Information Source: Tanzania: Country Assessment Report.
The World Bank, AFTU 1 & 2. January 2002.

Context Summary

Tanzania is approximately 945,100 sq. km. with a population of approximately 31 million, at a density of 32 persons per square kilometer. Agriculture accounts for 60 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), followed by services (26 percent) and industry (15 percent). It has a GDP per capita of approximately US$220 (1997).

Its diverse habitats and climate have enabled Tanzania to build a successful tourist industry around its wildlife.

25 percent live in urban areas growing at over 6 percent per annum, around twice the national rate of population growth. There are ten major towns with populations of over 150,000 with the major city and port, Dar es Salaam, having a population of approximately three million.

Tanzania’s rural-to-urban migration is a result of the decline of international primary commodity prices (mainly from coffee and sisal) in the 1970s and 1980s and other disincentives to national farmers that helped push rural producers to the towns in search of employment.

Dar es Salaam is seven times the size of the next largest city, Mwanza, and is growing at 8% per annum. It is estimated that about 70 percent of Dar es Salaam’s population live in poor, unplanned settlements, characterized by lack of basic infrastructure and ever-increasing poverty. It has been estimated that 50 percent of the informal settlement population lives on an average income of about US$1 per day.

In the 1960s, slum clearance was the common approach, with high-standard buildings developed on the cleared sites. The policy was implemented through the National Housing Corporation, but by the end of the 1960s it was abandoned due to high economic and social costs, and with negligible additions to the housing stock.

Until the late 1980s, sites and services and squatter upgrading projects formed the national strategy, with the World Bank initially supporting these projects. However, the World Bank ceased support after its second project because of poor performance.

In 1992, UNCHS (Habitat) introduced the 'Environmental Planning and Management' approach, and the Hanna Nassif Community-Based Upgrading Project was initiated through the 'Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project' (SDP), with support from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Ford Foundation. Subsequently the SDP collaborated with the World Bank on the preparation of further upgrading programs. However, delays resulted in a recasting of the Community Infrastructure Program (CIP) and ultimately only two communities were upgraded.

Early projects tried to address housing and housing related issues for the urban poor following a largely multi-sectorial and participatory approach, while the Hanna Nassif Upgrading Program focused mainly on drainage. Recent projects continued with the multi-sectorial approach.

Lessons from Recent Projects - Summary

Key lessons from Hanna Nassif Community Based Upgrading Project - Phase 1

• Technical aspects, particularly the comprehension of engineering design, were not adequately addressed at the beginning of the project.
• Community Development Committees (CDC) were over-emphasized. This created a sense of being able to deliver technical works that were above its capabilities and experiences.
• Participation of the Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC) through secondment of staff, particularly the town planners, was erratic. Staff members frequently abandoned their seconded positions, delaying the implementation.
• Community mobilization and participation is a long process, and there is a need to give adequate time to address different community issues.
• Residents of this area had been mobilized for earlier activities that never took place (early World Bank project) and were skeptical about the whole process.
• Previously the government had been the main provider of services and it took time for community members to see their new role.
• Cost contribution for priority infrastructure needs, as well as for operation and maintenance responsibilities; should be agreed with participating CBOs from the outset of the project. This is necessary to establish a demand-driven program to ensure a sense of commitment and ownership but also to overcome distrust and prevent donor dependency.
• Within the community leadership, there existed a division of opposing groups, the ‘Wasomi’ (the educated) who thought that the CDC should be composed of the educated people and the ‘Wasiosoma’ (the non-educated) who constitute the majority of the current CDC. The Wasiosoma promoted participation, while the Wasomi were against.
• Transparency is critical. Regular reporting on the community fund is crucial to win community trust and basic for the realization of participation and willingness to contribute.

Key lessons from Hanna Nassif - Phase 2

• More balance between software and hardware costs is required for more efficient and equitable use of a scarce budget.
• Cognizance must be taken of the “network” nature of most infrastructure if construction efficiency is required and “interface” problems are to be avoided.
• Lack of emphasis on planning and construction management planning resulted in the project being extended by six months and problems occurred with payment of the supervision consultants.
• Community contracting groups should be encouraged. However, expecting community labor to work at lower than normal construction rates (already low) may be problematic.
• In large urban communities the collection of funds should be through existing collection structures.
• Credit schemes do stimulate local business, raise awareness, and enable CBO financial sustainability.
• Labor-based methods can be cost effective and have wider social and economic benefits than private contracting. However, the type of work (network or stand-alone), the higher “software” costs (e.g. for construction management and supervision) and the longer than normal construction times should also be considered.

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