MIT Industry Systems Study

 

Communications Satellite Constellations

 

Engineering Systems Learning Center (ESLC)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

 

Overview

Version 1.1, October 17, 2003

 

Unit 1

Technical Success and Economic Failure

 

Unit 2

Architectural Design Space Exploration

 

Unit 3

Impact of Technology Infusion and Policy Decisions

 

Unit 4

Real Options and Staged Deployment

 

 

Summary

 

In the early 1990's there was a considerable amount of enthusiasm about expanding opportunities in the global telecommunications market. Within that industry there were optimistic projections for mobile satellite services (MSS) in general and global satellite telephony in particular. The idea of having telephones that could operate wirelessly almost anywhere on Earth, without ever being "out of range", was revolutionary at that time. Early market research suggested a substantial market for low bandwidth voice and data transmission services for international business travelers, offshore oil rig workers and field geologists, among others. This led to the conception, design and launch of a number of communications satellite constellations such as Iridium (66 satellites) and Globalstar (48 satellites).

 

Each of these constellations broke new ground in terms of technologies such as handheld satellite terminals and intersatellite links, as well as bulk manufacturing, launch and simultaneous operations of large numbers of spacecraft. System design was conducted during 1991-1997 and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licensing of these systems occurred in 1995. The total capital investment ($5.7 billion for Iridium and $3.3 billion for Globalstar) was secured through a mix of partner companies, public offerings and debt financing.

 

After launch and initial checkout of the constellations, commercial service started in November 1998 (Iridium) and March 2000 (Globalstar). Very quickly it became apparent that the earlier market predictions had been overly optimistic and that the actual subscriber base was much smaller than originally expected. Only a small fraction of system capacity was used and, consequently, revenues were insufficient to generate a profit or to service debt payments. Iridium filed for bankruptcy protection in August 1999, Globalstar followed in February 2002. Both constellations continued to operate in 2003, with moderate success, in a post-bankruptcy mode. Ironically, the events in the aftermath of September 11, 2003 seem to have led to a sort of rebirth for these systems.

 

This industry systems study takes a holistic view of constellations of communications satellites as a prime example of complex engineering systems. In order to understand such systems one must jointly consider the technological, architectural, economic and policy aspects that ultimately determine system success and failure. The study uses a combination of readings, data files, computer simulations and assignments to explore the history, challenges and decision making in the context of satellite constellations. The pedagogy decomposes the subject into four units of increasing complexity and subtlety.

 

Our hope is that the lessons learned from Iridium and Globalstar will serve to better architect future space systems as well as other engineering systems that share similar characteristics: high technical and social complexity, large investment required, new technologies and paradigm shifts, multiple time scales and sources of uncertainty.

 

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Unit 1

Technical Success and Economic Failure

 

This unit takes us back to 1987, when the idea of global communication satellite constellations for mobile users was first conceived. The summary of unit 1 recounts the history of Iridium and Globalstar from 1987 to 2002. The technical case discusses the technical foundations of satellite constellations: space and ground segment architecture, spot beams, multiple access and intersatellite links. The business case includes market forecasting, lifecycle cost analysis, financing and pricing strategies. Various articles serve as optional background reading material. The fundamental question addressed is: "How can it be that these complex engineering systems were so successful technically, but ultimately ended up as business failures?"

 

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Unit 2

Architectural Design Space Exploration

 

When designing complex systems, like satellite constellations, particular attention must be paid to the chosen architecture. Each of the systems that were actually built (Iridium, Globalstar) each represent one of dozens of architectures and thousands of potential designs that could have been chosen. This unit therefore introduces the notion of design space exploration. A computer simulation captures the important elements of the satellite constellation design problem. In this process high level design decisions such as the orbital altitude of the constellation or the transmitter power aboard the satellites are mapped to system performance, lifecycle cost and capacity. Iridium and Globalstar are used to benchmark the simulation. Those architectures that are non-dominated and approximate the Pareto frontier are of particular interest.

 

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Unit 3

Impact of Technology Infusion and Policy Decisions

 

In real life, system designers and architects have to make a number of difficult decisions and also cope with the consequences of decisions that are made by others. An example of the first kind is the incorporation of new technologies in

complex systems like satellite constellations. The effects of technology infusion are quantitatively modeled by their impact on the design space and the Pareto architectures in particular. Examples of technologies are large scale deployable reflectors or the use of optical intersatellite links. Policy decisions are an example of exogenous inputs that generally lie outside the sphere of influence of system designers. The effect of policy decisions, such as technology export or launch vehicle selection restrictions can also be captured in a similar fashion.

 

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Unit 4

Real Options and Staged Deployment

 

One of the lessons learned from Iridium and Globalstar is that market uncertainty must be considered during conceptual design. Rather than designing such systems for a fixed capacity one should consider a "staged deployment" approach. By embedding real options in the design (e.g. carry extra propellant for maneuvering) one gives managers the flexibility to grow system capacity in stages if market demand warrants it. This unit shows how demand uncertainty can be modeled and how Real Options Analysis can be used to identify system evolution

paths that can reduce economic risks of deploying large capital intensive systems. Staged deployment of satellite constellations will also require some amount of on-orbit reconfiguration. This approach marks a significant departure from traditional engineering practice and is also applicable to other types of engineering systems.

 

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Disclaimer Statement: The material in this industry systems study was created for educational purposes only. In no way do the statements made in this study express official positions of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The material may not be used for any purpose other than classroom or distance learning instruction. Copyright © 2003 M.I.T.- Engineering Systems Learning Center.

 

Author Information: Prof. Olivier de Weck (deweck@mit.edu), Room 33-410, Prof. Richard de Neufville (ardent@mit.edu) , Room E40-245,  Darren Chang (darrenz@mit.edu) , Mathieu Chaize (chaize@mit.edu), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA