The
key claim is Ithiel's argument that (Figure 2) . . .
"people who think about social change in traditional political
[even radical] terms cannot begin to imagine the changes that
lie ahead." If Ithiel is right, and his work does offer a
reliable guide to the effects of communications technology on
social, political, and economic life, then his work will have
fulfilled, rather splendidly, the dream of the pioneers of the
social sciences to provide an independent, steadier, truer, and
more realistic alternative to the frameworks and choices (e.g.,
ideologies, election speeches, or policy argument television)
that the political world provides. Clearly, it is an achievement
that would be featured prominently on a list drawn a hundred years
from now.
Actually,
Ithiel's work may rate a double billing, since Karl Deutsch
gave separate entries for revolutionaries who created new political
movements. In this respect, I draw to your attention the quotation
from Stewart Brand (Figure 2, also), a leader from the
counterculture left of the 1960s.
If Stewart
Brand is correct, then Ithiel pulled-off an almost unequaled
historical feat of consensus building for worldwide public policy.
The AT&Ts of the world were enrolled (from enlightened self-interest),
and almost everybody else.
In suggesting
a double-nomination, I want to draw to your attention one of
Ithiel's last writings that discusses the "unnatural institutions"
that he expects - with the communications policy changes underway
- now will begin to change.(8) It is a remarkable
list - the nation-state, large hierarchical bureaucracies, the
"unnatural" entrapment of human beings into megacities,
etc. I am reminded that Ithiel was a passionate student leader
and Trotskyite in his youth, and at this point I just want to
draw to your attention that (surface appearances not withstanding)
I am not sure, in some ways, how much he changed. Any leftist
revolutionary would be thrilled by the hit list.
And of course
if we consider Ithiel's legacy, there are the obvious points
in his favor that he might be more effective than Mao or Lenin
and that his science was better than Marx. Time will tell.
At this point,
I list this achievement as a "maybe" because Ithiel
did not live to write the equivalent of Das Kapital.
I do not think people fully understood, even in his own Department,
the pieces that were coming together. And we still need to see
how many predictions and causal pathways turn out as forecast.
Let me just
illustrate this legacy. On my desk is an announcement from Yale
Medical School discussing a new global Internet research colloquium
that our foundation has helped to develop that is connecting
to desktop PCs of educators, public health professionals, students
- and anybody else who is interested - in 110+ countries.(9)
It is designed to take a global framework and to accelerate
scientific innovation worldwide. The public domain technology
for compressed audio and graphics (Real Audio and QuickTime)
is good enough to begin, and it is obvious that it will continue
to improve quickly.(10)
For most
of world history, this would have seemed almost inconceivable.
Global, user-initiated and user-controlled television channels?
Across national boundaries, without a license and without asking
for permission? And building common frameworks for international
cooperation to solve urgent global problems, with many of the
people in the loop who could make this happen?
The Medical
School initiative is about global organizing and influence,
in addition to scientific information. The first global seminar
in the Yale series was given by Dr. Ruth Berkelman, MD from
the US government's Center for Disease Control. She was able,
so to speak, to address the troops (3,500+ leaders in international
public health) worldwide and begin to explain new leadership
in US policy: the audio and video technology began to create
relationships that writing an article alone could not have achieved
and saved her months of jet travel.
And once
you begin to use this new global, interactive, user-controlled,
and low-cost technology, contact networks become even more vividly
alive as a new mechanism of policy cooperation and influence.
Contact networks are not just sociological phenomena of people
Dr. Ruth Berkelman (for example) has met, but the people she
can interact with and work with - on a daily basis - wherever
they are in the world.
II.
What Ithiel Pool Would Be Doing Today
Ithiel was
a pioneer who believed that he and his students should be creating
the future. I think that this spirit and commitment were his
greatest legacies. Forecasting what he would be doing today
is easier than it may seem: Ithiel planned what he was going
to do next, there is a written record of his criteria, and here
are several major themes (Figure 3).
Even with
these questions to call forth a list there are many hazards
to this kind of enterprise. As a preface it may help to recall
Ithiel's own comment on forecasting, in a famous essay "The
Art of the Social Science Soothsayer." Ithiel wrote that
if an analyst was faced with three possibilities, with probabilities
p(A)=0.3 p(B)=0.3 and p(C)=0.4, he would predict option C (i.e.,
p(C)=0.4) as the most likely. But he also would predict that
he would be wrong, that the probability was 0.6 that the actual
outcome would be either A or B. The remark will, I think, introduce
you to something about Ithiel - his intelligence, his capacity
for self-reflection, his honesty, his humor. And although I
was never entirely convinced that Ithiel believed he would be
wrong, I will press forward in the same spirit (Figure 4). (11)
1.
