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Week One: Egoism
For an alternative view that tries to accommodate intentions within a belief/desire framework see Michael Ridge 'Humean Intentions' American Philosophical Quarterly 1998
For Velleman's views on reduction see [Handout 5], David Velleman, Chapter Four of Practical Reflection (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), and Rae Langton Intention as Faith in Action and Agency, ed. Helen Steward (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
R. Holton, 'Intention and Weakness of Will', Journal of Philosophy 1999 JSTOR
R. Holton 'How is Strength of Will Possible?' in S. Stroud and C Tappolet (eds.) Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford University Press, 2003). [Acrobat version] M. Muraven and R. Baumeister, 'Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?', Psychological Bulletin 126 (2000) pp. 247-59. Further Reading
Samuel McClure et al Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Reward Science 306 (2004) 503-7 George Ainslie and John Monterosso A Marketplace in the Brain?, Science 306 (2004) 421-3.
M. Bratman 'Toxin, Temptation and the Stability of Intention' in Faces of Intention pp. 58-90. J. Broome, 'Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?', in C. Morris and A. Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp. 98-120. Online version R. Holton 'Rational Resolve' The Philosophical Review 113 (2004) 507-35 [Acrobat version]
-- 'Excusing Addiction' Law and Philosophy 18, 1999 pp. 589-619.
Gary Watson 'Free Action and Free Will', Mind 96 (1987)
Week Seven: Free Will II
Watson, 'Responsibility and the Limits of Evil' D. Schoeman (ed.) Responsibility, Character and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) Susan Wolf, 'The Importance of Freewill' Mind 90 (1981)
Week of 2nd Nov: No class on 2nd Nov; but we will be meeting on 4th November. We'll be lookinga t the second Frankfurt piece (i.e. that marked for 21 October) Week Eight: Identification and Autonomy
Scanlon, 'Reasons and Passions', Contours of Agency, eds. Buss and Overton Moran, 'Frankfurt on Identification', Contours of Agency, eds. Buss and Overton Week Nine: Identification and Self-Deception
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55, 68-78. Further reading:Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). 'The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior', Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227-268.
R. Holton, 'What is the role of the self in self-deception?' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2000/1. Acrobat version
Joshua Greene et al, The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, Neuron 44 (2004)
Adina Roskies, 'Are ethical judgements intrinsically motivational? Lessons from acquired sociopathy' Joshua Greene et al, The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, Neuron 44 (2004)
Daryl Bem On the Uncommon Wisdom of our Lay Personality Theory Rachana Kamtekar Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of our Character Ethics 114 (2004) Last updated Feb 2 2009 |