Written
by Adam
Talsma
Seeing the Future
It
is time that the city of New
Orleans
plans for the future and not simply the next decade. If Hurricane
Katrina
taught us anything it was that planning for the future right now is
paramount
for the safety of future generations. Following
the USACE planning strategy, we chose to plan
for 100 years
into the future. It is vital that we, the city planners, learn
from past
mistakes and also take into account 100 year predictions for sea level
rise and
subsidence. The 100 year estimates for sea level rise due to
global
warming and subsidence due to oil drilling, oxidation of organic soil,
and
urban development gives us an estimate of what exactly we must plan for. With this information, the class agreed that
for safety reasons, New
Orleans
future should involve a smaller city that can be cost-effective yet
also provide
for a safe hurricane and flood protection system.
New Orleans hurricane
history clearly shows that the magnitude of hurricanes has steadily
increased
over time. In the New Orleans Hurricane of 1915, 23 people were
killed
and $239 million - in 2005 US dollars - was spent on damages.
Hurricane
Betsy struck in 1956 killing 28 and costing $250 million, also in 2005
US
dollars. Then in 1969 Camille claimed 259 lives and accumulated
costs of
over $9 billion (2005 US dollars). Hurricane Katrina and Rita
caused 2000
casualties and is expected to cost $105 billion (LAGIC, 2006). The history extrapolates towards a bleak
history for New Orleans.
The effects of these increasingly large hurricanes cannot be
underestimated.
Unfortunately,
meteorologists are predicting even worse conditions in the
future. Due to
global warming the sea level is expected to rise at a mean level of
½ meter
over the next century (IPCC, 2001). The
exact amount will depend on the amount of carbon dioxide emissions
between now
and then. In addition, the region has an
average subsidence rate of 5 mm/year, which then means that after sea
level
rise and subsidence are taken into account, in 100 years the land of New Orleans
is predicted to be 1 meter lower relative to the water (Burkett).
In an
attempt to visualize this, the data was entered into a GIS mapping
program. The result was startling! The entire city of New Orleans was several feet underwater, and only
a narrow
strip of land hugging the bank of the Mississippi
River
remained visible at all above the water.
It was very clear that a city so far under sea level
could not depend on
taller levees and more effective pumps because the risk involved was
simply too
great. If, in 100 years from now, the levees were to breach
during a
storm surge, New Orleans
would be completely inundated. Hurricane Katrina’s storm surges
were as
much as 16 feet in on the coast of
Lake
Borgne (LAGIC). If a storm of this same
magnitude were to hit New Orleans
in 100 years the levees would not only have to be completely
structurally sound
but also built to over 22 feet. The
problem is that the current levees are as low as 17 ft (Mayer, 2005)
If
any section was to give out at any time, thousands of lives would be
lost, and
any citizens who were able to evacuate would have to start over from
the
beginning once again. Breeched levees during Katrina affected at
least
80% of New Orleans has already cost the
US
government
over $75 billion dollars (Times interactive map). If predicted
levels of
subsidence and sea level rise over 100 years are to be trusted, a
breeched
levee during a storm similar to Katrina would flood nearly 100% of the
city and
accordingly cost over $93 Billion dollars. Furthermore, total
devastation
would mean the loss of priceless historic sites vital to not only
American
tourism but also to the history of the United States.
Katrina and Rita provide New Orleans city
planners with a chance to plan for a
better future by using the destruction already caused by Katrina to its
advantage. If the city’s rich culture and history is going to be
preserved
past another 100 years, the city cannot simply continue to build on
sinking
ground while putting their faith in a complex levee system that has a
record of
past failures and a limited budget. In fact, the Flood Risk
Education
Alliance (FREA) emphasizes the importance of New Orleans communities realizing
that levees
in general have a history of certain limitations including complicated
maintenance requirements which become more challenging with age, risk
of
overtopping, and failure to provide the level of protection for which
they were
designed. City planners cannot allow over 437,000 people to live
in an area
with such a high risk (Census 2005). This was the same mistake
made by
city officials before Katrina struck, and similarly before Hurricanes
Camille
and Betsy.
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Evaluation of Possible
Alternatives
Evaluation
of Possible Alternatives
A new plan is needed; one that heads down a
path that will
guarantee the safety of New
Orleans
residents 100 years down the road. This is not exactly in line
with the
plan currently being implemented by the Army Corps of Engineers.
There
proposal provides for a future dependent on an even more complex system
of even
higher levees and more efficient pumps and canal structures.
While these
proposals are rather convincing, nothing is mentioned about solving the
problem
of rising sea level nor is subsidence even addressed seriously.
Very
little time was dedicated to explaining why future effects of
subsidence and
global warming were discussed so little. Therefore, since there
plan
avoided these important issues, we agree that there was value in
formulating a
proposal that was independent of any actions or plans carried out by
the Army
Corps after Katrina hit.
As a class, therefore we have
carefully considered and estimated pros
and cons for the entire spectrum of possibilities we could think of
that might
accomplish our goal. We attempted to consider everything –
rebuilding and
improving the city to abandoning the city as a residential sector and
spreading
the city’s economy over Baton Rouge and
the Port
of South Louisiana.
Our third option
was to preserve only part of the city by stripping it of its suburbs
and providing for a shift in its transportation economy to the nearby Port of South Louisiana.
Rebuilding
and improving the entire city would be the plan that most closely
parallels the
path New Orleans
is currently following. This plan
basically involves not only repairing the city but also attempting to
improve
so that it withstands a hurricane occurring between now and 100 years. Although their explanation of a “100 year
elevation” has not been found, the USACE claims to be building a system
capable
of withstanding this hurricane that will cost over $6 billion in
contract costs
(Schwartz, 2006). The devastated areas
of the city would have to be rebuilt. In
addition, the residents would have to be convinced that their city was
safe to
invest their property. This plan could
also include provisions for filling in and developing the marshes
currently
sparsely populatied but yet within the levees system, such as parts of
St.
Bernard Parish
We
also shied away from completely abandoning the city, because this would
mean
turning our backs on one of the top tourist cities in the nation.
This
would be a huge loss to Louisiana’s
economy since last year tourism brought in $5 Billion (Forbes).
In fact
tourism, prior to Katrina and Rita, tourism was the fastest growing
part of New Orleans
economy, accounting
for 14% of the city’s economy (Career Journal, 2005). Although it
is
possible to relocate major port activity and other transportation
methods to
safer ground farther up the river, tourism lacks that portability.
Additionally if the city was to be closed off from rebuilding
entirely,
the entire city would have to be taken apart and salvaged as much as
possible
for reuse elsewhere. The costs for this are difficult to quantify
with
much accuracy. To simply put it into perspective, however,
Katrina
created 2 Billion cubic meters of debris in total (Hundley,
2005). The
Army Corps estimates that removal of each cubic meter costs between $10
and
$20. Using this data, cleaning up Katrina’s mess in New Orleans
could be as much as $40 Billion
dollars (USACE). This simply goes to show that the cost of
relocating the
entire city will be a very costly figure. Finally, if the
government were
to zone off New Orleans,
then the costs of compensation for everybody would be enormous.
The
government would have to put that land to a very profitable use in
order for it
to be possible from an economical standpoint.
Therefore,
after careful debate and comparison between these three
options, we agreed that it was in the city’s best interests to rebuild
only
certain parts while zoning off the rest for other uses. Our final
proposal is a conglomeration of the best ideas discussed and provides
for all
the major issues we decided were most important while at the same time
is
rooted in its core objective: rebuilding a safe New Orleans. Because of safety
reasons,
the residential suburbs of New
Orleans
will be zoned off by the government for various uses including museums,
ecological parks and environmental research. Since the city will
no
longer be capable of sustaining major port functions, the international
Port of New Orleans
will be moved up the river to the Port
of South Louisiana and Baton Rouge.
Ships
will have to travel slightly father, but if the companies are given
adequate
incentive, the workers and their families will follow. With
careful city
planning right now, the areas around the Port of South
Louisiana
can be developed into sustainable urban land. The trains that
currently
transport goods to the Midwest states will be rerouted to Baton Rouge and the Port of South
Louisiana.
Although both these areas are capable of absorbing extra residential
growth Baton Rouge appears to offer a
better transition for
residents of New Orleans because many residents of
New Orleans
have already moved there. In addition our
class has come up with a plan for aiding the residents in finding new
homes and
jobs. This committee is fittingly called
the Citizens Relocation Committee (CRC).
For
economical reasons, the city of New Orleans will be restructured
around tourism.
Important buildings must be kept intact and city building codes must
restrict
the modernization of various parts of the city. If there are
certain
buildings that were partly destroyed but still standing, there
preservation
would make excellent additions to their collection of interesting
architecture. In this way the city will have another famous piece
of
history to lure tourists. A memorial could be set up as an
addition to a
museum that allowed visitors to relive Hurricane Katrina through
interactive
exhibits, pictures, and possibly an Imax experience. This will
only make
the tourists excited about visiting these areas in person.
In
order to determine which areas to not rebuild, we chose certain
criteria to
base our decisions on. Since it was the future we were planning
for, we
chose to focus on predicted subsidence rates, current elevations,
severity of
damage done by Katrina, and cultural significance. A compilation
of data
on these criteria can be found here. The reason that only certain
criteria
is discussed with reference to the our final proposal, is because a few
of them
are more useful for deciding on how best to rebuild the city given a
year of
intense rebuilding has already gone by. Areas with subsidence
rates above
4 mm/year, an elevation of at least .5 ft below sea level, and that
sustained
over 50% major damage from Katrina were singled out as prime candidates
for
zoning off. The districts that qualified were: Lakeview,
Gentilly, New
Orleans East, Village de L’est, Venetian Isles, Mid City, Bywater, the
Lower
Ninth Ward, northern portions of Jefferson, and Plaquemines.
Several of
these were removed from this severance list later for specific
reasons.
The Lower Ninth Ward was removed because the damage done there was due
to
engineering failures in the levee system along the East bank of the Industrial Canal. Moreover, it is 1
foot
above sea level, not to mention that Holy Cross has been designated as
a
National Historic Site (NOLANRP). (The Lower Ninth Ward discussed
in
greater depth later on.) Mid City and Bywater were also removed
because
they were flooded as a result of breeches on the West side of the Industrial Canal. By downsizing, more
money
can go towards installing canal closures at the mouth of the Industrial Canal,
the Intercoastal Waterway that will keep the water levels from surging
and
overtopping the levees along the Industrial Canal.
Also, very few
houses have been sold and little demolition has occurred in all three
of these
districts (Times Picayune Interactive map). In the end, the
districts
that lent themselves most to further deconstruction rather than
reconstruction
were Lakeview, Gentilly, New Orleans East, Village D’Lest, Venetian
Isles, northern
portions of Jefferson, and Plaquemines Parish. Therefore the
districts we
decided to keep and rebuild after Katrina were Uptown, Old Carrollton,
Central
Business District, Broadmoor, the French Quarter, Mid City, Bywaters,
southern
portions of Jefferson and the Lower Ninth Ward.
Although our focus was on Orleans
Parish, this study was also applied to
a few neighboring parishes: St. Bernard, Jefferson, and
Plaquemines. For
Jefferson, it was determined that because of average subsidence rates
of over 6
mm/year and elevation around 3 feet below sea
level (Greater New Orleans), the parts farther North than Interstate 10
should
not be rebuilt. However, if areas right along the river were
properly
protected, then these would also be eligible for rebuilding rather than
zoning
off for uses other than residential. According to data collected
in the
EDC, the cost of rebuilding the levees in Plaquemines ($1125 million)
relative
to its population (26,765) is 11 times less cost-effective than the
$1885
million levees built to protect Orleans Parish’s population of 484,674
residents. (The population figure is from the Census 2000 and has since
gone
down closer to an estimated 437,186 by the Census 2005). This
area is
altogether too exposed to any category of hurricane that rebuilding
Plaquemines
would be illogical. The West Bank including Algiers was affected by the
hurricane.
However with proper protection both sides of the river can be
maintained and
protected for the future. Elevation on this side of the river is
lower
than the average level of New Orleans
however it
is not a determining factor because it is not located along a major
body of
water other than the Mississippi
that is affected by storm surges. As a result the West Bank is inexpensive to protect relative to
the other districts
along the lakes. Therefore, future studies should look into
filling in
and providing flood protection to the West Bank
of Jefferson Parish. As for St. Bernard, It has the similar
statistics as Jefferson but with less
developed wetlands
protecting it and sustained more damage. Therefore, our Vision
proposes
temporarily zoning off all of St. Bernard Parish. Before any
rebuilding
in this area begins, it is very important that the land is deemed safe
for 100
years into the future. Further consideration can be given towards
filling
in more land along the river for development. For these reasons,
the
Vision should provide for the rebuilding of the West
Bank,
Jefferson Parish under Interstate 10, and after it has been properly
filled and
protected, St. Bernard Parish should be rebuilt inside of its inner
levees. In addition, further consideration should be given
towards
filling in and developing the West Bank
of
Jefferson Parish along the river. Plaquemines Parish should be
abandoned
completely and its levees moved to protect the West
Bank,
and St. Bernard Parish.
Even though the districts we are keeping do not have as bad subsidence
rates, they still are sinking at an average rate of 5 mm/yr (Burkett). Since some of these neighborhoods have
already been destroyed by Katrina, our plan will require that these be
filled
in with of compacted dirt to acceptable FEMA standards before
rebuilding begins.
Accordingly, financial aid could be offered to encourage any future
private
rebuilding projects to first fill in the land. Regulations such
as this
will only provide for an even better future. Without a doubt, a
strategy
such as this would be a perfect addition to the rebuilding plan of the
neighborhoods within The Lower Ninth Ward.
Hurricane and Flood
Protection
According to
an article released soon after
Katrina, most of the city and state officials agreed that it was
mandatory for
flood protection levels to be increased to Category 5. In that
same article,
it was estimated that upgrading New Orleans levees to category 5
would cost between $10
billion and $20 billion (Steinhauer, 2005). As mentioned earlier,
the Flood
Risk Education Alliance (FREA) explains that older levees are more
expensive to
maintain and more likely to fail. Fittingly, these were the very
reasons
cited by the Army Corps as the main causes for levee
failure.
In
contrast, we propose building a 15 foot earthen levee that extends from
the
IHNC on the east to the Jefferson West levee in the west.
Our plan proposes leaving the estimated 57
miles of earthen levees and 9 miles of floodwalls protecting New
Orleans East,
Village de L’est, and Venetian Isles (IPET) and also the levees along
Jefferson, Lakeview, and Gentilly. Instead of draining FEMA’s
budget on
vast levees that are costly to maintain, the Vision allows the
government to
focus on protecting a much smaller area. The
best path this levee should follow requires on-site
research;
however by inspection of various maps including GIS and Google Earth
our best
proposal was that it be constructed on the North side of Interstate
10.
The levee will extend less than 20 miles along the free way and
everything
north of it will have to be relocated. Emergency pump systems
will be moved
to these levees and regular pumps will still be used to send water out
of
historical New Orleans to Lake
Pontchartrain and Lake
Borgne
through canals already in
place. St. Bernard Parish must wait until it is ready for
residents to
move in as soon as possible. The Vision plans to temporarily zone off
the Lower
Ninth Ward until it is filled in above sea level and the levees already
around
the land closest to the river are built up to 15 feet. For now we
will
only be rebuilding the levees up till Violet
Canal, which connects
the Mississippi to Lake Borgne. The levee
will be continued along Violet
Canal till it meets with
the Mississippi River and secures the
land our plan proposes rebuilt. Only
then will the entire area be opened up for development.
The
levees we propose putting in will create multiple layers of defense for
the
historic portions of New
Orleans. Not only
will the city be guaranteed safe
against hurricanes and floods for ten years, but, with the proper
maintenance,
it will be safe for at least 100 years. It is also very important
that
the levees constructed are made from rolled clay rather than hydraulic
filled
sand and silt because the rolled clay levees held up much better during
Katrina
and Rita (IPET). The levees surrounding
New Orleans East, Village D L’est, and Venetian Isles will also remain
intact
so that they can help protect those areas from being lost to the rising
sea
level.
Pump stations also need to be modernized. Some of the city
drainage pumps were installed in the 1960’s and consequently are
lacking
significant advances in technology (IPET). For example, pumps
throughout
the city need to be built with alternate sources of power supply so
that if the
city’s electricity is down during a storm, the pumps can draw from this
energy
source. As of right now, all the pumps run on either diesel or
electricity and none of them have alternate power sources. We
propose
incorporating solar panels for storing energy for emergency use.
In order
to protect these panels from heavy wind damage, it would not be best to
put
them on the roof, they should. Even though the city will be
downsized it
is still important that the pumps already built remain in their present
locations so that water drainage from the city can be let out into
Pontchartrain
and Lake
Borgne.
In addition, new pumps
equipped with alternate energy sources should be installed along the
levees
constructed along Interstate 10 in case of emergencies related to
flooding
and/or heavy precipitation. A necessary addition would be the
installation of large sluice gates at every place
where the city’s canals cut through the new levees. These gates
would be
equipped with pumps on either side for sending water over the levees
and into
the canal on the other side.
Other
considerations to consider include models and calculations made for the
new
levees. Since our plan provides for basically leaving the
strong
levees and pump systems along Lake Pontchartrain
as they were Pre-Katrina, the new levees will be more for future
considerations,
and guaranteed safety in case of emergencies. One change that the
Vision
would have made to Lakeview’s protection system is to transplant the
pumps that
were at the southern ends of the canals up to the mouth of the canal,
right on
the levee. Another proposal included in the Vision is to put
either
sluice gates or permanent canal closures equipped with pumps at the
ends of
each of the canals flowing into either Lake
Borgne or Lake Pontchartrain. Therefore, it would be
unnecessary to build neither
the current levee system nor the Vision system to heights capable of
withstanding a strong category 5 hurricane with future sea level rise
and
subsidence predictions taken into account. Armoring at least the
back
side would be a good future project, although it is unlikely that it
would
serve much of a purpose until then. However, it is paramount that
the
relocated levees are built so that future generations can confidently
add to
them as necessary if they were to need to rely on them as primary flood
protection.
A
major benefit of rebuilding the levees is that residents of the city
will feel
much more secure. Not only will there be multiple lines of
defense, but
the new levees will be able to be guaranteed by its builders.
This will
be a refreshing change from the ancient, patchwork levees that
surrounded New Orleans
before
Katrina. By implementing this plan, the residents of New Orleans will
feel safe and home insurance
rates will plummet, leading towards more economic living conditions.
In
addition to levees, approximately $10.6 billion has been spent
rebuilding homes
(FEMA 2006). Although relocating will be very expensive, it will
be a
short term cost that will prove to be much cheaper in the long run than
the
plan currently being carried out in New Orleans. The federal
government will be able to
protect the smaller city with much less, because the savings in lesser
maintenance and repair costs will add up over the years.
Zoning
off all these districts would really have worked had it been done right
after
Katrina, because according to the Times Picayune Interactive Map.
These
same areas also have reported selling the most houses and have been
given the
most demolition permits. This shows that if the government had
enforced
zoning laws from the beginning, the people in these areas would have
responded
favorably and many of them would have agreed to sell their land to the
government and start up a new life elsewhere. It is possible that
the
residents of the areas impacted most were convinced that living nearby
downtown New Orleans
was
not worth the risk.
Slimming a
city’s population by geography inevitably
alters demographic and household income diversity, creating severe
effects to a city’s economy. The
areas of safer geography happen to belong to a wealthier
subpopulation of
New Orleans
than the areas designated for land reuse. Compensation for the
discrepancy can
be achieved in many ways: government
subsidized housing, mixed-income residential communities, and
dedicating
massively damaged areas such as the Lower Ninth Ward to
residential development. Government subsidized housing will give
returning and
relocating citizens the opportunity to return to a safer part of
the city. Integrated
housing complexes will include commercial attractions in addition
to spacious, structurally
sound apartments offered at affordable rates.
To
read more about government subsidized housing, please
see Team 7’s
site. More prevalent than government subsidized housing
will be
mixed- income housing. For a city so split by social differences,
an integrated community will improve the average quality of
life.
Moreover, this will maintain an even economy for
New Orleans’ future.
In addition, the
lower ninth ward will be converted from a primarily low-income
neighborhood
to one more suitable to all classes. The extreme destruction to
the area
after hurricane Katrina leaves room for more thoughtful
redevelopment,
such as residential communities for those displaced by the heavily
zoned
surrounding neighborhoods.
If
the city and the federal government were no longer faced with the
various
difficulties involved with the protection of these areas, then more
money and
effort could be focused on protecting a more compact city. In
fact, once
the suburbs our cleared, they will also serve as a buffer for
protecting the
remaining sector of the city. Yet the
more historical parts of the city along the river will be protected. Additionally, it is important to note that
the more historic portions of the city are all located along the banks
of the Mississippi
which was
left mostly untouched by Hurricane Katrina. Therefore, these areas
are
located within the districts that are to be rebuilt. In
fact the
area along the river is about one foot above sea level and has lower
subsidence
rates than any where else in the city. It is also worth noting
that our
plan at least provides for the survival of New Orleans culture.