Developing
the communications framework as a formal and systematic field
in the social sciences.
Ithiel believed that the study of communication systems could
be as powerful as the study of economic systems.(12) He and several other pioneers (e.g., Karl Deutsch) worked
in this direction - for example, in American Business and Public
Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade, Bauer, Pool, and Dexter
created a model of scientific research to examine, with an anthropologist's
astute observation and alert generalization, the details of a
particular communication system.(13) Ithiel edited
the Handbook of Communication to begin codifying the field.(14) And with Inose, Takasaki, and Hurwitz he began to develop
a set of measures to monitor trends toward a global information
society.(15) But the vision
needs more work and refinement to develop the equivalent analytical
power of the field of economics and other disciplines.
For example,
there are flows of communication, just as there are flows of
money. But we also can ask about the productivity of communications
or of expenditures, about whether anything is happening or whether
we are experiencing 3% - 5% annual growth in the intelligence
and wisdom in what is being said; or the systems of feedback
and government learning(16); or citizen
learning or intelligence as a result of the flows of communications
in the mass media. Etc.
There are
many directions for the development of the field. My guess is
that Ithiel would be updating and expanding his early measures
of trends toward a global information society. And almost surely
would be engaged in experiments to develop creative potentials
of new communication technologies such as designing global discussions
on the World Wide Web and expanded contact nets to aid the creative
process in science. (Given his earlier interest in scientific
creativity, communication technology, and international agricultural
research, he might be drawn to this field for initial projects.)(17)
2. Nailing the Huntington thesis.
Samuel Huntington
at Harvard has recently written about the clash of civilizations
as the new, emerging trend in world politics - especially the
clash between Islam and the West. If true, these trends are
important.(18) But I think
that Ithiel would be drawn to studying these global processes
for three additional reasons, especially because there is related
work he began earlier in his life and that he set aside.
a)
As you will recall, I mentioned that Ithiel and others pioneered
the quantitative analysis of communication content. Eventually,
they came to their senses and stopped because even inputting
the data was taking too much time and they recognized that the
deeper questions they wanted to ask were more sophisticated
than their available technology to manipulate large data sets.
For example, Ithiel worked on one study that coded 19,553 editorials
from elite newspapers in 5 countries across 60 years. And each
of the 19,553 editorials was coded by hand, word by word, for
416 symbols. . . In 1959 they called a temporary halt and Ithiel
edited a volume that was a summary report in a time capsule,
to scientists in the future, when the cause could again be picked-up
with newer technology. Now, almost 40 years later, with scanning
technology and the expanded capacity of computers, the time
is arriving when renewed progress may be possible.
b)
Ithiel was fascinated by cultures and tried to formulate
an operational code that would capture and compare the deeper
logic of political cultures. The passion was inspired by Nathan
Leites, who fascinated his colleagues at Rand by The Operational
Code of the Politburo and A Study of Bolshevism.(19) Ithiel started to do the same analysis for India, and in
his basement is a trunk filled with note cards detailing classic
Indian texts, stories of monkey kings, learned discussions of
how the categories of Indian logic differ from Western logic,
and other inputs into the creative process of explicating what
made Indian sensibility distinctive.
(One of
the most interesting contents are letters describing his bafflement
at Indian movies - they are uniquely Indian because they are
greatly beloved in India, but there is almost no market elsewhere
in the world. And Ithiel could never quite grasp why Indian
audiences were so drawn to the stories - and he was fascinated
that he could not predict the plots!)
Ithiel never
solved the problem, but he hooked himself on it. And this is
a second reason why I think Ithiel would be engaged by the problem
that Huntington has posed. He already would see a way - using
operational code analysis - to make a deeper analysis of whether
(for example) the Islamic world was becoming more Western in
its sensibilities.
c)
There is a third reason why Ithiel might be drawn to the
problem and think he could do a better job of empirical grounding:
40 years ago, he had already anticipated that there were many
more interesting stories to be told about cultures than an analysis
of traditional religious/ethnic cultures as the organizing principles
in global human affairs. He wrote, for example, about different
languages and cultures that might be cross-cutting universals:
"Formal language, colloquial language, rude language, mothering
language, upper-class language, lower-class language, men's
language, women's language, children's language. . ."(20) It would not escape Ithiel's notice that MTV is now a global
channel and that a global teenage culture would be a consequential
phenomenon to recognize, even if its current relevance is beyond
the ken of national security elites. The study of global cultures
could reveal a much more interesting and pluralist world, and
perhaps - rather than a clash of cultures - a much more interesting
set of interactions. And I think it is a story he might like
to begin to tell.(21)
III.
Intermission
At this
point, I just want to take a brief intermission and suggest
one thing that Ithiel would not be doing. He would not be writing
a single word about Israeli or Middle Eastern politics or about
Israeli-Palestinian relations.
On its face,
this may seem unexpected, coming from a political scientist
whose ancestors, on both sides, included centuries of distinguished
rabbis. In fact Ithiel's father, Rabbi David de Sola Pool, was
the spiritual head of the Sephardic synagogue in New York City
and his mother was a passionate Zionist.(22) But across
two dozen books and several hundred articles there is a loud
silence about Israel and the Middle East.
3.
A third
prediction is that Ithiel would be involved in research to improve
decision making by governments and citizens concerning important
issues.
a)
The
battle for social science in domestic policy
In domestic
policy I think his priority would be easy to predict. Ithiel
belonged to a generation of pioneers who believed that ideology
was on the decline, being steadily replaced by social science,
and that we were entering a period of empirically-based, rather
than belief-based, public policy. Ithiel was passionately committed
to free speech and democratic processes, and he also believed
that the schema of hypothesis and evidence, introduced by our
scientific institutions into democratic processes, could save
us from the endless recycling of similar ideological arguments,
give us real historical leverage, and genuine progress. The
aggressive resurgence of ideologues such as Ronald Reagan or
Newt Gingrich was completely unexpected.
In this
regard, Ithiel shared the views of his Harvard colleague Daniel
Bell, whose famous pre-Reagan and pre-Gingrich book was The
End of Ideology. Ithiel, for his own part, believed that the
American people were not highly ideological and the policy differences
between Republicans and Democrats often could be resolved, in
practice, by testing empirical claims. He wrote:
"The
interesting issues in normative political theory are in the
end generally empirical ones. Only rarely do arguments over
policy turn on irreducible conflicts of values. More often they
are arguments about the facts of situations to which the values
are applied. Most men agree in valuing freedom and also equality,
and order and also progress. . . . {There is a fundamental problem,
clarified by Arrow and others of value mixes but] "for
the rest, when men differ in their policy conclusions it is
usually because of differing empirical judgments about how a
chosen package of values may be achieved."(23)
The difficulty,
as you may know, is that we made good progress in evaluating
liberal assumptions of the Great Society until the first election
of Ronald Reagan. Then David Stockman launched a pre-emptive
strike to zero-out all behavioral science research in the federal
budget and our major agenda-setting institutions in science
suddenly shut-up. And the accommodations have become permanent.(24)
I think
that Ithiel would have fought back for social science, and I
think he would have reacted strongly to test theories of the
political right, on an equal footing with evaluations of the
Great Society programs, and to preserve an independent and respected
role for empirically-based social and economic policy. And I
think he would have been outraged that distinguished scientific
panels (such as the Luce Commission quoted from private correspondence
in Figure 5)
were quietly compromising the political independence of science
and university-based inquiry, a challenge that he fought fiercely
when the Department of Health and Human Services sought to impose
requirements for prior review of research involving human subjects.(25)
Concerning
Figure 5, let me add
a current illustration from the new President's Council of Advisers
on Science and Technology. They have recently discussed the
question of restarting progress in testing ideological assumptions.
The meeting to discuss these issues acknowledged the distinction
between "belief-based rather than empirically-based"
social and economic policy, but the members expressed doubt
about "the relative important of these issues to the broader
public." And they decided to continue the de facto policy
of quietly deferring initiatives to obtain evidence that might
be too politically significant.(26)
Here is an
example of the current breakdown: if you listened to the televised
selection from the Markle Foundation's experiment during the last
election (bringing a sample of American voters together to discuss
the issues), it was striking to hear the citizen group ask an
expert panel of economists to address their concern of how much
government should do for people versus how much people should
do for themselves? In answer, Lester Thurow of MIT - one of the
experts - changed the subject and said that the citizens were
asking the wrong question - the real question is not what people
(v. government) should do, but the total amount of investment
made by both.
. . . And
the questioner nodded politely and, five minutes later, another
member of the citizen group persevered and said, still politely:
"Yes, we understand Professor Thurow's point, but what
we really wanted him to talk about was how much government should
do for people versus what people should be expected to do for
themselves. . . ?"
What is
involved in this non-exchange is a narrowness of social science.
Academic economists assume autonomous individuals with fixed
motivation - there is no group psychology or capacity of government
to energize people or otherwise affect their personality, motivation,
or moral character by its size, subjective prominence, or the
comprehensiveness of its responsibilities. But I think there
is very suggestive evidence - which is beyond the scope of this
discussion - that Ronald Reagan and a core of other Republicans
(and members of citizen panels) worry about the possibility
of a clinical-like, hierarchical relationship to a prominent
government that induces dependency and affects motivation and
responsibility in a zero-sum fashion. As government takes more
responsibility, people take less . . .
In candor,
Lester Thurow mis-answered the question, and he should have
said that he and his colleagues had no scientific basis to give
advice about economic policy if you framed the question this
way. Economic theory and econometric measurements have - and
I intend this as a technical comment - no imagination. When
Ronald Reagan was asked about economic policy, he talked about
how alive and wonderful it felt to ride the open range on horseback:
He was not talking in metaphors. Rather, he was trying to change
a sense of reality that originates in a different universe than
Lester Thurow and his colleagues inhabit.
I think
that Ithiel would have gone after the challenge to social science
by broadening an empirically-based dialogue and starting to
test the truth claims of these models. Especially, Republican
beliefs that they can change (and have been changing) national
modal personality by their policies.(27)
There is
another reason Ithiel would have done this. He went through
psychoanalysis and was engaged by the study of imagery as a
way to incorporate depth psychology into policy analysis. In
fact, one of his most original and gifted studies was "Newsman's
Fantasies, Audiences, and Newswriting" - using terms like
fantasy, audiences, and reference groups to discuss projection
and transference in a more acceptable vocabulary. I think he
would have been especially interested to develop the study of
hierarchical imagery to help evaluate the concerns and claims
of ideology.(28)
b)
Improving
government international policy: forecasting
I am quite
sure that Ithiel would be actively engaged by issues of international
policy, both intellectually and because the engagement could
contribute to the continued strength of a political science
program at MIT.
A word of
context: As many of you know, the Political Science Department
at MIT was always an unnatural institution. The Center for International
Studies, the Research Program in Communications, and the Political
Science Department were created when James Killian from MIT
was science adviser to President Eisenhower, and then Jerome
Weisner was science adviser to President Kennedy. They were
created during the Cold War to build national capacity and demonstrate
the contribution that first-rate social science might make to
understanding the major forces of change in the world. The original
research program was created by a distinguished Ford Foundation-supported
panel of which Ithiel was the secretary before being hired to
implement the agenda.(29) The quid
pro quo for a Political Science Department at MIT has always
been that first-rate scientific analysis of global trends and
international policy questions should be the defining agenda.
Ithiel also
believed strongly that foreign policy was too important, and
the assessment of reality required too much capacity for independent
thought, to be left to the kinds of people who chose careers
as spies, KGB or FBI operatives, or diplomats. He campaigned
very hard to open-up the CIA's analyses to rigorous vetting
by outside science-based research.(30) If you look
at the structure of the new National Intelligence Council at
the CIA - which had, as its first directors, Joseph Nye and
Richard Cooper from Harvard - it is the kind of institutional
innovation and meeting ground that his writings would support.
Just to
indicate briefly: I think he would pick forecasting as a critical
focus for this dialogue. He was interested in the development
of the methodology and - like "international communications"
- it is a wide-ranging entrČe and seems devoid of a partisan
agenda. And he would surely have credibility, as he was one
of the only social scientists to forecast the breakup of the
Soviet Union and the resurgence of nationality- and ethnicity-based
conflicts as part of this extraordinary development.(31)
Concerning
specific forecasting: Ithiel almost surely would be interested
in ethnicity-based conflicts, since he had been involved in
the programs of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of
America to affirm, among minorities in the USSR and in Eastern
Europe, that their true, natural, and healthiest identity was
their ethnic or national identity - i.e., and sought to encourage
the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as part
of this strategy. Having helped to turn the dial in one direction,
I think he would be especially engaged by the possibility of
communication technology that could turn the dial in the other
direction.
