President Mubarak. He was kind enough to welcome me and I immediately went to his house where he was vacationing in Sharm-Al-Sheikh. We talked, and I said I needed a favor. I asked Mubarak to invite Iraqi P.M. Maliki to Egypt, to demonstrate support to them, because they badly needed external support at that time. This was back in early 2007. Mubarak picked up the phone and called Maliki. It was a little thing, but it broke the ice. So a lot of this stuff is not true. You're never going to have everybody agree on everything. But we are trying to do the right thing for the most people, to help our larger aims, which are to expand stability and security.

continued on next page

précis: What advice do you have for President-elect Barack Obama?

WF: Well, I'd probably start out by saying I'm not going to offer advice. If he comes to seek my opinion on things, I would be happy to share my thoughts with him. The opinions would be big picture. We need a long-term, coherent strategy. We really have to think it through. Where do we want to be in the world, and who is going to be there to help us? Who are we going to work with? And how do we get there? Keeping the big picture in focus is very difficult, given the day-to-day realities. I think he will surely be tested, quickly, by several people around the world who have other ideas. I'm a firm believer that you can never have too many friends, but you can certainly end up with too many enemies.

The American people, I believe, have become too self-centered and focused on consumption. It is very difficult to tell your own people that we are too greedy and too materialistic. But I think we need to hear that message, difficult as it is to do. As I see it, we have challenges in the Middle East. A lot of those challenges can be traced back to this excessive demand that we have for oil and gas. We are the biggest consumers by far in the world, and it's high time we knocked it off. And we can do that. The technology is there. I know there's a major effort here at MIT in energy. We can change. I believe that we could start out by taking a real hard look at ourselves. Let's get our domestic act straightened up now. We have a responsibility. We've been given many gifts. And we've got to use them, and use them appropriately.

précis: What are your plans for the future?

WF: Well, I'm still exploring opportunities. Being in a place like CIS where I can think and read and listen is wonderful. As I look back over my career and the opportunities that I had to periodically intellectually refresh, I found those occasions really helpful to me. So, I'm contemplating the future. I would like to continue to use my experience and knowledge to offer opinions shaping policy. And I also want to see what things in the world I may have missed in the last 40 years. ■

Fallon Gives Public Talk

CIS hosted a Starr Forum with Admiral Fallon on October 28, just one week before the national election. The former CENTCOM head addressed global issues of national importance for the next U.S. administration. He emphasized the importance of personal responsibility to the American populace. Many of the country's economic problems stem from citizens living beyond their means, he said. This mindset parallels U.S. government policies, thus he called for a return to fiscal responsibility.

He also expressed his support for efforts to move the U.S. to alternative forms of energy. He highlighted research associated with MIT's Energy Initiative as a good step forward, but argued that the government needs to do much more.

On the strategic picture in Iraq and Afghanistan, he noted that the reality

on the ground is far more complex than what is generally presented in the media. He commended the valiant American men and women in uniform and the maturing of the Iraqi political system as playing a large role in improving the situation in Iraq.

In response to a question from the audience about the costs of U.S. forward deployment in the Middle East, Fallon stated that the U.S. benefits from its presence in the region, including key personal relationships that are the social lubricant for effective foreign policy. He added that a hasty withdrawal from Iraq would be unwise and would endanger much of the progress that has been made.

The public talk is available in video format at <http://web.mit.edu/cis/starr.html>.



Photos are from Admiral Fallon's personal collection. Photo of Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, and Fallon is courtesy Wikimedia Commons.



MISTI Celebrates 25 Years



*Suzanne Berger, director of MISTI and
Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck
Professor of Political Science*

Photo courtesy Justin Knight Photography

MIT celebrated 25 years of international engagement through the Center's International Science and Technology Initiatives at an Oct. 2 dinner hosted by Dana Mead, chairman of the MIT Corporation, and Deborah Fitzgerald, Kenan Sahin Dean of the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences. MIT's largest international program, MISTI, is a pioneer in the field of applied international studies. Participants receive rigorous language and cultural training, which helps prepare MIT students and faculty to participate in the global economy by connecting them to hands-on professional internships and research opportunities across the globe.

MISTI traces its origins to a day in 1981, when Richard Samuels accompanied visiting Japanese executives on a plant tour as a translator. He was struck by the fact that the executives needed no translation—they spoke fluent English, and asked tough questions in American-style meetings and conversations. Samuels realized that few people at MIT had the linguistic and cultural skills to participate in similar meetings in Japan, which was then emerging as the first Asian technology hotbed.

Professor Samuels, now director of MIT's Center for International Studies, recognized that this type of isolation posed a risk to MIT's ability to maintain its global leadership, and envisioned a solution—an initiative that would rigorously prepare MIT students to operate at the highest professional levels in Japan. In addition to intensive language lessons, participants took Samuels' *Introduction to Japanese Politics and Society* course (fondly known as "Raw Fish") and received instruction in Japanese business practices and teamwork.

With the program's formal launch in 1983, milestones arrived quickly: the first MIT interns in Japan, the first of many intern patents filed in Japanese, and addition of an MIT course in *Technical Japanese*. Through the efforts of longtime MISTI staff, like associate director Patricia Gercik, even old-line Japanese companies with no history of taking U.S. interns were persuaded to participate, in part by reminding them of their emerging role as technology leaders.

By 1991, more than 60 MIT interns each year were working in Japan. Today, MISTI prepares and sends more than 300 MIT interns annually to nine countries: China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico and Spain. "From the path that MISTI has broken, we are now paving the way to a whole new avenue for education at MIT," President Susan Hockfield said. "The reason I'm convinced that global exposure makes an MIT education even better for our students is that we have been very careful in designing those experiences. MISTI is the premier example." ■

In Memory of Lucian Pye



Retired MIT political science professor Lucian W. Pye, one of America's leading China scholars, died Sept. 5 in Boston after a long illness. He was 86. Pye was a founding member of the Center for International Studies and Ford Professor of Political Science (Emeritus) at MIT, where he taught for 35 years. He was a leader in studying the politics of modernization in the Third World. He was author or editor of more than 25 books including *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*, *China: An Introduction* and *Mao-Tse Tung*.

Pye served as a mentor to several generations of influential political scientists and as an active public intellectual and policy adviser to presidential candidates, including John F. Kennedy. In addition to serving as president of the American Political Science Association from 1988-89, Pye participated in a variety of private organizations where scholars, government experts and lay leaders met to discuss Asia-related research and policy. These included the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S.-China Relations Committee and the Asian Foundation.

His dominant intellectual concern was to explore the cultural differences that help explain why the game of politics differs so greatly from one nation to another. Widely regarded as one of the foremost contemporary practitioners and proponents of the concept of political culture, Pye attempted to penetrate beneath the surface of political life to the deeper layers of attitude, value and sentiment that motivate political behavior. A giant in his field, "[Lucian] redirected political science away from rational models of political behavior and toward things that are harder to measure and understand," said Richard Samuels, director of CIS and Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT. "It was the beginning of what would be a very important moment in postwar social science," Samuels continued.

His studies of the politics of modernization in the Third World made theoretical and empirical contributions to our understanding of the development process and his participation in many social science and advising organizations were broadly influential. As one of a handful of scholars who studied Asian politics from a comparative standpoint, he was listened to in the policy world as well as the classroom.

He is survived by his wife, Mary, of Lexington, Mass., and his three children, Lyndy and Chris, both of Northampton, Mass., and Virginia, of Richmond, Va., as well as three grandchildren, Anna Swann-Pye and Eva and Daniel Ravenal.

Portions of this article appeared in MIT Tech Talk on September 17, 2008.

Danish Ambassador on Climate Security

Denmark's Ambassador to the U.S., Friis Arne Petersen, came to MIT in September to deliver a talk on expectations for the United Nations Climate Conference and how Denmark has implemented its climate and energy policy. Denmark is to host the UN Climate Conference in 2009 when the successor to the Kyoto protocol is to be agreed upon. Denmark is also among the leading nations in the use of renewable energy and has already reduced CO₂-emissions by 15 percent.

Seminar on International Migration

The Myron Weiner Seminar on International Migration presented the following talks: "Migration and Development: Remittances, Brain Drains and Diasporas," with Ron Skeldon, University of Sussex, UK, on Tuesday, Sept. 9; "Migration In and Out of Africa," with Paulina Makinwa Adebuseye, Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Nigerian National Order of Merit, on Tuesday, Sept. 30; "African Migration to the Developed North: What Kind of Collaboration is Necessary?" with John O. Ouchou, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick, on Tuesday, Oct. 7; "Competing for Foreign Students and Workers in Science and Engineering," with B. Lindsay Lowell, Georgetown University, on Wednesday, Nov. 12; and "The Colombian Diaspora: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in South and North America," with Jenny Manrique, Santo Tomas University, Colombia, and CIS Neuffer Fellow, on Tuesday, Dec. 9. The talks are sponsored by the Inter-University Committee on International Migration.

Mogahed on Islam

Dr. Dalia Mogahed, Senior Analyst and Executive Director of Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, delivered a lecture in November entitled "Who Speaks for Islam?" based on her new book, *Who Speaks for Islam?: What a Billion Muslims Really Think*. The lecture was part of The Emile Bustani Middle East Seminar at MIT, which celebrates its 23rd anniversary this year. Each year the Bustani Seminar invites scholars, journalists, consultants, and other experts from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States to MIT to present recent research findings on contemporary politics, society and culture, and economic and technological development in the Middle East.

The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy

CIS co-sponsored a provocative discussion of America's nuclear policy and the critical choices facing a new administration in October with The Technology and Culture Forum at MIT and The MIT Nuclear Weapons Abolition Initiative. The speakers for the talk, "US Nuclear Policy: Critical Choices: A Conservative and Progressive View," were Joseph Cirincione, author of *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons* and president, Ploughshares Fund; and Mark Esper, executive vice president, Global Intellectual Property Center, U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

continued on next page

CIS Announces Two New Working Groups

The Center announces two new working groups to encourage collaboration across disciplines to tackle global issues. The Working Group on environmental vulnerability, resilience, and justice will be advised by JoAnn Carmin, a professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at MIT and a CIS affiliate. The group will focus on environmental challenges in both cities and regions in the global North and South. The Working Group on violent non-state actors aims to examine why non-state actors resort to violence, what means and tactics they use, and what can be done to counter that violence. Associate Professor of Political Science Roger Petersen and Assistant Professor of Political Science Fotini Christia are the faculty sponsors of the group. The Center now sponsors ten working groups, each being open to MIT faculty, students, and outside scholars. To learn more about the groups, how to participate, and the proposal process, visit our Working Groups web page.

Jerusalem Seminar Series Continues Outreach and Education

The Jerusalem Seminar Series, presented by CIS as part of the Jerusalem 2050 Project, concluded in November with a talk by Susan Marks, executive vice president of Search for Common Ground, entitled "Civil Society and Conflict Resolution." Earlier speakers included Diana Abouali, Bedross Der Matossian, Everett Mendelsohn, Anat Biletzki, Bernard Avishai, Kate Rouhana, and Nili Portugali discussing the history, economy, physical structure, and civil society of Jerusalem.

Nagl on Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan

Lt. Col. John Nagl spoke at CIS in October as part of the MIT Security Studies Program Wednesday seminar series. Nagl, who earned his doctorate from Oxford University and served in both Iraq wars, is the author of *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* and was on the writing team that produced the Army's new Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Nagl stated that in his COIN experience, killing insurgents is not nearly as important as shifting the support of the population from supporting the insurgents to being neutral or supporting the government coalition. He discussed how in conventional war you provide security by figuring out how to kill your enemy, while in insurgency you figure out how to find your enemy as the actual killing is easier. Nagl argued that information operations are the most important aspect of COIN, but also the one thing the U.S. does the most poorly. He made a number of recommendations to improve U.S. operations in this area in the future. Other speakers in the SSP Wednesday seminar series included Steve Miller (Director, International Security Program, Belfer Center, Harvard University) on Iran and the Diplomacy of Nuclear Confrontation, Karl Kaiser (Director, Program on Transatlantic Relations, Weatherhead Center, Harvard University) on recalibrating European security, and Alexander Downes (Assistant Professor at Duke University) on democracies at war. The talks are open to the public. The schedule and summaries of past talks are online here: <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wednesday.html>.

People



Professor of Political Economy **Alice Amsden** has been elected Chair of the Committee on Comparative Innovation Policy at the National Academies of Science.

SSP Associate Director **Owen Cote** and SSP Principal Research Scientist **Cindy Williams** completed the second year of their collaboration with The George Washington University running the Department of Defense-sponsored National Security Studies Program by leading simulations from September 24-26 and October 31-November 2 on U.S. policy toward a post-Castro Cuba. Cote also attended an Office of the Secretary of Defense Net Assessment-sponsored conference on the future of undersea warfare in Washington, D.C. in September.

Ph.D. candidate **Edward Cunningham** testified in Washington, D.C. before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in August for the hearing entitled “China’s Energy Policies and Their Environmental Impacts”. The hearing press release is available at: http://www.uscc.gov/pressreleases/2008/08_08_07pr.php

Associate Professor of Political Science **Taylor Fravel** was interviewed by *The Boston Globe* in August about the likelihood of China using force in its future foreign policy. The interview is available here: http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/08/10/a_talk_with_m_taylor_fravel/.

SSP Affiliate **Jeanne Guillemin** gave an invited talk on the future of Biodefense at the University of Texas at Austin’s Robert Strauss Center in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Government in October. In September, the PBS’s “American Experience” program “The Living Weapon,” which was inspired by Guillemin’s book, *Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism*, and in which she was a featured narrator, won an Emmy Award for Individual Achievement in Research.

Newly minted Ph.D. candidates **Phil Haun**, **Tara Maller**, and **Joshua Itzkowitz-Shiffrin** passed their general exams in international relations.

Ph.D. candidate **Peter Krause** presented a paper entitled “Coercion by Any Other Name Should Smell as Sweet: Terrorism as Nonstate Coercion,” at the American Political Science Association’s annual convention in August.



Ph.D. candidate **Jon Lindsay** returned to CIS this semester from his United States Naval Reserves deployment in Iraq. We are happy to have him back.



Topher McDougal, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning, presented a paper, “Law of the Landless: The Dalit Bid for Land Redistribution in Gujarat, India”, at Brown University’s Watson Institute during the conference “After Empire: Global Empire Today” in June. He delivered a paper entitled “Production Firms in Civil War: The Case of Liberia” as part of the “Cities in an Insecure World” panel at the London School of Economics in November.

Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies Program **Barry Posen** testified before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House

continued on next page

Armed Services Committee on a new U.S. Grand Strategy in July. The hearing marked the first of several debates planned by the Committee in an effort to help the “next president determine a strategy for today’s rapidly changing world,” said the committee chairman, Ike Skelton, in a speech earlier that month. In October, Posen served as a panel member for the Alternative Strategic Environment Workshop Series at The National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. In November, Posen chaired a panel on energy security at the Tobin Conference “America and the World: National Security in the New Era,” in Washington D.C.



Associate Professor of Law and Development **Balakrishnan Rajagopal** was awarded tenure by MIT in spring 2008. He was a Visiting Professor at University of Melbourne Law School in June.

Senior Research Scholar **Sharon Stanton Russell** has been appointed an associate editor of *International Migration Review* starting this fall. As a member of the Centre Advisory and Review Group (CARG) of the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty at the University of Sussex, UK, Russell participated in the Conference on “Migration and Development: Building Migration into Development Strategies” at the Royal Society, London in April. At this event, she was surprised to learn that there is a new book on migration: *The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies*, edited by Anthony M. Messina & Gallya Laha, published in 2007 by The Center for Global Studies, International Programs & Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and this book re-published one of her articles (originally published in 1989) plus an article written by the late MIT Professor and former CIS Director **Myron Weiner** (originally published in 1985).

Professor of Political Science **Richard Samuels** provided assistance to a film entitled “Japan’s About Face,” which aired for the first time on PBS on July 8, 2008. He also provided commentary for the film.

Professor of Political Science **Stephen Van Evera** appeared on NPR’s program “On Point” discussing “U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror” on September 11. He delivered a talk entitled “American Grand Strategy in the New Era,” to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in September. Van Evera and Ph.D candidate **Peter Krause** presented a paper entitled “Ideas for the War of Ideas” at the Tobin Project’s conference “National Security for the New Era” in November.

A group of scholars and former diplomats has issued a “Joint Experts’ Statement on Iran” calling for a change of U.S. direction to emphasize diplomacy. The statement was written with the help of several scholars with CIS connections, including Research Associate **Jim Walsh**, Executive Director **John Tirman**, and Research Affiliates **Sanam Anderlini** (one of the group’s organizers), **Ali Banuazizi**, and **Juan Cole**. Geoffrey Forden of STS is another participant. The effort, co-chaired by Ambassadors Thomas Pickering and James Dobbins, calls on the new administration to “open the door to direct, unconditional and comprehensive negotiations at the senior diplomatic level where personal contacts can be developed, intentions tested, and possibilities explored on both sides.” The experts’ statement, which calls for a step-by-step approach to improve bilateral relations in the interest of U.S. security, is stirring widespread interest following a Capitol Hill news conference on Tuesday, November 18.

SSP Research Associate **Jim Walsh** was on WBUR's "Here and Now" on June 12, 2008, discussing Iran. You can listen to the show here: <http://www.here-now.org/shows/2008/06/20080612.asp>.

SSP Principal Research Scientist **Cindy Williams** appeared on NPR's "Weekend America" with Bill Radke in June. She delivered a lecture in July entitled "U.S. Budgets and Resource Allocation Processes for National Security and International Affairs," to the Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS), which is run by Columbia University for young scholars in international relations. In September, Williams presented a talk entitled "Manpower and Personnel Needs for a Transformed Naval Force," as part of a discussion of findings and recommendations of the Naval Studies Board committee that she co-chaired with the Chief of Naval Personnel.



Ph.D. candidate **Sarah Zukerman** was granted a 2008-9 predoctoral fellowship in the International Security Program and Intrastate Conflict Program at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs as well as a Peace Scholar Award from the US Institute of Peace. She gave a talk at the American Political Science Association's annual convention in August entitled "Achieving Post-War Peace: The Internal Politics of Colombia's Demilitarizing Paramilitary Groups."

SSP Military Fellow **John Sullivan** (U.S. Army) was promoted to Colonel by Admiral (Ret) William Fallon at a ceremony in December.

Published

Taylor Fravel, Cecil and Ida Green Career Dev Assoc Prof of Political Science
Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

"China's Search for Military Power," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 2008): 125-141.

Peter Krause, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science
"The Last Good Chance: A Reassessment of U.S. Operations at Tora Bora," *Security Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter 2008): 644-684.

Austin Long, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science
"Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006," RAND Occasional Paper from the RAND Counterinsurgency Study, 2008.

Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of SSP
"What's Next for Iraq?" *The Boston Globe*, June 19, 2008.

Andrew Radin, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science
Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), with James Dobbins et al.

Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Associate Professor of Law and Development
International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice (London: Routledge-Cavendish,

continued on next page

2008), co-edited with Richard Falk and Jackie Stevens.

“Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Rebuilding: A Critical Examination,” *William and Mary Law Review*, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2008.

Richard Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of CIS
“Awaiting Japan’s Global Vision,” *The Boston Globe*, June 21, 2008.

Harvey Sapolsky, Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science, **Eugene Gholz**, Associate Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin and SSP alum, **Caitlin Talmadge**, Ph.D. candidate in Political Science

US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy (London: Routledge, 2008)

Eugene Skolnikoff, Professor of Political Science Emeritus
“Responding to Asymmetric Threat: The Dual-use Strategy,” *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2008): 42 - 47.

Paul Staniland, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science
“Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 2008): 322-362.

“When Talking with Terrorists Makes Sense,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 29, 2008.

Sharon Stanton Russell, Senior Research Scholar
“The Demographic Impact of Partition in the Punjab in 1947,” *Population Studies*, Vol. 62, No. 2, (July 2008): 1-16, with Jennifer Leaning et al.

Caitlin Talmadge, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science
“Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008): 82-117.

Stephen Van Evera, Professor of Political Science
“A Farewell to Geopolitics,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., *To Lead the World: American Strategy After the Bush Doctrine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Cindy Williams, SSP Principal Research Scientist
Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, June 2008, with Gordon Adams.

“The Other Resources: The People Factor in Future Defense Strategy,” in *Defense Strategy and Forces: Setting Future Directions*, William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics Paper Number 3 (Newport, RI: Naval War College 2008): 55-63.

Personnel and Manpower for a Transformed Naval Force (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2008), with co-chair John Moxley.

IAP 2009 Offerings

CIS will sponsor several new IAP courses in January 2009. The Security Studies Program Military Fellows will each teach their own course in the series “Contemporary Military Topics.” Col. John Sullivan will teach “Logistics Contracting in Support of U.S. Forces: Lessons Learned from Iraq.” Lt. Col. Terrence O’Connell will teach “Adapting for the Challenges of the 21st Century: A Look at the U.S. Marine Corps.” Lt. Col. Kelly Lawson will teach “B-52 Operational Testing: Teaching the Old Dog New Tricks.” Additionally, MIT Security Studies Program experts Cindy Williams, Owen Cote, and Harvey Sapolsky will review the key spending, weapons system, and doctrinal issues facing the Department of Defense in the course “Key Issues In the Department of Defense for the Obama Administration.” The Security Studies Program is also offering a four-part film series highlighting different wars offering a glimpse of the varying ways conflict is depicted in film. A half hour of discussion, led by an SSP faculty member, will follow each film.




*Mia Kirshner,
actor and author,
to teach IAP course*

Finally, the Center is honored to bring Mia Kirshner, actor and author of *I Live Here*, to teach an IAP course. *I Live Here* is a multimedia publication that presents the first-hand stories of refugees and displaced people in four specific areas of the world. Mirroring the multimedia approach of the book, the two-week course will ask participants to create their own short video based on hidden stories that need to be heard within the greater Boston community. The results will be featured on the *I Live Here* website. They will also be shown at a CIS-sponsored event with Mia Kirshner at the end of January.

See MIT’s online IAP listings (<http://web.mit.edu/iap/>) for sign-up requirements and meeting times.

Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
292 Main Street, E38-200
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307



PROJECTS