1. Background:
The
way of life that distinguishes indigenous populations from one another and
the rest of Brazilian society is inexorably attached to the land they
inhabit. In some cases it is the particular tract of land that has been
inhabited by their ancestors that is of particular importance, in other
cases it is the nature of the land, the condition of the forest and its
natural resources that allow indigenous populations to define their distinct
cultures.
The
influx of NeoBrazilians into the Amazon River basin over the last century
has drastically reduced the amount of land held by the indigenous people.
Whether a product of accident or intention, enormous tracts of land that
were once the territory of indigenous people, usable as hunting grounds and
farmland and the source of all sustenance for the indigenous peoples, are
now the property of large corporations, wealthy landowners, small scale
farmers, speculators and the government. Needless to say, that for the
indigenous people who have lost these lands, their ability to support
themselves has been badly damaged by loss of territory. This loss of land,
coupled with the other side effects of NeoBrazilian expansion: epidemics,
alcoholism, acculturation, enslavement and genocide, have devastated both
the populations and cultures of the indigenous people of the Amazon.
Currently, there exists a legal process that permits the Native Amazonians
to obtain the land rights to the land that they inhabit. However, the laws,
the execution of them, and the enforcement of them are all flawed.
Built into the structure of Decree 1,775/96 is a clause permitting anybody
to challenge the ownership of demarcated lands. Should the challenge
prevail in court, a decision made by a single judge, the demarcation process
is halted and the indigenous people do not receive the legal rights to their
land. This often leads, in the end, to the claiming of their land by
another party, the governance of whom the inhabitants are required to bear.
As
the decisions regarding the validity of challenges to the demarcated lands
is dependant on a small group of individuals, corruption is not uncommon.
Often the challenging party is a large corporation, wishing to establish
plantations or hydroelectric facilities for example, that holds very real
power over the decision of the ruling court.
Even after land has been demarcated, it is very difficult to enforce the
property rights of the indigenous people. Encroachment by both large
corporations, farmers, loggers and miners has caused the deterioration of
demarcated lands throughout the Amazon. The nature of the Amazon, a remote
and difficult-to-penetrate forest, has made enforcement of land rights an
extremely difficult task for the government. In many cases, the natives
themselves have taken the responsibility of enforcing their land claims upon
themselves, resulting in inter-racial hostilities and unnecessary violence.
After assessing the situation, Project Amazonia recommends that Decree
1,775/96 be modified to ensure that the indigenous people of Brazil are
guaranteed a minimum quantity and quality of land upon which to live and
maintain their cultural uniqueness.
Figure 1: Amazonas Region
(courtesy of the National Indian Foundation of
Brazil (FUNAI))
2.
Problem:
a)
Legal challenges often lead to the denial of legitimate land claims
by indigenous people.
b)
The settlements of these legal challenges often do not provide fair
compensation to the indigenous people.
c)
Possession of adequate land is essential to the survival of the
indigenous peoples of Brazil as well as their unique cultures and pools of
knowledge.
d)
There exists no mechanism to ensure that the indigenous people of
Brazil retain legal claim to the area of land necessary for their survival
under the aforementioned legal challenges.
e)
Vast quantities of knowledge held by the indigenous population,
concerning the presence and extraction of natural resources within the
rainforest, remain inaccessible to the rest of Brazilian Society and the
World.
3.
Plan:
Project Amazonia recommends that the Brazilian Government:
1.
lock the minimum amount of land demarcated to Indigenous people at
its current value of 940,000 square kilometers,
2.
is held responsible to maintain the area and quality of demarcated
land held by individual indigenous groups should legal challenges be settled
against their favor,
3.
establish a government agency under the Ministry of Science and
Technology, with input from the Ministry of the Interior, FUNAI and the
National Institute of Industrial Property to regulates both the collection
of indigenous knowledge regarding the existence and application of natural
resources within the Amazon and the distribution of corresponding royalties
among the appropriate indigenous groups.
4. Procedure:
Phase 1
(Approximate Duration: 10 to 20 weeks): Establishing the Indigenous
Coexistence Project-eXperiment (ICP-X)
Infrastructure: The ICP-X will research and determine the
best choices for project infrastructure - such as the location of the ICP-X
Brazilian headquarters, human resources, communications systems, and
etcetera.
Public Relations: The ICP-X will initiate contact and
relations with the proper Brazilian government agencies, conservation
interest groups, and Brazilian public. Brazilian government contacts
include, but are not limited to: the National Indian Foundation of Brazil (FUNAI),
the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources
(IBAMA), the National Environment Council (CONAMA), the Amazon Region
Protected Areas (ARPA), the provincial government of Amazonas the System for
Vigilance of the Amazon Region (SIVAM), the
Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of the Interior, and
the President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Conservation interest group
contacts include, but are not limited to, the Amazon Conservation Team
(ACT), Greenpeace, Socioambiental, the Coordinating Committee of
Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA). Finally, public relations with
the Brazilian public will include focusing efforts on education programs
outside of school, publicity events (such as public meetings and/or
marches), and media outlets (such as radio, television, press releases, and
internet advertisements).
Phase
2: (Approximate Duration: 6 months to 1 year): ICP-X Implementation:
Legislative Recommendation: Though the
ICP-X has no direct governing or legislative power, it aims to effect change
through legislative recommendation. The ICP-X will present a proposal to
the government of Amazonas, outlined in the plan above and explained further
below:
ICP-X
recommends that the government of Amazonas amend Decree 1,775/96
in order to:
1.
Fix the minimum amount of land demarcated to Indigenous people at its
current value of 940,000 square kilometers. With this policy in place, any
demarcated land taken away from indigenous people must be replaced to them
in full at another location. Land distributed to replace successfully
challenged demarcated land will be paid for and provided by the provincial
government, creating a built-in “checks and balance” system on the courts.
2. Protect the quality of demarcated land held
by individual indigenous groups should legal challenges be settled against
their favor. This aspect of our plan ensures that successfully challenged
demarcated land is replaced by land of equal or greater value. Without this
clause, companies would legally challenge demarcated lands and merely
replace the land with land of far poorer quality, thus making a profit.
Furthermore, land used to replace challenged land must have a reasonable
portion of the land adjacent to previously demarcated land. This second
component ensures that the cultural and historical ties of an Indigenous
group are not wholly lost in the court challenge. This aspect of ICP-X
provides an effective bulwark for this type of corruption.
3. Establish the Agency for the Cooperative
Dissemination of Indigenous Knowledge (ACDIK), under the Ministry of Science
and Technology, with input from the Ministry of the Interior, FUNAI and the
National Institute of Industrial Property to regulates both the collection
of indigenous knowledge regarding the existence and application of natural
resources within the Amazon and the distribution of corresponding royalties
among the appropriate indigenous groups. This third and final aspect of our
proposal will protect the Indigenous people from bio-piracy while
simultaneously opening up a legitimate, legal market for the use of
internationally unknown biological information by establishing patent
regulations. These patent regulations will provide royalties to the
indigenous people for the information they sell to researchers.
Furthermore, information regarding the agricultural and sustainable living
practices of Indigenous people could prove invaluable to future preservation
efforts and land conservation.
The ICP-X will lobby the
government of Amazonas to educate legislators and advance conservationist
motives. Lobbyists will aid legislators in research compilation and
proposal construction.
The ICP-X public relations team
will continue and advance education and promotional programs to the
Brazilian government, the public interest groups, and to the people of
Brazil. Specific attention and emphasis will be placed on organizations and
people of the Amazonas province.
The ICP-X will conduct constant
analysis of progress toward proposal confirmation. Weekly reports, to be
publicly released, will document the success, drawbacks, and future of the
proposal. Every six (6) months, the ICP-X will publicly release its
“Semiannual Report on the Status of the Indigenous Cooperation Project-eXperiment”.
Phase 2 ends when the Decree is
amended in a manner in compliance with the above proposal, as determined by
the ICP-X.
Phase 3: (Approximate Duration: three (3)
years): ICP-X in Action
The
amended Decree 1,775/96 will take effect in all demarcation
disputes.
The ICP-X public relations team
will continue and advance education and promotional programs to the
Brazilian government, the public interest groups, and to the people of
Brazil. Specific attention and emphasis will be placed on organizations and
people of the Amazonas province.
The ICP-X will monitor court
rulings, giving particular attention to cases in which the challenge is
successful. Court analysts, working hand in hand with environmental
experts, will determine the legitimacy and quality of land granted to
Indigenous people. These analysts will produce weekly reports, entitled
“ICP-X: Recent Court Analysis”, outlining and explaining the court events of
the week. Furthermore, the analysts will compile the “ICP-X: Semiannual
Report on the Court System” to be publicly released.
The ACDIK will collaborate with
indigenous people and interested researchers as outlined by the proposal.
The ACDIK oversight team will
monitor and analyze the agreements and interactions between indigenous
people and researchers. Analysis will determine the legitimacy of
agreements, outlining the beneficial and detrimental effects to the
indigenous people. This team will further investigate any unwelcome
interaction with Indigenous groups that explicitly decline cooperation
offers.
The ACDIK oversight team will
produce weekly reports, entitled “ACDIK Recent Agreements and Experimental
Analysis”, outlining and explaining the notable events of the week.
Furthermore, the analysts will compile the “ACDIK: Semiannual Report on the
Cooperative Dissemination of Indigenous Knowledge” to be publicly
released.
Phase 3 is complete at the end
of three (3) years.
Phase 4: (Approximate Duration: 2 to 3 months):
Project Analysis
The ICP-X and ACDIK
will conduct project research to determine the overall success of the
program and the status of the problems stated above.
When these analysis teams are confident in their understanding of the status
of the ICP-X and ACDIK, they will publicly release the “Indigenous
Cooperation Project-Experiment Abstract and Analysis”, that outlines the
successes, failures, and projections for the project.
All aspects of Phase Three (3)
will continue, while the analysis teams compile their Phase 4
results.
Phase Four (4) ends upon release
of the Abstract.
Phase 5: (Approximate Duration: Indefinite):
Project Expansion:
Based upon the previously
released success or failure of ICP-X and ACDIK, the ICP will determine
whether to propose the ICP to the Brazilian national government, to adjust
or alter the ICP-X in an effort to adapt to new understanding of the
situation, or to abort the ICP and ICP-X completely. If the ICP determines,
as we predict, to expand the ICP to the national level, the procedure for
expansion will mirror the phase-based plan of the ICP-X, with modifications
made as the ICP determines necessary.
5. Funding and Administration: