Itai Ashlagi
I am an Assistant Professor of Operations Management in MIT Sloan
School Management affiliated with the ORC.
I was a post-doc fellow at Harvard Business School, advised by Alvin E. Roth.
Before that I was a graduate student at the Technion, advised by Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz.
I am a recipient of the NSF CAREER award and a Franz Edelman
finalist.
Research
interests:
I’m interested in market and mechanism design, game theory and matching.
Students
I
also work with Vahideh Manshadi who
is a Post-doc at MIT.
Working papers
Unbalanced random matching markets: the
stark effect of competition, with Yash Kanoria and Jacob D. Leshno
(extended abstract in EC 13). Blogged about here
and here.
A dynamic model of barter exchange,
with Ross Anderson, David Gamarnik and Yash Kanoria.
Optimal allocation without money:
an engineering approach, with Peng
Shi (extended abstract in EC 14), Minor revision at Management
Science.
Kidney
exchange in dynamic sparse heterogeneous pools, with Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi (extended abstract in
EC 13), R&R at Management Science.
The
need for (long) chains in kidney exchange, with David Gamarnik, Michael
A. Rees and Alvin
E. Roth, R&R at Operations Research.
Ascending unit demand auctions with budget limits with Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim. Technical
report.
Published and forthcoming papers
Improving
community cohesion in school choice via correlated-lottery implementation,
with Peng Shi. forthcoming in Operations
Research.
Stability
in large matching markets with complementarities, with Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim, forthcoming in
Operations Research (extended abstract in EC 11).
Free riding and participation
in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange, with Alvin E. Roth,
forthcoming in Theoretical Economics. Covered in TheMarker (Haaretz), (extended abstract
appears in EC 11).
Mix
and match with Felix
Fischer, Ian
A. Kash and Ariel D. Procaccia,
forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, (extended
abstract in EC 10).
New challenges in multi-hospital kidney exchange, with Alvin E. Roth, American Economic Review (P&P), 102(3), 354-359, 2012.
An
optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms, with Shahar Dobzinski and Ron Lavi, Mathematics of
Operations Research, 37(2),
244-258, 2012.
Winner of the outstanding paper award of EC 09.
Nonsimultaneous
chains and dominos in kidney paired donation – revisited with Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael
A. Rees, American Journal of Transplantation, 11(5), 984-994,
2011. Covered in Nature
Reviews.
Nead chains in
transplantation with Duncan
S. Gilchrist, Alvin
E. Roth and Michael
A. Rees, American Journal of Transplantation, December, 11,
2780-2781, 2011.
Manipulability in matching markets:
conflict and coincidence of interests, with Flip Klijn, Social
Choice and Welfare, 39(1), 23-33, 2012.
A noncooperative
support for equal division in estate division, with Emin Karagozoglu and Bettina Klaus, Mathematics of Social
Sciences, 63(3), 228-233,
2012.
Characterizing
Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity with Shigehiro Serizawa, Social
Choice and Welfare, 28(3),
531-542, 2012.
Simultaneous
ad auctions with Dov
Monderer and Moshe
Tennenholtz. Mathematics of Operations Research, 36(1),
1-13, 2011.
Monotonicity
and implementability with Mark
Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim
and Dov Monderer, Econometrica,
78(5), 1749-1772, 2010. Supplementary material.
Position
auctions with budgets: existence and uniqueness with Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim, Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz, B.E.
journal of Theoretical Economics – Advances, forthcoming.
Mediators in
position auctions with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Games
and Economic Behavior, 67(1), 2009, (extended abstract in EC 07). slides
Two-terminal
routing games with unknown active
players with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz, Artificial
Intelligence Journal, 173(15), 1441-1455, 2009.
On the value of
correlation with Dov
Monderer and Moshe
Tennenholtz, Journal of Artificial Intelligence, 33, 575-613,
2008, (extended abstract appears in
UAI 05).
Papers in refereed conference
proceedings (not
appearing above)
K-NCC:
stability against group deviations in non-cooperative computation with
Andrey Klinger and Moshe
Tennenholtz (WINE 07).
Learning equilibrium
in resource selection games with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz
(AAAI 07).
Routing
games with an unknown set of active players with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz
(AAMAS 07).
Robust
learning equilibrium with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz
(UAI 06).
Resource
selection games with unknown number of players with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz (A
shorter version appears in AAMAS 06).
Software:
Kidney
exchange source code. Instructions for how to compile can be found here. An older version in c# can be found here (both cycles and chains)
which
also generates patient-donor pairs as well as compatibility matrices. The
software finds an allocation that maximizes the number of transplants using
cycles
and
chains each of a different bounded length. CPLEX is needed to use.
Contact Information:
Itai
Ashlagi
E62-577,
Sloan
School of Management, MIT
e-mail:
iashlagi [at] mit [dot] edu