My guess,
too, is that he might be interested in the study of contact
nets and the remarkable growth of a cluster of global humanitarian
politics movements - environment, human rights (including women's
rights), and support for humanitarian interventions in Africa
and elsewhere - as an expression of new communication networks
and organizational patterns.
IV.
Conclusion
My final
thought is that Ithiel did like to travel. And I suspect that
he would manage to be developing projects in Japan, which he
was beginning to know and admire greatly at the time of his
death. And Russia, since the political transition there is surely
one of the most interesting and consequential processes in world
politics and reality-based policy would be very helpful.
Bibliography
|
[The
MIT Library is the principal depository for Ithiel de
Sola Pool's papers, with secondary holdings at the University
of Chicago and in the Smithsonian. A complete bibliography
of Ithiel Pool's work is included in Etheredge (in press).]
|
Abelson,
Robert; |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola; Popkin, Samuel. Candidates, Issues,
and Strategies: A Computer Simulation
of the 1960 and 1964 Elections.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965. |
Bauer,
Raymond; |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola; Dexter, Lewis A. American Business
and Public Policy: The Politics of
Foreign Trade. New York: Atherton Press of Prentice-Hall,
1963. |
Etheredge,
Lloyd S., |
ed.
Politics in Wired Nations: Selected
Papers of Ithiel de Sola Pool
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, in press).
|
Kochen,
Manfred, |
ed.
The Small World: A Volume of
Recent Research Commemorating Ithiel
de Sola Pool, Stanley Milgram,
and Theodore Newcomb. Norwood, NJ: Ablex
Publishing Company, 1989. |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola; |
Inose,
H.; Takasaki, N.; Hurwitz, R. Communication Flows:
A Census in the United States
and Japan. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984.
|
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola. |
"Deterrence
as an influence process." In Theory
and Research on the Causes
of War, edited by Pruitt, Dean G.; Snyder, Richard
C., 189-196. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969.
|
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola. |
"Effects
of cross-national contact on national and international
images." In International Behavior:
A Social Psychological Analysis, edited
by Kelman, Herbert C., 106-129. NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1965. |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola. |
Forecasting
the Telephone: A Retrospective Technology
Assessment of the Telephone. Norwood,
NJ: Ablex Publishing Company, 1983. |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola; |
Schramm,
Wilbur; with others, eds. Handbook of Communication.
Chicago: IL: Rand McNally, 1973. See especially Pool's contributions,
"Communication in totalitarian societies," 462-511,
chapter 14 and "Public opinion," 779-835, chapter
25. |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola. |
"The
Kaiser, the Tsar, and the computer: Information processing
in a crisis." American Behavioral Scientist
8, no. 9 (May, 1965): 31-39. |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola; |
Shulman,
Irwin. "Newsmen's fantasies, audiences and newswriting."
Public Opinion Quarterly 23, no. 2 (Summer, 1959):
145-158. |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola. |
"Public
opinion and the control of armaments." In Arms
Control, Disarmament, and National
Security, edited by Brennan, Donald G., 333-346. NY:
George Braziller, 1961. [A shorter version appears in Daedalus
(Fall, 1960): 984-999.] |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola. |
"The
role of communication in the process of modernization and
technological change." 279-293 in Hoselitz, Bert F.
And Moore, Wilbert E., eds., Industrialization
and Society. Paris: UNESCO-Mouton, 1963. |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola. |
The
Social Impact of the Telephone.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977. |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola, |
ed.
Studies in Political Communication.
Public Opinion Quarterly: v. 20, no. 1 (Spring, 1956).
Entire issue. |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola. |
Technologies
of Freedom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1984. |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola. |
Technologies
Without Boundaries: On Telecommunications
in a Global Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1990. |
Pool,
Ithiel de Sola. |
"Trends
in content analysis today: A summary" in Ithiel de
Sola Pool, ed., Trends in Content Analysis;
papers. Chapter 7, 189-233. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois
Press, 1959. |
Speier,
Hans; |
Bruner,
Jerome; Carroll, Wallace; Lasswell, Harold D.; Lazarsfeld,
Paul; Shils, Edward; Pool, Ithiel de Sola. "A plan
of research in international communication." Condensation
of the Planning Committee Report,
Center for International Studies, MIT. World Politics
6, no. 3 (April, 1954): 358-377. |