Category P: Internal politics of the sides
Phase 2 Factors
| 2P-01 | "Non-status quo" side believes it can win through political means |
| 2P-02 | "Status quo" side believes it can win through political means |
| 2P-03 | Neither side believes it can win through political means |
| 2P-04 | Leaders of one side believe that limited violence will give weight and urgency to diplomatic efforts |
| 2P-05 | One side's policy increases in militancy |
| 2P-06 | Government policy vis-a-vis the other side encounters political opposition |
| 2P-07 | One side shifts from downgrading the dispute to exaggerating it |
| 2P-08 | One side hardens position and will negotiate only if its claim is accepted |
| 2P-09 | Opposition parties in one side urge firmer policy toward other side |
| 2P-10 | Opposition parties in one side want to achieve their ends more rapidly |
| 2P-11 | Opposition parties in one side urge use of force to achieve their goals |
| 2P-12 | One side believes that prompt action is needed to forestall more extreme action |
| 2P-13 | Authorities of one side are divided on whether to deal with the other side unyieldingly or moderately |
| 2P-14 | One side fears that yielding to the other side's demands will lead others to make similar demands |
| 2P-15 | Humanitarian motives make action seem urgent |
| 2P-16 | Domestic political situation of one side heightens public attention to the conflict |
| 2P-17 | Public opinion hardens against the other side |
| 2P-18 | "Status quo" side agrees to submit the dispute to a plebiscite |
| 2P-19 | "Non-status quo" side agrees to submit the dispute to a plebiscite |
| 2P-20 | Some clashes involve persons under neither side's control |
| 2P-21 | "Non-status quo" side has the experience and capacity to carry on hostilities |
| 2P-22 | "Non-status quo" side lacks the experience and capacity to carry on hostilities |
| 2P-23 | Individuals with personal stake in status quo are involved in inflammatory incidents |
| 2P-24 | "Non-status quo" side develops a strategy which was successful elsewhere |
| 2P-25 | "Status quo" side adopts a strategy which was successful elsewhere |
| 2P-26 | One side fears if planned action is reversed those involved will proceed without restraint |
| 2P-27 | "Status quo" side concerned over world opinion |
| 2P-28 | "Non-status quo" side concerned over world opinion |
| 2P-29 | Aid to one side portends its use as a base for political action in the region |
| 2P-30 | One side wishes to keep its role covert or indirect |
| 2P-31 | One side obtains a proxy force to carry out its policy |
| 2P-32 | Members of one side are agitated by political developments in other areas of the region |
| 2P-33 | "Status quo" side calculates that its action will be successful |
| 2P-34 | "Non-status quo" side calculates that its action will be successful |
| 2P-35 | For the first time political groups begin to emerge on one side |
| 2P-36 | Opposition parties in "status quo" side urge concession to "non-status quo" side's |
| 2P-37 | Focus is shifting from external and/or military to internal, civil concerns |
Copyright © 1999 Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Allen Moulton