People would much rather have the heart of New Orleans live
on then
sacrifice it as a whole right away.
In
addition by not rebuilding these areas, we have turned dangerous
residential
areas into storm surge breakers that, if the first line of defense were
topped,
are capable of serving a similar purpose to that of the wetlands.
In the
case of a catastrophic Hurricane, this extra line of defense will
ensure that
the city will not be flooded from the outside.
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Considerations and
Conclusion
Although
historic New Orleans
will be preserved there certainly are important parts of the city that
will
have to be relocated. For example, The University of New Orleans
currently has its East campus located on the northeastern tip of
Gentilly. Or take the example of Six Flags New Orleans that is
located in
Village de L’est, the district with the highest subsidence rates of
Orleans
Parish. According to Six Flags homepage, they have already chosen
to
abandon their new location outside of New Orleans. These are just a couple
examples, but if the
Vision was to be implemented, many other buildings and businesses would
be
forced to relocate.
For
reasons such as relocation, enforcing such a plan will undoubtedly
encounter
significant opposition. If reasons are well publicized and the citizens
and
businesses realize that it is in their best interests to relocate as
soon as
possible, then this is a plan that can be carried through. Of course,
any
proposal in this case will be highly controversial because it depends
on what
the critic considers most important. The Vision was formed by
viewing the
situation with safety as the priority. Based on their methods
between
August 29, 2005 and today, the city and federal governments currently
appear to
be viewing the situation with economy as the priority. Hence, our
planning process produced a Vision very unique to that which is
currently
underway.
Until
a system for either defeating or significantly diminishing hurricanes
is
invented in the near future, it is important for the government to
realize that
in the long-term, the size of Pre-Katrina New Orleans cannot be
guaranteed
adequate protection. The government is not able nor has it
displayed
willingness to spend $10 to $20 billion dollars on a durable levee
system and
it might not be the best way to spend our nation’s tax dollars.
Katrina
and Rita have proved to everyone that if a city partially under sea
level and
surrounded by oceans and a river cannot guarantee 100% protection to
its
residents, a smaller city altogether is a necessity. It is time
to face
the reality of the scientific predictions and begin implementing a plan
to
downsize New Orleans
right now when major demolition costs have already been covered by
Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.
The
Vision is not simply an idea that our class came up with in a couple of
days. This is the result of a semester of research,
collaboration, and
decision making. Moreover, we are not the only ones who have
thought of
this. A report published in August of 2006 reiterates our plan by
agreeing that “The new
city
is certain to be smaller in size and population. A smaller size
will
make it easier to provide police, fire, and other essential services.”
(Waugh,
Smith, 2006).
After
inspecting the results produced by our EDC and evaluating the various
alternatives,
it was quite clear that Lakeview, Gentilly, New Orleans East, Village
de L’est,
and the Northern portion of Jefferson
should
not be rebuilt. A satisfactory boundary between zoned off areas
and land
to be rebuilt appears to be Interstate 10. In the long run,
downsizing
the size of New Orleans will be significantly cheaper than the option
currently
in place which is projected to spend around $6 billion on hurricane
protection
(IPET), and around $10.6 billion for private property losses (FEMA,
2006).
River portions of St. Bernard Parish will be considered for future
development,
and Plaquemines will be abandoned. The levees built to protect
Plaquemines,
New Orleans East, Venetian Isles, and Village de L’est will also remain
for now
in order to mitigate loss of coastal land to the sea.
The Vision provides a sustainable future for New
Orleans that can only be attained by learning from past
costly
mistakes and taking into account the environment considerations which
will
determine the historical city of New Orleans 100 years from now.
The Vision is an
interesting alternative that is worth seriously looking farther
into. Its
time the city planners and governments in charge of rebuilding New Orleans
examine the predicted rises in
subsidence rates and sea level. The destruction caused by Katrina
and
Rita gave them an opportunity to rethink their lofty economical plans
of
development. Unfortunately, that is an
quickly becoming less and less of an option. The Vision, however,
focuses
on building an improved Katrina from the wake of the most costly storm
to have
ever hit the United
States.
Using past trends as warning, future predictions as motivation and
current data
to make decisions we believe that this proposal is a step in the right
direction, a direction that New
Orleans must take before more costly mistakes
are
made.
